RE: copy method important?

2005-06-23 Thread Brent Meeker
>-Original Message- >From: Bruno Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] >Sent: Monday, June 20, 2005 1:33 PM >To: Norman Samish >Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com >Subject: Re: copy method important? > > > >Le 18-juin-05, à 20:36, Norman Samish a écrit : > > >> I'm no physicist, but doesn't Heise

FW: Dualism

2005-06-23 Thread Brent Meeker
Can anyone explain http://chu.stanford.edu/guide.html#ratmech to me. Stephen seems to think Pratt has solved the "Caspar" problem of dualism. It also involves http://www.meta-religion.com/Philosophy/Articles/Philosophy_of_the_mind/mind-bo dy.htm by someone whose nom-de-internet is "Cassiels Sophi

Re: another puzzzle

2005-06-23 Thread rmiller
Jesse wrote In reality the molecules in your brain are constantly being recycled--if you believe that the changes that make up memories happen at the synapses, the article at http://www.sci-con.org/articles/20040601.html suggests all the molecules at the synapses are replaced in only 24 hou

Re: New Scientist

2005-06-23 Thread Russell Standish
It is really just a discussion of Bell's inequality, I didn't find the article had a lot new to say. I recall having read a similar standard article in Scientific American in the 1980s. On Fri, Jun 24, 2005 at 01:24:54AM -0500, rmiller wrote: > All, > New Scientist has a very interesting article

singular versus plural

2005-06-23 Thread rmiller
All-- The arguments here seem to assume a consensus experience, i.e. "Can't we all just agree on this set of evidence?" What if reality experienced by one in a closed room is fundamentally different that when experienced as a dyad, triad, or mob? No one (to my knowledge) has been able to refu

New Scientist

2005-06-23 Thread rmiller
All, New Scientist has a very interesting article this week about free will, reality and entanglement. Worth a look. Additionally, for the trivia fans among you, it seems one of the researchers quoted has clocked similarity effects associated with entanglement at something like (minimum) 10,0

Re: another puzzzle

2005-06-23 Thread Eric Cavalcanti
> >I know that sounds somewhat solipsist in the end, but I can't believe > >that merely scanning me can affect my future. And I would like to > >be convinced otherwise, because I don't like solipsism. > > What do you mean, "the only way I could be convinced otherwise is by doing > the test"? You a

Re: another puzzzle

2005-06-23 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Eric Cavalcanti writes: I believe that the solution is not 3-rd person communicable. I believe that if I press the button 100 times, I'll never experience leaving the room, but there will be 100 copies of me claiming otherwise. That is because I believe that my 1-st person probability (in the

RE: Torture yet again

2005-06-23 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Lee Corbin writes: quote-- [quoting Stathis] > When you press the button in the torture room, there is a 50% > chance that your next moment will be in the same room and and > a 50% chance that it will be somewhere else where you won't be > tortured. However, this constraint has been added to the

Re: another puzzzle

2005-06-23 Thread Jesse Mazer
Eric Cavalcanti wrote: In fact, I believe that in your example "Eric the copy" would probably agree that he is a copy after seing evidence of that, and would live with his life without claiming the rights of the original. That would make him very unhappy and confused, of course, and then "Eric

Re: another puzzzle

2005-06-23 Thread Eric Cavalcanti
On 6/23/05, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Eric Cavalcanti writes: > >I don't think it is that good an analogy for the following reason: > >I don't believe that pushing a button to create a copy of me in > >New York will increase my expectation of experiencing New York, > >while

Re: Pareto laws and expected income

2005-06-23 Thread Russell Standish
On Thu, Jun 23, 2005 at 10:43:50AM +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote: > On Thu, Jun 23, 2005 at 12:01:16PM +1000, Russell Standish wrote: > > The alternative is that consciousness is a continuous property (or at > > least finely divided miltivalued), argued by people like Susan > > ..and by all of critical

Re: copy method important?

2005-06-23 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Tom Caylor writes: [quoting Stathis Papaioannou] But I don't really understand your objection: are you disagreeing that your consciousness will continue as long as there is a successor OM somewhere, or are you disagreeing that there will be a successor OM somewhere if everything exists, or are

Re: Pareto laws and expected income

2005-06-23 Thread Eugen Leitl
On Thu, Jun 23, 2005 at 12:01:16PM +1000, Russell Standish wrote: > The alternative is that consciousness is a continuous property (or at > least finely divided miltivalued), argued by people like Susan ..and by all of critical care medicine. http://www.google.com/search?num=100&hs=aXM&hl=en&lr=