RE: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted

2006-10-31 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Peter Jones writes: > Another staunch opponent is Edelmann. > > http://dangerousintersection.org/?p=178 > > 'The notion that the brain is a kind of computer is an error of such > magnitude, Mr. Edelman believes, > that cognitive science is on the brink of a crisis. "I claim," he > writes, "tha

RE: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted

2006-10-31 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Bruno Marchal writes: > Le 30-oct.-06, à 14:15, Stathis Papaioannou wrote (in part): > > > > A computationalist would add that a computer analogue > > of a person would also have the same mental states, but this is more > > controversial. > > > Is it really? With the notable couragous excep

Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted

2006-10-31 Thread 1Z
Bruno Marchal wrote: > Le 29-oct.-06, à 17:43, David Nyman a écrit : > > > Peter, when you said that the physical might be 'relations all the way > > down', and I asked you what would you find if you went 'all the way > > down', you replied 'primary matter'. IOW, you posit primary matter as a > >

Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted

2006-10-31 Thread 1Z
Bruno Marchal wrote: > Le 30-oct.-06, à 14:15, Stathis Papaioannou wrote (in part): > > > > A computationalist would add that a computer analogue > > of a person would also have the same mental states, but this is more > > controversial. > > > Is it really? With the notable couragous exception of

Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted

2006-10-31 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 30-oct.-06, à 14:15, Stathis Papaioannou wrote (in part): > A computationalist would add that a computer analogue > of a person would also have the same mental states, but this is more > controversial. Is it really? With the notable couragous exception of Penrose I don't know people who

Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted

2006-10-31 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 30-oct.-06, à 00:40, David Nyman wrote (to Peter Jones (1Z)): > Name your > turtle. Can't we just get on with investigating what either theory > explains or predicts, and stop arguing over words - isn't this why no > agreement is ever reached on this? Peter, I think that David is right. W

Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted

2006-10-31 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 29-oct.-06, à 17:43, David Nyman a écrit : > Peter, when you said that the physical might be 'relations all the way > down', and I asked you what would you find if you went 'all the way > down', you replied 'primary matter'. IOW, you posit primary matter as a > 'bare substrate' to which are a

Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted

2006-10-31 Thread 1Z
Bruno Marchal wrote: > Le 29-oct.-06, à 12:11, 1Z a écrit : > > >>> > >>> If numbers aren't real at all they cannot generate reality > >>> (ITSIAR). > >> > >> > >> You beg the question. Numbers are not physically real > >> does not entails > >> that numbers don't exist at all, unless you define "

Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted

2006-10-31 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 29-oct.-06, à 12:11, 1Z a écrit : >>> >>> If numbers aren't real at all they cannot generate reality >>> (ITSIAR). >> >> >> You beg the question. Numbers are not physically real >> does not entails >> that numbers don't exist at all, unless you define "real" by "physical >> real". > > I didn'

Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted

2006-10-31 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 28-oct.-06, à 23:24, 1Z a écrit : > >> Stathis: and no explicit ordering is necessary. The counting sequence >> "one, two, three" may involve millions of slices of brain activity or >> computer emulation activity spread throughout space and time, and it >> may take many of these slices to

RE: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted

2006-10-31 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
David Nyman writes: > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > I think I see what you mean, but it's as much a problem for the intact and > > normally functioning brain as it is for teleportation experiments, isn't it? > > Yes, that's my point! I'm trying to argue that the brain has actually > come up