Re: Movie cannot think

[Brent Meeker]

On 3/10/2011 6:47 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:

*From:* Brent Meeker 
*Sent:* Thursday, March 10, 2011 1:39 PM
*To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com 


*Subject:* Re: Movie cannot think
On 3/10/2011 7:15 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote:

*From:* Andrew Soltau 
*Sent:* Thursday, March 10, 2011 7:47 AM
*To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com 


*Subject:* Re: Movie cannot think
On 09/03/11 16:53, Brent Meeker wrote:
The appearance of change is already explained by the fact that there 
are different frames that have an implicit sequence and in which the 
observers state is different.  Further "explanation" is just 
muddying the picture - at leas that's what Deutsch et al would say.



by saying that the frame of reference is changed, f


But this is no more than a magic finger pointing to the frames and 
saying, "This one. And then this one.  And then"

Which is what one seems to be experiencing.

snip


[SPK] One thing must be considered: There are more that one
possible sequence of observer states. Not only are we considering
all possible frames for a single movie but the frames for every
possible movie too, even the ones that are pure noise! All of
them will be equally co-present in the heap and there is no a
priori bias for one over another.
The magic finger is a figure of speech of something that
selects one of them: how is the one that is “actually
experienced” selected? I propose that a mutual constraint
methodology such as what has been proposed as a solution the the
concurrency problem in computer science may answer this. But this
possibility seems to be a bit outside of the light of the
lamppost under which we currently are looking for the answer...

Onward!
Stephen


Actually I think this picture of observer states as being like frames 
of a movie is misleading.  What we could identify as an observation or 
an experience, overlaps with preceding and succeeding observer states 
and this provides an explicit order.  Bruno's idea of digital 
simulation by a Turing machine, which has idealized discreet states, 
can only work at a much lower level so that a momentary "experience" 
corresponds to a very large number of simulation states.


Brent
**

[SPK]

But exactly how is the overlap (and underlap) determined? We are 
leaving something out here! We cannot treat objects that have variable 
information content as just another case of fungible tokens! When we 
do this we are completely eliminating the notion of meaningfulness. 
There is a difference between a frame that depicts a deer and fawn 
feeing in the forest and a frame that shows the screen of a TV set to 
a non-existing channel, but if all we are considering are the frames 
as objects we have no means to determine the sequence of frames.




We do if they overlap.  Of course if we consider "frames" at a very low 
level then they don't overlap - but then they don't depict much of 
anything we'd recognize either.


Brent

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Re: Movie cannot think

[Stephen Paul King]

From: Brent Meeker 
Sent: Thursday, March 10, 2011 1:39 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
Subject: Re: Movie cannot think
On 3/10/2011 7:15 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: 

  From: Andrew Soltau 
  Sent: Thursday, March 10, 2011 7:47 AM
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Subject: Re: Movie cannot think
  On 09/03/11 16:53, Brent Meeker wrote: 
The appearance of change is already explained by the fact that there are 
different frames that have an implicit sequence and in which the observers 
state is different.  Further "explanation" is just muddying the picture - at 
leas that's what Deutsch et al would say.


  by saying that the frame of reference is changed, f

But this is no more than a magic finger pointing to the frames and saying, 
"This one. And then this one.  And then"

  Which is what one seems to be experiencing.

snip

[SPK] One thing must be considered: There are more that one possible 
sequence of observer states. Not only are we considering all possible frames 
for a single movie but the frames for every possible movie too, even the ones 
that are pure noise! All of them will be equally co-present in the heap and 
there is no a priori bias for one over another. 
The magic finger is a figure of speech of something that selects one of 
them: how is the one that is “actually experienced” selected? I propose that a 
mutual constraint methodology such as what has been proposed as a solution the 
the concurrency problem in computer science may answer this. But this 
possibility seems to be a bit outside of the light of the lamppost under which 
we currently are looking for the answer...

  Onward!

  Stephen


Actually I think this picture of observer states as being like frames of a 
movie is misleading.  What we could identify as an observation or an 
experience, overlaps with preceding and succeeding observer states and this 
provides an explicit order.  Bruno's idea of digital simulation by a Turing 
machine, which has idealized discreet states, can only work at a much lower 
level so that a momentary "experience" corresponds to a very large number of 
simulation states. 

Brent
**

[SPK] 

But exactly how is the overlap (and underlap) determined? We are leaving 
something out here! We cannot treat objects that have variable information 
content as just another case of fungible tokens! When we do this we are 
completely eliminating the notion of meaningfulness. There is a difference 
between a frame that depicts a deer and fawn feeing in the forest and a frame 
that shows the screen of a TV set to a non-existing channel, but if all we are 
considering are the frames as objects we have no means to determine the 
sequence of frames. Frames alone are fungible. There is at least more than one 
level of information here!

Axioms and assumptions have consequences.



Onward!



Stephen


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Re: Movie cannot think

[Stephen Paul King]

From: Bruno Marchal 
Sent: Thursday, March 10, 2011 12:48 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
Subject: Re: Movie cannot think
Dear Stephen, 


On 10 Mar 2011, at 16:27, Stephen Paul King wrote:


  -Original Message- 
  From: Bruno Marchal 
  Sent: Thursday, March 10, 2011 9:10 AM 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Subject: Re: Movie cannot think 


  On 10 Mar 2011, at 13:47, Andrew Soltau wrote:

  > All the moments exist, and as Deutsch points out, as you summarise,  
  > 'The appearance of change is already explained by the fact that  
  > there are different frames that have an implicit sequence and in  
  > which the observers state is different', but for change to actually  
  > happen, the magic finger must move. Otherwise reality would be like  
  > a movie film sitting in the can in storage.


  The change in the "working program" is brought by the "universal  
  machine" which interprets it. All you need is an initial universal  
  "machine". It happens that addition and multiplication, with first  
  order logic is enough to define such an initial universal system, and  
  the UDA+MGA shows that the laws of mind, including the laws of matter,  
  does not depend on the choice of the initial universal system.

  So elementary arithmetic does emulate, in the mathematical sense,  
  computations. Arithmetic does not just describe all those  
  computations: it literally emulate them. This is not trivial to show,  
  although computer science gives the insight. Computations in  
  arithmetic are not like movie, they are like a observer line universe  
  in a block universe.

  To add an external time reintroduces a mystery where it is not needed.  
  That use of time is like the use of "God" as gap explanation by the  
  pseudo-religious (authoritative) people. You will end up with a  
  primitive time, a primitive matter, and why not a primitive "god"  
  responsible for all this.

  That is, in my opinion, the correct insight of Deutsch. Except that he  
  mentions an "implicit sequence", which is typically made explicit by  
  the universal machine which emulates, albeit statically or  
  arithmetically-realistically, the computation. All computations in  
  that setting are ultimately based on the explicit sequence 0, s(0),  
  s(s(0)), ... (or the equivalent in the combinators, etc.).

  Bruno


  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

  **
  Dear Bruno,

  I only really have one difficulty with this thought: What choose that 
particular "initial universal 'machine'"? 


[BM]
Addition+multiplication?  (RA, Robinson Arithmetic)

Because it is shown that it is enough to derive mind and matter from it.

Because it is shown that, if we accept the comp bet, it *has to* be enough. And 
adding anything more betrays the solution of the 1-3 person relations.

Because it is taught in high school, and with few exception accepted and used 
by everybody.

Because it can be shown to be necessary, in the sense that any weaker theory 
cannot derive it.

***
  [SPK] But how does this address my question? I must have misunderstood you 
but the word “initial” appears three times in the following:

“The change in the "working program" is brought by the "universal  
machine" which interprets it. All you need is an initial universal  
"machine". It happens that addition and multiplication, with first  
order logic is enough to define such an initial universal system, and  
the UDA+MGA shows that the laws of mind, including the laws of matter,  
does not depend on the choice of the initial universal system.”

  Why does the word “initial” appear here, if there is no sense of a sequence 
of machine of which there is a least machine? So you are saying that the fact 
that a “weaker theory” cannot derive it determines its minimality in the 
sequence? Why is it necessary to assume a form of the well founded axiom? It 
appears to me that you are otherwise there would not necessarily be a minimal 
machine! 
  Even then we have no phenomenological interview of the so defined Löbian 
Machine to at least give us the appearance that we have found a derivation of 
mind and matter that can be analytically continued to any person’s experience 
of what it is like to have a mind in a physical world! I concede that within 
your argument there is something that seems to be like a mind in an abstract 
3-p sense, but you have not shown how such a “mind” interacts with other 
similarly defined minds except in a reasoning that involves taking the plural 
case, but mere plurality is not sufficient for yield a general result for 
concurrency.
***

  If it cannot be shown to be unique in contrast to all possible machines, what 
makes it special? 
[BM]
I insist that any first order logical specification of a universal system will 
do. I have tried to introduce the combinators instead of numbers, but people 
were a bit uneasy with it, so I take the numbers, which are equivalent with 
respect to our goal.

What makes 

Re: The Emergence of Consciousness in the Quantum Universe

[Russell Standish]

Thanks Stephen, for the warning. I guess the onus is on the author to
not sound like a crank! 

By the way, all the ligatures in your quote below displayed as a space
in my email reader, so it doubled the effect :(.

Cheers

On Thu, Mar 10, 2011 at 08:27:04AM -0500, Stephen Paul King wrote:
> Hi Ronald!
> 
>My first impression of this paper is that it is yet another
> attempt to reify the doctrine of dialectical materialism, then I
> wondered if the paper was the output of a science-word-salad-izer
> but reading further I saw some gems:
> 
> "Another implication of the current proposal is that there can be no
> self-aware mecha-
> nized artificial intelligence no matter how advanced the technology
> becomes, since biological
> intelligence is evolved as part of inter-connected universal
> evolution. A mechanical com-
> puter’s CPU will never acquire free will, since it will never be
> able to establish the infinite
> multitude of connections with the rest of the universe environment,
> as manifested in the
> entanglement of the phases of the wave-functions (the Aharonov-Bohm
> effect). However,
> entities formed through semi-biological pathways such as cloning are
> possible because they
> tap into nature’s established pathways to establish these infinite
> connections."
> 
>As my kids would say: OMG! LOL! /facepalm
> 
>I would like to agree in principle with Zhang but I am not sure
> that s/he is not a Chinese Room!
> 
> Onward!
> 
> Stephen
> 
> PS, thanks for posting this reference
> 
> 
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Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Molecular Motion and Heat, was ON THE THEORY OF EVERYTHING was Another TOE short paper

[John Mikes]

Thanks, David, for a reasonable post.
I admire Evgeniy for his boldness of a frontal attack against conventional
physicality's terms.
I would go a step further (is it a surprise?) like: ontology is rather a
description of a stagnant knowledge (state? even if dynamic) of *a
phase*considered in conventional science - if we consider a
continuously changing
complexity of everything for* "the world"* (whatever) - way beyond the
limitations of our knowables (i.e. the 'model' we carry about our solipsism:
the (world)view based upon the acquired knowables and their explanation at
the level we actually reached).

In such views atoms and molecules are cute explanations at a primitive level
of knowledge for phenomena humanity thought to have observed and tried to
understand (explain).

So is the Brownian and other 'movement'(?) applied in the terms of 'heat'
(not really) of those marvels. Since 'movement' is the relationship between
our poorly understood terms of space and time the uncertainty is no
surprise.

Your last sentence may be a connotation to all that 'stuff' of everything' -
outside of the so far acquired knowables, yet in the indivisible
wholeness-complexity duly influencing whatever comes as 'knowable' within
our model. (This - the so far unknown, but seeping gradually into our
ssolipsism of yesterday - yet affecting the observed *model-behavior* serves
my agnosticism, the uncertainty, the fact that our (conventional) sciences
are* "ALMOST"* OK. Meaning: we may be proud of our knowledge and skills, but
technological failures, evaluational mishaps, sicknesses, societal malaise
and unexpected catastrophes etc. still occur.)

To Evgeniy's train of thought I would attach another question (what you,
savants of Q-science may answer easily): if the universe expands (does it,
indeed?) do the interstitial spaces in an atom expand similarly, or they are
exempt and stay put? If they expand, a recalculation of the entire
(Q?)physics and cosmology would be in order . If they don't, there must
be some Big Bang initial volume - not a zero-point start-up, unless that
ridiculous 'inflation-theory' works to save the evening. I like fairy tales.

Spilberg may get a physical Nobel. The idea is not new: Lenin said that the
large increase in quantity turns into a change in quality.

Regards

John M





On Wed, Mar 9, 2011 at 6:08 PM, David Nyman  wrote:

> On 9 March 2011 19:22, Evgenii Rudnyi  wrote:
>
> > So I personally not that sure that molecular motion has more meaning
> > *ontologically* than heat.
>
> Actually, I agree with you.  Of course whatever we can speak or
> theorise about is, strictly, entirely epistemological and consequently
> those aspects we label "ontological" are properly a subset of the
> theory of knowledge.  And of course even in these terms it isn't clear
> that the "physical" is simply reducible to independently existing
> fundamental entities and their relations.  Even though I was
> attempting to pursue some rather obvious consequences of the idea that
> reality might be so reducible, I accept that the relation between what
> we know and what may ultimately ground such knowledge is doubtless
> altogether more complex, subtle and opaque.
>
> David
>
>
> > When you compare heat and molecular motion, first it would be good to
> define
> > what molecular motion is.
> >
> > At the beginning, the molecules and atoms were considered as hard
> spheres.
> > At this state, there was the problem as follows. We bring a glass of hot
> > water in the room and leave it there. Eventually the temperature of the
> > water will be equal to the ambient temperature. According to the heat
> > theory, the temperature in the glass will be hot again spontaneously and
> it
> > is in complete agreement with our experience. With molecular motion, if
> we
> > consider them as hard spheres there is a nonzero chance that the water in
> > the glass will be hot again. Moreover, there is a theorem (Poincaré
> > recurrence) that states that if we wait long enough then the temperature
> of
> > the glass must be hot again. No doubt, the chances are very small and
> time
> > to wait is very long, in a way this is negligible. Yet some people are
> happy
> > with such statistical explanation, some not. Hence, it is a bit too
> simple
> > to say that molecular motion has eliminated heat at this level.
> >
> > Then we could say that molecules and atoms are not hard spheres but
> quantum
> > objects. This however brings even more problems, as we do not have
> > macroscopic objects then. Let me quote Laughlin to this end
> >
> > "By the most important effect of phase organisation is to cause objects
> to
> > exist. This point is subtle and easily overlooked, since we are
> accustomed
> > to thinking about solidification in terms of packing of Newtonian
> spheres.
> > Atoms are not Newtonian spheres, however, but ethereal quantum-mechanical
> > entities lacking that most central of all properties of an object – an
> > identifiable position

Re: Molecular Motion and Heat, was ON THE THEORY OF EVERYTHING was Another TOE short paper

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 10.03.2011 01:29 1Z said the following:



On Mar 9, 7:22 pm, Evgenii Rudnyi  wrote:

When you compare heat and molecular motion, first it would be good
to define what molecular motion is.

At the beginning, the molecules and atoms were considered as hard
spheres. At this state, there was the problem as follows. We bring
a glass of hot water in the room and leave it there. Eventually
the temperature of the water will be equal to the ambient
temperature. According to the heat theory, the temperature in the
glass will be hot again spontaneously and it is in complete
agreement with our experience.


OK.


With molecular motion, if we consider them as hard spheres there is
a nonzero chance that the water in the glass will be hot again.


I don't see the difference. Both seem to predict the same thing


The difference is that from the viewpoint of the heat theory the 
probability that the water in the glass spontaneously will be hot again 
is zero. In classical mechanics however according to the Poincaré 
recurrence such a probability is one. This, in my view, makes the 
difference.



Moreover, there is a theorem (Poincar recurrence) that states that
if we wait long enough then the temperature of the glass must be
hot again. No doubt, the chances are very small and time to wait is
very long, in a way this is negligible. Yet some people are happy
with such statistical explanation, some not. Hence, it is a bit too
simple to say that molecular motion has eliminated heat at this
level.


I still don't see the difference


Then we could say that molecules and atoms are not hard spheres
but quantum objects. This however brings even more problems, as we
do not have macroscopic objects then. Let me quote Laughlin to this
end

"By the most important effect of phase organisation is to cause
objects to exist. This point is subtle and easily overlooked, since
we are accustomed to thinking about solidification in terms of
packing of Newtonian spheres. Atoms are not Newtonian spheres,
however, but ethereal quantum-mechanical entities lacking that most
central of all properties of an object an identifiable position.
This is why attempts to describe free atoms in Newtonian terms
always result in nonsense statements such as their being neither
here nor there but simultaneously everywhere. It is aggregation
into large objects that makes a Newtonian description of the atoms
meaningful, not the reverse. One might compare this phenomenon with
a yet-to-be-filmed Stephen Spilberg movie in which a huge number of
little ghosts lock arms and, in doing so, become corporeal."

So I personally not that sure that molecular motion has more
meaning *ontologically* than heat


Ermm... so you are saying that the classical explanation of heat
reduces it to the motions of molecules with individually well-defined
positions and velocities --whereas Qm reuires that those things can
only be defined in a kind of reverse- reductionism scenario where the
parts acquire their properties from the whole? Is that right? I am
not sure that really breaks anything in thermodynamics, because
quantum entities still can have well-defined kinetic energies without
having well defined positions or velocities.


I have employed in my life quantum mechanics (more exactly quantum 
chemistry, I am a chemist) mostly pragmatically as what chemists do, 
that is, to earn some more money. Along this way there is nothing wrong 
with quantum mechanics.


Yet, if you look at discussions in this group: quantum mechanics and 
observer, quantum mechanics and consciousness, etc., things do not look 
that simple. The quote from Laughlin, in my view, offers some other look 
at this, but frankly speaking I do not know. It is not quite clear what 
molecular motion at the level of quantum mechanics is.


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Re: Movie cannot think

[Brent Meeker]

On 3/10/2011 7:15 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote:

*From:* Andrew Soltau 
*Sent:* Thursday, March 10, 2011 7:47 AM
*To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com 


*Subject:* Re: Movie cannot think
On 09/03/11 16:53, Brent Meeker wrote:
The appearance of change is already explained by the fact that there 
are different frames that have an implicit sequence and in which the 
observers state is different.  Further "explanation" is just muddying 
the picture - at leas that's what Deutsch et al would say.



by saying that the frame of reference is changed, f


But this is no more than a magic finger pointing to the frames and 
saying, "This one. And then this one.  And then"

Which is what one seems to be experiencing.

snip


[SPK] One thing must be considered: There are more that one
possible sequence of observer states. Not only are we considering
all possible frames for a single movie but the frames for every
possible movie too, even the ones that are pure noise! All of them
will be equally co-present in the heap and there is no a priori
bias for one over another.
The magic finger is a figure of speech of something that
selects one of them: how is the one that is “actually experienced”
selected? I propose that a mutual constraint methodology such as
what has been proposed as a solution the the concurrency problem
in computer science may answer this. But this possibility seems to
be a bit outside of the light of the lamppost under which we
currently are looking for the answer...

Onward!
Stephen


Actually I think this picture of observer states as being like frames of 
a movie is misleading.  What we could identify as an observation or an 
experience, overlaps with preceding and succeeding observer states and 
this provides an explicit order.  Bruno's idea of digital simulation by 
a Turing machine, which has idealized discreet states, can only work at 
a much lower level so that a momentary "experience" corresponds to a 
very large number of simulation states.


Brent

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Re: Movie cannot think

[Bruno Marchal]

Dear Stephen,


On 10 Mar 2011, at 16:27, Stephen Paul King wrote:


-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal
Sent: Thursday, March 10, 2011 9:10 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Movie cannot think


On 10 Mar 2011, at 13:47, Andrew Soltau wrote:

> All the moments exist, and as Deutsch points out, as you summarise,
> 'The appearance of change is already explained by the fact that
> there are different frames that have an implicit sequence and in
> which the observers state is different', but for change to actually
> happen, the magic finger must move. Otherwise reality would be like
> a movie film sitting in the can in storage.


The change in the "working program" is brought by the "universal
machine" which interprets it. All you need is an initial universal
"machine". It happens that addition and multiplication, with first
order logic is enough to define such an initial universal system, and
the UDA+MGA shows that the laws of mind, including the laws of matter,
does not depend on the choice of the initial universal system.

So elementary arithmetic does emulate, in the mathematical sense,
computations. Arithmetic does not just describe all those
computations: it literally emulate them. This is not trivial to show,
although computer science gives the insight. Computations in
arithmetic are not like movie, they are like a observer line universe
in a block universe.

To add an external time reintroduces a mystery where it is not needed.
That use of time is like the use of "God" as gap explanation by the
pseudo-religious (authoritative) people. You will end up with a
primitive time, a primitive matter, and why not a primitive "god"
responsible for all this.

That is, in my opinion, the correct insight of Deutsch. Except that he
mentions an "implicit sequence", which is typically made explicit by
the universal machine which emulates, albeit statically or
arithmetically-realistically, the computation. All computations in
that setting are ultimately based on the explicit sequence 0, s(0),
s(s(0)), ... (or the equivalent in the combinators, etc.).

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

**
Dear Bruno,

I only really have one difficulty with this thought: What choose  
that particular "initial universal 'machine'"?




Addition+multiplication?  (RA, Robinson Arithmetic)

Because it is shown that it is enough to derive mind and matter from it.

Because it is shown that, if we accept the comp bet, it *has to* be  
enough. And adding anything more betrays the solution of the 1-3  
person relations.


Because it is taught in high school, and with few exception accepted  
and used by everybody.


Because it can be shown to be necessary, in the sense that any weaker  
theory cannot derive it.





If it cannot be shown to be unique in contrast to all possible  
machines, what makes it special?


I insist that any first order logical specification of a universal  
system will do. I have tried to introduce the combinators instead of  
numbers, but people were a bit uneasy with it, so I take the numbers,  
which are equivalent with respect to our goal.


What makes it special is Church thesis, in the comp motivation. The  
closure of the set of partial computable function for the  
diagonalization procedure.





We may be blinded by the sophistication and brilliance of our logics  
but can we really be sure that there is not a deeper level at which  
this  Löbian machine is just another in a vast infinitude?




RA is not Löbian. RA is the TOE. RA is equivalent with the UD, and it  
generates the histories which contains the much more complex Löbian  
machines. I interview the Löbian machine because they have the maximal  
introspective power possible.


RA is the TOE, the Löbian machine are the internal observer. They are  
much clever than RA. I think as clever as you and me.


Also, in science, we are NEVER sure. Comp might be false.




Consider G. Chiatin's Omega! 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chaitin%27s_constant



OK.





I question the entire premise of a "special initial conditions"!  
Why must we believe that there really is a singularity that 'causes'  
it at all?




What initial conditions?

I think you are confusing "initial condition" and the theory we might  
choose.


I give a theory, quite simple and already known by everybody. And I  
provide its internal intensional epistemologies/theologies, in the  
most classical way (Aristotle's logic, Plato Tarski's semantic, George  
Boole's law of thought, Gödel, Löb,  ... Solovay, or simpler George  
Boolos' laws of mind, Plotinus' theology... and Pythagorus' ontology).


Church Post Kleene Turing Markov thesis resurrects Pythagorus'  
ontology, with someone no one expected: the universal machine. That's  
a recurring creative bomb on this planet and it is a typical event in  
the modern (post Gödel) arithmetical Platonia as seen by its inhabitant.


In UDA i provide a formulation of the mind body problem in the co

Re: Movie cannot think

[Stephen Paul King]

-Original Message- 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Sent: Thursday, March 10, 2011 9:10 AM 
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
Subject: Re: Movie cannot think 


On 10 Mar 2011, at 13:47, Andrew Soltau wrote:

> All the moments exist, and as Deutsch points out, as you summarise,  
> 'The appearance of change is already explained by the fact that  
> there are different frames that have an implicit sequence and in  
> which the observers state is different', but for change to actually  
> happen, the magic finger must move. Otherwise reality would be like  
> a movie film sitting in the can in storage.


The change in the "working program" is brought by the "universal  
machine" which interprets it. All you need is an initial universal  
"machine". It happens that addition and multiplication, with first  
order logic is enough to define such an initial universal system, and  
the UDA+MGA shows that the laws of mind, including the laws of matter,  
does not depend on the choice of the initial universal system.

So elementary arithmetic does emulate, in the mathematical sense,  
computations. Arithmetic does not just describe all those  
computations: it literally emulate them. This is not trivial to show,  
although computer science gives the insight. Computations in  
arithmetic are not like movie, they are like a observer line universe  
in a block universe.

To add an external time reintroduces a mystery where it is not needed.  
That use of time is like the use of "God" as gap explanation by the  
pseudo-religious (authoritative) people. You will end up with a  
primitive time, a primitive matter, and why not a primitive "god"  
responsible for all this.

That is, in my opinion, the correct insight of Deutsch. Except that he  
mentions an "implicit sequence", which is typically made explicit by  
the universal machine which emulates, albeit statically or  
arithmetically-realistically, the computation. All computations in  
that setting are ultimately based on the explicit sequence 0, s(0),  
s(s(0)), ... (or the equivalent in the combinators, etc.).

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

**
Dear Bruno,

I only really have one difficulty with this thought: What choose that 
particular "initial universal 'machine'"? If it cannot be shown to be unique in 
contrast to all possible machines, what makes it special? We may be blinded by 
the sophistication and brilliance of our logics but can we really be sure that 
there is not a deeper level at which this  Löbian machine is just another in a 
vast infinitude? 

Consider G. Chiatin's Omega! 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chaitin%27s_constant


I question the entire premise of a "special initial conditions"! Why must 
we believe that there really is a singularity that 'causes' it at all? Why must 
we recycle that old theological idea? Are there no viable alternatives?

Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Movie cannot think

[Stephen Paul King]

From: Andrew Soltau 
Sent: Thursday, March 10, 2011 7:47 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
Subject: Re: Movie cannot think
On 09/03/11 16:53, Brent Meeker wrote: 
  The appearance of change is already explained by the fact that there are 
different frames that have an implicit sequence and in which the observers 
state is different.  Further "explanation" is just muddying the picture - at 
leas that's what Deutsch et al would say.


by saying that the frame of reference is changed, f

  But this is no more than a magic finger pointing to the frames and saying, 
"This one. And then this one.  And then"

Which is what one seems to be experiencing.

  snip

  [SPK] One thing must be considered: There are more that one possible sequence 
of observer states. Not only are we considering all possible frames for a 
single movie but the frames for every possible movie too, even the ones that 
are pure noise! All of them will be equally co-present in the heap and there is 
no a priori bias for one over another. 
  The magic finger is a figure of speech of something that selects one of 
them: how is the one that is “actually experienced” selected? I propose that a 
mutual constraint methodology such as what has been proposed as a solution the 
the concurrency problem in computer science may answer this. But this 
possibility seems to be a bit outside of the light of the lamppost under which 
we currently are looking for the answer...

Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Movie cannot think

[Bruno Marchal]

On 10 Mar 2011, at 13:47, Andrew Soltau wrote:

All the moments exist, and as Deutsch points out, as you summarise,  
'The appearance of change is already explained by the fact that  
there are different frames that have an implicit sequence and in  
which the observers state is different', but for change to actually  
happen, the magic finger must move. Otherwise reality would be like  
a movie film sitting in the can in storage.



The change in the "working program" is brought by the "universal  
machine" which interprets it. All you need is an initial universal  
"machine". It happens that addition and multiplication, with first  
order logic is enough to define such an initial universal system, and  
the UDA+MGA shows that the laws of mind, including the laws of matter,  
does not depend on the choice of the initial universal system.


So elementary arithmetic does emulate, in the mathematical sense,  
computations. Arithmetic does not just describe all those  
computations: it literally emulate them. This is not trivial to show,  
although computer science gives the insight. Computations in  
arithmetic are not like movie, they are like a observer line universe  
in a block universe.


To add an external time reintroduces a mystery where it is not needed.  
That use of time is like the use of "God" as gap explanation by the  
pseudo-religious (authoritative) people. You will end up with a  
primitive time, a primitive matter, and why not a primitive "god"  
responsible for all this.


That is, in my opinion, the correct insight of Deutsch. Except that he  
mentions an "implicit sequence", which is typically made explicit by  
the universal machine which emulates, albeit statically or  
arithmetically-realistically, the computation. All computations in  
that setting are ultimately based on the explicit sequence 0, s(0),  
s(s(0)), ... (or the equivalent in the combinators, etc.).


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: The Emergence of Consciousness in the Quantum Universe

[Stephen Paul King]

-Original Message- 
From: ronaldheld

Sent: Thursday, March 10, 2011 7:18 AM
To: Everything List
Subject: The Emergence of Consciousness in the Quantum Universe


http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1103/1103.1651v1.pdf
Here we go again.
Ronald


***

Hi Ronald!

   My first impression of this paper is that it is yet another attempt to 
reify the doctrine of dialectical materialism, then I wondered if the paper 
was the output of a science-word-salad-izer

but reading further I saw some gems:

"Another implication of the current proposal is that there can be no 
self-aware mecha-
nized artificial intelligence no matter how advanced the technology becomes, 
since biological
intelligence is evolved as part of inter-connected universal evolution. A 
mechanical com-
puter’s CPU will never acquire free will, since it will never be able to 
establish the infinite
multitude of connections with the rest of the universe environment, as 
manifested in the
entanglement of the phases of the wave-functions (the Aharonov-Bohm effect). 
However,
entities formed through semi-biological pathways such as cloning are 
possible because they
tap into nature’s established pathways to establish these infinite 
connections."


   As my kids would say: OMG! LOL! /facepalm

   I would like to agree in principle with Zhang but I am not sure that 
s/he is not a Chinese Room!


Onward!

Stephen

PS, thanks for posting this reference


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Re: Movie cannot think

[Andrew Soltau]

On 09/03/11 16:53, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 3/9/2011 5:24 AM, Andrew Soltau wrote:

On 08/03/11 16:14, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 3/8/2011 3:14 AM, Andrew Soltau wrote:
What I am driving at here is the same question as in the email 
Comp. Granted that all possible states exist, what changes the 
point of the present moment from one to another. My referring to 
'the thinker' was probably not a helpful metaphor. Given the 
universal numbers, what carries out the process whereby one is 
transformed into another? What makes the state of the thinker or 
the dreamer into the state of that entity at the next moment?


Andrew 


I think the idea is analogous to the block universe.  In Platonia 
all the states of "the thinker" and his relation to the world are 
"computed" in a timeless way. 
OK. But for any given definition of the thinker, there is a version 
of the world to which he corresponds. Whether considered as a 
physical entity, or a mind or a record of observations, I am 
instantiated in a specific version of the universe. On observation, 
this state changes. The observer is now in a new and different state, 
and is instantiated in a new and different version of the universe.


If one steps back and looks at all the possible states of the 
thinker, existing in all the different corresponding states of the 
universe at each moment, the result is the movie film Barbour refers 
to. This is a timeless situation.


The impression of time for "the thinker" is recovered by putting the 
states into a sequence which is implicitly defined by their content.
So then you have a sequence, but still nothing actually happens. This 
is exactly the scenario Deutsch addresses.


/Nothing/ can move from one moment to another. To exist at all at a 
particular moment means to exist there for ever. (1997, 263; his italics)


One seems to pass from moment to moment, experiencing change. 
Deutsch, however, declares that this can only be an illusion.


We do not experience time flowing, or passing. What we experience are 
differences between our present perceptions and our present memories 
of past perceptions. We interpret those differences, correctly, as 
evidence that the universe changes with time. We also interpret them, 
incorrectly, as evidence that our consciousness, or the present, or 
something, moves through time. (1997, 263)


Physically, this is unassailable. However, we can explain the 
appearance of change very neatly, 


The appearance of change is already explained by the fact that there 
are different frames that have an implicit sequence and in which the 
observers state is different.  Further "explanation" is just muddying 
the picture - at leas that's what Deutsch et al would say.



by saying that the frame of reference is changed, f


But this is no more than a magic finger pointing to the frames and 
saying, "This one. And then this one.  And then"

Which is what one seems to be experiencing.


rom one moment to the next to the next, with no change in anything 
physical. The only drawback is that this requires something 'outside' 
of the moments, and there is nothing outside the multiverse. The 
solution I propose is that phenomenal consciousness is an emergent 
property of this unitary system as a whole. In other words, this 
process is to the moments the way the computational capability of a 
computer is to the frames of a movie in solid state memory.
Based on that, my belief is that, in the collapse dynamics of quantum 
mechanics, we have discovered evidence for a property of the unitary 
system in action


??? Collapse is not unitary.
By this I simply mean that only something of the logical type of the 
system itself can perform the magic finger operation. Just as it takes a 
projector, something outside of the frames of the movie, to operate on 
the sequence of frames of the movie, to produce a motion picture. Just 
as it takes a whole working computer system to actually alter the value 
of a pointer from one address in memory to another. All the moments 
exist, and as Deutsch points out, as you summarise, 'The appearance of 
change is already explained by the fact that there are different frames 
that have an implicit sequence and in which the observers state is 
different', but for change to actually happen, the magic finger must 
move. Otherwise reality would be like a movie film sitting in the can in 
storage. Nothing happens. As Weyl states


The world simply is, it does not happen. Only to the gaze of my 
consciousness, crawling up the life-line of my body, does the world 
fleetingly come to life. (1949, 116)


This applies to the static block universe of spacetime, but it also 
applies to the sequence of moments, each one a static block universe 
moments, 'snapshots', which Deutsch describes as the  quantum concept of 
time. That static sequence is an unchanging layout, just like the movie 
film.


Everett's formulation describes how one passes from moment to moment, 
the making of each observa

The Emergence of Consciousness in the Quantum Universe

[ronaldheld]

http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1103/1103.1651v1.pdf
Here we go again.
 Ronald

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Re: Movie cannot think

[1Z]

On Mar 10, 2:16 am, stephenk  wrote:
> On Mar 9, 11:33 am, 1Z  wrote:
>
>
>
> > On Mar 9, 1:24 pm, Andrew Soltau  wrote:
>
> > > On 08/03/11 16:14, Brent Meeker wrote:> On 3/8/2011 3:14 AM, Andrew 
> > > Soltau wrote:
> > > >> What I am driving at here is the same question as in the email Comp.
> > > >> Granted that all possible states exist, what changes the point of the
> > > >> present moment from one to another. My referring to 'the thinker' was
> > > >> probably not a helpful metaphor. Given the universal numbers, what
> > > >> carries out the process whereby one is transformed into another? What
> > > >> makes the state of the thinker or the dreamer into the state of that
> > > >> entity at the next moment?
>
> > > >> Andrew
>
> > > > I think the idea is analogous to the block universe.  In Platonia all
> > > > the states of "the thinker" and his relation to the world are
> > > > "computed" in a timeless way.
>
> > > OK. But for any given definition of the thinker, there is a version of
> > > the world to which he corresponds. Whether considered as a physical
> > > entity, or a mind or a record of observations, I am instantiated in a
> > > specific version of the universe. On observation, this state changes.
> > > The observer is now in a new and different state, and is instantiated in
> > > a new and different version of the universe.
>
> > > If one steps back and looks at all the possible states of the thinker,
> > > existing in all the different corresponding states of the universe at
> > > each moment, the result is themoviefilm Barbour refers to. This is a
> > > timeless situation.
>
> > > > The impression of time for "the thinker" is recovered by putting the
> > > > states into a sequence which is implicitly defined by their content.
>
> > > So then you have a sequence, but still nothing actually happens. This is
> > > exactly the scenario Deutsch addresses.
>
> > > /Nothing/ can move from one moment to another. To exist at all at a
> > > particular moment means to exist there for ever. (1997, 263; his italics)
>
> > > One seems to pass from moment to moment, experiencing change. Deutsch,
> > > however, declares that this can only be an illusion.
>
> > > We do not experience time flowing, or passing. What we experience are
> > > differences between our present perceptions and our present memories of
> > > past perceptions. We interpret those differences, correctly, as evidence
> > > that the universe changes with time. We also interpret them,
> > > incorrectly, as evidence that our consciousness, or the present, or
> > > something, moves through time. (1997, 263)
>
> > Movement of or through time is dismissed too easily here. Why don we
> > have to experience our history one moment at a time  if it
> > all already exists (albeit with a sequential structure)
>
> > > Physically, this is unassailable.
>
> > Hmm. The arguments in favour of the block universe are actually
> > rather subtle
>
> > > However, we can explain the appearance
> > > of change very neatly, by saying that the frame of reference is changed,
> > > from one moment to the next to the next, with no change in anything
> > > physical.
>
> > The "Frame of Reference" being non-physical?
>
> > >The only drawback is that this requires something 'outside' of
> > > the moments, and there is nothing outside the multiverse. The solution I
> > > propose is that phenomenal consciousness is an emergent property of this
> > > unitary system as a whole.
>
> > If it is a property of the whole system, why are we each only
> > conscious of one small spatio temporal area? Why bring consciousness
> > in at all? Why not have a time-cursor that is responsible for
> > the passage of time?
>
> > > In other words, this process is to the
> > > moments the way the computational capability of a computer is to the
> > > frames of amoviein solid state memory.
> > > Based on that, my belief is that, in the collapse dynamics of quantum
> > > mechanics, we have discovered evidence for a property of the unitary
> > > system in action, we just haven't recognised it as such. Which is why it
> > > gives rise to all the puzzles it does.
>
> > > > Brent
>
>     There may be a solution to the question of finiteness, such as in
> "why are we each only conscious of one small spatio temporal area?" A
> possible answer is that our consciousness involves the consumption of
> free energy (work) that does not have access to infinite power
> supplies within any finite duration.  Action is defined in units of
> energy and time This also can be related to the Bekenstein 
> bound.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bekenstein_bound
>
> Onward!
>
> Stephen

It's easy enough to answer physicalistically...the problem  is the
mismatch with "consciousness
is an emergent property of the system as a whole"

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