On 13 Feb 2014, at 22:23, LizR wrote:
On 14 February 2014 07:49, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Liz, and others,
On 13 Feb 2014, at 10:04, LizR wrote:
On 13 February 2014 21:38, Bruno Marchal wrote:
If I reported that there was a flying pig, wouldn't comp just
explain, "That's the way arithmetic
On 13 Feb 2014, at 22:08, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 5:11 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
My question was "what is the unique consistent definition of
"the 1p" after the duplication has been performed?".
>>> In the 3-1 view, that does not exist,
>> Then "the 1p" is of n
On 14 February 2014 10:11, John Mikes wrote:
> Liz: the "white rabbit" was an esteemed member of the Everything List in
> it's 1st decade. - John
>
> I believe it has been immortalised in Russell's book, too.
(As well as Lewis Carroll's, obviously :)
--
You received this message because you ar
On 14 February 2014 07:49, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Liz, and others,
>
>
> On 13 Feb 2014, at 10:04, LizR wrote:
>
> On 13 February 2014 21:38, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> If I reported that there was a flying pig, wouldn't comp just explain,
>> "That's the way arithmetic looks from inside."?
>>
>>
PS! I hate grammatical undecisivenesses like what I committed in the
previous post to you.
I did not mean the "1st decade" of the white rabbit, I meant it of the
list. (Habituel newscast English!). JM
On Thu, Feb 13, 2014 at 4:11 PM, John Mikes wrote:
> Liz: the "white rabbit" was an esteem
Liz: the "white rabbit" was an esteemed member of the Everything List in
it's 1st decade. - John
On Thu, Feb 13, 2014 at 3:43 PM, LizR wrote:
> On 14 February 2014 07:24, meekerdb wrote:
>
>> On 2/13/2014 1:04 AM, LizR wrote:
>>
>> On 13 February 2014 21:38, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> If
On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 5:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> My question was "what is the unique consistent definition of "the
>>> 1p" after the duplication has been performed?".
>>>
>>
>> >>> In the 3-1 view, that does not exist,
>>
>
> >> Then "the 1p" is of no use to anyone
>
> > Why?
>
Beca
On 14 February 2014 07:24, meekerdb wrote:
> On 2/13/2014 1:04 AM, LizR wrote:
>
> On 13 February 2014 21:38, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> If I reported that there was a flying pig, wouldn't comp just explain,
>> "That's the way arithmetic looks from inside."?
>>
>> Why? No. Not at all.
>> You
Liz, and others,
On 13 Feb 2014, at 10:04, LizR wrote:
On 13 February 2014 21:38, Bruno Marchal wrote:
If I reported that there was a flying pig, wouldn't comp just
explain, "That's the way arithmetic looks from inside."?
Why? No. Not at all.
You must (using G & Co.) looks at the way arith
On 2/13/2014 1:04 AM, LizR wrote:
On 13 February 2014 21:38, Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
wrote:
If I reported that there was a flying pig, wouldn't comp just explain,
"That's the
way arithmetic looks from inside."?
Why? No. Not at all.
You must (using G & Co.) lo
On Wednesday, February 12, 2014 9:30:25 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>
> On 12 February 2014 23:47, Craig Weinberg >
> wrote:
>
> >> > I don't think that my experience can be replaced with a copy though.
> >>
> >> So how would you know you were a copy?
> >
> >
> > It has nothing to do with wh
On 13 February 2014 21:38, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> If I reported that there was a flying pig, wouldn't comp just explain,
> "That's the way arithmetic looks from inside."?
>
> Why? No. Not at all.
> You must (using G & Co.) looks at the way arithmetic looks from inside,
> and if you find the flyin
On 13 Feb 2014, at 04:08, meekerdb wrote:
That doesn't mean it can explain ghosts, leprechauns, gods and
other things *not* observed.
Why not "consciousness" and other things that we do not see, but
at least believe in?
There's a difference between being able to explain anything and
On 2/12/2014 11:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:34, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/12/2014 1:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Feb 2014, at 18:20, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/11/2014 8:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Feb 2014, at 04:15, meekerdb wrote:
...
Brent
"That which can
On 12 February 2014 23:47, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> > I don't think that my experience can be replaced with a copy though.
>>
>> So how would you know you were a copy?
>
>
> It has nothing to do with whether or not I would know, it's because in my
> understanding, copying is not primitively real,
On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:34, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/12/2014 1:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Feb 2014, at 18:20, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/11/2014 8:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Feb 2014, at 04:15, meekerdb wrote:
...
Brent
"That which can explain anything fails to explain at all."
John, I add a comment to my preview post.
On 11 Feb 2014, at 19:47, John Clark wrote:
Then "the 1p" is of no use to anyone and neither is "the 3-1 view"
whatever the hell that is supposed to be.
It is a bit unfair, as I introduced that "3-1" notation exactly to
reply to your first attempt
On 2/12/2014 1:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Feb 2014, at 18:20, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/11/2014 8:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Feb 2014, at 04:15, meekerdb wrote:
...
Brent
"That which can explain *anything* fails to explain at all."
With physicalism, QM explains everything.
On Tuesday, February 11, 2014 10:26:51 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>
> On 12 February 2014 05:21, Craig Weinberg >
> wrote:
> >
> >
> > On Monday, February 10, 2014 7:51:58 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
> >>
> >> On 11 February 2014 11:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >>
> >> >> Continuity and the
On 11 Feb 2014, at 19:47, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Feb 10, 2014 at 1:40 PM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
>> My question was "what is the unique consistent definition of
"the 1p" after the duplication has been performed?".
> In the 3-1 view, that does not exist,
Then "the 1p" is of no use to
On 11 Feb 2014, at 18:20, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/11/2014 8:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Feb 2014, at 04:15, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/10/2014 3:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
The laws of physics or arithmetic makes it possible for you to
express your
> point, but the content of your post
On 12 February 2014 05:21, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> On Monday, February 10, 2014 7:51:58 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>>
>> On 11 February 2014 11:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> >> Continuity and the idea that physical laws will be consistent in
>> >> different times and places are definitely as
On 12 February 2014 02:18, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> I don't agree. I think it *can* be proved that replacing the brain
>> neuron by neuron will preserve consciousness with the only assumption
>> being that the observable behaviour of the neuron is preserved. This
>> holds whatever theory of consci
On Mon, Feb 10, 2014 at 1:40 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> My question was "what is the unique consistent definition of "the 1p"
>> after the duplication has been performed?".
>>
>
> > In the 3-1 view, that does not exist,
>
Then "the 1p" is of no use to anyone and neither is "the 3-1 view" whate
On Monday, February 10, 2014 7:51:58 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>
> On 11 February 2014 11:23, Craig Weinberg >
> wrote:
>
> >> Continuity and the idea that physical laws will be consistent in
> >> different times and places are definitely assumptions. They could turn
> >> out to be false tomo
On 2/11/2014 8:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Feb 2014, at 04:15, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/10/2014 3:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
The laws of physics or arithmetic makes it possible for you to express your
>point, but the content of your post is explained by your awareness of the
>questio
On 11 Feb 2014, at 04:15, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/10/2014 3:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
The laws of physics or arithmetic makes it possible for you to
express your
> point, but the content of your post is explained by your
awareness of the
> questions, your taste for the field, your plea
On 11 Feb 2014, at 04:07, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/10/2014 2:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Feb 2014, at 06:09, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/9/2014 1:46 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Feb 2014, at 22:27, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/8/2014 12:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
An epiphenomenalist would say tha
On 11 Feb 2014, at 00:18, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 10 February 2014 22:30, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I can't know that either. If you are conscious, you might well
become a
zombie after the substitution, if comp is false for example. I
cannot
know
for sure that comp is true. I can know i
On 11 February 2014 16:07, meekerdb wrote:
>
> Why aren't we agnostic about arithmetic?
>
> Physics provides only evidences and proves nothing about reality.
>
> Neither does logic or mathematics. They only prove that some theorems
> follow from some assumed axioms.
>
> Looks like you answere
On 2/10/2014 3:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
The laws of physics or arithmetic makes it possible for you to express your
>point, but the content of your post is explained by your awareness of the
>questions, your taste for the field, your pleasure to argue rationally, your
>personality, etc.
On 2/10/2014 2:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Feb 2014, at 06:09, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/9/2014 1:46 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Feb 2014, at 22:27, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/8/2014 12:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
An epiphenomenalist would say that consciousness is just a necessary side effe
On 11 February 2014 11:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> Continuity and the idea that physical laws will be consistent in
>> different times and places are definitely assumptions. They could turn
>> out to be false tomorrow.
>
>
> The possibility of continuity seems like it is implicit in almost every
On Monday, February 10, 2014 3:51:59 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>
> On 10 February 2014 00:32, Craig Weinberg >
> wrote:
>
> >> Strictly speaking everything is tentative and subject to revision in
> the
> >> light of new evidence, but some things in science as well as in
> everyday
> >> life
On 11 February 2014 01:39, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> On Monday, February 10, 2014 12:48:31 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>>
>> On 9 February 2014 22:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> > On Sunday, February 9, 2014 4:27:57 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>> >>
>> >> On 9 February 2014 15:11, Craig Wei
On 10 February 2014 22:30, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> I can't know that either. If you are conscious, you might well become a
>>> zombie after the substitution, if comp is false for example. I cannot
>>> know
>>> for sure that comp is true. I can know it in the Theatetus' way, but this
>>> means on
On 10 February 2014 18:09, meekerdb wrote:
> But can we prove the equivalence in the sense that physics proves that
> atoms exist, i.e. beyond a reasonable doubt.
>
That isn't very Popperian of you!
I'm not sure what actually "exists" in an atom. According to Tegmark and
Lisi it's a bunch of ma
On 10 February 2014 00:32, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> Strictly speaking everything is tentative and subject to revision in the
>> light of new evidence, but some things in science as well as in everyday
>> life you have to simply assume are true. For example, there is the
>> assumption that the gro
On 10 Feb 2014, at 17:36, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Feb 9, 2014 at 2:38 PM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
>>> 1p = the content of the diary of the guy who enter actually the
teleportation box.
>> And what is the unique consistent definition of " the 1p" after
the duplication has been performe
On Monday, February 10, 2014 11:36:53 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sun, Feb 9, 2014 at 2:38 PM, Bruno Marchal
> > wrote:
>
>
>
> > We cannot detect it, nor can be detect intelligence. We can detect
>> competence, relatively to a domain.
>>
>
> Apparently you believe the distinction betwee
On Sun, Feb 9, 2014 at 2:38 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 1p = the content of the diary of the guy who enter actually the
>>> teleportation box.
>>>
>>
>>
> >> And what is the unique consistent definition of " the 1p" after the
>> duplication has been performed?
>>
>
> > For the guy in M, it is t
On Monday, February 10, 2014 1:55:12 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>
> On 9 February 2014 22:50, Craig Weinberg >
> wrote:
>
> >> Neuroscientists assume that we think with our brains just as cardiac
> >> physiologists assume the heart pumps blood around the body. It's
> >> possible they are wrong
On Monday, February 10, 2014 12:48:31 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>
> On 9 February 2014 22:40, Craig Weinberg >
> wrote:
> >
> >
> > On Sunday, February 9, 2014 4:27:57 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
> >>
> >> On 9 February 2014 15:11, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > On Saturday, F
On 10 Feb 2014, at 06:42, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 9 February 2014 21:22, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Feb 2014, at 02:47, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 7 February 2014 07:47, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Well, I *could* be a zombie and still say that, unless you
consider
the idea of zombi
On 10 Feb 2014, at 06:09, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/9/2014 1:46 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Feb 2014, at 22:27, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/8/2014 12:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
An epiphenomenalist would say that consciousness is just a
necessary side effect of intelligence. But I don't follow thi
On 9 February 2014 22:50, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> Neuroscientists assume that we think with our brains just as cardiac
>> physiologists assume the heart pumps blood around the body. It's
>> possible they are wrong, but you would have to have a very good reason
>> to challenge these assumptions.
On 9 February 2014 22:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> On Sunday, February 9, 2014 4:27:57 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>>
>> On 9 February 2014 15:11, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> > On Saturday, February 8, 2014 8:47:26 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>> >>
>> >> On 7 February 2014 07:47, Bruno Marc
On 9 February 2014 21:22, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 09 Feb 2014, at 02:47, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>> On 7 February 2014 07:47, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
Well, I *could* be a zombie and still say that, unless you consider
the idea of zombies contradictory (which maybe it is).
>>>
>
On 2/9/2014 1:46 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Feb 2014, at 22:27, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/8/2014 12:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
An epiphenomenalist would say that consciousness is just a necessary side effect of
intelligence. But I don't follow this: it is a phenomena having some role, I would
On Sunday, February 9, 2014 9:41:29 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>
> Craig,
>
> I explain both OBE's and NDE's in my book on Reality.
>
> The key to understanding OBE's is to first understand why normally the
> brain constructs a view of reality in which we seem to be INSIDE our body,
> insid
On Sunday, February 9, 2014 9:27:38 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>
> Craig,
>
> Of course science is supposed to make assumptions. It's done all the time
> and rightfully so.
>
> But those assumptions are then supposed to be tested to see if they are
> reasonable.
>
I wouldn't call them as
On 09 Feb 2014, at 19:27, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Feb 8, 2014 at 2:57 PM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
> What is inconsistent with the definition of 3p and 1p?
3p = the content of the diary of the guy which observes the
teleportation experience.
So 3p is the stuff that I see and 1p is the st
On Sat, Feb 8, 2014 at 2:57 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> What is inconsistent with the definition of 3p and 1p?
> 3p = the content of the diary of the guy which observes the teleportation
> experience.
So 3p is the stuff that I see and 1p is the stuff you see. But the words
"I" and "you" can be
Craig,
I explain both OBE's and NDE's in my book on Reality.
The key to understanding OBE's is to first understand why normally the
brain constructs a view of reality in which we seem to be INSIDE our body,
inside our heads. When you understand how that works, it's easy to
understand how the b
Craig,
Of course science is supposed to make assumptions. It's done all the time
and rightfully so.
But those assumptions are then supposed to be tested to see if they are
reasonable.
This is done in two ways. One by testing against empirical evidence. Two by
seeing if they are logically co
On Sunday, February 9, 2014 7:23:12 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, February 9, 2014, LizR > wrote:
>
>> On 9 February 2014 17:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>> On Saturday, February 8, 2014 8:55:43 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>>>
On 8 February 2014 05:03, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Sunday, February 9, 2014, LizR wrote:
> On 9 February 2014 17:10, Craig Weinberg
>
> > wrote:
>
>> On Saturday, February 8, 2014 8:55:43 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>> On 8 February 2014 05:03, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>> > If there were identical triplets, and one of them grew up on the ot
On Sunday, February 9, 2014 4:28:09 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>
> On 9 February 2014 15:10, Craig Weinberg >
> wrote:
>
> >> It's an assumption in science that the language difference is due to
> >> brain difference. That's not to say that our techniques are at present
> >> refined enough to
On Sunday, February 9, 2014 4:27:57 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>
> On 9 February 2014 15:11, Craig Weinberg >
> wrote:
> >
> >
> > On Saturday, February 8, 2014 8:47:26 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
> >>
> >> On 7 February 2014 07:47, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>
> >> >> Well, I *could* be a zom
On 09 Feb 2014, at 10:35, LizR wrote:
On 9 February 2014 17:10, Craig Weinberg
wrote:
On Saturday, February 8, 2014 8:55:43 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
On 8 February 2014 05:03, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> If there were identical triplets, and one of them grew up on the
other side
> of the worl
On 09 Feb 2014, at 10:27, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 9 February 2014 15:11, Craig Weinberg
wrote:
On Saturday, February 8, 2014 8:47:26 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
On 7 February 2014 07:47, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Well, I *could* be a zombie and still say that, unless you
consider
the
On 08 Feb 2014, at 22:27, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/8/2014 12:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
An epiphenomenalist would say that consciousness is just a
necessary side effect of intelligence. But I don't follow this: it
is a phenomena having some role, I would say, and so evolution is
just not a p
On 09 Feb 2014, at 02:47, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 7 February 2014 07:47, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Well, I *could* be a zombie and still say that, unless you consider
the idea of zombies contradictory (which maybe it is).
I bet you are not a zombie. But you seem to illustrate my point, i
On 09 Feb 2014, at 05:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Saturday, February 8, 2014 8:55:43 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
On 8 February 2014 05:03, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> If there were identical triplets, and one of them grew up on the
other side
> of the world and spoke a different language, while
On 9 February 2014 17:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> On Saturday, February 8, 2014 8:55:43 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>
>> On 8 February 2014 05:03, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> > If there were identical triplets, and one of them grew up on the other
>> side
>> > of the world and spoke a different langu
On 9 February 2014 15:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> It's an assumption in science that the language difference is due to
>> brain difference. That's not to say that our techniques are at present
>> refined enough to see a difference, but there must be one if language
>> is due to the brain.
>
>
>
On 9 February 2014 15:11, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> On Saturday, February 8, 2014 8:47:26 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>>
>> On 7 February 2014 07:47, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> >> Well, I *could* be a zombie and still say that, unless you consider
>> >> the idea of zombies contradictory (which ma
On Saturday, February 8, 2014 8:47:26 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>
> On 7 February 2014 07:47, Bruno Marchal >
> wrote:
>
> >> Well, I *could* be a zombie and still say that, unless you consider
> >> the idea of zombies contradictory (which maybe it is).
> >
> >
> > I bet you are not a zombi
On Saturday, February 8, 2014 8:55:43 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>
> On 8 February 2014 05:03, Craig Weinberg >
> wrote:
> > If there were identical triplets, and one of them grew up on the other
> side
> > of the world and spoke a different language, while the others grew up in
> the
> > sa
On 8 February 2014 05:03, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> If there were identical triplets, and one of them grew up on the other side
> of the world and spoke a different language, while the others grew up in the
> same state and spoke the same language, do you think that a neuroscientist
> could figure o
On 7 February 2014 07:47, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Well, I *could* be a zombie and still say that, unless you consider
>> the idea of zombies contradictory (which maybe it is).
>
>
> I bet you are not a zombie. But you seem to illustrate my point, if
> epiphenomenalism is true, despite you are not
On 2/8/2014 12:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
An epiphenomenalist would say that consciousness is just a necessary side effect of
intelligence. But I don't follow this: it is a phenomena having some role, I would say,
and so evolution is just not a problem.
To say it has some role implies that th
On 08 Feb 2014, at 17:53, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Feb 8, 2014 at 3:23 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
> here is no consistent definition of "p"
> ?
!
> What is inconsistent with the definition of 3p and 1p
Just as there is no absolute meaning to the word "motion" there is
no consistent mea
On Sat, Feb 8, 2014 at 3:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> here is no consistent definition of "p"
>>
>
> > ?
>
!
> > What is inconsistent with the definition of 3p and 1p
>
Just as there is no absolute meaning to the word "motion" there is no
consistent meaning to "the 1p" or "the 3p". Your "3p"
On 07 Feb 2014, at 19:03, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Feb 4, 2014 at 5:53 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
> Computation is 3p, and consciousness is 1p, and no 1p thing can be
a 3p thing.
Sure it can. There is no consistent definition of "p"
?
What is inconsistent with the definition of 3p an
On Fri, Feb 7, 2014 at 12:58 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>> it impossible to make a brain replacement that is 100% functional.
>>>
>>
>> >> If so then right now your brain is not 100% functional because over
>> the past year all of the material in it has been replaced.
>>
>
> > My brain of last yea
On Friday, February 7, 2014 1:03:36 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Tue, Feb 4, 2014 at 5:53 AM, Bruno Marchal
> > wrote:
>
>>
>> > Computation is 3p, and consciousness is 1p, and no 1p thing can be a 3p
>> thing.
>>
>
> Sure it can. There is no consistent definition of "p" so "3p" can be
>
On Tue, Feb 4, 2014 at 5:53 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > Computation is 3p, and consciousness is 1p, and no 1p thing can be a 3p
> thing.
>
Sure it can. There is no consistent definition of "p" so "3p" can be
anything as can "1p".
And I'm still waiting for somebody to explain to me why if int
If there were identical triplets, and one of them grew up on the other side
of the world and spoke a different language, while the others grew up in
the same state and spoke the same language, do you think that a
neuroscientist could figure out with certainty which triplet spoke the
other langu
On Friday, February 7, 2014 12:39:06 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Tue, Feb 4, 2014 at 12:32 AM, Craig Weinberg
>
> > wrote:
>
> > it impossible to make a brain replacement that is 100% functional.
>>
>
> If so then right now your brain is not 100% functional because over the
> past year
On Tue, Feb 4, 2014 at 12:32 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> it impossible to make a brain replacement that is 100% functional.
>
If so then right now your brain is not 100% functional because over the
past year all of the material in it has been replaced.
John K Clark
--
You received this messag
On 06 Feb 2014, at 17:52, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, February 6, 2014 11:00:27 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Feb 2014, at 19:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:
An important rule is the modus ponens, for example; A, A -> B / B
Who are "we"? What is "allow"? What is "prove"? What is
On 06 Feb 2014, at 09:57, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 5 February 2014 23:32, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Feb 2014, at 07:54, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
To be clear, what I find problematic is the question of whether
consciousness can cause someone to refer to it.
That is a good questi
On Thursday, February 6, 2014 11:00:27 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 05 Feb 2014, at 19:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, February 5, 2014 12:39:47 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 05 Feb 2014, at 14:28, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> Why would I share an elementary
On 05 Feb 2014, at 19:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, February 5, 2014 12:39:47 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Feb 2014, at 14:28, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Why would I share an elementary belief that I understand to be false?
Nobody ask you this. On the contrary, the idea is t
On Thursday, February 6, 2014 3:59:45 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>
> On 5 February 2014 23:55, Craig Weinberg >
> wrote:
> >
> >
> > On Wednesday, February 5, 2014 1:57:43 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
> >>
> >> On 5 February 2014 13:46, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > On Tuesday,
On 6 February 2014 21:59, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> My point is that an argument that is logically sound trumps any
> aesthetic objections to its conclusion.
>
Naah, I don't like the sound of that.
:-)
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On 5 February 2014 23:55, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> On Wednesday, February 5, 2014 1:57:43 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>>
>> On 5 February 2014 13:46, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> > On Tuesday, February 4, 2014 8:38:31 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>> >>
>> >> On 5 February 2014 01:31, Craig We
On 5 February 2014 23:32, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 05 Feb 2014, at 07:54, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> To be clear, what I find problematic is the question of whether
>> consciousness can cause someone to refer to it.
>
>
> That is a good question. (I will answer it positively).
>
>
>
>
>> It
On Wednesday, February 5, 2014 12:39:47 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 05 Feb 2014, at 14:28, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, February 5, 2014 4:54:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 04 Feb 2014, at 18:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, February 4, 2014 11:
On 05 Feb 2014, at 14:28, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, February 5, 2014 4:54:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Feb 2014, at 18:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, February 4, 2014 11:54:26 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Feb 2014, at 12:46, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 5 February 2014 06:31, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Of course I know I am conscious. I could say, what a silly question!
>
> If I declare that I am conscious this action is entirely explainable
> in physical terms. I am also actually conscious, but that's not why
> I'm saying it, since conscious
On Wednesday, February 5, 2014 4:54:13 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 04 Feb 2014, at 18:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, February 4, 2014 11:54:26 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 04 Feb 2014, at 12:46, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> > On 4 February 2014 22:32,
On Wednesday, February 5, 2014 1:57:43 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>
> On 5 February 2014 13:46, Craig Weinberg >
> wrote:
> >
> >
> > On Tuesday, February 4, 2014 8:38:31 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
> >>
> >> On 5 February 2014 01:31, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >>
> >> >> As per my answer to D
On 05 Feb 2014, at 07:54, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 5 February 2014 03:54, Bruno Marchal wrote:
My view is that if consciousness is epiphenomenal it's
meaningless to
ask why bodies emit utterances referring to the epiphenomenon.
Why? You agree that there is still one way causal li
On 05 Feb 2014, at 00:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, February 4, 2014 6:00:02 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
On 4 February 2014 23:44, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Feb 2014, at 01:19, Craig Weinberg wrote:
It's because you're stuck on the idea that consciousness is something
extra and optional.
On 04 Feb 2014, at 21:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, February 4, 2014 2:31:36 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Feb 2014, at 15:33, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, February 4, 2014 3:57:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Feb 2014, at 21:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On
On 04 Feb 2014, at 18:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, February 4, 2014 11:54:26 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Feb 2014, at 12:46, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On 4 February 2014 22:32, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>> My view is that if consciousness is epiphenomenal it's meaningles
On 5 February 2014 13:46, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> On Tuesday, February 4, 2014 8:38:31 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>>
>> On 5 February 2014 01:31, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> >> As per my answer to David: if you could show that a physical
>> >> phenomenon of a particular type necessarily leads
On 5 February 2014 03:54, Bruno Marchal wrote:
My view is that if consciousness is epiphenomenal it's meaningless to
ask why bodies emit utterances referring to the epiphenomenon.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Why? You agree that there is still one way causal link. That is
>>> consciousness is a
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