On Sat, Feb 11, 2012 at 12:32 AM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>wrote:
> Hi ACW, > > Thank you for the time and effort to write this up!!! > > On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote: > > Bruno has always said that COMP is a matter of theology (or religion), > that is, the provably unprovable, and I agree with this. However, let's try > and see why that is and why someone would take COMP as an assumption: > > - The main assumption of COMP is that you admit, at some level, a digital > substitution, and the stronger assumption that if you were to implement/run > such a Turing-emulable program, it would be conscious and you would have a > continuation in it. Isn't that a strong theological assumption? > > [SPK] > Yes, but it is the "substitution" of one configuration of "stuff" with > another such that the functionality (that allows for the > implementation/running of the Turing-emulable (Turing equivalence!)) > program to remain invariant. One thing interesting to point out about this > is that this substitution can be the replacement of completely different > kinds of stuff, like carbon based stuff with silicon based stuff and does > not require a continuous physical process of transformation in the sense of > smoothly morphism the carbon stuff into silicon stuff at some primitive > level. B/c of this it may seem to bypass the usual restrictions of physical > laws, but does it really? > What exactly is this "physical stuff" anyway? If we take a hint from > the latest ideas in theoretical physics it seems that the "stuff" of the > material world is more about properties that remain invariant under sets of > symmetry transformations and less and less about anything like "primitive" > substances. So in a sense, the physical world might be considered to be a > wide assortment of bundles of invariants therefore it seems to me that to > test COMP we need to see if those symmetry groups and invariants can be > derived from some proposed underlying logical structure. This is what I am > trying to do. I am really not arguing against COMP, I am arguing that COMP > is incomplete as a theory as it does not yet show how the appearance of > space, time and conservation laws emerges in a way that is invariant and > not primitive. I guess I have the temerity to play Einstein against Bruno's > Bohr. :-) OTOH, I am not arguing for any kind of return to naive realism or > that the physical world is the totality of existence. I do know that I am > just a curious amateur, so I welcome any critique that might help me learn. > > > I think it is, but at the same time, it has solid consequences and a > belief in it can be justified for a number of reasons: > a) Fading qualia thought experiment, which shows that consciousness is > utterly fickle if it doesn't follow a principle of functional / > organizational invariance. Most of our sense data tends to point that such > a principle makes sense. Avoiding it means consciousness does not > correspond to brain states and p. zombies. > > > Certainly! We need a precise explanation for psycho-physical > parallelism. My tentative explanation is that at our level a form of > dualism holds. A dualism quite unlike that of Descartes, since instead of > "separate substances", it is proposed that the logical and the physical are > two distinct aspect of reality that follow on equal yet anti-parallel > tracks. As Vaughan Pratt explains in his papers, the logical processes and > the physical processes have dynamics that have arrows that point in > opposite directions. Schematically and crudely we can show a quasi-category > theory diagram of this duality: > > ---- > X -----> Y -----> > | | > <----- A <------B <----- > > The vertical lines represent the Stone duality relation and the > horizontal arrow represent logical entailment and physical causation. The > chaining (or "*residuation*") rule is "X causes Y iff B necessitates A", > where X and A and duals and Y and B and duals. This duality prohibits > zombies and disembodied spirits. There is much more to this diagram as it > does not include the endomorphisms, homeomorphisms and other mappings and > objects that are involved in the full implementation of the *residuation*rule. > I just found a paper by Martin Wehr > www.dcs.ed.ac.uk/home/wehr/newpage/Papers/qc.ps.gz that elaborates on > Pratt's idea and explains *residuation* better! Here is the abstract: > > Quantum Computing: A new Paradigm and it's Type Theory > > Martin Wehr > > Quantum Computing Seminar, Lehrstuhl Prof. Beth, > Universit"at Karlsruhe, July 1996 > > > To use quantum mechanical behavior for computing has > been proposed by Feynman. Shor gave an algorithm for > the quantum computer which raised a big stream of research. > This was because Shor's algorithm did reduce the yet assumed exponential > complexity of the security relevant factorization problem, to > a quadratic complexity if quantum computed. > > In the paper a short introduction to quantum mechanics can be > found in the appendix. With this material the operation of the > quantum computer, and the ideas of quantum logic will be explained. > The focus will be the argument that a connection > of quantum logic and linear logic is the right type theory for > quantum computing. These ideas are inspired by Vaughan Pratt's > view that the intuitionistic formulas argue about states > (i.e physical quantum states) and linear formulas argue > about state transformations (i.e computation steps). > > *** > I have been excitedly studying category theory (with some bias towards toposes) on my own for the past few months. Pratt's work looks interesting, but I am not quite at the level of full comprehension yet. I am looking forward to reaching that point, however! > > > b) Neuroscience and physics suggests that we do indeed admit such a > substitution level, or that the functions of the brain are Turing-emulable > (although obviously the architecture is massively parallel and running it > on a TM is not optimal, but then, neither is running physics, either way, > this is unimportant due to specific(provable) instances of the CTT(Church > Turing Thesis)). > > > I agree but we do need more detail of the 1p and 3p aspects of this > idea. > > c) a and b do not directly suggest the continuity part, although we can't > really guarantee continuity that much ourselves. Given that we can never > experience a moment past our death, we would always experience being alive, > that is, the Anthropic Principle where the laws of physics happen to be > that which support or is compatible with us (trivial statement, maybe even > too general). The continuity bet is a matter of past observations, although > it's utterly unprovable, on the other hand, we usually expect a next OM and > that we will wake up in the morning, that the sun will "rise" and so on (by > induction, regardless if consciously realized or not). That one could > continue their existence in a different machine body which is functionally > equivalent is not utterly preposterous to me, at least not much more than > when one considers how strange it must be that their consciousness follows > their body/senses even when the body moves through space and time, > sometimes even with discontinuities (sleep, etc). > This assumption is almost magical, but not really: it's a consequence of > some strong "no magic" assumptions in the nature of reality, but as we can > see, sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic and > sufficiently strong "no magic" assumptions can also be quite > indistinguishable from magic (more on this later). > > > Pratt's duality explains all of this without any magic at all! Well > there is some magical mathematics... ;-) > > d) The UDA paints a picture which seems to include an explanation for > QM/MWI, thus confirming some current physical theories. Your objection to > COMP immortality applies to MWI as well - there is MWI immortality as well, > just a bit more limited in fancifulness. Yet, MWI is one of the simplest > possible realist interpretations of QM (by various Occam's Razor > formalizations). COMP itself scores high on the simplicity > score - easy to describe ontology (after reasoning is done), although very > rich, it also gives reasonably satisfactory (partial or full) answers/hints > to some ancient questions (such as "why something instead of nothing", > "what is matter", "what is mind" along with some more concrete > questions...) > > > Yes, MWI still suffers from a basis problem even though decoherence > arguments can seem to make the problem go away temporarily in calculations, > but it returns every time a new basis is introduced to consider a different > set of observables. I conjecture that "there is something rather than > nothing because something is just a piece of nothing distinguished from > another piece of nothing by a third piece of nothing." As Russell Standish > argued in his book, Nothing and Everything are indistinguishable. > > > - Another assumption of COMP is the Church Turing Thesis. Very strong > mathematical evidence is for it being true, and we can show it for just > about any finite (but unbounded) machine following finite rules. It's a > hypothesis/assumption because in the general form it's not provable because > it's too general, but we can prove any individual case we care to try, > there's also many strong intuitions for why it has to be true. I don't > think there are many computer scientists who don't believe in it, but > usually those that don't just try to define CTT in wider scope than it is > (such as hypercomputation, which it obviously doesn't include), such issues > are a matter of definition and shouldn't be considered to be included in > this assumption. > > > I have no problem at all with CTT, i just have a serious problem with > the idea that CTT is completely divorced from the physical. > > > - Consistency of arithmetic (existence of the standard model of > arithmetic), existence of truth value of arithmetical sentences. > > > The existence of truth values does not, in itself, define them. > Additional structure is required to define not only what domain the truth > value lies in but how it is mapped to our propositions and sentences. > > The consistency belief is both intuitive as well as one about a certain > Turing Machine never halting (which can be made in stronger theories, but > cannot be believed any more than you can believe that arithmetic is > consistent). A belief in a sentence being either true or false independent > of anything is not much different from the belief that a machine either > halts or doesn't halt (and no other choice exists). > This is again a matter of theology - of the provably unprovable stuff. > Although, again, it's a strong "no magic" assumption, that given a finite > self-contained set of rules (addition, multiplication) applied on finite > self-contained objects (numbers), it will always yield the same result and > nothing whatsoever can change that. > > > I agree that "given a finite self-contained set of rules (addition, > multiplication) applied on finite self-contained objects (numbers), it will > always yield the same result" but this does not address my problem. Unless > there is something physical that is somehow different but equal in > ontological level to show results side by side, there is no proof of > equivalence, all there is is modulo isomorphism and barely even that. > > > - A hidden assumption: we have minds/are conscious/experience qualia. This > is a bit magical, but it's hidden in the first assumption that I listed. > > > It is not magical, it is quite ordinary. It is the most ordinary of > facts that I am conscious of what my hands are doing at this moment, for > example... But what is this "my"? If it is just an illusion generated by > some kind of feedback loop, how does the delay that allows the loop come to > be? It is interesting that there is a mapping in category theory that shows > this exact kind of mapping: the Idempotent Endomap > > [image: Idempotent Endomap] > > It is interesting to note the properties of this mapping. See, for > example: ls.poly.edu/~jbain/Cat/lectures/13.MoreCats.pdf > > The thing is - the only thing we can be certain of, but cannot communicate > is having a mind. From our observations we can infer the existence of the > external world and that our bodies are part of it, we can also observe that > the states of our brain correlate very well with our conscious experience. > A different computationalist theory (eliminative materialism) takes this > hidden assumption and posts its negation as an axiom. The problem with that > is that the external world is only inferred by using observation, thus it > cannot really be accepted by most conscious observers (who are delusional > in such a theory), however such a theory is not inconsistent if > consciousness is ignored. If you ignore the mind assumption, you can > completely ignore almost all of COMP's strange conclusions because none of > them would matter, but the existence of primitive matter would be saved in > such a theory. > > > I agree. I just do not require matter nor mind to be primitive, I > argue that both are aspects of a single neutral primitive. > > > All of these are assumptions which are not uncommon for most > secular-minded people: the first is widely considered by the "no magic" > camp, it also is required if you don't want consciousness to be utterly > strange and magic current evidence, the second is widely considered true by > anyone who studied computability/math/comp sci, the third is usually > considered true, if it's false, pretty much all math we know is false, and > there are many intuitions why it's likely true. Given these assumptions, > COMP is a fairly rational theory with a few unprovable, but widely accepted > "no magic" assumptions. However, even with these assumptions, you can't > really avoid some really unusual magic (given only the first assumption). > The strange conclusion is hidden in the assumptions, just most people don't > see it (strangely it's not uncommon for people to hold those assumptions > and still not see that primitive matter is utterly incompatible with a > non-eliminative form of computationalism). > > > I agree. > > Onward! > > Stephen > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. 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