Thanks, David, for a reasonable post.
I admire Evgeniy for his boldness of a frontal attack against conventional
physicality's terms.
I would go a step further (is it a surprise?) like: ontology is rather a
description of a stagnant knowledge (state? even if dynamic) of *a
phase*considered in conventional science - if we consider a
continuously changing
complexity of everything for* "the world"* (whatever) - way beyond the
limitations of our knowables (i.e. the 'model' we carry about our solipsism:
the (world)view based upon the acquired knowables and their explanation at
the level we actually reached).

In such views atoms and molecules are cute explanations at a primitive level
of knowledge for phenomena humanity thought to have observed and tried to
understand (explain).

So is the Brownian and other 'movement'(?) applied in the terms of 'heat'
(not really) of those marvels. Since 'movement' is the relationship between
our poorly understood terms of space and time the uncertainty is no
surprise.

Your last sentence may be a connotation to all that 'stuff' of everything' -
outside of the so far acquired knowables, yet in the indivisible
wholeness-complexity duly influencing whatever comes as 'knowable' within
our model. (This - the so far unknown, but seeping gradually into our
ssolipsism of yesterday - yet affecting the observed *model-behavior* serves
my agnosticism, the uncertainty, the fact that our (conventional) sciences
are* "ALMOST"* OK. Meaning: we may be proud of our knowledge and skills, but
technological failures, evaluational mishaps, sicknesses, societal malaise
and unexpected catastrophes etc. still occur.)

To Evgeniy's train of thought I would attach another question (what you,
savants of Q-science may answer easily): if the universe expands (does it,
indeed?) do the interstitial spaces in an atom expand similarly, or they are
exempt and stay put? If they expand, a recalculation of the entire
(Q?)physics and cosmology would be in order <G>. If they don't, there must
be some Big Bang initial volume - not a zero-point start-up, unless that
ridiculous 'inflation-theory' works to save the evening. I like fairy tales.

Spilberg may get a physical Nobel. The idea is not new: Lenin said that the
large increase in quantity turns into a change in quality.

Regards

John M





On Wed, Mar 9, 2011 at 6:08 PM, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote:

> On 9 March 2011 19:22, Evgenii Rudnyi <use...@rudnyi.ru> wrote:
>
> > So I personally not that sure that molecular motion has more meaning
> > *ontologically* than heat.
>
> Actually, I agree with you.  Of course whatever we can speak or
> theorise about is, strictly, entirely epistemological and consequently
> those aspects we label "ontological" are properly a subset of the
> theory of knowledge.  And of course even in these terms it isn't clear
> that the "physical" is simply reducible to independently existing
> fundamental entities and their relations.  Even though I was
> attempting to pursue some rather obvious consequences of the idea that
> reality might be so reducible, I accept that the relation between what
> we know and what may ultimately ground such knowledge is doubtless
> altogether more complex, subtle and opaque.
>
> David
>
>
> > When you compare heat and molecular motion, first it would be good to
> define
> > what molecular motion is.
> >
> > At the beginning, the molecules and atoms were considered as hard
> spheres.
> > At this state, there was the problem as follows. We bring a glass of hot
> > water in the room and leave it there. Eventually the temperature of the
> > water will be equal to the ambient temperature. According to the heat
> > theory, the temperature in the glass will be hot again spontaneously and
> it
> > is in complete agreement with our experience. With molecular motion, if
> we
> > consider them as hard spheres there is a nonzero chance that the water in
> > the glass will be hot again. Moreover, there is a theorem (Poincaré
> > recurrence) that states that if we wait long enough then the temperature
> of
> > the glass must be hot again. No doubt, the chances are very small and
> time
> > to wait is very long, in a way this is negligible. Yet some people are
> happy
> > with such statistical explanation, some not. Hence, it is a bit too
> simple
> > to say that molecular motion has eliminated heat at this level.
> >
> > Then we could say that molecules and atoms are not hard spheres but
> quantum
> > objects. This however brings even more problems, as we do not have
> > macroscopic objects then. Let me quote Laughlin to this end
> >
> > "By the most important effect of phase organisation is to cause objects
> to
> > exist. This point is subtle and easily overlooked, since we are
> accustomed
> > to thinking about solidification in terms of packing of Newtonian
> spheres.
> > Atoms are not Newtonian spheres, however, but ethereal quantum-mechanical
> > entities lacking that most central of all properties of an object – an
> > identifiable position. This is why attempts to describe free atoms in
> > Newtonian terms always result in nonsense statements such as their being
> > neither here nor there but simultaneously everywhere. It is aggregation
> into
> > large objects that makes a Newtonian description of the atoms meaningful,
> > not the reverse. One might compare this phenomenon with a
> yet-to-be-filmed
> > Stephen Spilberg movie in which a huge number of little ghosts lock arms
> > and, in doing so, become corporeal."
> >
> > So I personally not that sure that molecular motion has more meaning
> > *ontologically* than heat.
> >
> > Evgenii
> >
> > P.S. For those who love heat, entropy, and information:
> >
> > http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2010/12/entropy-and-artificial-life.html
> >
> >
> > On 09.03.2011 15:39 1Z said the following:
> >>
> >>
> >> On Mar 9, 2:23 pm, David Nyman<da...@davidnyman.com>  wrote:
> >>>
> >>> On 9 March 2011 14:17, 1Z<peterdjo...@yahoo.com>  wrote:
> >>>
> >>>> Phlogiston was eliminated, heat was reduced. There's a
> >>>> difference
> >>>
> >>> So on this basis you would claim that heat is *ontologically*
> >>> (i.e. not merely epistemologically) distinguishable from molecular
> >>> motion?
> >>>
> >> No. I would say it is ontologically the same as molecular motion, and
> >> molecular motion exists, so heat exists, so heat was not eliminated
> >>
> >
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