Peter Jones writes:
> Another staunch opponent is Edelmann.
>
> http://dangerousintersection.org/?p=178
>
> 'The notion that the brain is a kind of computer is an error of such
> magnitude, Mr. Edelman believes,
> that cognitive science is on the brink of a crisis. "I claim," he
> writes, "tha
Bruno Marchal writes:
> Le 30-oct.-06, à 14:15, Stathis Papaioannou wrote (in part):
>
>
> > A computationalist would add that a computer analogue
> > of a person would also have the same mental states, but this is more
> > controversial.
>
>
> Is it really? With the notable couragous excep
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 29-oct.-06, à 17:43, David Nyman a écrit :
>
> > Peter, when you said that the physical might be 'relations all the way
> > down', and I asked you what would you find if you went 'all the way
> > down', you replied 'primary matter'. IOW, you posit primary matter as a
> >
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 30-oct.-06, à 14:15, Stathis Papaioannou wrote (in part):
>
>
> > A computationalist would add that a computer analogue
> > of a person would also have the same mental states, but this is more
> > controversial.
>
>
> Is it really? With the notable couragous exception of
Le 30-oct.-06, à 14:15, Stathis Papaioannou wrote (in part):
> A computationalist would add that a computer analogue
> of a person would also have the same mental states, but this is more
> controversial.
Is it really? With the notable couragous exception of Penrose I don't
know people who
Le 30-oct.-06, à 00:40, David Nyman wrote (to Peter Jones (1Z)):
> Name your
> turtle. Can't we just get on with investigating what either theory
> explains or predicts, and stop arguing over words - isn't this why no
> agreement is ever reached on this?
Peter, I think that David is right. W
Le 29-oct.-06, à 17:43, David Nyman a écrit :
> Peter, when you said that the physical might be 'relations all the way
> down', and I asked you what would you find if you went 'all the way
> down', you replied 'primary matter'. IOW, you posit primary matter as a
> 'bare substrate' to which are a
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 29-oct.-06, à 12:11, 1Z a écrit :
>
> >>>
> >>> If numbers aren't real at all they cannot generate reality
> >>> (ITSIAR).
> >>
> >>
> >> You beg the question. Numbers are not physically real
> >> does not entails
> >> that numbers don't exist at all, unless you define "
Le 29-oct.-06, à 12:11, 1Z a écrit :
>>>
>>> If numbers aren't real at all they cannot generate reality
>>> (ITSIAR).
>>
>>
>> You beg the question. Numbers are not physically real
>> does not entails
>> that numbers don't exist at all, unless you define "real" by "physical
>> real".
>
> I didn'
Le 28-oct.-06, à 23:24, 1Z a écrit :
>
>> Stathis: and no explicit ordering is necessary. The counting sequence
>> "one, two, three" may involve millions of slices of brain activity or
>> computer emulation activity spread throughout space and time, and it
>> may take many of these slices to
David Nyman writes:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> > I think I see what you mean, but it's as much a problem for the intact and
> > normally functioning brain as it is for teleportation experiments, isn't it?
>
> Yes, that's my point! I'm trying to argue that the brain has actually
> come up
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