Dear Günther,
Le 02-avr.-08, à 20:16, Günther Greindl a écrit :
Dear Bruno,
Yes. The comp intelligible matter hypostases give the modal logic
corresponding to quantum logic, except that I loose the necessitation
rule.
The significance of this remains to be seen of course.
Ok I get it.
On Apr 3, 3:12 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Dear Günther,
Le 02-avr.-08, à 20:16, Günther Greindl a écrit :
Dear Bruno,
Yes. The comp intelligible matter hypostases give the modal logic
corresponding to quantum logic, except that I loose the necessitation
rule.
The
Gear Günther,
Le 31-mars-08, à 19:01, Günther Greindl a écrit :
Dear Bruno,
The things I am unclear about are:
1) maximally complete computational histories going through a state
-
what are these?
We assume comp ok? So for example, my current relative mind state can
be associated
Dear Bruno,
Yes. The comp intelligible matter hypostases give the modal logic
corresponding to quantum logic, except that I loose the necessitation
rule.
The significance of this remains to be seen of course.
Ok I get it. I will reread your papers :-) (too much new stuff in one
reading)
Dear Bruno,
The things I am unclear about are:
1) maximally complete computational histories going through a state -
what are these?
We assume comp ok? So for example, my current relative mind state can
be associated with a computational state. By Church thesis, this state
is accessed
On Fri, Mar 28, 2008 at 12:56:48AM -0500, Jason Resch wrote:
I am in complete disagreement with Searle's assertion that
consciousness is a physical property.
I'm with you on this one. Searle's suggestion sound bizarre to me,
without further evidence to back it up.
Where you and I might
Hi guys,
Well, Bruno may be interested to know that I've finally come around to
COMP.
I do now agree, everything emerges from mathematics. Nevertheless,
the mathematical world does *appear* to seperate into three different
domains; *physical* (material), *teleological* (goal directed) and
Hi Jason,
Le 28-mars-08, à 01:07, Jason a écrit :
To expand on Günther's question: If we equate computational states
with mind states as COMP assumes,
This could be a misleading way to present the thing, especially in
front of a physicalist which most of the time tends to equate a
Hi Marc,
Le 28-mars-08, à 08:53, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Hi guys,
Well, Bruno may be interested to know that I've finally come around to
COMP.
OK.
I do now agree, everything emerges from mathematics. Nevertheless,
the mathematical world does *appear* to seperate into three
On Mar 28, 11:08 pm, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Hi Marc,
Le 28-mars-08, à 08:53, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Hi guys,
Well, Bruno may be interested to know that I've finally come around to
COMP.
OK.
I do now agree, everything emerges from mathematics.
Hi Günther,
Le 25-mars-08, à 13:35, Günther Greindl a écrit :
Dear Bruno,
I have used the Easter holidays to read again through your SANE 2004
paper, and I have a question regarding step 7.
(I am fine with step 1-6, step 8 seems OK but I will withhold judgment
until I understand step 7
To expand on Günther's question: If we equate computational states
with mind states as COMP assumes, and if this universe is computable,
would that imply the universe itself can be considered a singular
mind? I think this is a consistent viewpoint not contradicted by
experience. Of course I
Surely consciousness is both granular (much of what we are conscious of is
pre-processed by the brain and body, and not part of our direct experience.
This gives a huge amount of leeway for underlying ambiguity) and limiting
(two people holding hands or talking do not become one conscious entity).
On Thu, Mar 27, 2008 at 05:07:30PM -0700, Jason wrote:
To expand on Günther's question: If we equate computational states
with mind states as COMP assumes, and if this universe is computable,
would that imply the universe itself can be considered a singular
mind? I think this is a
On Thu, Mar 27, 2008 at 7:32 PM, Michael Rosefield
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Surely consciousness is both granular (much of what we are conscious of is
pre-processed by the brain and body, and not part of our direct experience.
This gives a huge amount of leeway for underlying ambiguity) and
On Thu, Mar 27, 2008 at 8:16 PM, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The situation is surely more subtle. To recognise a physical process
as a computation requires an observer to interpret it as such. One of
the key features of conscious is the ability to recognise a certain
Dear Bruno,
I have used the Easter holidays to read again through your SANE 2004
paper, and I have a question regarding step 7.
(I am fine with step 1-6, step 8 seems OK but I will withhold judgment
until I understand step 7 ;-)
The things I am unclear about are:
1) maximally complete
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