Re: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
[LC]: > Well, Russell did also say that OMs and events seemed to him about as > alike as chalk and cheese. It's starting to look that way: > So, alas, it seems that the firmly established meanings of > "event" and "observer moment" can't really be said to be at > all the same thing. (Folks like Russell and Hal have been > using the term "OM" for years and years, and "event" has > a pretty standard meaning in physics.) Observer moments have > to do with something conscious (and, evidently, pretty complex). > And of course, as Hal wrote later on, consciousness exists on > a gray scale. Then dare I say that any Theory based on this "restricted" definition of OMs (happening to observers with consciousness/intelligence "comparable" to ours) can never be as complete as a theory based on the much simpler (and encompassing) notion of events. Ok, the above sounds a bit arrogant on my part, but its just that when I think of Big things like ToEs, I am much more comfortable without the burden of assuming that I am special in some way. If it were so, It would either be too much of a coincidence, or some act of a God that I can never hope to explain to myself. I can only agree to disagree by saying that any theory that explains consciousness in terms of something more than just "interference of events" on a HUGE scale, is pretty much the same as explaining away coincidents as acts of a God: that unreachable, unfathomable "entity". -- Aditya Varun Chadha adichad AT gmail.com http://www.adichad.com
RE: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
[Lee wrote:] >Interesting note about "mind": there is no German language >equivalent for it. Another reason to be *very* careful when >employing it. Teutonic zombies elided.> > >In a very deep (but non-mathematical) book, "What is Thought?" >by Eric Baum, the author decides to use "mind" as the name of >the program the brain runs, and it seems to work out well. > >Lee What is going on? Another book is quoted and it too is right in front of me. I conclude there is a hidden web cam somewhere in my office I love causality. :) As regards the book contents. I have to go through it in moiré detail but at first run through he makes precisely the same mistakes as all the other functionalists outlined so well in Searle J. R. 1992. The rediscovery of the mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. xv, 270 p. Once again: A metaphor based on a lack of imagination. The fallacy: that because our mind is so adept at constructing ontologies that therefore there is such things as 'things' in the universe. There are ways of constructing 'thought' that have no need for prescription of an ontology of any sort yet appears to be so. Including Germans! Baum cannot make any empirical predictions of brain matter. Nice read...but no progress has been made except to shoehorn the received view into the limelight. Are we ever going to get past this? Cheers Colin
RE: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
[Lee wrote:] >Interesting note about "mind": there is no German language >equivalent for it. Another reason to be *very* careful when >employing it. Teutonic zombies elided.> > >In a very deep (but non-mathematical) book, "What is Thought?" >by Eric Baum, the author decides to use "mind" as the name of >the program the brain runs, and it seems to work out well. > >Lee What is going on? Another book is quoted and it too is right in front of me. I conclude there is a hidden web cam somewhere in my office I love causality. :) As regards the book contents. I have to go through it in moiré detail but at first run through he makes precisely the same mistakes as all the other functionalists outlined so well in Searle J. R. 1992. The rediscovery of the mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. xv, 270 p. Once again: A metaphor based on a lack of imagination. The fallacy: that because our mind is so adept at constructing ontologies that therefore there is such things as 'things' in the universe. There are ways of constructing 'thought' that have no need for prescription of an ontology of any sort yet appears to be so. Including Germans! Baum cannot make any empirical predictions of brain matter. Nice read...but no progress has been made except to shoehorn the received view into the limelight. Are we ever going to get past this? Cheers Colin
Re: OMs are events
Quentin Anciaux writes: > In all of these discussion, it is really this point that annoy me... What is > the calculation ? Is it a physical process ? Obviously a calculation need > time... what is the difference between an abstract calculation (ie: one which > is done on a sheet of paper or just in your head) with an "effective" > calculation ? What is the meaning of "instantiating" in a block universe > view ? I am generally of the school that considers that calculations can be treated as abstract or formal objects, that they can exist without a physical computer existing to run them. The goal is to model the universe (among other things) as such a calculation. If we demand that a calculation exists in a universe, and a universe is also a calculation, then we have an infinite regression. One might postulate a God who is infinite himself and is the endpoint of the regression, but absent such supernatural entities, the model otherwise doesn't work. Why model the universe as a calculation? Well, for one reason, because it seems to work. It appears that physical law is essentially mathematical, implying that it should be feasible in principle to construct a program which could simulate the entire universe to any degree of accuracy. It would seem odd, given that the universe can be a calculation, if it weren't a calculation. If it seems objectionable to have a calculation without a calculator, perhaps simpler examples can support the intuition. You can imagine a triangle without a triangulator. You can imagine a number without someone who counts. Perhaps you can even imagine a mathematical proof without a prover. Mathematical objects may have virtually unlimited complexity and internal structure, and can be said to exist independently of anyone who thinks about them or discovers them. Computations seem to fit very comfortably into this framework. If we allow ourselves to imagine calculations as having mathematical reality, and further to imagine that our universe is such a calculation, then we have unified mathematical and physical reality. There is no longer a difference. Things which are physically real are merely a subset of the things which are mathematically real. If we don't take this step, we have two kinds of reality, mathematical and physical, which makes for a more awkward (IMO) philosophical position. However I certainly understand that all these arguments are only persuasive and indicative and certainly do not amount to a proof. Nevertheless it is my hope that by pursuing these ideas we can construct testable propositions which, if verified, will add weight to the possibility that this is the nature of reality. Hal Finney
RE: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
Lee wrote: >Interesting note about "mind": there is no German language >equivalent for it. Another reason to be *very* careful when >employing it. Teutonic zombies elided.> > >In a very deep (but non-mathematical) book, "What is Thought?" >by Eric Baum, the author decides to use "mind" as the name of >the program the brain runs, and it seems to work out well. > >Lee What is going on? Another book is quoted and it too is right in front of me. I conclude there is a hidden web cam somewhere in my office I love causality. :) As regards the book contents. I have to go through it in more detail but at first run through he makes precisely the same mistakes as all the other functionalists outlined so well in ... Searle J. R. 1992. The rediscovery of the mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Chapter 2 Once again: Baum formulates a metaphor based on a lack of imagination. The fallacy: that because our mind is so adept at constructing ontologies that therefore there is such things as 'things' in the universe. There are ways of constructing 'thought' that have no need for prescription of an ontology of any sort but where it can appear to be that way. Including Germans! Baum cannot make any empirical predictions of brain matter. Nice read...but no progress has been made except to shoehorn the received view into the limelight. Are we ever going to get past this? Cheers Colin
Re: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
On Sun, Jul 31, 2005 at 08:09:46PM -0700, Lee Corbin wrote:
>
> Interesting note about "mind": there is no German language
> equivalent for it. Another reason to be *very* careful when
> employing it. Teutonic zombies elided.>
>
I am surprised about that! The word "der Geist" sprang immediately to
mind as the translation.
According to my German/English disctionary, the relevant words were:
die Seele (psychology)
der Geist (intellect)
das Gemuet (feelings)
das? Lust (desire/inclination) (bsp ich habe Lust zu es machen)
So Geist or Seele would in fact be the closest translations to how I
used mind above. Similarly in French, the word esprit would be
used. In English, these two words have become corrupted to Ghost and
Spirit, meaning much the same thing as each in English, but somewhat
different to the original language meanings. In Seele becomes Soul in English.
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RE: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
Russell writes > John M. wrote > > > I believe if we are up to identifying concepts with > > common sense content as well, we should not restrict > > ourselves into the model-distinctions of (any) physics > > but generalize the meanings beyond such restrictions. I agree: that is, so long as we can smoothly extend the concepts from daily life without conflict with other areas of knowledge. > > To Russell's 4 coordinates of (any?) event: how come > > the occurrence (event!) of a 'good idea' in my mind - > > (mind: not a thing, not a place, not time-restricted) > > should have t,x,y,z coordinates? > > I would say that the event occurs in your brain (the neural correlate > of whatever is going on in your mind). Whatever is going on in your > mind is something else - an "observation" perhaps. Interesting note about "mind": there is no German language equivalent for it. Another reason to be *very* careful when employing it. In a very deep (but non-mathematical) book, "What is Thought?" by Eric Baum, the author decides to use "mind" as the name of the program the brain runs, and it seems to work out well. Lee
Re: Reality vs. Perception of Reality
[-Original Message-Tom Caylor wrote:] May I offer the following quote as a potential catalyst for Bruno and Colin: If thought is laryngeal motion, how should any one think more truly than the wind blows? All movements of bodies are equally necessary, but they cannot be discriminated as true and false. It seems as nonsensical to call a movement true as a flavour purple or a sound avaricious. But what is obvious when thought is said to be a certain bodily movement seems equally to follow from its being the effect of one. Thought called knowledge and thought called error are both necessary results of states of brain. These states are necessary results of other bodily states. All the bodily states are equally real, and so are the different thoughts; but by what right can I hold that my thought is knowledge of what is real in bodies? For to hold so is but another thought, an effect of real bodily movements like the rest. . . These arguments, however, of mine, if the principles of scientific [naturalism]... are to stand unchallenged, are themselves no more than happenings in a mind, results of! bodily movements; that you or I think them sound, or think them unsound, is but another such happening; that we think them no more than another such happening is itself but yet another such. And it may be said of any ground on which we may attempt to stand as true, Labitur et labetur in omne volubilis aevum ["It flows and will flow swirling on forever" (Horace, Epistles, I, 2, 43)]. (H. W. B. Joseph, Some Problems in Ethics (Oxford University Press, 1931), pp. 14-15) Regards, Tom Caylor [Brent Meeker wrote:] So what? Of course without any context, simply looking at physical processes doesn't allow one distiguish "true opinion" for "false opinion". True and false are the linguistic analogues of effective and ineffective action. Wiiliam S. Cooper as written a nice little book on this called "The Evolution of Reason - Logic as a Branch of Biology". Brent Meeker [Bruno wrote] I am not sure I follow that (very well written) statements. It is a little bit wrong like the argument of those who use determinism against free will. By looking at yourself at some low level it *looks* there is no sense, but this just shows that from your personal point of view you are not "living" at that level. You take the risk at dismissing all theories by pointing that they are all produce by and then you are using a theory for describing some level. The fact that Schroedinger was obeying to its one wave equation cannot be used to invalidate it! Bruno [Col replies---] Tom, in your very eloquent fashion you have touched upon the essence of my approach to the issue of a theory of everything. Somewhat spooky in coincidence: as Brent Meeker tells us of Cooper's "Evolution of Reason - Logic as a Branch of Biology" I happen to have that very book in front of me. In that book is yet another very handsome structured linguistic metaphor for the structure of thought and reasoning. Once again I think to myself(very paradoxical, this act!) if I build one will it truly reason like us? The usual answer is 'maybe'. You simply can never resolve the question with linguistic frameworks (artifacts of brain material). Note in the case of Brent and Bruno (and I do this too... putting it aside has been agonising) is an assumption. That assumption is that within the products of thought some direct correspondence with the natural world has been achieved. The reality of the situation is that what has been achieved is a cogent way of arguing for the position, not that the position has touched upon the true nature of things. Cooper has not done this. Nor has Crick, Koch, Edelman or anyone else... The acid test is to make empirical predictions in relation to brain material or some other testable physical situation. If a metaphor ( a model) can’t do that then you're never going to resolve it. Indeed that you can ever really resolve it is as open to criticism. The prediction/observation of the behaviour of the natural world, in particular novel technology, is the only way any progress can be made. Even then the relationship model to the natural world can never be assumed more than verisimilitude in respect of the predicted outcome. This sounds ever so dry and empirical, but it has teeth! If the only evidence you can find in support of 'truth' X is brain material reporting the belief - you are wasting your time. You will be going around in linguistic circles rearranging mental beliefs of other beliefs of other beliefs of. I would commend everyone to take a moment to simply look at things the way Tom has. A collection of matter, a human, made of the natural world, within the natural world, has made an utterance 'about' that natural world. Consider the bare reality of that situation. Forget everything else you have ever read about it. There may be an infinity of abstract do
Re: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
On Sun, Jul 31, 2005 at 02:00:30PM -0700, John M wrote:
> I salute Lee's new subject designation.
>
> I believe if we are up to identifying concepts with
> common sense content as well, we should not restrict
> ourselves into the model-distinctions of (any) physics
> but generalize the meanings beyond such restrictions.
> Of course: I am no physicist. My apologies.
>
> To Russel's 4 coordinates of (any?) event: how come
> the occurrence (event!) of a 'good idea' in my mind -
> (mind: not a thing, not a place, not time-restricted)
> should have t,x,y,z coordinates?
>
> Naively yours
>
> John Mikes
>
I would say that the event occurs in your brain (the neural correlate
of whatever is going on in your mind). Whatever is going on in your
mind is something else - an "observation" perhaps.
I'm only pointing to my understanding of these terms - I'm willing to
change terminology if its useful to do so.
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Re: What We Can Know About the World
I would not be surprised if there were some sort of duality
relationship (note: mathematical term employed here) between observer
moment and event, appropriately defined, however it is unclear how one
might adjust the definitions I gave to illuminate such a duality.
Cheers
On Sun, Jul 31, 2005 at 10:44:17AM -0400, Stephen Paul King wrote:
> Hi Russel,
>
>A possibly related question. Given your definition of events and OMs,
> does it not seem that they complement each other, assuming that events have
> more quatities associated, such as 4-momentum-energy?
>
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
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RE: What We Can Know About the World
Brent writes > [Lee writes] > > [Jesse wrote] > > > Sure, but all of this is compatible with an idealist philosophy where > > > reality is made up of nothing but observer-moments at the most > > > fundamental level--something like the "naturalistic panpsychism" > > > discussed on that webpage I mentioned. > > > > The disagreement I have with what you have written > > is that I do *not* see observer-moments as the most > > fundamental entities. > > There are two distinct kinds of "fundamental". OMs may be epistemologically > fundamental, but not ontologically fundamental. We'll see about that! :-) > Starting with what we think we know, we develop a model > of reality which goes beyond what we directly experience. > It's the best explanation of our experience that > there is a reality not dependent on our thoughts. I can't argue with that. Yes, indeed, whether individually as we develop from childhood, or historically, as we develop away from primitive concepts, (but NOT philologically, as we develop from early life forms), we fashion all these complicated explanations of what lies beyond what we directly experience, e.g., other parts of the light spectrum. Key is the fantastic accuracy of these models. Fifteen or more decimal places of accuracy! Let us never forget this! But I'd suggest that even the stance of a tiger is that of an explorer who's ready to learn about some aspect of his environment which has so far escaped him (like lunch). So the tiger too in a sense understands that there is a reality not dependent on his thoughts. I would say that *epistemologically* fundamental are the usual objects of childhood, which we still regard as primary most of each day. You know there's a keyboard in front of you, and about other practical realities that do not permit you to post all day long on the Everything list. Lee > > It's just so much *clearer* to me to see them arising > > only after 13.7 billion years or so (locally) and that\ > > they obtain *only* as a result of physical processes. > > That seems to be the most parsimonious explanation. > > Brent Meeker
Re: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
I salute Lee's new subject designation. I believe if we are up to identifying concepts with common sense content as well, we should not restrict ourselves into the model-distinctions of (any) physics but generalize the meanings beyond such restrictions. Of course: I am no physicist. My apologies. To Russel's 4 coordinates of (any?) event: how come the occurrence (event!) of a 'good idea' in my mind - (mind: not a thing, not a place, not time-restricted) should have t,x,y,z coordinates? Naively yours John Mikes --- Lee Corbin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Russell submits the following as clarifications: > > > An event is a particular set of coordinates > (t,x,y,z) in 4D > > spacetime. This is how it is used in GR, anyway. > > > > An observer moment is a set of constraints, or > equivalently > > information known about the world (obviously at a > moment of time). > > It [the observer moment] corresponds the the > "state" vector \psi > > of quantum mechanics. > > and Stephen inquires > > > Hi Russell, > > A possibly related question. Given your > definition of events and OMs, > > does it not seem that they complement each other, > assuming that events have > > more quatities associated, such as > 4-momentum-energy? > > Well, Russell did also say that OMs and events > seemed to him about as > alike as chalk and cheese. It's starting to look > that way: > > I quote Hal: > > Calling them [causal patterns] "observer > moments" seems > to be a bit of a stretch, given the enormous > number of > orders of magnitude difference between what we > would > normally recognize as a conscious OM and one of > these > trivial ones [e.g. a 302-neuron nematode OM]. > > So, alas, it seems that the firmly established > meanings of > "event" and "observer moment" can't really be said > to be at > all the same thing. (Folks like Russell and Hal have > been > using the term "OM" for years and years, and "event" > has > a pretty standard meaning in physics.) Observer > moments have > to do with something conscious (and, evidently, > pretty complex). > And of course, as Hal wrote later on, consciousness > exists on > a gray scale. > > Lee > > P.S. In normal physics an event, as Russell says, is > associated > with coordinates. Nonetheless I, for one, had always > supposed > that indeed something was happening there, e.g., a > photon was > emitted. Well, in familiar physics we may also say > that in the > usual three-space there is quantum activity at each > point. This, > at least for me, makes the terms a little more > meaningful. > >
Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
Russell submits the following as clarifications: > An event is a particular set of coordinates (t,x,y,z) in 4D > spacetime. This is how it is used in GR, anyway. > > An observer moment is a set of constraints, or equivalently > information known about the world (obviously at a moment of time). > It [the observer moment] corresponds the the "state" vector \psi > of quantum mechanics. and Stephen inquires > Hi Russell, > A possibly related question. Given your definition of events and OMs, > does it not seem that they complement each other, assuming that events have > more quatities associated, such as 4-momentum-energy? Well, Russell did also say that OMs and events seemed to him about as alike as chalk and cheese. It's starting to look that way: I quote Hal: Calling them [causal patterns] "observer moments" seems to be a bit of a stretch, given the enormous number of orders of magnitude difference between what we would normally recognize as a conscious OM and one of these trivial ones [e.g. a 302-neuron nematode OM]. So, alas, it seems that the firmly established meanings of "event" and "observer moment" can't really be said to be at all the same thing. (Folks like Russell and Hal have been using the term "OM" for years and years, and "event" has a pretty standard meaning in physics.) Observer moments have to do with something conscious (and, evidently, pretty complex). And of course, as Hal wrote later on, consciousness exists on a gray scale. Lee P.S. In normal physics an event, as Russell says, is associated with coordinates. Nonetheless I, for one, had always supposed that indeed something was happening there, e.g., a photon was emitted. Well, in familiar physics we may also say that in the usual three-space there is quantum activity at each point. This, at least for me, makes the terms a little more meaningful.
RE: OMs are events
to all:
since I missed hundreds of posts in this list - now
extremely proliferous and sweeping through "subjects"
making backtracking a bore,
do we have an agreement on
WHAT do we call an EVENT? Also: To OBSERVE?
In my lay common sense I am inclined to call a step in
a change an event, and the acknowledgment (absorption
acceptance, incorporation) of information an
observation - by anything, photon, universe or G. B.
Shaw.
In such semantics an OM may be a qualifier in events.
Not the event proper.
I know this is splittin hair, but we may fix what we
are talking about. Just to keep our sanity.
Best regards
John Mikes
--- Lee Corbin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Saibal writes
>
> > I agree with the notion of OMs as events in some
> suitably chosen space.
> > Observers are defined by the programs that
> generate them. If we identify
> > universes with programs then observers are just
> embedded universes. An
> > observer moment is just a qualia experienced by
> the observer, which is just
> > an event in the observer's universe.
>
> Is there a possible confusion here on the one hand
> between
> "event" as a witnessed event by extensive systems
> like observers,
> and on the other hand event as used in, say,
> spacetime physics?
> ("Observers" are *usually* taken to be rather
> complex systems.)
>
> One interpretation of what Aditya was saying (and
> which I know Stephen
> sometimes entertains) is that every film in a
> camera, or even anything
> whatsoever on which a record can be made could be
> thought of as an
> observer. That is---perhaps---anything that can be
> influenced at all.
> So I'm not sure what you mean by "observer". Could
> you put some limits
> on it?
>
> Lee
>
>
Re: OMs are events
Hi Hal, Le Dimanche 31 Juillet 2005 19:06, Hal Finney a écrit : > SNIP > > This shows that the program really did create the observer-moment, because > there was little extra data in the map program. The correspondence was > in the calculation, not in the map. In all of these discussion, it is really this point that annoy me... What is the calculation ? Is it a physical process ? Obviously a calculation need time... what is the difference between an abstract calculation (ie: one which is done on a sheet of paper or just in your head) with an "effective" calculation ? What is the meaning of "instantiating" in a block universe view ? Quentin
RE: OMs are events
Saibal writes
> I agree with the notion of OMs as events in some suitably chosen space.
> Observers are defined by the programs that generate them. If we identify
> universes with programs then observers are just embedded universes. An
> observer moment is just a qualia experienced by the observer, which is just
> an event in the observer's universe.
Is there a possible confusion here on the one hand between
"event" as a witnessed event by extensive systems like observers,
and on the other hand event as used in, say, spacetime physics?
("Observers" are *usually* taken to be rather complex systems.)
One interpretation of what Aditya was saying (and which I know Stephen
sometimes entertains) is that every film in a camera, or even anything
whatsoever on which a record can be made could be thought of as an
observer. That is---perhaps---anything that can be influenced at all.
So I'm not sure what you mean by "observer". Could you put some limits
on it?
Lee
Re: OMs are events
Saibal Mitra writes: > I agree with the notion of OMs as events in some suitably chosen space. > Observers are defined by the programs that generate them. If we identify > universes with programs then observers are just embedded universes. An > observer moment is just a qualia experienced by the observer, which is just > an event in the observer's universe. I can agree with the thrust of this, but let me break it down a bit. I agree that, "Observers are defined by the programs that generate them." One complication is that any output, including an observer, may be produced by multiple programs, which leads to Bruno's first-person indeterminacy. But that's not important here. I pretty much agree that, "If we identify universes with programs then observers are just embedded universes." However I think the terminology is being stretched quite a bit here, calling observers embedded universes. What I would say is, programs produce every possible kind of information structure. We could call all of these structures "universes", although the word is going to be more applicable in some cases than others. For example, there is a program which outputs the sequence of integers. Is that sequence a "universe"? It's a stretch, but okay, we can call it that. But there are also programs which output the dynamic information patterns that recognizably correspond to observers. The structure of such programs is a key part of the "book" which Lee Corbin suggests I have been in effect writing. If we stick to the definition that all outputs are (in some sense) "universes" then yes, I agree with your statement that observers can be thought of as embedded universes. Actually I'm not sure I fully agree about the "embedded" part. I'm not sure what you mean by that. Maybe you mean that the observer (whom we have defined as a universe) is himself embedded in a larger universe, the world we see around us. I agree that this will often be the case. "An observer moment is just a qualia experienced by the observer, which is just an event in the observer's universe." I think I see what you're saying here. If we focus on the observer as a "universe" we can think of him as being sort of self-contained. Yes, in practice he is probably embedded in a larger world, but we can restrict our attention to the observer himself, as an abstract process that is going through a sequence of states. These momentary states are what you are calling the "events" of the observer "universe", and these would correspond to observer-moments. In our space-time we have a notion of "events" as the four dimensional points out of which space-time is built. But you are saying that the internal structure of an observer as a sort of self-contained universe is not really four-dimensional. Maybe it's trillion-dimensional. It is an abstract structure which, while embedded in our space-time, exists on its own terms with its own internal data representation. You are defining "events" within that data structure, that self-contained universe. They don't have a direct correspondence with four dimensional space-time events in the larger universe that the observer is embedded in. This reminds me of Jesse Mazer's conjecture about consciousness as a causal pattern. I asked whether he could imagine an abstract causal network as capturing the essence of a given moment of consciousness. I could see that concept as being closely related to your idea of the observer as a universe, embedded in a larger structure. However I may be merely projecting both of your ideas into my own framework. > I don't think that Hal's idea of identifying brain patterns with OMs will be > successful. The brain is just the hardware that runs a program (the > observer). I don't think we necessarily disagree about this. In http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m7453.html I wrote: "To apply this concept to observers, we first need to think of an observer as an information pattern. I adopt a block universe perspective and think of time as a dimension. Then we can see the dynamic activity that is part of an observer's thinking as producing a pattern in space and time." So I have an observer as being a *dynamic* pattern in space and time. It is not just the hardware, it is the temporal pattern of activation of the neural network. I then went into painstaking albeit crude detail in the rest of that message to try to estimate just how much information it would take to capture a certain number of seconds of firing of the neural network. Again, this is a pattern of activity, a series of related events, not just a static snapshot. I also discussed in detail in that message how an observer as a self contained information pattern could be considered to be embedded in a larger universe, and how that would affect the measure of the observer. That seems very much like your conception above, if I understood it correctly. > If I run a simulation of our solar system on a computer, then the > r
Re: OMs are events
Hi Saibal, Let me add a question to your insightful post. Could we consider the "hardware: itself to be a simulation as well? Onward! Stephen - Original Message - From: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Aditya Varun Chadha" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; "Lee Corbin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; ; ""Hal Finney"" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2005 12:19 PM Subject: OMs are events I agree with the notion of OMs as events in some suitably chosen space. Observers are defined by the programs that generate them. If we identify universes with programs then observers are just embedded universes. An observer moment is just a qualia experienced by the observer, which is just an event in the observer's universe. I don't think that Hal's idea of identifying brain patterns with OMs will be successful. The brain is just the hardware that runs a program (the observer). If I run a simulation of our solar system on a computer, then the relevant events are e.g. that Jupiter is in such and such a position. This is associated with the state of the transistors of the computer running the program. But that same pattern could arise in a completely different calculation. You would have to extract exactly what program is running on the machine to be able to define OMs like that. To do that you need to feed the program with different kinds of input and study the output, otherwise you'll fall prey to the famous ''clock paradox'' (you can map the time evolution of a clock to that of any object, including brains). Saibal
OMs are events
I agree with the notion of OMs as events in some suitably chosen space. Observers are defined by the programs that generate them. If we identify universes with programs then observers are just embedded universes. An observer moment is just a qualia experienced by the observer, which is just an event in the observer's universe. I don't think that Hal's idea of identifying brain patterns with OMs will be successful. The brain is just the hardware that runs a program (the observer). If I run a simulation of our solar system on a computer, then the relevant events are e.g. that Jupiter is in such and such a position. This is associated with the state of the transistors of the computer running the program. But that same pattern could arise in a completely different calculation. You would have to extract exactly what program is running on the machine to be able to define OMs like that. To do that you need to feed the program with different kinds of input and study the output, otherwise you'll fall prey to the famous ''clock paradox'' (you can map the time evolution of a clock to that of any object, including brains). Saibal - Original Message - From: "Aditya Varun Chadha" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Lee Corbin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2005 08:46 AM Subject: Re: What We Can Know About the World > [RS] > On 7/31/05, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > On Sat, Jul 30, 2005 at 12:25:48PM -0700, Lee Corbin wrote: > > > > > > This is not to say that progress is impossible. Consider an idea > > > like Aditya has: what is the real difference between an event > > > and an observer-moment? In trying to answer that question, many > > > of us may learn something (at least for our own purposes). > > > > > > > Err, an event is a particular set of coordinates (t,x,y,z) in 4D > > spacetime. This is how it is used in GR, anyway. > > > > An observer moment is a set of constraints, or equivalently > > information known about the world (obviously at a moment of time). It > > corresponds the the "state" vector \psi of quantum mechanics. > > > > Perhaps you have different definitions of these terms, but it seems > > like chalk and cheese to me. > > > > Lets not constrain an "event" to mean something only in 4-space. Take > any N-Space and you can define it in terms of a set of N-dim. events. > Ofcourse I agree with your definition, am just making it scale over > dimensions. > > Now consider an "observer moment" to be exactly what you are defining > it to be: information KNOWN about the world at a moment of time. The > "coming to know" of any information corresponds to an "event". Thus an > "observer moment" is well-defined if and only if "event" is defined. > In other words, an Observer-Moment exists iff it's corresponding > "coming to know" event exists for "some" observer. In terms of light > cones, OMs are the Events at and "after" the crossing over of light > cones. > > I think the distinction is not a qualitative one between the two, only > those events which interfere with the set of events "observable" by > "us" (who are also just sets of events) correspond to > "observer-moments" in "our universe". So the set of OMs is simply a > subset of the set of all events. > > refer to my previous mail about the multiverse as a partition with > equivalence classes which are maximal sets of connected "observer > moments", in other words, maximal sets of "mutually interfering > events". visualize this as connected components of a graph. > > Defining entities in more than one different sets of words does not > rule out their qualitative identity. Every Observer-Moment is an > event. Every event is an Observer-Moment in some universe. > > -- > Aditya Varun Chadha > adichad AT gmail.com > http://www.adichad.com >
Re: What We Can Know About the World
Hi Russel,
A possibly related question. Given your definition of events and OMs,
does it not seem that they complement each other, assuming that events have
more quatities associated, such as 4-momentum-energy?
Onward!
Stephen
- Original Message -
From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Lee Corbin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc:
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2005 12:40 AM
Subject: Re: What We Can Know About the World
On Sat, Jul 30, 2005 at 12:25:48PM -0700, Lee Corbin wrote:
This is not to say that progress is impossible. Consider an idea
like Aditya has: what is the real difference between an event
and an observer-moment? In trying to answer that question, many
of us may learn something (at least for our own purposes).
Err, an event is a particular set of coordinates (t,x,y,z) in 4D
spacetime. This is how it is used in GR, anyway.
An observer moment is a set of constraints, or equivalently
information known about the world (obviously at a moment of time). It
corresponds the the "state" vector \psi of quantum mechanics.
Perhaps you have different definitions of these terms, but it seems
like chalk and cheese to me.
Cheers
--
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RE: What We Can Know About the World
Jesse Mazer writes: > as I said, my idea is > that *all* possible causal patterns qualify as "observer-moments", not just > complex ones like ours. And I don't disagree that complex observer-moments > are generally the result of a long process of evolution in the physical > universe, it's just that I think at a most fundamental level the "physical > universe" would be reducible to an enormous pattern of causal relationships > which can be broken down into the relationships between a lot of > sub-patterns, each of which is an observer-moment. The idea that physics > should ultimately be explainable in terms of nothing more than causal > relationships between events, and that higher-order concepts like > "particles" and "spacetime" would emerge from this level of explanation, is > an idea that some approaches to quantum gravity seem to favor, like loop > quantum gravity--it's at least not out of the question that a final > "physical" ToE would be about nothing more than causal relationships between > events. If so, it would just be a different "interpretation" of this theory > to say that each sub-network in this universal causal network would be an > observer-moment of some kind, and my "meta-physical" speculation would be > that you could *start* by looking at all possible finite causal networks and > finding a unique measure on them, and the appearance of the huge causal > network we call the "physical universe" could be derived from the > relationships between all the sub-patterns implied by this unique measure. This is a very interesting speculation which raises some random questions and comments: 1. One problem I have is with the notion of causality. Do you view this as something that is well defined, the degree and/or kind of causality that one node in a causal network applies to another? Would it be merely a boolean (node A either does or does not have a causal influence on node B) or would it be more complex (node A promotes B while inhibiting C)? I realize that these are detailed questions to be asked of an embryonic theory but it would help to understand what your notion of causality is. One of my concerns is that some universes may not have causality as well defined as ours does, and I wonder how well your theory would work there. In fact, even in our universe one can certainly imagine situations and relationships between events where the existence or degree of causality is not at all well defined. I'm worried about basing a model for consciousness on something as abstract and ill defined as causality. Are we replacing one mystery with another? 2. If we think of the "causal pattern" which corresponds to a conventional observer-moment, say your experience of eating a particular bite of cherry pie, would you imagine that this is something which could in principle be diagrammed, and/or represented in some kind of canonical form? So we could point to this picture and say, this *is* that particular experience of eating that byte of cherry pie. That would be pretty cool, and I do think that ultimately any theory of consciousness is going to have to be able to do something like this. 3. Presumably the actual causal patterns of our conscious moments are very large. We have trillions of neurons each with tens of thousands of synapses, firing at hundreds or thousands of times per second. That's a lot of activity, all of it intricately linked into what might well be called a causal network, although the "causality" involved is quite complex and involves integration over time. But assuming that we could in fact imagine representing that in canonical form, clearly the representation would be very large. We could imagine successively simpler "causal patterns" until we got down to quite trivial ones. Calling them "observer moments" seems to be a bit of a stretch, given the enormous number of orders of magnitude difference between what we would normally recognize as a conscious OM and one of these trivial ones. But on the other hand I agree that we could probably not draw a line in this succession of causal patterns and say this half are conscious, this half are unconscious. Presumably we are talking about shades of gray here, degrees of consciousness. It never completely goes away, although it certainly gets close enough to zero for all practical purposes. 4. Another point is that for a "causal pattern" to actually be recognizably conscious requires more than complexity. One can imagine any number of causal networks of perhaps tremendous complexity that would not seem particularly likely to correspond to what we would recognize as conscious experience. (In terms of the "shades of gray" analogy, even though the networks are at least slightly conscious by definition, there would still be virtually no "gray" there.) 5. To me, this points to the problem with panpsychism theories like this. On the one hand, everything is conscious (at least a little bit). This saves us from t
