Re: The Meaning of Life
On Feb 19, 7:00 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On 2/20/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > On Feb 19, 4:00 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > On 2/20/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > These are positivist questions. This is your basic error in this > > > > whole post (and previous ones). These questions are assuming that > > > > positivism is the right way of viewing everything, even ultimate > > > > meaning (at least when meaning is said to be based on God, but not > > > > when meaning is said to be based on ourselves). > > > > > Tom > > > > Can you explain that a bit further? I can understand that personal > > meaning > > > is not necessarily connected to empirical facts. The ancient Greeks > > believed > > > in the gods of Olympus, built temples to them, wrote songs about them, > > and > > > so on. They provided meaning to the Greeks, and had an overall positive > > > effect on Greek society even though as a matter of fact there weren't > > any > > > gods living on Mount Olympus. Just as long as we are clear about that. > > > > Stathis Papaioannou > > > It is a given that whatever belief we have falls short of the set of > > all truth. But here we are talking about different "theories" behind > > beliefs in general. Positivism is one such "theory" or world view. > > This problematic type of world view in which positivism falls has also > > been referred to as "rationalism in a closed system". In such a world > > view there is no ultimate meaning. All meaning is a reference to > > something else which is in turn meaningless except for in reference to > > yet something else which is meaningless. We can try to hide this > > problem by putting the end of the meaning dependency line inside each > > individual person's 1st person point of view. At that point, if we > > claim that we still have a closed system, then we have to call the 1st > > person point of view meaningless. Or, if we at that point allow an > > "open system", then we can say that the 1st person point of view has > > meaning which comes from where-we-know-not. This is just as useless > > as the meaningless view (in terms of being meaningful ;). This is all > > opposed to the world view which allows an ultimate source of meaning > > for persons. If there were such an ultimate source of meaning for > > persons, then, even though our beliefs would fall short of the full > > truth of it, it makes sense that there would be some way of "seeing" > > or discovering the truth in a sort of progressive or growing process > > at the personal level. Gotta go. > > > Tom > > I don't see how ultimate meaning is logically possible (if it is even > desirable, but that's another question). What is God's ultimate meaning? If > he gets away without one or has one from where-we-know-not then how is this > different to the case of the individual human? Saying God is infinite > doesn't help because we can still ask for the meaning of the whole infinite > series. Defining God as someone who *just has* ultimate meaning as one of > his attributes is a rehash of the ontological argument. > > Stathis Papaioannou > Ultimate meaning is analogous to axioms or arithmetic truth (e.g. 42 is not prime). In fact the famous quote of Kronecker "God created the integers" makes this point. I think Bruno takes arithmetic truth as his ultimate source of meaning. If you ask the same positivist questions of arithmetic truth, you also have the same problem. The problem lies in the positivist view that there can be no given truth. Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds
Hi Bruno: At 05:43 AM 2/19/2007, you wrote: >Le 18-févr.-07, à 03:33, Hal Ruhl a écrit : > > > > > Hi Bruno: > > > > In response I will start with some assumptions central to my approach. > > > > The first has to do with the process of making a list. > > > > The assumption is: > > > > Making a list of items [which could be some of > > the elements of a set for example] is always a > > process of making a one to one mapping of the > > items to some of the counting numbers such as: > > > > 1 - an item > > 2 - an item not previously on the list > > 3 - an item not previously on the list > > . > > . > > . > > n - last item and it was not previously on the list > > >I don' t see clearly an assumption here. I guess you are assuming >existence of things capable of being put in a list. What I am trying to do is establish what making a list is in my model and does it have any mathematical credence. I make it an assumption because some may believe that "make a list" means something different. >Effectively? then >why not use the Wi (cf Cutland's book or older explanations I have >provided on the list. Help yourself with Podniek's page perhaps, or try >to be just informal. > See below > > > > My second assumption is: > > > > Objects [such as states of universes for example] have properties. > > >You talk like if it was an axiomatic. A good test to see if it is an >axiomatic consists to change the primitive words you are using by >arbitrary words. You are saying "glass of bears have trees and garden". Did you mean class not "glass"? >You can add that you mean that the term "glass of bear" is *intended >for states of universes, I am not a mathematician so I do not quite understand the above. > but recall the goal is to provide an >explanation for the appearance of the "states of universes". If I understand you, that comes later in the walk through of my model > In general >properties are modelized by sets. It is ok to presuppose some naive set >theory, but then you "axiomatic" has to be clean. > See below > > > > My third assumption is: > > > > All of the properties it is possible for objects to have can be listed. > > >I guess you assume church thesis, and you are talking about effective >properties. > To me at this point the Church Thesis is an ingredient in some of the possible state succession sequences allowed in my model. I mean all properties I do not know if that is the same as your "effective" properties. > > > > My fourth assumption is: > > > > The list of possible properties of objects is countably infinite. > > >? (lists are supposed to be countably infinite (or finite)). > This is my point above - "to list" inherently a countably infinite [as max length] process. I would add that my third assumption becomes more important later as one of the keys to my model's dynamic. > > > > Conclusions so far: > > [All possible objects are defined by all the sub lists of the full > > list.] > > [The number of objects is uncountably infinite] > >What is the full list? The list of all possible properties of objects. > > > > I will stop there for now and await comments. > > > > As to the remainder of the post: > > > > In the above I have not reached the point of > > deriving the dynamic of my model but I am not > > focusing on computations when I say that any > > succession of states is allowed. Logically > > related successions are allowed. Successions > > displaying any degree of randomness are also allowed. > > >I have already mentionned that comp entails some strong form of (first >person) randomness. Indeed, a priori to much. > Yes we have discussed this before, and it is one of the reasons I continue to believe that your approach is a sub set of mine. I know it has taken a long time for me to reach a level in my model where I could even begin to use an axiom based description and I appreciate your patience. > > > > I would like to finish the walk through of my > > model before discussing white rabbits and observation. > > >I am really sorry Hall. It looks you want to be both informal and >formal. It does not help me to understand what you are trying to say. I have read that it takes 10 years of focused practice to become an expert in a given sub discipline. At this point in my practice of engineering I am on my way to becoming an expert in a fifth sub discipline. I hope you can understand why I must continue to find a path to the development and expression of my ideas in this venue that is short of becoming an expert in mathematical expression. I appreciate your help and perhaps with a little more of it I can reach what you are asking for. Perhaps it is also a good idea to exhaust the idea of whether or not your approach is or is not a sub set of another approach. Yours Hal Ruhl --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this gr
Re: The Meaning of Life
On 2/20/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On Feb 19, 4:00 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > On 2/20/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > These are positivist questions. This is your basic error in this > > > whole post (and previous ones). These questions are assuming that > > > positivism is the right way of viewing everything, even ultimate > > > meaning (at least when meaning is said to be based on God, but not > > > when meaning is said to be based on ourselves). > > > > > Tom > > > > Can you explain that a bit further? I can understand that personal > meaning > > is not necessarily connected to empirical facts. The ancient Greeks > believed > > in the gods of Olympus, built temples to them, wrote songs about them, > and > > so on. They provided meaning to the Greeks, and had an overall positive > > effect on Greek society even though as a matter of fact there weren't > any > > gods living on Mount Olympus. Just as long as we are clear about that. > > > > Stathis Papaioannou > > > > It is a given that whatever belief we have falls short of the set of > all truth. But here we are talking about different "theories" behind > beliefs in general. Positivism is one such "theory" or world view. > This problematic type of world view in which positivism falls has also > been referred to as "rationalism in a closed system". In such a world > view there is no ultimate meaning. All meaning is a reference to > something else which is in turn meaningless except for in reference to > yet something else which is meaningless. We can try to hide this > problem by putting the end of the meaning dependency line inside each > individual person's 1st person point of view. At that point, if we > claim that we still have a closed system, then we have to call the 1st > person point of view meaningless. Or, if we at that point allow an > "open system", then we can say that the 1st person point of view has > meaning which comes from where-we-know-not. This is just as useless > as the meaningless view (in terms of being meaningful ;). This is all > opposed to the world view which allows an ultimate source of meaning > for persons. If there were such an ultimate source of meaning for > persons, then, even though our beliefs would fall short of the full > truth of it, it makes sense that there would be some way of "seeing" > or discovering the truth in a sort of progressive or growing process > at the personal level. Gotta go. > > Tom I don't see how ultimate meaning is logically possible (if it is even desirable, but that's another question). What is God's ultimate meaning? If he gets away without one or has one from where-we-know-not then how is this different to the case of the individual human? Saying God is infinite doesn't help because we can still ask for the meaning of the whole infinite series. Defining God as someone who *just has* ultimate meaning as one of his attributes is a rehash of the ontological argument. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The Meaning of Life
On Feb 19, 4:00 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On 2/20/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > These are positivist questions. This is your basic error in this > > whole post (and previous ones). These questions are assuming that > > positivism is the right way of viewing everything, even ultimate > > meaning (at least when meaning is said to be based on God, but not > > when meaning is said to be based on ourselves). > > > Tom > > Can you explain that a bit further? I can understand that personal meaning > is not necessarily connected to empirical facts. The ancient Greeks believed > in the gods of Olympus, built temples to them, wrote songs about them, and > so on. They provided meaning to the Greeks, and had an overall positive > effect on Greek society even though as a matter of fact there weren't any > gods living on Mount Olympus. Just as long as we are clear about that. > > Stathis Papaioannou > It is a given that whatever belief we have falls short of the set of all truth. But here we are talking about different "theories" behind beliefs in general. Positivism is one such "theory" or world view. This problematic type of world view in which positivism falls has also been referred to as "rationalism in a closed system". In such a world view there is no ultimate meaning. All meaning is a reference to something else which is in turn meaningless except for in reference to yet something else which is meaningless. We can try to hide this problem by putting the end of the meaning dependency line inside each individual person's 1st person point of view. At that point, if we claim that we still have a closed system, then we have to call the 1st person point of view meaningless. Or, if we at that point allow an "open system", then we can say that the 1st person point of view has meaning which comes from where-we-know-not. This is just as useless as the meaningless view (in terms of being meaningful ;). This is all opposed to the world view which allows an ultimate source of meaning for persons. If there were such an ultimate source of meaning for persons, then, even though our beliefs would fall short of the full truth of it, it makes sense that there would be some way of "seeing" or discovering the truth in a sort of progressive or growing process at the personal level. Gotta go. Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The Meaning of Life
On 2/20/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > On 2/18/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > > > On Feb 16, 8:18 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > > > > If you built a model society and set its citizens instincts, goals, > > > > laws-from-heaven (but really from you) and so on, would that suffice > to > > > > provide "meaning"? > > > > > > > > > > It would not provide ultimate meaning for two reasons... > > > > > > My answer would have been that the beings would have no way of knowing > the > > difference between the provided meaning and "ultimate" meaning, and > would > > live their lives just as we live our lives, some of them atheists and > others > > theists. In other words, the idea of ultimate meaning can have no > objective > > or subjective consequences: you can honestly, deeply believe in it and > this > > belief can change the way you live your life, but it would do so even if > it > > had no basis in reality. A child might behave well in order to receive > > presents from Santa Claus, but this has no bearing whatsoever on the > > question of whether Santa Claus exists. > > > > 1) Logical reason, but still important and inescapable: If the source > > > of meaning was from within the "system", i.e. the observable/ > > > controllable universe, then we can always ask the why question when we > > > find the source. This is not acceptable as part of a scientifically > > > observable causal universe, as it contradicts it. A closed system > > > which is supposedly totally explainable will always have at least one > > > fixed point that is unexplainable. This is the old positivism > > > problem. This is actually part of the problem with a straw-man > > > caricature god, in our image, i.e. any thing that we (as part of the > > > universe) can think up. > > > > > > You can always draw a circle around the system + externals and call it a > > new, larger system: the universe, the multiverse, the plenitude, God + > the > > Plenitude, or whatever. Long before it was a problem for positivism it > was a > > problem for theism: Who made God? Who gives God meaning? Who tells God > > whether his ethical principles are right or wrong? > > > > These are positivist questions. This is your basic error in this > whole post (and previous ones). These questions are assuming that > positivism is the right way of viewing everything, even ultimate > meaning (at least when meaning is said to be based on God, but not > when meaning is said to be based on ourselves). > > Tom > Can you explain that a bit further? I can understand that personal meaning is not necessarily connected to empirical facts. The ancient Greeks believed in the gods of Olympus, built temples to them, wrote songs about them, and so on. They provided meaning to the Greeks, and had an overall positive effect on Greek society even though as a matter of fact there weren't any gods living on Mount Olympus. Just as long as we are clear about that. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
On 19 Feb, 18:48, "Jason" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On Feb 19, 7:50 am, "John M" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > Pls see after Jason's remark > > John > > > - Original Message - > > From: Jason > > To: Everything List > > Sent: Monday, February 19, 2007 3:42 AM > > Subject: Re: Searles' Fundamental Error > > > On Feb 18, 5:46 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > On 2/18/07, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > My main problem with Comp is that it needs several unprovable > > assumptions to > > > > > be accepted. > > I believe that to say that some special substrate is needed for > > consciousness, be it chemical reactions or anything else, is > > subscribing to an epiphenominal view. For example, there should be no > > difference in behavior between a brain that operates chemically and > > one which has its chemical reactions simulated on a computer; however > > if it is the chemicals themselves that are responsible for > > consciousness, this consciousness can have no effect on the brain > > because the net result will be identical whether the brain is > > simulated or not. To me, epiphenominalism is a logical contradiction, > > because if consciousness has no effect on the mind, we wouldn't wonder > > about the mind-body problem because the mystery of consciousness would > > have no way of communicating itself to the brain. Therefore, I don't > > see how anything external to the functioning of the brain could be > > responsible for consciousness. > > > Jason > > --- > > JM: > > I think you are in a limitation and draw conclusions from this limited > > model to beyond it. > > Whatever we can 'simulate' is from within the up-to-date knowledge base: > > our cognitive inventory. That is OK - and the way how humanity developed > > over the eras of the epistemic enrichment since dawn. Topics are added and > > views change as we learn more. > > We are not (yet?) at the end with omniscience. > > > So our today's simulation is valid only to the extent of today's level of > > knowables. Nobody can include the yet unknown into a simulation. (see the > > remark of Stathis: "> You can't prove that a machine will be conscious in > > the same way you are.") > > > If you insist of considering "the brain", it is OK with me (I go further > > in my views into a total interconnection) but from even the brain you can > > include into your simulation only what was learnt about it to date. > > The computer cannot go beyond it either. > >The brain does. > > So our model-simulation is just that: a limited model. > > Are we ready for surprizes? > > > John M > > John, > > Today I would agree, we probably don't know enough about the brain and > physcis to make an accurate simulation, nor do we have anywhere near > the computational power necessary for such a simulation. My point > however is outside of that, it is: > > If you have two minds (one physical and one simulated) if their states > evolve identically and indistinguishably then the simulation must be > taking into account all necessary aspects related to the mind's > functoning. If some unknown aspect of physics were responsible for > consciousness in the physical mind but not the simulated one, it would > be detected, as the simulation would diverge from the physical mind > (assuming consciousness effects the brain, i.e. a non epiphenominal > view) > > To put in another way, if consciousness effects the mind (which I > think is necessary for us to be having this discussion), how could one > have a perfect simulation if the simulation is not also concious? If > one brain is conscious and there is a perfect simulation of it, the > simulation must be conscious. Otherwise the effects of consciousness > would cause a divergence in the simulation. > You need to distinguish between causal equivalence and functional equivalence. Functional equivalence depends on a "mapping" that is in the eye of the beholder. A perfect simualtion of an aircraft does not fly (no causal equivalence). Instead we map different part ofthe simulation onto "ait", "wing", and so on (functoional equivalence). > Jason --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
>I would bet on functionalism as the correct theory of mind for various >reasons, but I don't see that there is anything illogical the possibility >that consciousness is substrate-dependent. Let's say that when you rub two >carbon atoms together they have a scratchy experience, whereas when you rub >two silicon atoms together they have a squirmy experience. This could just >be a mundane fact about the universe, no more mysterious than any other >basic physical fact. What is illogical, however, is the "no causal effect" >criterion if this is called epiphenomenalism. If the effect is purely and >necessarily on first person experience, it's no less an effect; we might >not >notice if the carbon atoms were zombified, but the carbon atoms would >certainly notice. I think it all comes down to the deep-seated and very >obviously wrong idea that only third person empirical data is genuine >empirical data. It is a legitimate concern of science that data should be >verifiable and experiments repeatable, but it's taking it a bit far to >conclude from this that we are therefore all zombies. > >Stathis Papaioannou One major argument against the idea that qualia and/or consciousness could be substrate-dependent is what philosopher David Chalmers refers to as the "dancing qualia" and "fading qualia" arguments, which you can read more about at http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html . As a thought-experiment, imagine gradually replacing neurons in my brain with functionally identical devices whose physical construction was quite different from neurons (silicon chips emulating the input and output of the neurons they replaced, perhaps). If one believes that this substrate is associated with either different qualia or absent qualia, then as one gradually replaces more and more of my brain, they'll either have to be a sudden discontinuous change (and it seems implausible that the replacement of a single neuron would cause such a radical change) or else a gradual shift or fade-out of the qualia my brain experiences...but if I were noticing such a shift or fade-out, I would expect to be able to comment on it, and yet the assumption that the new parts are functionally identical means my behavior should be indistinguishable from what it would be if my neurons were left alone. And if we suppose that I might be having panicked thoughts about a change in my perceptions yet find that my voice and body are acting as if nothing is wrong, and there is no neural activity associated with these panicked thoughts, then there would have to be a radical disconnect between subjective experiences and physical activity in my brain, which would contradict the assumption of supervenience (see http://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDict/supervenience.html ) and lead to the possibility of radical mind/body disconnects like rocks and trees having complex thoughts and experiences that have nothing to do with any physical activity within them. Jesse _ Refi Now: Rates near 39yr lows! $430,000 Mortgage for $1,399/mo - Calculate new payment http://www.lowermybills.com/lre/index.jsp?sourceid=lmb-9632-17727&moid=7581 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The Meaning of Life
Tom Caylor wrote: > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> On 2/18/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> >> >>> On Feb 16, 8:18 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: If you built a model society and set its citizens instincts, goals, laws-from-heaven (but really from you) and so on, would that suffice to provide "meaning"? >>> It would not provide ultimate meaning for two reasons... >> >> My answer would have been that the beings would have no way of knowing the >> difference between the provided meaning and "ultimate" meaning, and would >> live their lives just as we live our lives, some of them atheists and others >> theists. In other words, the idea of ultimate meaning can have no objective >> or subjective consequences: you can honestly, deeply believe in it and this >> belief can change the way you live your life, but it would do so even if it >> had no basis in reality. A child might behave well in order to receive >> presents from Santa Claus, but this has no bearing whatsoever on the >> question of whether Santa Claus exists. >> >> 1) Logical reason, but still important and inescapable: If the source >>> of meaning was from within the "system", i.e. the observable/ >>> controllable universe, then we can always ask the why question when we >>> find the source. This is not acceptable as part of a scientifically >>> observable causal universe, as it contradicts it. A closed system >>> which is supposedly totally explainable will always have at least one >>> fixed point that is unexplainable. This is the old positivism >>> problem. This is actually part of the problem with a straw-man >>> caricature god, in our image, i.e. any thing that we (as part of the >>> universe) can think up. >> >> You can always draw a circle around the system + externals and call it a >> new, larger system: the universe, the multiverse, the plenitude, God + the >> Plenitude, or whatever. Long before it was a problem for positivism it was a >> problem for theism: Who made God? Who gives God meaning? Who tells God >> whether his ethical principles are right or wrong? >> > > These are positivist questions. This is your basic error in this > whole post (and previous ones). These questions are assuming that > positivism is the right way of viewing everything, even ultimate > meaning (at least when meaning is said to be based on God, but not > when meaning is said to be based on ourselves). > > Tom Then is it your error to assume that it must be based on God and not on ourselves? If there is a purpose and it's not my purpose, what meaning can it provide to my actions? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > Le 18-févr.-07, à 13:57, Mark Peaty a écrit : > > My main problem with Comp is that it needs several unprovable > assumptions to be accepted. For example the Yes Doctor hypothesis, > wherein it is assumed that it must be possible to digitally emulate > some or all of a person's body/brain function and the person will > not notice any difference. The Yes Doctor hypothesis is a particular > case of the digital emulation hypothesis in which it is asserted > that, basically, ANYTHING can be digitally emulated if one had > enough computational resources available. As this seems to me to be > almost a version of Comp [at least as far as I have got with reading > Bruno's exposition] then from my simple minded perspective it looks > rather like assuming the very thing that needs to be demonstrated. > > > > I disagree. The main basic lesson from the UDA is that IF I am a machine > (whatever I am) then the universe (whatever the universe is) cannot be a > machine. > Except if I am (literaly) the universe (which I assume to be false). > > If I survive classical teleportation, then the physical appearances > emerge from a randomization of all my consistent continuations, What characterizes a consistent continuation? Does this refer to one's memory and self-identity or does it mean consistent with the unfolding of some algorithm or does it mean consistent with some physical "law" like unitary evolution in Hilbert space? >and this > is enough for explaining why comp predicts that the "physical > appearance" cannot be entirely computational (cf first person > indeterminacy, etc.). > > > You can remember it by a slogan: If I am a machine, then (not-I) is not > a machine. > > Of course something like "arithmetical truth" is not a machine, or > cannot be produced by a machine. > > Remember that one of my goal is to show that the comp hyp is refutable. > A priori it entails some highly non computable things, but then computer > science makes it less easy to refute quickly comp, and empiry (the > quantum) seems to assess comp, until now. > > > However, as far as I can see it is inherent in the nature of > consciousness to reify something. > > > Well, it depends what you mean by reifying. I take it as a high level > intellectual error. When a cat pursues a mouse, it plausible that the > cat believes in the mouse, and reify it in a sense. If that is your > sense of reifying, then I am ok with the idea that consciousness reifies > things. > But I prefer to use "reifying" more technically for making existing > something primitively, despite existence of phenomenological explanation. > > Let me be clear, because it could be confusing. A computationalist can > guess there is a universe, atoms, etc. He cannot remain consistent if he > believes the universe emerge from its parts, that the universe is made > of atoms, etc. You are saying that these beliefs entail a logical contradiction. What is that contradiction? Brent Meeker > > > I appreciate that the UDA and related treatments in mathematical > philosophy, can be rigorous, and enormously potent in their > implications for further speculation and development within their > universe of discourse, but I remain very sceptical of any advertised > potential to bootstrap the rest of the universe. > > > > I agree with you. But a thorough understanding of UDA would add > substance to your skepticism. With comp, the more we know about the > universe, the more we know we are ignorant about it. It is related with > the G* minus G gap. Although you can go from G (science) toward G* > (correct faith), when you do that, you will discover many genuine new > things, but the gap between G and G* will be made greater too. In > computerland, it is like each time you see a new star or galaxy, then > necessarily bigger things are forced to exist. The more you explore, the > more it remains to be explored, necessarily so. Understanding comp and > uda makes you infinitely more modest than we are used to think. > > I must go, > > Regards, > > > Bruno > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
On Feb 19, 7:50 am, "John M" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Pls see after Jason's remark > John > > - Original Message - > From: Jason > To: Everything List > Sent: Monday, February 19, 2007 3:42 AM > Subject: Re: Searles' Fundamental Error > > On Feb 18, 5:46 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > On 2/18/07, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > My main problem with Comp is that it needs several unprovable assumptions > to > > > > be accepted. > I believe that to say that some special substrate is needed for > consciousness, be it chemical reactions or anything else, is > subscribing to an epiphenominal view. For example, there should be no > difference in behavior between a brain that operates chemically and > one which has its chemical reactions simulated on a computer; however > if it is the chemicals themselves that are responsible for > consciousness, this consciousness can have no effect on the brain > because the net result will be identical whether the brain is > simulated or not. To me, epiphenominalism is a logical contradiction, > because if consciousness has no effect on the mind, we wouldn't wonder > about the mind-body problem because the mystery of consciousness would > have no way of communicating itself to the brain. Therefore, I don't > see how anything external to the functioning of the brain could be > responsible for consciousness. > > Jason > --- > JM: > I think you are in a limitation and draw conclusions from this limited > model to beyond it. > Whatever we can 'simulate' is from within the up-to-date knowledge base: > our cognitive inventory. That is OK - and the way how humanity developed > over the eras of the epistemic enrichment since dawn. Topics are added and > views change as we learn more. > We are not (yet?) at the end with omniscience. > > So our today's simulation is valid only to the extent of today's level of > knowables. Nobody can include the yet unknown into a simulation. (see the > remark of Stathis: "> You can't prove that a machine will be conscious in the > same way you are.") > > If you insist of considering "the brain", it is OK with me (I go further in > my views into a total interconnection) but from even the brain you can > include into your simulation only what was learnt about it to date. > The computer cannot go beyond it either. >The brain does. > So our model-simulation is just that: a limited model. > Are we ready for surprizes? > > John M John, Today I would agree, we probably don't know enough about the brain and physcis to make an accurate simulation, nor do we have anywhere near the computational power necessary for such a simulation. My point however is outside of that, it is: If you have two minds (one physical and one simulated) if their states evolve identically and indistinguishably then the simulation must be taking into account all necessary aspects related to the mind's functoning. If some unknown aspect of physics were responsible for consciousness in the physical mind but not the simulated one, it would be detected, as the simulation would diverge from the physical mind (assuming consciousness effects the brain, i.e. a non epiphenominal view) To put in another way, if consciousness effects the mind (which I think is necessary for us to be having this discussion), how could one have a perfect simulation if the simulation is not also concious? If one brain is conscious and there is a perfect simulation of it, the simulation must be conscious. Otherwise the effects of consciousness would cause a divergence in the simulation. Jason --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The Meaning of Life
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > On 2/18/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > On Feb 16, 8:18 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > > If you built a model society and set its citizens instincts, goals, > > > laws-from-heaven (but really from you) and so on, would that suffice to > > > provide "meaning"? > > > > > > > It would not provide ultimate meaning for two reasons... > > > My answer would have been that the beings would have no way of knowing the > difference between the provided meaning and "ultimate" meaning, and would > live their lives just as we live our lives, some of them atheists and others > theists. In other words, the idea of ultimate meaning can have no objective > or subjective consequences: you can honestly, deeply believe in it and this > belief can change the way you live your life, but it would do so even if it > had no basis in reality. A child might behave well in order to receive > presents from Santa Claus, but this has no bearing whatsoever on the > question of whether Santa Claus exists. > > 1) Logical reason, but still important and inescapable: If the source > > of meaning was from within the "system", i.e. the observable/ > > controllable universe, then we can always ask the why question when we > > find the source. This is not acceptable as part of a scientifically > > observable causal universe, as it contradicts it. A closed system > > which is supposedly totally explainable will always have at least one > > fixed point that is unexplainable. This is the old positivism > > problem. This is actually part of the problem with a straw-man > > caricature god, in our image, i.e. any thing that we (as part of the > > universe) can think up. > > > You can always draw a circle around the system + externals and call it a > new, larger system: the universe, the multiverse, the plenitude, God + the > Plenitude, or whatever. Long before it was a problem for positivism it was a > problem for theism: Who made God? Who gives God meaning? Who tells God > whether his ethical principles are right or wrong? > These are positivist questions. This is your basic error in this whole post (and previous ones). These questions are assuming that positivism is the right way of viewing everything, even ultimate meaning (at least when meaning is said to be based on God, but not when meaning is said to be based on ourselves). Tom > 2) Spiritual reason, but no less important and inescapable: Perhaps > > this one is more for people (like Bruno, and Jesse Mazer?) who accept > > the possible existence of difference levels of reasoning, based on > > different ways of "seeing" truth (a la G and G*). We just know > > somehow that there is something inexplicable about personhood. There > > is a hunger in us that wants to always ask the question why, a hunger > > for the meaning behind whatever layer of stuff we just discovered. > > Perhaps it's like looking for our true home, or for the reason why > > this is or is not our true home. It's like Neo in the Matrix. And > > there have been signs the meaning behind this existence poking in this > > existence now and then, and seen by different people. Yes, we can > > always imagine how someone could have thought these signs up, or > > interpretted them up, and thus explain everything back down to the > > purely logical level, dealing only with repeatable things. Like a 2- > > dimensional shadow world can make up laws that somehow explain the > > behavior of shadows and say that there are only shadows, but it is not > > seeing the whole reality. > > > I agree that there is something fundamentally inexplicable, irreducible > about first person experience, but you are basically challenging this idea > and saying there *can't* be any inexplicable things, hence God is postulated > to explain the inexplicable. But again, you are just delaying the > inevitable: how do you explain God's existence? How do you explain the > concept of necessary existence? How do you explain why God wanted to have > other conscious beings around, and why he decided to give just the amount of > evidence of his existence to those beings as he did? There are countless > such questions to which the answer is just, "I don't know, that's just the > way it is". > > > On 2/16/07, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > Yes. Now we're startin' to talk! I don't know much of the language, > > > > but I think that when people experience what some may call words like > > > > "enlightenment", "cosmic consciousness", etc. they are experiencing > > > > something that is really there. In fact, they use words like "seeing" > > > > reality as it "actually" is, etc. They speak of "wholeness" and > > > > "integralness". > > > > > > Except that people would still have the same experiences whether or not > > > something were really there, just as they would still experience the sky > > as > > > a dome whether or not it is in fact a dome. In other words, if
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
Stathis:'Would any device that can create a representation of the world, itself and the relationship between the world and itself be conscious?' MP: Well that, in a nutshell, is how I understand it; with the proviso that it is dynamic: that all representations of all salient features and relationships are being updated sufficiently often to deal with all salient changes in the environment and self. In the natural world this occurs because all the creatures in the past who/which failed significantly in this respect got eaten by something that stalked its way in between the updates, or the creature in effect did not pay enough attention to its environment and in consequence lost out somehow in ever contributing to the continuation of its specie's gene pool. Stathis [in another response to me in this thread]: 'You can't prove that a machine will be conscious in the same way you are.' MP: Well, that depends what you mean; 1. to what extent does it matter what I can prove anyway? 2. exactly what or, rather, what range of sufficiently complex systems are you referring to as 'machines'; 3. what do you mean by 'conscious in the same way you are'?; I'm sure others can think of equally or more interesting questions than these, but I can respond to these. 1. I am sure I couldn't prove whether or not a machine was conscious, but it the 'machine' was, and it was smart enough and interested enough IT could, by engaging us in conversation about its experiences, what it felt like to be what/who it is, and questioning us about what it is like to be us. Furthermore, as Colin Hales has pointed out, if the machine was doing real science it would be pretty much conclusive that it was conscious. 2. By the word machine I could refer to many of the biological entities that are significantly less complex than humans. What ever one says in this respect, someone somewhere is going to disagree, but I think maybe insects and the like could be quite reasonably be classed as sentient machines with near Zombie status. 3. If we accept a rough and ready type of physicalism, and naturalism maybe the word I am looking for here, then it is pretty much axiomatic that the consciousness of a creature/machine will differ from mine in the same degree that its body, instinctive behaviour, and environmental niche differ from mine. I think this must be true of all sentient entities. Some of the people I know are 'colour blind'; about half the people I know are female; many of the people I know exhibit quite substantial differences in temperament and predispositions. I take it that these differences from me are real and entail various real differences in the quality of what it is like to be them [or rather their brain's updating of the model of them in their worlds]. I am interested in birds [and here is meant the feathered variety] and often speculate about why they are doing what they do and what it may be like to be them. They have very small heads compared to mine so their brains can update their models of self in the world very much faster than mine can. This must mean that their perceptions of time and changes are very different. To them I must be a very slow and stupid seeming terrestrial giant. Also many birds can see by means of ultra violet light. This means that many things such as flowers and other birds will look very different compared to what I see. [Aside: I am psyching myself up slowly to start creating a flight simulator program that flies birds rather than aircraft. One of the challenges - by no mean the hardest though - will be to represent UV reflectance in a meaningful way.] Stathis [from the other posting again]: 'There is good reason to believe that the third person observable behaviour of the brain can be emulated, because the brain is just chemical reactions and chemistry is a well-understood field.' MP: Once again it depends what you mean. Does 'Third person observable behaviour of the brain' include EEG recordings and the output of MRI imaging? Or do you mean just the movements of muscles which is the main indicator of brain activity? If the former then I think that would be very hard, perhaps impossible; if the latter however, that just might be achievable. Stathis: 'I think it is very unlikely that something as elaborate as consciousness could have developed with no evolutionary purpose (evolution cannot distinguish between me and my zombie twin if zombies are possible), but it is a logical possibility.' MP: I agree with the first bit, but I do not agree with the last bit. If you adopt what I call UMSITW [the Updating Model of Self In The World], then anything which impinges on consciousness, has a real effect on the brain. In effect the only feasible zombie like persons you will meet
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
Stathis (barging in to your post to Mark); Your premis is redundant, a limited model (machine) cannot be (act, perform, sense, react etc.) identical to the total it was cut out from. So you cannot prove it either. As i GOT the difference lately, so I would use 'simulated' instead of 'emulated' if I got it right. Even the 3rd p and as you restrict it: "observable" behavior is prone to MY 1st p. interpretation (distortion). "Of the brain"? if you extend it into "the tool of mental behavior" it refers to more than just the tissue-machine up to our today's level of knowledge. Penrose (though not a friendly correspondent) is smart (happens to Nobelist also) in assuming more than computable. His (if he used it really) "brain" must be that all inclusive total complexity of all related networks. What I really wanted to stress is your expression "purpose" in evolution. (I am not 'in' for the 'zombie craze' because a person without *anything* belonging to 'it' is not "the person"), but the *purpose* in conventional 'evolution-talk' points to the ID camouflage of creationism. Evolutionary mutation does not occur 'in order to' better sustainability (a purpose) - rather 'because of'' - in variations induced by the changes in the totality (an entailment). How intensely some change may influence 'us' is still my terra incognita to be explored. (In my 'evolution' term i.e. the history of a universe from occurring from the plenitude all the way to re-smoothening into it I include a 'purpose: to facilitate such 're-smoothening from the incipient unavoidable complexity-formation from the plenitude's infinite invariant symmetry - see my 'Multiverse-narrative). John On 2/18/07, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > On 2/18/07, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > My main problem with Comp is that it needs several unprovable assumptions > > to be accepted. For example the Yes Doctor hypothesis, wherein it is assumed > > that it must be possible to digitally emulate some or all of a person's > > body/brain function and the person will not notice any difference. The Yes > > Doctor hypothesis is a particular case of the digital emulation hypothesis > > in which it is asserted that, basically, ANYTHING can be digitally emulated > > if one had enough computational resources available. As this seems to me to > > be almost a version of Comp [at least as far as I have got with reading > > Bruno's exposition] then from my simple minded perspective it looks rather > > like assuming the very thing that needs to be demonstrated. > > > > You can't prove that a machine will be conscious in the same way you are. > There is good reason to believe that the third person observable behaviour > of the brain can be emulated, because the brain is just chemical reactions > and chemistry is a well-understood field. (Roger Penrose believes that > something fundamentally non-computable may be happening in the brain but he > is almost on his own in this view.) However, it is possible that the actual > chemical reactions are needed for consciousness, and a computer emulation > would be a philosophical zombie. I think it is very unlikely that something > as elaborate as consciousness could have developed with no evolutionary > purpose (evolution cannot distinguish between me and my zombie twin if > zombies are possible), but it is a logical possibility. > > Stathis Papaioannou > > > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
Pls see after Jason's remark John - Original Message - From: Jason To: Everything List Sent: Monday, February 19, 2007 3:42 AM Subject: Re: Searles' Fundamental Error On Feb 18, 5:46 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On 2/18/07, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > My main problem with Comp is that it needs several unprovable assumptions to > > > be accepted. I believe that to say that some special substrate is needed for consciousness, be it chemical reactions or anything else, is subscribing to an epiphenominal view. For example, there should be no difference in behavior between a brain that operates chemically and one which has its chemical reactions simulated on a computer; however if it is the chemicals themselves that are responsible for consciousness, this consciousness can have no effect on the brain because the net result will be identical whether the brain is simulated or not. To me, epiphenominalism is a logical contradiction, because if consciousness has no effect on the mind, we wouldn't wonder about the mind-body problem because the mystery of consciousness would have no way of communicating itself to the brain. Therefore, I don't see how anything external to the functioning of the brain could be responsible for consciousness. Jason --- JM: I think you are in a limitation and draw conclusions from this limited model to beyond it. Whatever we can 'simulate' is from within the up-to-date knowledge base: our cognitive inventory. That is OK - and the way how humanity developed over the eras of the epistemic enrichment since dawn. Topics are added and views change as we learn more. We are not (yet?) at the end with omniscience. So our today's simulation is valid only to the extent of today's level of knowables. Nobody can include the yet unknown into a simulation. (see the remark of Stathis: "> You can't prove that a machine will be conscious in the same way you are.") If you insist of considering "the brain", it is OK with me (I go further in my views into a total interconnection) but from even the brain you can include into your simulation only what was learnt about it to date. The computer cannot go beyond it either. The brain does. So our model-simulation is just that: a limited model. Are we ready for surprizes? John M --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
Le 18-févr.-07, à 13:57, Mark Peaty a écrit : > My main problem with Comp is that it needs several unprovable > assumptions to be accepted. For example the Yes Doctor hypothesis, > wherein it is assumed that it must be possible to digitally emulate > some or all of a person's body/brain function and the person will not > notice any difference. The Yes Doctor hypothesis is a particular case > of the digital emulation hypothesis in which it is asserted that, > basically, ANYTHING can be digitally emulated if one had enough > computational resources available. As this seems to me to be almost a > version of Comp [at least as far as I have got with reading Bruno's > exposition] then from my simple minded perspective it looks rather > like assuming the very thing that needs to be demonstrated. I disagree. The main basic lesson from the UDA is that IF I am a machine (whatever I am) then the universe (whatever the universe is) cannot be a machine. Except if I am (literaly) the universe (which I assume to be false). If I survive classical teleportation, then the physical appearances emerge from a randomization of all my consistent continuations, and this is enough for explaining why comp predicts that the "physical appearance" cannot be entirely computational (cf first person indeterminacy, etc.). You can remember it by a slogan: If I am a machine, then (not-I) is not a machine. Of course something like "arithmetical truth" is not a machine, or cannot be produced by a machine. Remember that one of my goal is to show that the comp hyp is refutable. A priori it entails some highly non computable things, but then computer science makes it less easy to refute quickly comp, and empiry (the quantum) seems to assess comp, until now. > However, as far as I can see it is inherent in the nature of > consciousness to reify something. Well, it depends what you mean by reifying. I take it as a high level intellectual error. When a cat pursues a mouse, it plausible that the cat believes in the mouse, and reify it in a sense. If that is your sense of reifying, then I am ok with the idea that consciousness reifies things. But I prefer to use "reifying" more technically for making existing something primitively, despite existence of phenomenological explanation. Let me be clear, because it could be confusing. A computationalist can guess there is a universe, atoms, etc. He cannot remain consistent if he believes the universe emerge from its parts, that the universe is made of atoms, etc. > I appreciate that the UDA and related treatments in mathematical > philosophy, can be rigorous, and enormously potent in their > implications for further speculation and development within their > universe of discourse, but I remain very sceptical of any advertised > potential to bootstrap the rest of the universe. I agree with you. But a thorough understanding of UDA would add substance to your skepticism. With comp, the more we know about the universe, the more we know we are ignorant about it. It is related with the G* minus G gap. Although you can go from G (science) toward G* (correct faith), when you do that, you will discover many genuine new things, but the gap between G and G* will be made greater too. In computerland, it is like each time you see a new star or galaxy, then necessarily bigger things are forced to exist. The more you explore, the more it remains to be explored, necessarily so. Understanding comp and uda makes you infinitely more modest than we are used to think. I must go, Regards, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
On 2/18/07, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: MP: Well at least I can say now that I have some inkling of what 'machine's > theology' means. However, as far as I can see it is inherent in the nature > of consciousness to reify something. I have not seen anywhere a refutation > of my favoured understanding of consciousness which is that a brain is > creating a representation of its world and a representation of itself and > representations of the relationships between self and world. The 'world' in > question is reified by the maintenance and updating of these > representations, this is what the brain does, this is what it is FOR. Our > contemplation of numbers and other mathematical objects or the abstract > entities posited as particles and energy packets etc., by modern physics is > experientially and logically second to the pre-linguistic/non-linguistic > representation of self in the world, mediated by cell assemblies > constituting basic qualia. [In passing; a quale must embody this triple > aspect of representing something about the world, something about oneself > and something significant about relationships *between* that piece of the > world and that rendition of 'self'.] > Would any device that can create a representation of the world, itself and the relationship between the world and itself be conscious? If you believe that it would, then you are thereby very close to computationalism, the thing you seem to be questioning. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Texas, Georgia legislators: Copernicus and Darwin a Jewish conspiracy
Le 18-févr.-07, à 05:03, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : > > http://www.capitolannex.com/IMAGES2/CHISUMMEMO.pdf > > What can you say? This is frightening, but perhaps not so astonishing when you realize that since about 1500 years the scientific method (the doubting procedure mainly) is still discouraged and taboo for many "believers" (in "God", with Christians or "Matter" with the "Atheist theologian"). Of course the Darwinist will not help to encourage a creationist to doubt, if he presents Darwinism as undoubtedly true. Where doubts are absent you have no science, whatever is taught. Doubts alert us on falsifiability and falsification, which are the things the creationist would really attack, and scientism (that is authoritative science) helps them a lot. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds
Le 18-févr.-07, à 03:33, Hal Ruhl a écrit : > > Hi Bruno: > > In response I will start with some assumptions central to my approach. > > The first has to do with the process of making a list. > > The assumption is: > > Making a list of items [which could be some of > the elements of a set for example] is always a > process of making a one to one mapping of the > items to some of the counting numbers such as: > > 1 - an item > 2 - an item not previously on the list > 3 - an item not previously on the list > . > . > . > n - last item and it was not previously on the list I don' t see clearly an assumption here. I guess you are assuming existence of things capable of being put in a list. Effectively? then why not use the Wi (cf Cutland's book or older explanations I have provided on the list. Help yourself with Podniek's page perhaps, or try to be just informal. > > My second assumption is: > > Objects [such as states of universes for example] have properties. You talk like if it was an axiomatic. A good test to see if it is an axiomatic consists to change the primitive words you are using by arbitrary words. You are saying "glass of bears have trees and garden". You can add that you mean that the term "glass of bear" is *intended for states of universes, but recall the goal is to provide an explanation for the appearance of the "states of universes". In general properties are modelized by sets. It is ok to presuppose some naive set theory, but then you "axiomatic" has to be clean. > > My third assumption is: > > All of the properties it is possible for objects to have can be listed. I guess you assume church thesis, and you are talking about effective properties. > > My fourth assumption is: > > The list of possible properties of objects is countably infinite. ? (lists are supposed to be countably infinite (or finite)). > > Conclusions so far: > [All possible objects are defined by all the sub lists of the full > list.] > [The number of objects is uncountably infinite] What is the full list? > > I will stop there for now and await comments. > > As to the remainder of the post: > > In the above I have not reached the point of > deriving the dynamic of my model but I am not > focusing on computations when I say that any > succession of states is allowed. Logically > related successions are allowed. Successions > displaying any degree of randomness are also allowed. I have already mentionned that comp entails some strong form of (first person) randomness. Indeed, a priori to much. > > I would like to finish the walk through of my > model before discussing white rabbits and observation. I am really sorry Hall. It looks you want to be both informal and formal. It does not help me to understand what you are trying to say. Bruno --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
On 2/19/07, Jason <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: On Feb 18, 5:46 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > You can't prove that a machine will be conscious in the same way you > are. > > There is good reason to believe that the third person observable > behaviour > > of the brain can be emulated, because the brain is just chemical > reactions > > and chemistry is a well-understood field. (Roger Penrose believes that > > something fundamentally non-computable may be happening in the brain but > he > > is almost on his own in this view.) However, it is possible that the > actual > > chemical reactions are needed for consciousness, and a computer > emulation > > would be a philosophical zombie. I think it is very unlikely that > something > > as elaborate as consciousness could have developed with no evolutionary > > purpose (evolution cannot distinguish between me and my zombie twin if > > zombies are possible), but it is a logical possibility. > > > > Stathis Papaioannou > > I believe that to say that some special substrate is needed for > consciousness, be it chemical reactions or anything else, is > subscribing to an epiphenominal view. For example, there should be no > difference in behavior between a brain that operates chemically and > one which has its chemical reactions simulated on a computer; however > if it is the chemicals themselves that are responsible for > consciousness, this consciousness can have no effect on the brain > because the net result will be identical whether the brain is > simulated or not. To me, epiphenominalism is a logical contradiction, > because if consciousness has no effect on the mind, we wouldn't wonder > about the mind-body problem because the mystery of consciousness would > have no way of communicating itself to the brain. Therefore, I don't > see how anything external to the functioning of the brain could be > responsible for consciousness. > > Jason I would bet on functionalism as the correct theory of mind for various reasons, but I don't see that there is anything illogical the possibility that consciousness is substrate-dependent. Let's say that when you rub two carbon atoms together they have a scratchy experience, whereas when you rub two silicon atoms together they have a squirmy experience. This could just be a mundane fact about the universe, no more mysterious than any other basic physical fact. What is illogical, however, is the "no causal effect" criterion if this is called epiphenomenalism. If the effect is purely and necessarily on first person experience, it's no less an effect; we might not notice if the carbon atoms were zombified, but the carbon atoms would certainly notice. I think it all comes down to the deep-seated and very obviously wrong idea that only third person empirical data is genuine empirical data. It is a legitimate concern of science that data should be verifiable and experiments repeatable, but it's taking it a bit far to conclude from this that we are therefore all zombies. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
On Feb 18, 5:46 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On 2/18/07, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > My main problem with Comp is that it needs several unprovable assumptions to > > > be accepted. For example the Yes Doctor hypothesis, wherein it is assumed > > that it must be possible to digitally emulate some or all of a person's > > body/brain function and the person will not notice any difference. The Yes > > Doctor hypothesis is a particular case of the digital emulation hypothesis > > in which it is asserted that, basically, ANYTHING can be digitally emulated > > if one had enough computational resources available. As this seems to me to > > be almost a version of Comp [at least as far as I have got with reading > > Bruno's exposition] then from my simple minded perspective it looks rather > > like assuming the very thing that needs to be demonstrated. > > You can't prove that a machine will be conscious in the same way you are. > There is good reason to believe that the third person observable behaviour > of the brain can be emulated, because the brain is just chemical reactions > and chemistry is a well-understood field. (Roger Penrose believes that > something fundamentally non-computable may be happening in the brain but he > is almost on his own in this view.) However, it is possible that the actual > chemical reactions are needed for consciousness, and a computer emulation > would be a philosophical zombie. I think it is very unlikely that something > as elaborate as consciousness could have developed with no evolutionary > purpose (evolution cannot distinguish between me and my zombie twin if > zombies are possible), but it is a logical possibility. > > Stathis Papaioannou I believe that to say that some special substrate is needed for consciousness, be it chemical reactions or anything else, is subscribing to an epiphenominal view. For example, there should be no difference in behavior between a brain that operates chemically and one which has its chemical reactions simulated on a computer; however if it is the chemicals themselves that are responsible for consciousness, this consciousness can have no effect on the brain because the net result will be identical whether the brain is simulated or not. To me, epiphenominalism is a logical contradiction, because if consciousness has no effect on the mind, we wouldn't wonder about the mind-body problem because the mystery of consciousness would have no way of communicating itself to the brain. Therefore, I don't see how anything external to the functioning of the brain could be responsible for consciousness. Jason --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
