On 8/3/2016 6:59 PM, smitra wrote:
Actually, there will objective evidence as to whether or not you have
won the lottery. There will be a winning number and you will have a
ticket that will have this number on it or not, regardless of whether
you forget anything or not. The idea that branches
On 4/08/2016 1:04 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Aug 2016, at 07:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 3/08/2016 2:55 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 Aug 2016, at 14:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 2/08/2016 3:07 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Aug 2016, at 09:04, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Consider ordinary
On 4/08/2016 11:59 am, smitra wrote:
On 04-08-2016 01:51, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 4/08/2016 9:30 am, smitra wrote:
On 04-08-2016 01:16, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/3/2016 4:09 PM, smitra wrote:
On 04-08-2016 00:12, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Only if you wake up and find out winning the
On 04-08-2016 01:51, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 4/08/2016 9:30 am, smitra wrote:
On 04-08-2016 01:16, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/3/2016 4:09 PM, smitra wrote:
On 04-08-2016 00:12, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Only if you wake up and find out winning the lottery was a
mistake,
which seems less
On 8/3/2016 5:55 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 3 August 2016 at 16:02, Brent Meeker > wrote:
On 8/2/2016 10:19 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wednesday, 3 August 2016, Brent Meeker
wrote:
On 8/3/2016 4:30 PM, smitra wrote:
On 04-08-2016 01:16, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/3/2016 4:09 PM, smitra wrote:
On 04-08-2016 00:12, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Only if you wake up and find out winning the lottery was a
mistake,
which seems less likely than waking up a winner. Waking up as
On 3 August 2016 at 16:02, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
> On 8/2/2016 10:19 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, 3 August 2016, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 8/2/2016 3:29 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, 3
On 4 August 2016 at 09:51, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> On 4/08/2016 9:30 am, smitra wrote:
>
>> On 04-08-2016 01:16, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
>>> On 8/3/2016 4:09 PM, smitra wrote:
>>>
>>> On 04-08-2016 00:12, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Only if you wake up and find
On 4/08/2016 9:30 am, smitra wrote:
On 04-08-2016 01:16, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/3/2016 4:09 PM, smitra wrote:
On 04-08-2016 00:12, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Only if you wake up and find out winning the lottery was a
mistake,
which seems less likely than waking up a winner. Waking up as
On 4 August 2016 at 09:09, smitra wrote:
> On 04-08-2016 00:12, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>> Only if you wake up and find out winning the lottery was a mistake,
>> which seems less likely than waking up a winner. Waking up as one of
>> the many copies who didn't win is not
On 04-08-2016 01:16, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/3/2016 4:09 PM, smitra wrote:
On 04-08-2016 00:12, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Only if you wake up and find out winning the lottery was a
mistake,
which seems less likely than waking up a winner. Waking up as one
of
the many copies who didn't win
On 8/3/2016 4:09 PM, smitra wrote:
On 04-08-2016 00:12, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Only if you wake up and find out winning the lottery was a mistake,
which seems less likely than waking up a winner. Waking up as one of
the many copies who didn't win is not one of the options - those
copies
On 04-08-2016 00:12, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Only if you wake up and find out winning the lottery was a mistake,
which seems less likely than waking up a winner. Waking up as one of
the many copies who didn't win is not one of the options - those
copies are not continuations of the you who
On 8/3/2016 3:03 PM, smitra wrote:
Suppose that you won the lottery, you had a one in a hundred million
chance to win, so you got extremely lucky. You party, go to bed and
think about planning your trip around the World next morning.
In the MWI, things will actually not pan out this way.
Only if you wake up and find out winning the lottery was a mistake, which
seems less likely than waking up a winner. Waking up as one of the many
copies who didn't win is not one of the options - those copies are not
continuations of the you who won the lottery.
On Thursday, 4 August 2016, smitra
Suppose that you won the lottery, you had a one in a hundred million
chance to win, so you got extremely lucky. You party, go to bed and
think about planning your trip around the World next morning.
In the MWI, things will actually not pan out this way. What will happen
is that the next
On Wed, Aug 3, 2016 at 3:01 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
> I've given up following your exchanges with Clark. They seem to be about
> semantics.
I certainly hope so, semantics is the branch of
logic concerned with meaning
.
John K Clark
--
You received
On 8/3/2016 7:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 Aug 2016, at 22:41, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/2/2016 11:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But the argument seems somewhat circular since you assume that the
different physical processes associated with location make the
thoughts different.
On 8/3/2016 7:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 Aug 2016, at 20:52, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/2/2016 6:15 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
It's not that it can't, but rather that it doesn't, and if it does
then that would require some extra physical explanation, a radio
link between brains
On Tue, Aug 2, 2016 at 2:56 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> The question is not about duplication.
OK.
>
> Do you agree that if today, someone is "sure" that tomorrow (or any
> precise time later) he will be uncertain of an outcome of a certain
> experience, then he
On Wed, Aug 3, 2016 at 4:40 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 02 Aug 2016, at 22:39, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>>
>> On 8/2/2016 11:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> Not at all. The existence of the computations is an elementary
>>> metatheorem about Robinson Arithmetic, and
On 03 Aug 2016, at 08:50, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 3/08/2016 4:37 pm, 'scerir' via Everything List wrote:
The suggestion that the one consciousness could inhabit more
than one physical
body does not predict telepathy -- it could merely indicate that
consciousness
is not localized to a
On 03 Aug 2016, at 07:28, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 3/08/2016 3:19 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wednesday, 3 August 2016, Brent Meeker
wrote:
On 8/2/2016 3:29 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wednesday, 3 August 2016, Brent Meeker
wrote:
On 03 Aug 2016, at 07:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 3/08/2016 2:55 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 Aug 2016, at 14:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 2/08/2016 3:07 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Aug 2016, at 09:04, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Consider ordinary consequences of introspection: I can be
On 03 Aug 2016, at 00:49, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 3/08/2016 4:28 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/2/2016 5:40 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
The point that I am trying to make here is that a person's
consciousness at any moment can consist of many independent
threads. From this I speculate that
On 02 Aug 2016, at 22:41, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/2/2016 11:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But the argument seems somewhat circular since you assume that
the different physical processes associated with location make the
thoughts different.
Yes, it is more pedagogical, but the
On 02 Aug 2016, at 22:39, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/2/2016 11:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Not at all. The existence of the computations is an elementary
metatheorem about Robinson Arithmetic, and already a theorem of
Peano Arithmetic (still less that what is needed to enunciate
Church
On 02 Aug 2016, at 22:23, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/2/2016 9:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
(2) The Church-Turing thesis; and
(3) Arithmetical realism;
(3) is redundant. There is no (2) without (3).
?? Why not? 2+2=4 only expresses a true relation of concepts. It
no more entails the
On 03 Aug 2016, at 02:16, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List wrote:
From: Bruno Marchal
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Monday, August 1, 2016 3:36 AM
Subject: Re: musings on time
On 29 Jul 2016, at 00:25, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List
wrote:
On 02 Aug 2016, at 20:52, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/2/2016 6:15 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
It's not that it can't, but rather that it doesn't, and if it does
then that would require some extra physical explanation, a radio
link between brains or something.
That's what I mean by
>Messaggio originale
>Da: "Brent Meeker"
>Data: 03/08/2016 8.49
>A:
>Ogg: Re: R: Re: Holiday Exercise
>
>
>
>On 8/2/2016 11:37 PM, 'scerir' via Everything List wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> The suggestion that the one consciousness
>> The suggestion that the one consciousness could inhabit more than one
physical
>> body does not predict telepathy -- it could merely indicate that
consciousness
>> is not localized to a single physical body, that it is non-local, for
instance.
>> Or, indeed, that physics is not fundamental
On 3/08/2016 4:37 pm, 'scerir' via Everything List wrote:
The suggestion that the one consciousness could inhabit more than one physical
body does not predict telepathy -- it could merely indicate that consciousness
is not localized to a single physical body, that it is non-local, for
On 8/2/2016 11:37 PM, 'scerir' via Everything List wrote:
The suggestion that the one consciousness could inhabit more than one physical
body does not predict telepathy -- it could merely indicate that consciousness
is not localized to a single physical body, that it is non-local,
The suggestion that the one consciousness could inhabit more than one physical
body does not predict telepathy -- it could merely indicate that consciousness
is not localized to a single physical body, that it is non-local, for instance.
Or, indeed, that physics is not fundamental but
On 3/08/2016 12:01 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Aug 02, 2016 at 06:55:58PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 Aug 2016, at 14:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:
I suggest that for step 3 to go through, you need to demonstrate
that computationalism requires that a single consciousness cannot
On 8/2/2016 10:19 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wednesday, 3 August 2016, Brent Meeker > wrote:
On 8/2/2016 3:29 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wednesday, 3 August 2016, Brent Meeker
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