Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-07-02 Thread Fred Chen
> > I don't see why we should limit ourselves to the simplest possible universe > containing consciousness. > > I would think that all worlds containing consciousness would be inhabited > naturally. > > Joel > Actually I agree, fundamentally. Perhaps, there is just a gut feeling around that "sim

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-07-02 Thread Fred Chen
Bruno, I think we are probably just talking past each other...perhaps our background/goals are different. > >To reconcile with anthropic fine-tuning without white rabbits, I had bought > >into the postulate that we were in the simplest possible universe, in the > >absence of knowing the exact cr

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-07-02 Thread Joel Dobrzelewski
Fred: > Without knowing these criteria, we cannot tell what is the simplest > possible universe containing consciousness. I don't see why we should limit ourselves to the simplest possible universe containing consciousness. I would think that all worlds containing consciousness would be inhabit

Re: UDA last question (was UDA step 9 10)

2001-07-02 Thread Joel Dobrzelewski
> That's part of the problem. What do you mean by "*our* current > simulation?" Within the Plenitude there are an infinite number of > simulations that resemble "this" one up to some moment and then > suddenly change the laws in crazy ways...if you agreed with the > earlier thought-experiment abo

Re: UDA last question (was UDA step 9 10)

2001-07-02 Thread Jesse Mazer
>From: "Joel Dobrzelewski" >Hmm... I think I see the problem now. But I don't understand your proposed >solution. > >Do you want to 1) make predictions about the future based on past >observations, or 2) make predictions about the future based on all possible >histories, or 3) something else ent

Re: UDA last question (was UDA step 9 10)

2001-07-02 Thread Joel Dobrzelewski
Bruno: > We can go back to that "step 11" another time, but for now I will > assume you agree "everything is soft, and even arithmetical (in the > sense that the UD is naturally embedded in plato heaven arithmetics. Yes, that's fine. Joel: >> Yes, this sounds reasonable. I would agree: In gene

Re: lowly complexity

2001-07-02 Thread George Levy
Joel Dobrzelewski wrote: > I do understand all universal computers are > equivalent. But again: What program are these machines running? It is > becoming clear to me - that is the real question. They are running COBOL version 5.3. This language has been, and will remain with us for ever. ;-)

Re: UDA last question (was UDA step 9 10)

2001-07-02 Thread Jesse Mazer
>For the computationalist that simple explanation is not available. >For an explanation that "preparing coffee" augment the degree of >plausibility (probability, credibility) of the experience of >drinking coffee, the only way is to isolate, from pure arithmetics, >a measure on the consistent com

Re: Go Hal !

2001-07-02 Thread Marchal
Jacques Mallah wrote: >What do you mean by the "grandma sense"? Well, you'd better get >technical now, since the problem is already here. In cognitive science "grand mother psychology" is synonymous with "folk psychology". It admits explanations like "Claude takes that long trip by train

Re: lowly complexity

2001-07-02 Thread Spudboy100
In a message dated 7/2/2001 8:31:39 AM Eastern Daylight Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: << George, I like your idea. Is there any way to study/make use of the Zen non-computer? Where's the mouse & keyboard? How can we explore the plentitude? Joel >> More to the point, how (by what mater

Re: lowly complexity

2001-07-02 Thread Marchal
Joel: >I keep wondering: Exactly how does the Turing Machine read-write head move? >What propels it? What is fluid motion? You can conceive a Turing machine as just a table of number controlling an unbounded one dimensional cellular automata. But honestly I see it, either through a simple min

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-07-02 Thread Marchal
Fred Chen wrote: >I appreciate how something like the Universal Dovetailer or equivalent >programs can generate an infinite set of programs that could include the one >that describes our universe (including our consciousness). You are confusing Schmidhuber-like theories with me-like theories (if

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-07-02 Thread Fred Chen
Bruno, Joel, et. al., I appreciate how something like the Universal Dovetailer or equivalent programs can generate an infinite set of programs that could include the one that describes our universe (including our consciousness). However, Godel's theorem applied to this top-down approach would pre

UDA last question (was UDA step 9 10)

2001-07-02 Thread Marchal
Joel: >Bruno: >> Do you realise now that not only we have a form of 1-indeterminacy >> but we have also a sort of 1-nonlocality. > >Yes, from the first-person point of view. Though I would try to >argue that the third-person point of view must always remain local. >Note: If you find that rema

Re: lowly complexity

2001-07-02 Thread Joel Dobrzelewski
Bruno: > There exists one dimensional *universal* automata. Yes, but it has many internal states and is not minimal. Also... it does not specify something very important... What is this one-dimensional universal automaton doing? What program is it running? > If minimality + universality im

Re: lowly complexity

2001-07-02 Thread Joel Dobrzelewski
George: > The observer's psyche then becomes the constraint of what he can > observe. No computer needed. Just an observer and the Plenitude. The > rest is first person emergent. Yes, this is true. In fact I agree with you. As a matter of practicality, it doesn't matter at all "what is at the

Re: lowly complexity

2001-07-02 Thread Marchal
Joel (in his reply to Jacques Mallah): >At this time, none of the elementary one-dimensional minimal >cellular automata appear capable of universal computation. >[...] >Maybe three dimensions is the minimum needed to do this >successfully. ? There exists one dimensional *universal* automata.