RE: More than one kind of 'causality'?
On 19th September 2005 Marc Geddes writes: Here's a speculation: The model I'm working with for my theory seems to suggest 3 different fundamental kinds of 'cause and effect'. The first is physical causality - motion of physical objects through space. The second is mental causality - agents making choices which effect agents The third is what I call 'Multiverse causality', a sort of highly abtsract 'causality' close to the notion of logical consistency/consilience - that which ensures that knowledge has a certain ordered 'structure' to it . How does the second type differ from the first? Descartes thought there was a difference, and a puzzle: how can the non-physical (i.e. the mental) affect the physical? His solution was that that the two fundamentally different domains - the mental and the physical - must somehow connect and interact at the pineal gland. Of course, this conclusion is laughable, even for a dualist. The interaction of billiard balls is an archetypical example of what you call "physical causality". Suppose it were shown that this interaction implements a conscious computation, as the less immediately accessible but (do you agree?) fundamentally similar interaction of atoms in the brain implements a conscious computation. Does the billiard ball interaction then transform from the first type to the second type, or both types, or what? As for the third type of causality, could you give an example? --Stathis Papaioannou _ SEEK: Over 80,000 jobs across all industries at Australia's #1 job site. http://ninemsn.seek.com.au?hotmail
Re: More than one kind of 'causality'?
Its a different mode of description. Physics does not describe the
subjective state. Also, causation no. 2 appears to work in the
opposite direction to causation no. 1.
Cheers
On Mon, Sep 19, 2005 at 06:01:45PM -0700, Pete Carlton wrote:
>
> On Sep 19, 2005, at 1:00 AM, Marc Geddes wrote:
>
> >Here's a speculation:
> >
> >The model I'm working with for my theory seems to suggest 3
> >different fundamental kinds of 'cause and effect'.
> >
> >The first is physical causality - motion of physical objects
> >through space.
> >The second is mental causality - agents making choices which
> >effect agents
> >The third is what I call 'Multiverse causality', a sort of highly
> >abtsract 'causality' close to the notion of logical consistency/
> >consilience - that which ensures that knowledge has a certain
> >ordered 'structure' to it .
> >
> >Anyone have any thoughts on this?
> >
>
> Here's my thought -- isn't it the case that we know enough about how
> brains work today that, at the very least, it is a huge overstatement
> to refer to the first two types as "different fundamental kinds"? In
> other words, I will claim that type 2 is actually nothing more than a
> subset of type 1, occurring in particular circumstances. What
> evidence goes against this view?
>
> -Pete
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Re: More than one kind of 'causality'?
On Sep 19, 2005, at 1:00 AM, Marc Geddes wrote: Here's a speculation: The model I'm working with for my theory seems to suggest 3 different fundamental kinds of 'cause and effect'. The first is physical causality - motion of physical objects through space. The second is mental causality - agents making choices which effect agents The third is what I call 'Multiverse causality', a sort of highly abtsract 'causality' close to the notion of logical consistency/ consilience - that which ensures that knowledge has a certain ordered 'structure' to it . Anyone have any thoughts on this? Here's my thought -- isn't it the case that we know enough about how brains work today that, at the very least, it is a huge overstatement to refer to the first two types as "different fundamental kinds"? In other words, I will claim that type 2 is actually nothing more than a subset of type 1, occurring in particular circumstances. What evidence goes against this view? -Pete
Re: Summary of seed ideas for my developing TOE - 'The Sentient Centered Theory Of Metaphysics' (SCTOM)
Whether it's ignoring the unperceived or unperceivable, what I'm asking is: Why do you limit metaphysics, at the outset, to being "for the purposes of understanding general intelligence?" On the other hand, how do we know what "general" intelligence is if all we have is our human understanding? Tom
Re: Summary of seed ideas for my developing TOE - 'The Sentient Centered Theory Of Metaphysics' (SCTOM)
Marc seems unclear between "unperceivable" and "unperceived," maybe clearing that up would help. If everything real needs some sort of perceivability, then everything real would need not only to be interpretable and decodable, but also to be verifiable, confirmable, corroborable, etc., by interpreted signs' (not symbols per se, just anything significant) recipients on the basis of earlier/current/later experiences. Evolution confirms/disconfirms in a way; but percipient intelligent organisms prefer to check our interpretations before evolution gets a chance to find them wrong and to discard them by discarding us from the gene pool. If reality needs perceivability, & not merely decodability by something plantlike and unlearning, then it needs not only interpretability (meaning, value, etc.), but also observability-in-light-of-interpretations and verifiability (validity, cogency, soundness, etc.) as to meaning. This seems more or less the view of typical working scientists (of whom I'm not one) -- if it's beyond all observability by anything whatsoever, even in principle,! then is it even real? One can argue about it. But if we're talking about a requirement for actual perception, then we're talking about a need by reality for actual observation, verification, etc. (and ultimately more science than seems possible for us finite creatures to produce). Bishop Berkeley might like it, though. Regards, Ben Udell - Original Message - From: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; Sent: Monday, September 19, 2005 6:07 PM Subject: Re: Summary of seed ideas for my developing TOE - 'The Sentient Centered Theory Of Metaphysics' (SCTOM) OK, you said All comments welcome. You asked for it. First, there's a lot to read here, so I assumed you were presenting the basic gist of your ideas in the first few paragraphs, and so I have a few comments about those paragraphs. I commend you for trying to explain values as part of the framework. I've whinced before when I've read some thought experiments on this list that depended on accepting the existence of such ideas as good and bad. I believe in the existence of good and bad, but one needs to support his/her belief in good and bad and not take them as a given. It seems that your limitation of reality to meaningful existence is actually rejecting Mathematical Platonism. Why is consciousness required to make a mathematical truth real? I thought that you are trying to deal with all of existence, not just meaningful existence, since your theory tries to explain "how the most fundamental properties of existence facts fit together into a unified metaphysical framework." And yet here you limit existence to what we can perceive. >> The core assumption is that existence without perception is meaningless. Reality requires not only raw data but something to *interpret* that data, to supply meaning to it. This can only be done by consciousness of *some* kind. If something was hypothesized to exist that could in no way directly or indirectly affect the conscious perceptions of *any* possible observer, then in what sense could it be said to exist at all? Even if it could be successfully argued that it did have some kind of abstract philosophical existence, it could never have any possible value to sentient minds. For the purposes of understanding general intelligence, it suffices to define that which exists as that which could directly or indirectly ( i.e. in principle) affect the perceptions of *some* possible conscious observer. So you've eliminated the whole realm of "unperceived reality" in the superset of existence. You've eliminated the motivation to bring unperceived reality into the realm of perceived reality, since the former does not exist. Reading these metaphysical theories doesn't really impress me when I realize that these theories really don't have anything new in them that the ancient Greeks (for instance) didn't have. Of course the big gap in all of these theories, which I believe will never be filled, is the integration of consciousness (in general) into physics. Even if we integrate human consciousness into it (which I don't think is going to happen), that doesn't cover the whole gammit of what consciousness is in the whole universe. Who knows, there's so much we don't know about stars (and they are so big) that perhaps some stars have consciousness of some kind that is outside of the definition of how we would define it, but may be even more "enlightened" about the universe, and yet we may never know. Tom
Re: Summary of seed ideas for my developing TOE - 'The Sentient Centered Theory Of Metaphysics' (SCTOM)
OK, you said All comments welcome. You asked for it. First, there's a lot to read here, so I assumed you were presenting the basic gist of your ideas in the first few paragraphs, and so I have a few comments about those paragraphs. I commend you for trying to explain values as part of the framework. I've whinced before when I've read some thought experiments on this list that depended on accepting the existence of such ideas as good and bad. I believe in the existence of good and bad, but one needs to support his/her belief in good and bad and not take them as a given. It seems that your limitation of reality to meaningful existence is actually rejecting Mathematical Platonism. Why is consciousness required to make a mathematical truth real? I thought that you are trying to deal with all of existence, not just meaningful existence, since your theory tries to explain "how the most fundamental properties of existence facts fit together into a unified metaphysical framework." And yet here you limit existence to what we can perceive. The core assumption is that existence without perception is meaningless. Reality requires not only raw data but something to *interpret* that data, to supply meaning to it. This can only be done by consciousness of *some* kind. If something was hypothesized to exist that could in no way directly or indirectly affect the conscious perceptions of *any* possible observer, then in what sense could it be said to exist at all? Even if it could be successfully argued that it did have some kind of abstract philosophical existence, it could never have any possible value to sentient minds. For the purposes of understanding general intelligence, it suffices to define that which exists as that which could directly or indirectly ( i.e. in principle) affect the perceptions of *some* possible conscious observer. So you've eliminated the whole realm of "unperceived reality" in the superset of existence. You've eliminated the motivation to bring unperceived reality into the realm of perceived reality, since the former does not exist. Reading these metaphysical theories doesn't really impress me when I realize that these theories really don't have anything new in them that the ancient Greeks (for instance) didn't have. Of course the big gap in all of these theories, which I believe will never be filled, is the integration of consciousness (in general) into physics. Even if we integrate human consciousness into it (which I don't think is going to happen), that doesn't cover the whole gammit of what consciousness is in the whole universe. Who knows, there's so much we don't know about stars (and they are so big) that perhaps some stars have consciousness of some kind that is outside of the definition of how we would define it, but may be even more "enlightened" about the universe, and yet we may never know. Tom
Re: Book preview: Theory of Nothing
Hi John: It would surprise me if it turns out somehow that a single description [kernel] can have two fully contradictory properties from the list such as fully square and fully round simultaneously assigned to the same object. I do not currently allow that this is in any way "logical". However, I would allow that a transitioning object may have aspects of roundness and aspects of squareness simultaneously.Otherwise I am fairly liberal in what I allow is "logical" for objects. I do not include "ideas" - such as inconsistent mathematical systems - in this "exclusion". Thus I would currently allow that all descriptions that do not contain fully contradictory objects but can perhaps contain self contradictory collections of ideas are in the All and thus eventually given instantations of physical reality over and over. As to the full list I suspect that to allow for inconsistent "ideas" such as inconsistent mathematics that some of the items on the list [properties] could themselves be self contradictory. Yours Hal Ruhl At 04:00 PM 9/19/2005, you wrote: Hal: Do you have any suppositions how 'fragments' can be part of 'this' or rather 'that' description? Is there anything in 'everything' (pardon me the pun) which 'makes' more likely for a (possible??? see below) component to belong to ensemble D vs. ensemble F? Are there attributes of the fragments (component? and how can they be found/defined? (I use 'information' in a different sense: as an 'absorbed' (acknowledged) difference - giving to the characteristic of a difference a way to (real) existence). Your 'theory' seems to round itself to more and more completion (I still call 'mine' a narrative) the only striking word lately (for me) was: "possible", meaning "in our view?" or "also exceeding the possibilities WE find so"? How can we include - in our terms - impossibles into the list of the possibles? I hope this is not more nitpicking than our overall struggle with words to express the inexpressible... John Mikes
Re: More than one kind of 'causality'?
Stephen, without any 'implication' to 'logic' (I leave that to Bruno) my theoretical disapproval for the term 'cause' coming from the (reductionist?) view of our physical (both verbally and scientifically meant) universe: we have a model with boundaries (my distinction, I hope in congruence with Hal's lexicon) and we search for the "most obvious" originator for an event WITHIN those boundaries (within any of our models we consider). My wholistic view of 'complexity' acknowledges the interconnection of 'them all', our model is connected to extraneous (beyond boundary) factors as well with effects (and responses) whether we recognize them or not. So to "pick" a cause may please the order, but is incomplete at least. The origination of the cumulative changes of nature cannot be restricted to any (maybe in our restricted observation: the most ostentatious) single "cause". I 'feel' (I am far from having studied it in any depth) that the "3rd kind" is close to my vision, except for the connotation of the (in my views) restricted QM-related Multiverse and explanations from the model-view physics (Q or class). I would keep away from the use of 'teleological'. Best regards to Marc and you John Mikes --- Stephen Paul King <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Dear Marc, > > Is this proposed third kind of cause similar to > the notion of Implication in logic? > > Kindest regards, > > Stephen > - Original Message - > From: Marc Geddes > To: everything-list@eskimo.com > Sent: Monday, September 19, 2005 4:36 AM > Subject: Re: More than one kind of 'causality'? > > > > Yes, my first proposed kind of causation is indeed > the usual physics kind of causation. > > I'm not sure that you understood my second > proposed kind of causation - a choice made by a > teleological agent (like humans) which affects the > teleology (process of moving towards one's goals) of > other agents. This is not 'downward causation' or > 'efficient causation' as far as I can tell. > > My third proposed kind of causation is highly > abstract in nature and hard to explain. It involves > the structure of the Multiverse (patterns across > multiple QM branches). A sort of 'Platonic' cause > tying different kinds of knowledge together - i.e > establishing a logical 'direction' for complexity. > > On 9/19/05, Russell Standish > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > OK - the first is the usual sort of cause used > in Physics, or material > cause. The second is sometimes known as downward > causation, or > efficient causation. The third one, though I'm > struggling with. Is it > the same as my "circular causation", sort of > first and final casuation > rolled into one? > > Cheers >
Re: Book preview: Theory of Nothing
Hal: Do you have any suppositions how 'fragments' can be part of 'this' or rather 'that' description? Is there anything in 'everything' (pardon me the pun) which 'makes' more likely for a (possible??? see below) component to belong to ensemble D vs. ensemble F? Are there attributes of the fragments (component? and how can they be found/defined? (I use 'information' in a different sense: as an 'absorbed' (acknowledged) difference - giving to the characteristic of a difference a way to (real) existence). Your 'theory' seems to round itself to more and more completion (I still call 'mine' a narrative) the only striking word lately (for me) was: "possible", meaning "in our view?" or "also exceeding the possibilities WE find so"? How can we include - in our terms - impossibles into the list of the possibles? I hope this is not more nitpicking than our overall struggle with words to express the inexpressible... John Mikes --- Hal Ruhl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > At 08:18 PM 9/17/2005, you wrote: ...SNIP > Assumption: There is [exists] a list of all possible > components of > descriptions [not descriptions themselves - these > are derivative of the > list's existence but have a potential [a kernel in > my model's lexicon] of > instantiations of reality [a "dust in the wind" > "physical" existence.]] > Cut > > Yours > > Hal Ruhl > > >
Re: Book preview: Theory of Nothing
At 08:18 PM 9/17/2005, you wrote: I wouldn't say a lower level, its more of an alternative route to the same point. I get there fairly directly from the observation that the Plenitude of all descriptions has zero information (according to all observers), so is in effect the simplest possible object. My approach starts with - I would now say - one assumption and three observations: Assumption: There is [exists] a list of all possible components of descriptions [not descriptions themselves - these are derivative of the list's existence but have a potential [a kernel in my model's lexicon] of instantations of reality [a "dust in the wind" "physical" existence.]] This list of fragments of descriptions is my primitive. It has no information [meaning or boundary potential] unless divided into pairs of descriptions. The ensemble of all such divisions also has no net information beyond its inconsistency. This inconsistency is a tag of information [meaning or boundary potential] attached to the All which is cancelled by the dual tag of incompleteness attached to the Nothing. Can a system that is both incomplete and inconsistent be said to have overall meaning? Observation 1: The list can be parsed so as to produce the definition of [is,is not] pairs. [produce descriptions two by two] Observation 2: At least one of these pairs is unavoidable [the idea that there is either nothing or something is replaced with the idea that there is both simultaneously] and so has a "permanence" derived from the lists existence. Observation 3: Because of the logical properties of the unavoidable pair this "permanence" has a dynamic and that dynamic is random because of these logical properties. I also note the duality relation that maps the Plenitude to Nothing, hence my title "Theory of Nothing". I am not a mathematician but I have recently explored the idea of mathematical duality and do not contest at this time that my [Nothing;All] and your [Nothing;Plenitude] can be considered mathematically dual pairs. Constrasting this with your model, you note an inherent contradiction in the Nothing not being able to state its own completeness, hence immediately necessitating the existence of the "All", My Nothing and my All are both necessitated by the list, the divisible nature of lists, and the unavoidable nature of this particular division of the list. which in turn is inconsistent. Your claim is that this leads to a "dynamic" between Nothing and All. My concern for some time has been: What drives the "observational" process? Why do we perceive a succession of events? My answer is the evolving Somethings. Most Somethings evolve because they are unlikely to be complete short of when they grow to be infinite [encompass the entire All]. [I revised my posted model to make this more explicit.] Don't get me wrong, I think your idea has the germ of a very interesting idea, Thank you. the problem is I have never really understood what your "dynamic" is supposed to be in a timeless world. The inconsistency of the All makes the dynamic in the All an endless change absence order. I see this as timeless. Nor have I seen anyone else on the list grok your ideas and express them in other words. This is not a criticism, but does make it hard for me to include in an integrated fashion in my book. I realize that over the years I have explored numerous dead ends and made many errors in my posts. This naturally leads to confusion in others as to what I am trying to say. I appreciate all the tolerance and comments I have received on this list. I have recently managed to compact the resulting ideas into a two page presentation. Perhaps this is now too compact, and I welcome any questions. I have resolved to include a mention of your ideas in my book, although I don't find it an easy task to express your ideas in a way that intergrates with the rest of the book. I have only reached page 63 of your book. Perhaps as I explore it further I will have comments that help. However, for now I see my All as similar to your Plenitude. However, one of my comments re your Plenitude is that it too should have the "inconsistency" tag which I see as making it an information bearing object. I do not see it as correct to simply invoke a dual entity [that may cancel this tag]. This is one issue that I believe is resolved by starting at a more primitive structure - in my case my list. Further as I said above I am not satisfied unless there is a "positive" driver for sequential observation. Do you have a write up that I can reference - ie a journal ref, arXiv, DOI or even permanent URL? I am an engineer and my publications have dealt mostly with that profession. This endeavor is an intellectual hobby. I do own a small business and might be able to place it on that web site - a dot com site - once I am satisfied with it. That could last as long as the business
Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model
I have attached a revision to my model at (9) which makes the driver for the evolution of the Somethings more explicit. Definitions: The list of all possibilities: The list of all the possible properties and aspects of things. This list can not be empty since there is unlikely to be less than nothing and a nothing has at least one property - emptiness. The list is most likely at least countably infinite. Information: Information is the potential to establish a boundary on the list of all possibilities. Kernel of information: The information relevant to a specific boundary. The All: The complete ensemble of kernels. The Nothing: That which is empty of all kernels. The Everything: The boundary which establishes the All and separates it from the Nothing and thus it also establishes the Nothing. It could be said to contain both. A Something: A division [by a boundary] of the All into two subparts. True Noise: The inconsistency of the evolution of a Something reflected in the course of physical reality given to universes within it. Model Proposal: The Existence of our and other universes and their dynamics are the result of unavoidable definition and logical incompleteness. Justification: 1) Notice that "Defining" is the same as establishing a boundary - on the list of all possibilities [1def] - between what a thing is and what it is not. This defines a second thing: the "is not". A thing can not be defined in isolation. 2) Given the definitions of the All, the Nothing, and the Everything: 3) These definitions are interdependent because you can not have one without the whole set. 4) These definitions are unavoidable because at least one of the [All, Nothing] pair must exist. Since they form an [is, is not] pair they bootstrap each other into existence via a single combined definition - the Everything. 5) The Nothing has a logical problem: since it is empty of kernels it can not answer any meaningful question about itself including the unavoidable one of its own stability [persistence]. 6) To answer this unavoidable question the Nothing must at some point "penetrate" the boundary between itself and the All [the only place information resides] in an attempt to complete itself. This could be viewed as a spontaneous symmetry breaking. 7) However, the boundary is permanent as required by the definitional [is, is not] pairing and a Nothing must be restored. 8) Thus the "penetration" process repeats in an always was and always will be manner. 9) The boundary "penetration" described above produces a shock wave [a boundary] that moves into the All as the old Nothing becomes a Something and tries to complete itself [perhaps like a Big Bang event]. This divides the All into two evolving Somethings - i.e. evolving multiverses. Evolving Somethings are unlikely to reach completeness short of encompassing the entire All. Notice that half the multiverses are "contracting" - i.e. losing kernels [but the cardinality of the number of kernels would be at least the cardinality of the list of all possibilities]. 10) Notice that the All also has a logical problem. Looking at the same meaningful question of its own stability it contains all possible answers because just one answer would constitute an exclusion of specific kernels which is contradictory to the definition of the All as the complete kernel ensemble. Thus the All is internally inconsistent. 11) Therefore the motion of a shock wave boundary in the All must echo this inconsistency. That is each step in the motion as it encompasses kernel after kernel [the evolution of a Something] can not be completely dependent on any past motion of that boundary. 12) Some kernels are states of universes and when the boundary of an evolving Something passes about a kernel, the kernel can have a moment of physical reality. [This moment can extend so that successor states can have a degree of overlapping physical reality resulting in a "flow of consciousness" for some sequences for universes that contain Self Aware Structures.] 13) From within any Something the future pattern of reality moments due to (11) would be non deterministic i.e. suffer True Noise. 14) The All of course contains a kernel re the founding definition and thus there is an infinitely nested potential to have All/Nothing pairs. This completes the system in that the origin of the dynamic basically destroys [Nothing, All] pairs but there is an infinite potential to form new Nothings. Hal Ruhl
Re: More than one kind of 'causality'?
Dear Marc, Is this proposed third kind of cause similar to the notion of Implication in logic? Kindest regards, Stephen - Original Message - From: Marc Geddes To: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Monday, September 19, 2005 4:36 AM Subject: Re: More than one kind of 'causality'? Yes, my first proposed kind of causation is indeed the usual physics kind of causation. I'm not sure that you understood my second proposed kind of causation - a choice made by a teleological agent (like humans) which affects the teleology (process of moving towards one's goals) of other agents. This is not 'downward causation' or 'efficient causation' as far as I can tell. My third proposed kind of causation is highly abstract in nature and hard to explain. It involves the structure of the Multiverse (patterns across multiple QM branches). A sort of 'Platonic' cause tying different kinds of knowledge together - i.e establishing a logical 'direction' for complexity. On 9/19/05, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: OK - the first is the usual sort of cause used in Physics, or materialcause. The second is sometimes known as downward causation, or efficient causation. The third one, though I'm struggling with. Is itthe same as my "circular causation", sort of first and final casuationrolled into one?Cheers
Re: More than one kind of 'causality'?
Yes, my first proposed kind of causation is indeed the usual physics kind of causation. I'm not sure that you understood my second proposed kind of causation - a choice made by a teleological agent (like humans) which affects the teleology (process of moving towards one's goals) of other agents. This is not 'downward causation' or 'efficient causation' as far as I can tell. My third proposed kind of causation is highly abstract in nature and hard to explain. It involves the structure of the Multiverse (patterns across multiple QM branches). A sort of 'Platonic' cause tying different kinds of knowledge together - i.e establishing a logical 'direction' for complexity. On 9/19/05, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: OK - the first is the usual sort of cause used in Physics, or materialcause. The second is sometimes known as downward causation, or efficient causation. The third one, though I'm struggling with. Is itthe same as my "circular causation", sort of first and final casuationrolled into one?Cheers -- Please vist my website:http://www.riemannai.orgScience, Sci-Fi and Philosophy---THE BRAIN is wider than the sky,For, put them side by side, The one the other will includeWith ease, and you beside. -Emily Dickinson'The brain is wider than the sky'http://www.bartleby.com/113/1126.html
Re: More than one kind of 'causality'?
OK - the first is the usual sort of cause used in Physics, or material
cause. The second is sometimes known as downward causation, or
efficient causation. The third one, though I'm struggling with. Is it
the same as my "circular causation", sort of first and final casuation
rolled into one?
Cheers
On Mon, Sep 19, 2005 at 08:00:32PM +1200, Marc Geddes wrote:
> Here's a speculation:
> The model I'm working with for my theory seems to suggest 3 different
> fundamental kinds of 'cause and effect'.
> The first is physical causality - motion of physical objects through space.
> The second is mental causality - agents making choices which effect agents
> The third is what I call 'Multiverse causality', a sort of highly abtsract
> 'causality' close to the notion of logical consistency/consilience - that
> which ensures that knowledge has a certain ordered 'structure' to it .
>
> Anyone have any thoughts on this?
>
> --
>
> Please vist my website:
> http://www.riemannai.org
>
> Science, Sci-Fi and Philosophy
>
> ---
>
> THE BRAIN is wider than the sky,
> For, put them side by side,
> The one the other will include
> With ease, and you beside.
>
> -Emily Dickinson
>
> 'The brain is wider than the sky'
> http://www.bartleby.com/113/1126.html
--
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A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
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More than one kind of 'causality'?
Here's a speculation: The model I'm working with for my theory seems to suggest 3 different fundamental kinds of 'cause and effect'. The first is physical causality - motion of physical objects through space. The second is mental causality - agents making choices which effect agents The third is what I call 'Multiverse causality', a sort of highly abtsract 'causality' close to the notion of logical consistency/consilience - that which ensures that knowledge has a certain ordered 'structure' to it . Anyone have any thoughts on this?-- Please vist my website:http://www.riemannai.orgScience, Sci-Fi and Philosophy--- THE BRAIN is wider than the sky,For, put them side by side, The one the other will includeWith ease, and you beside. -Emily Dickinson'The brain is wider than the sky' http://www.bartleby.com/113/1126.html
Summary of seed ideas for my developing TOE - 'The Sentient Centered Theory Of Metaphysics' (SCTOM)
All comments welcome
---
Over-view of 'The Sentient Centered Theory of Metaphysics' (SCTOM) By Marc Geddes This version: 13th September, 2005
Metaphysics: Mathematico-Cognition
SCTOM is a rational framework which attempts to provide a truly integrated conception of reality. By 'integrated' it is meant a conception of reality that explains how the most fundamental properties of existence facts fit together into a unified metaphysical framework. SCTOM is not reductionistic. A true explanatory framework must explain how high level properties of reality such as values fit into the picture. SCTOM is intended to provide a logical scaffolding upon which all future scientific and philosophical theories can be developed and integrated.
The proposed noumena ('raw stuff', foundation) of reality is called Mathematico-Cognition. The metaphysical position proposed is a hybrid of two known positions - Mathematical Platonism - the idea that mathematics is the objectively real fabric of reality, and Objective Idealism - the idea that cognition is the objectively real fabric of reality.
The core assumption is that existence without perception is meaningless. Reality requires not only raw data but something to *interpret* that data, to supply meaning to it. This can only be done by consciousness of *some* kind. If something was hypothesized to exist that could in no way directly or indirectly affect the conscious perceptions of *any* possible observer, then in what sense could it be said to exist at all? Even if it could be successfully argued that it did have some kind of abstract philosophical existence, it could never have any possible value to sentient minds. For the purposes of understanding general intelligence, it suffices to define that which exists as that which could directly or indirectly (
i.e. in principle) affect the perceptions of *some* possible conscious observer.
We propose that *cognition* (in the very general sense defined above) should be taken as the bedrock or fundamental building-blocks of reality. The heart of SCTOM is the assumption that a truly integrated understanding of reality requires that *all* aspects of reality be defined in terms of cognition of some kind. We assume panpsychism, the view that there is some degree of conscious awareness in everything.
The approach adopted however, is not mysticism or one of the subjectivist views of reality that propose that aspects of reality are mind created. Instead, a very robust realism is assumed. Properties of reality exist largely independently of what any particular observer thinks about them and are not mind created. Properties of reality are not defined by the mind of any one particular observer. That idea quickly leads to solipsism, the idea that reality can only be ascribed to one's own conscious perception. What is being suggested here is that reality be defined by the minds of *all logically possible* observers. Nor does this mean that reality is somehow 'socially constructed' - or created by some sort of consensus view emerging from the beliefs of every one in a society. Objective Idealism proposes that properties of reality are *correlated with* or *emergent from* from general properties of conscious perception, not that they are *created* by specific beliefs. Reality is not mind created. But it is not greater than mind either.
Metaphysics - The 'Complexity' of reality is finite
In order for SCTOM to be a truly general theory, it has to be all encompassing. It must be universal in scope. And it must be comprehensible to sentient minds. But this assumes that some unitary finite logical framework is capable of being applied everywhere that a sentient mind could logically exist. This in turn requires the curious idea that the complexity of reality be finite in *some* sense (perhaps in a sense which has not yet been defined).
Metaphysics: Core SCTOM assumptions
The two initial working assumptions of SCTOM then are:
Mathematico-Cognition - The essence of reality is a hybrid of mathematics and cognition
The complexity of reality is in some sense finite
The evidence for these assumptions will come in part from the internal consistency of SCTOM itself. If SCTOM seems to be providing an elegant explanatory framework for many different areas of knowledge, this is some evidence that its correct ideas are correct.
Metaphysics : Quantum Computation and Classical Computation
The most general form of computation is not the classical conception of universal computation as developed by Turing, but the quantum conception. Physicist David Deutsch was the first to begin exploring quantum computation in depth. Since reality is at root quantum mechanical and SCTOM is supposed to be a truly general metaphysical framework, SCTOM must produce an integrated explanation of quantum phenomena.
Metaphysics: The Multiverse
SCTOM should provide an explanatory framework for the space of all possible worlds in which sentient minds could exist, if
