Re: Time and Concurrency Platonia?
On 11 Feb 2012, at 21:32, acw wrote: On 2/10/2012 13:54, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote: [SPK] I do not see how this deals effectively with the concurrency problem! :-( Using the Platonia idea is a cheat as it is explicitly unphysical. But physics by itself does not explain consciousness either (as shown by MGA). Maybe I just don't see what the concurrency problem is. It has no constraints of thermodynamics, no limits on speeds of signals, no explanation as to how an Ideal Form is defined, e.g. what is the standard of its perfection, ect. It is no different from the Realm of God in religious mythos, so what is it doing here in our rational considerations? Forgive me but I was raised by parents that where Fundamentalists Believers, so please understand that I have an allergy to ideas that remind me of the mental prison that I had to work so hard to escape. I'm not asking you to share all of Plato's beliefs here. It's merely a minimal amount of magic, not unlike the magic you have to accept by positing a 3p world. The amount is basically this: arithmetical (or computational) sentences have truth values independent of anything physical and consciousness/qualia may be how some such arithmetical truth feels from the inside. Without at least some axioms, one cannot get anywhere, you can't reduce arithmetic to only logic and so on. Why would Platonia have to have the same constraints as our physical realms - it need only obey to constraints of logic and math, which usually means stuff that is contained within the Church Turing Thesis and its implications. Speed of signals? If some theory is inconsistent, it's only there as part of the reasoning of some other machine. Ideal Form? How do you define an integer or the axioms that talk about arithmetic? Popular religious mythos tend to be troublesome because they involve *logically impossible* properties being attributed to Gods and other beings - things which are inconsistent. It's not like one doesn't assume some axioms in any theory - they are there in almost any scientific theory. Yet, unlike popular religions, you're free to evaluate your hypotheses and use evidence and meta-reasoning to decide which one is more likely to be true and then try to use the results of such theories to predict how stuff will behave or bet on various things. Of course, it's not hard to get trapped in a bad epistemology, and I can see why you'd be extra skeptical of bad theories, however nobody is telling you to believe a theory is true or false, instead it asks you to work out the consequences of each theory's axioms (as well as using meta-reasoning skills to weed down overly complex theories, if you prefer using Occam's) and then either choose to use or not use that particular theory depending if the results match your observations/expectations/standards/... (if expectations are broken, one would either have to update beliefs or theories or both). Hi ACW, What ever the global structure that we use to relate our ideas and provide explanations, it makes sense that we do not ignore problems that are inconvenient. A big problem that I have with Platonia is that it does not address the appearance of change that we finite semi- autonomous beings observe. The problem of time is just a corollary to this. I would prefer to toss out any postulates that require *any* magic. Magic is like Arsenic poison, every little bit doubles the harmful effects. Magic is only used for things which have to either be axioms or which just cannot be reduced further. Arithmetic cannot be reduced further. What we have as subjective experience is not directly communicable, it is very 'magical', yet our theories must explain it somehow. We may want to have no axioms at all, but such theories are inconsistent as they can prove anything at all. I make just a little technical remark. A theory without any axiom is consistent, because it cannot prove anything, not even a falsity. It has a model, indeed, all models are model of the empty theory. It makes such a theory non interesting, but perfectly consistent. To be inconsistent you will need axioms and rules such that you can prove a proposition and its negation. Otherwise I am OK with most of what you say. For the measure problem, and the derivation of the physical laws, I use the self-reference logics. I might come back on this, but it needs some background in mathematical logic. Bruno Why do we even need a notion of 3p except as a pedagogical tool? What we need, at least, is a stratification scheme that allows us to represent these differences, but we need to understand that in doing this we are sneaking in the notion of a 3p that is equivalent to some kind of agent whose only mission is to observe differences and that is a fallacy since we are trying to explain observers in the first place. Unless we have some way to handle a fundamental
Re: Intelligence and consciousness
On 12 Feb 2012, at 06:50, L.W. Sterritt wrote: I don't really understand this thread - magical thinking? The neural network between our ears is who / what we are, and everything that we will experience. If that was the case, we would not survive with an artificial brain. Comp would be false. With comp it is better to consider that we have a brain, instead that we are a brain. It is the source of consciousness - even if consciousness is regarded as an epiphenomenon. UDA shows that it is the other way around. I know that is is very counterintuitive. But the brain, as a material object is a creation of consciousness, which is itself a natural flux emerging on arithmetical truth from the points of view of universal machine/numbers. But locally you are right. the material brain is what makes your platonic consciousness capable of manifest itself relatively to a more probable computational history. yet in the big (counterintuitive) picture, the numbers relation are responsible for consciousness which select relative computations among an infinities, and matter is a first person plural phenomenon emergent from a statistical competition of infinities of (universal) numbers (assuming mechanism). Most people naturally believe that mechanism is an ally to materialism, but they are epistemologically incompatible. Bruno Gandalph On Feb 11, 2012, at 9:34 PM, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Feb 10, 2012 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: I think you are radically overestimating the size of the book and the importance of the size to the experiment. ELIZA was about 20Kb. TO HELL WITH ELIZA That prehistoric program is NOT intelligent! What is the point of a though experiment that gives stupid useless answers to questions? If it's a thousand times better than ELIZA, then you've got a 20 Mb rule book. For heavens sake, if a 20 Mb look-up table was sufficient we would have had AI decades ago. Since you can't do so let me make the best case for the Chinese Room from your point of view and the most difficult case to defend from mine. Let's say you're right and the size of the lookup table is not important so we won't worry that it's larger than the observable universe, and let's say time is not a issue either so we won't worry that it operates a billion trillion times slower than our mind, and let's say the Chinese Room doesn't do ELIZA style bullshit but can engage in a brilliant and interesting (if you are very very very patient) conversation with you in Chinese or any other language about anything. And lets have the little man not only be ignorant of Chinese but be retarded and thus not understand anything in any language, he can only look at input symbols and then look at the huge lookup table till he finds similar squiggles and the appropriate response to those squiggles which he then outputs. The man has no idea what's going on, he just looks at input squiggles and matches them up with output squiggles, but from outside the room it's very different. You ask the room to produce a quantum theory of gravity and it does so, you ask it to output a new poem that a considerable fraction of the human race would consider to be very beautiful and it does so, you ask it to output a original fantasy children's novel that will be more popular than Harry Potter and it does so. The room certainly behaves intelligently but the man was not conscious of any of the answers produced, as I've said the man doesn't have a clue what's going on, so does this disprove my assertion that intelligent behavior implies consciousness? No it does not, or at least it probably does not, this is why. That reference book that contains everything that can be said about anything that can be asked in a finite time would be large, astronomical would be far far too weak a word to describe it, but it would not be infinitely large so it remains a legitimate thought experiment. However that astounding lookup table came from somewhere, whoever or whatever made it had to be very intelligent indeed and also I believe conscious, and so the brilliance of the actions of the Chinese Room does indeed imply consciousness. You may say that even if I'm right about that then a computer doing smart things would just imply the consciousness of the people who made the computer. But here is where the analogy breaks down, real computers don't work like the Chinese Room does, they don't have anything remotely like that astounding lookup table; the godlike thing that made the Chinese Room knows exactly what that room will do in every circumstance, but computer scientists don't know what their creation will do, all they can do is watch it and see. But you may also say, I don't care how the room got made, I was talking about inside the room and I insist there was no consciousness inside that room. I
Re: 1p 3p comparison
On 12 Feb 2012, at 01:01, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Feb 11, 3:51 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 11 Feb 2012, at 15:56, Craig Weinberg wrote: Dennett's Comp: Human 1p = 3p(3p(3p)) - What do you mean precisely by np(np) n = 1 or 3. ? I'm using 1p or 3p as names only, first person direct phenomenology or third person objective mechanism. The parenthesis is hierarchical/ holarchical nesting or you could say multiplication. ? I'm not using 1p and 3p in any standard way. 3p(3p(3p)) represents a top level mechanical process that is controlled by lower level mechanical processes that are controlled by lower level mechanical processes. 1p(1p(1p)) represents a top level self that contains or incorporates sub-selves and their sub-selves. But how, precisely? I call the intra-physical nesting (quantum-arithmetic) a virtual nesting. Are you assuming quantum mechanics? I think that what we measure at that level is literally the most 'common sense' of matter, and not an independent phenomena. It is the logic of matter, not the embodiment of logic. It's a small detail really, but when logic is the sense of matter then all events are anchored in the singularity, so that ultimately the cosmos coheres as a single story. If matter is the embodiment of logic then authenticity is not possible, and all events are redundant and arbitrary universes unto themselves. With comp, matter is not an embodiment of logic, if that means something. I know you will invoke finite things non Turing emulable, but I cannot ascribe any sense to that. When you gave me yellow as example, you did not convince me. The qualia yellow is 1p simple, but needs a complex 3p relation between two universal numbers to be able to be manifested in a consistent history. I think that the 1p simplicity is all that is required. It does not need to be understood or sensed as a complex relation at all, indeed it isn't even possible to bridge the two descriptions. This is a don't ask assumption. The 3p quant correlation is not yellow, nor does it need yellowness to accomplish any computational purpose whatsoever. Even if it did, where would it get yellowness from? Why not gribbow or shlue instead? Of all beings in the universe, we are the only ones we know of who can even conceive of a 3p quant correlation to 1p qualities. Most things will live and die with nothing but the 1p descriptions, We have access only to 1p, but this does not mean that there are no 1p-3p relation. The cat lives the 1p experience of the mouse, but sometimes the cat catch a mouse, also. therefore we cannot assume the universe to be incomplete for those beings. If they had the power to create a copy of their universe, they could do it based only on their naive perception, just as our ability to create a copy of the universe we understand would not be limited by our incomplete understanding of the universe. The 1p experiences make sense on their own. This is too fuzzy. Comp can agree or disagree with this. I am still waiting for a list of what you assume and derive. Machine 1p = (3p(3p(1p))) - Machine subjectivity is limited to hardware level sense modalities, which can be used to imitate human 3p quantitatively but cannot be enriched qualitatively to human 1p. Which seems ad hoc for making machine non conscious. Again we see here that you accept that your position entails the existence of philosophical zombies, I call them puppets. Zombies are assumed to have absent qualia, puppets are understood not to have any qualia in the first place. Puppets don't handle complex counterfactuals, like humans and philosophical zombie. I don't know the difference between absent qualia and having no qualia, also. A puppet could handle any degree of complexity that was anticipated by the puppet master. Which means that the puppet is not autonomous, like a human, or its behaviorally equivalent zombie. The difference between absent qualia and no qualia is that absent qualia presumes the possibility of presence. We already know from blindsight that qualia can indeed be absent as well. OK. It is consciousness with a lacking qualia. Philosophical zombie lacks consciousness, and all qualia. that is: the existence of unconscious machines perfectly imitating humans in *all* circumstances. Not perfectly imitating, no. Sorry but it is the definition. That's why it's a theoretical/philosophical definition and not a practical realism. But we reason about theory. That's what that whole business of substitution being indexical is about. I propose more of a formula of substitution, like in pharmacological toxicity where LD50 represents a lethal dose in 50% of animal test population. Let's call it TD (Turing Discovery). What you are talking about is a hypothetical puppet with a TD00 value - it fails the Turing Test for 0% of test participants (even itself - since if it didn't
Re: The free will function
On Feb 11, 8:33 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Feb 11, 12:01 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Feb 11, 1:24 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: I'm not trying to convince anyone that I'm brilliant, I'm explaining why the popular ideas and conventional wisdom of the moment are misguided. You need to explain, non-question-beggingly.. I have been accused of that sometimes, but I have never been guilty of it that I have seen. What a computer does is arithmetic to us, but to the computer it's billions of separate electronic or mechanical events that signify nothing to it. ...why that is a problem with the computer being a computer and not with the computer being too dumb. All computers are as dumb as anything could be. Any computer will run the same loop over and over forever if you program them to do that. Craig And not of you don't.. We have made a little progress here. You think computers are dumb because you think in terms of the hardware, and not in terms of the software, despite the fact that the latter can be of any degree of complexity. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The free will function
On Feb 11, 8:04 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2012/2/11 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com All computers are as dumb as anything could be. Any computer will run the same loop over and over forever if you program them to do that. It's not because you can program's them to being slavingly dumb to do a thing *that's the only thing they can do*, that's a program mean. That's what being dumb is - not being able to figure out how to do anything else than what you already do. Intelligence is the ability to make sense of any given context and to potentially transcend it, which is why it can't be programmed or simulated (but it can be imitated trivially for specific functions). If it weren't that way we would not be having this discussion. Machines would exhibit creativity and versatility and would be widely considered identical to animal and human life. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The free will function
On Feb 12, 7:14 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: And not of you don't.. We have made a little progress here. You think computers are dumb because you think in terms of the hardware, and not in terms of the software, despite the fact that the latter can be of any degree of complexity. Complexity isn't intelligence, and conflating the two obscures the more relevant issue of understanding. A DVD player exports a pattern of bits as pixels on a video screen. That is software interfacing between two hardware platforms. Neither the screen, the TV, the pixels, the microprocessors, the room, the couch, or the neighborhood is watching the movie. Only the human audience is watching the movie. The software is not watching anything, because it is not a thing anywhere except in our understanding. We are the ones who are writing it to satisfy our own human motives and we are the only ones in the universe who enjoy the results. On every other level, the software has no signal, no semantic content. It is purely a syntactic mechanism that runs on the basic detection-response level of sense. This view of intelligence recognizes subtle differences between actions and experience that scale up to be crucially important issues when considering AI. I'm not sure what alternative you are offering to this view, but it appears to be blind to these distinctions by presuming the neuron doctrine in the first place.If you start out thinking that consciousness can only be the software of the brain then you wind up having to conjure awareness for every program or mathematical function we can imagine. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Truth values as dynamics?
On 2/11/2012 5:15 PM, acw wrote: On 2/11/2012 05:49, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote: I think the idea of Platonia is closer to the fact that if a sentence has a truth-value, it will have that truth value, regardless if you know it or not. Sure, but it is not just you to whom a given sentence may have the same exact truth value. This is like Einstein arguing with Bohr with the quip: The moon is still there when I do not see it. My reply to Einstein would be: Sir, you are not the only observer of the moon! We have to look at the situation from the point of view of many observers or, in this case, truth detectors, that can interact and communicate consistently with each other. We cannot think is just solipsistic terms. Sure, but what if nobody is looking at the moon? Or instead of moon, pick something even less likely to be observed. To put it differently, Riemann hypothesis or Goldbach's conjecture truth-value should not depend on the observers thinking of it - they may eventually discover it, and such a discovery would depend on many computational consequences, of which the observers may not be aware of yet, but doesn't mean that those consequences don't exist - when the computation is locally performed, it will always give the same result which could be said to exist timelessly. [SPK] My point is that any one or thing that could be affected by the truth value of the moon has X, Y, Z properties will, in effect, be an observer of the moon since it is has a definite set of properties as knowledge. The key here is causal efficacy, if a different state of affairs would result if some part of the world is changed then the conditions of that part of the world are observed. The same thing holds for the truth value Riemann hypothesis or Goldbach's conjecture, since there would be different worlds for each of their truth values. My point is that while the truth value or reality of the moon does not depend on the observation by any _one_ observer, it does depend for its definiteness on the possibility that it could be observed by some observer. It is the possibility that makes the difference. A object that cannot be observer by any means, including these arcane versions that I just laid out, cannot be said to have a definite set of properties or truth value, to say the opposite is equivalent to making a truth claim about a mathematical object for whom no set of equations or representation can be made. You're conjecturing here that there were worlds where Riemann hypothesis or Goldbach's conjecture have different truth values. I don't think arithmetical truths which happen to have proofs have indexical truth values, this is due to CTT. Although most physical truths are indexical (or depend on the axioms chosen). We could limit ourselves to decidable arithmetical truths only, but you'd bump into the problem of consistency of arithmetic or the halting problem. It makes no sense to me that a machine which is defined to either halt or not halt would not do either. We might not know if a machine halts or not, but that doesn't mean that if when ran in any possible world it would behave differently. Arithmetical truth should be the same in all possible worlds. An observer can find out a truth value, but it cannot alter it, unless it is an indexical (context-dependent truth, such as what time it is now or where do you live). Of course, we cannot talk about the truth value of undefined stuff, that would be non-sense. However, we can talk about the truth value of what cannot be observed - this machine never halts is only true if no observation of the machine halting can ever be made, in virtue of how the machine is defined, yet someone could use various meta-reasoning to reach the conclusion that the machine will never halt (consistency of arithmetic is very much similar to the halting problem - it's only consistent if a machine which enumerates proofs never finds a proof of 0=1; of course, this is not provable within arithmetic itself, thus it's a provably unprovable statement for any consistent machine, thus can only be a matter of theology as Bruno calls it). Hi ACW, I am considering that the truth value is a function of the theory with which a proposition is evaluated. In other words, meaningfulness, including truth value, is contextual while existence is absolute. Of course it's a function of the theory. Although, I do think some theories like arithmetic, computability and first-order logic are so general and infectious that they can be found in literally any non-trivial theory. That is, one cannot really escape their consequences. At that point, one might as well consider them absolute. That said, an axiom that says you're now in structure X and state Y would be very much contextual. Hi ACW, I was considering something like a field of propositions what say I am now in structure X_i, state Y_j and an internal model Z_k and a truth value that is only
Re: COMP theology
On 2/11/2012 5:09 PM, Joseph Knight wrote: On Sat, Feb 11, 2012 at 11:41 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 2/11/2012 6:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Feb 2012, at 07:32, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi ACW, Thank you for the time and effort to write this up!!! On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote: Bruno has always said that COMP is a matter of theology (or religion), that is, the provably unprovable, and I agree with this. However, let's try and see why that is and why someone would take COMP as an assumption: - The main assumption of COMP is that you admit, at some level, a digital substitution, and the stronger assumption that if you were to implement/run such a Turing-emulable program, it would be conscious and you would have a continuation in it. Isn't that a strong theological assumption? [SPK] Yes, but it is the substitution of one configuration of stuff with another such that the functionality (that allows for the implementation/running of the Turing-emulable (Turing equivalence!)) program to remain invariant. One thing interesting to point out about this is that this substitution can be the replacement of completely different kinds of stuff, like carbon based stuff with silicon based stuff and does not require a continuous physical process of transformation in the sense of smoothly morphism the carbon stuff into silicon stuff at some primitive level. B/c of this it may seem to bypass the usual restrictions of physical laws, but does it really? What exactly is this physical stuff anyway? If we take a hint from the latest ideas in theoretical physics it seems that the stuff of the material world is more about properties that remain invariant under sets of symmetry transformations and less and less about anything like primitive substances. So in a sense, the physical world might be considered to be a wide assortment of bundles of invariants therefore it seems to me that to test COMP we need to see if those symmetry groups and invariants can be derived from some proposed underlying logical structure. This is what I am trying to do. I am really not arguing against COMP, I am arguing that COMP is incomplete as a theory as it does not yet show how the appearance of space, time and conservation laws emerges in a way that is invariant and not primitive. So you miss the UDA point. The UDA point is that if COMP is true, it has to be complete as a theory, independently of the fact that the shorter time to derive physics might be 10^1000 millenia. Comp explains, by the UDA, that whatever you add to comp, or to RA, or to the UD, cannot play any role in consciousness, including the feeling that the worlds obeys some role. So if comp is correct the las of physics have to be derived from arithmetic alone. Then AUDA makes a non trivial part of the derivation. We have already the symmetry of the core bottom physics, the quantum indeterminacy, non locality, non cloning. But this is just for illustrating the consistency: the UDA conclusion is that no matter what, the appearance of matter cannot use any supplementary assumption to comp and/or arithmetic. You can sum up the UD by comp is not completable. It is the Bell-von Neuman answer to Einstein, in your analogy below. Arithmetic is made conceptually complete. Whatever you add to it will prevent the comp solution of the mind-body problem, a bit like evruthing you add to the SWE will reintroduce the measurement problem in quantum physics. Comp and arithmetic are conceptually complete, but of epistemologically highly incomplete and uncompletable. Also, once you agree that stuff is not primitive, you have to define it from your primitive terms, which I don't see possible given that your primitive is the word existence which is not defined, nor even a theory. Hi Bruno, You are still not addressing my questions and what I see as a problem. The speed issue and completeness is not just addressing from an internal perspective since we have to have invariance over many different internal perspectives and these can vary over speed and complexity. This is illustrated by the discussion of how stuff can vary while preserving the functionality. The 'theory' of existence follows naturally from neutral monism, you just need spend the effort to understand it. Think of this another way, we have a choice between belief that COMP is true or COMP is false. In order to have a coherent notion of a bet, both COMP is True and COMP is false have to exist side by side as equivalently possible. [JK] Yet COMP is true AND COMP is false is necessarily false. Hi Joseph, I agree, they are false as a proposition
The Anthropic Trilemma - Less Wrong
Hi Folks, I would like to bring the following to your attention. I think that we do need to revisit this problem. http://lesswrong.com/lw/19d/the_anthropic_trilemma/ The Anthropic Trilemma http://lesswrong.com/lw/19d/the_anthropic_trilemma/ 21Eliezer_Yudkowsky http://lesswrong.com/user/Eliezer_Yudkowsky/27 September 2009 01:47AM Speaking of problems I don't know how to solve, here's one that's been gnawing at me for years. The operation of splitting a subjective worldline seems obvious enough - the skeptical initiate can consider the Ebborians http://lesswrong.com/lw/ps/where_physics_meets_experience/, creatures whose brains come in flat sheets and who can symmetrically divide down their thickness. The more sophisticated need merely consider a sentient computer program: stop, copy, paste, start, and what was one person has now continued on in two places. If one of your future selves will see red, and one of your future selves will see green, then (it seems) you should /anticipate/ seeing red or green when you wake up with 50% probability. That is, it's a known fact that different versions of you will see red, or alternatively green, and you should weight the two anticipated possibilities equally. (Consider what happens when you're flipping a quantum coin: half your measure will continue into either branch, and subjective probability will follow quantum measure for unknown reasons http://lesswrong.com/lw/py/the_born_probabilities/.) But if I make two copies of the same computer program, is there twice as much experience, or only the same experience? Does someone who runs redundantly on three processors, get three times as much weight as someone who runs on one processor? Let's suppose that three copies get three times as much experience. (If not, then, in a Big universe, large enough that at least one copy of anything exists /somewhere,/ you run into the Boltzmann Brain problem http://lesswrong.com/lw/17d/forcing_anthropics_boltzmann_brains/.) Just as computer programs or brains can split, they ought to be able to merge. If we imagine a version of the Ebborian species that computes digitally, so that the brains remain synchronized so long as they go on getting the same sensory inputs, then we ought to be able to put two brains back together along the thickness, after dividing them. In the case of computer programs, we should be able to perform an operation where we compare each two bits in the program, and if they are the same, copy them, and if they are different, delete the whole program. (This seems to establish an equal causal dependency of the final program on the two original programs that went into it. E.g., if you test the causal dependency via counterfactuals, then disturbing any bit of the two originals, results in the final program being completely different (namely deleted).) So here's a simple algorithm for winning the lottery: Buy a ticket. Suspend your computer program just before the lottery drawing - which should of course be a quantum lottery, so that every ticket wins somewhere. Program your computational environment to, if you win, make a trillion copies of yourself, and wake them up for ten seconds, long enough to experience winning the lottery. Then suspend the programs, merge them again, and start the result. If you don't win the lottery, then just wake up automatically. The odds of winning the lottery are ordinarily a billion to one. But now the branch in which you /win /has your measure, your amount of experience, /temporarily/ multiplied by a trillion. So with the brief expenditure of a little extra computing power, you can subjectively win the lottery - be reasonably sure that when next you open your eyes, you will see a computer screen flashing You won! As for what happens ten seconds after that, you have no way of knowing how many processors you run on, so you shouldn't feel a thing. Now you could just bite this bullet. You could say, Sounds to me like it should work fine. You could say, There's no reason why you /shouldn't /be able to exert anthropic psychic powers. You could say, I have no problem with the idea that no one else could see you exerting your anthropic psychic powers, and I have no problem with the idea that different people can send different portions of their subjective futures into different realities. I find myself somewhat reluctant to bite that bullet, personally. Nick Bostrom, when I proposed this problem to him, offered that you should anticipate winning the lottery after five seconds, but anticipate losing the lottery after fifteen seconds. To bite this bullet, you have to throw away the idea that your joint subjective probabilities are the product of your conditional subjective probabilities. If you win the lottery, the subjective probability of having still won the lottery, ten seconds later, is ~1. And if you lose the lottery, the
Re: 1p 3p comparison
On Feb 12, 6:54 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Feb 2012, at 01:01, Craig Weinberg wrote: Dennett's Comp: Human 1p = 3p(3p(3p)) - What do you mean precisely by np(np) n = 1 or 3. ? I'm using 1p or 3p as names only, first person direct phenomenology or third person objective mechanism. The parenthesis is hierarchical/ holarchical nesting or you could say multiplication. ? I'm not using 1p and 3p in any standard way. 3p(3p(3p)) represents a top level mechanical process that is controlled by lower level mechanical processes that are controlled by lower level mechanical processes. 1p(1p(1p)) represents a top level self that contains or incorporates sub-selves and their sub-selves. But how, precisely? It doesn't translate as a how or what, it's a who and why. How do you make your signature your own? How do you stay the same person even thought your body changes? It doesn't work that way, it's a whole other sense which is symmetrical but anomalous to the what and how senses of 3p architecture. I call the intra-physical nesting (quantum-arithmetic) a virtual nesting. Are you assuming quantum mechanics? I'm assuming the observations of quantum mechanics, but not the interpretations. I think that what we measure at that level is literally the most 'common sense' of matter, and not an independent phenomena. It is the logic of matter, not the embodiment of logic. It's a small detail really, but when logic is the sense of matter then all events are anchored in the singularity, so that ultimately the cosmos coheres as a single story. If matter is the embodiment of logic then authenticity is not possible, and all events are redundant and arbitrary universes unto themselves. With comp, matter is not an embodiment of logic, if that means something. Why not? I know you will invoke finite things non Turing emulable, but I cannot ascribe any sense to that. When you gave me yellow as example, you did not convince me. The qualia yellow is 1p simple, but needs a complex 3p relation between two universal numbers to be able to be manifested in a consistent history. I think that the 1p simplicity is all that is required. It does not need to be understood or sensed as a complex relation at all, indeed it isn't even possible to bridge the two descriptions. This is a don't ask assumption. No, it is a positive assertion of irreducibility. Ask all you want, I'm explaining why you will never get an answer. No amount of whats and hows add up to a who or a why. They are anomalously symmetric. Not dualistic, because they are only opposite views of the same sense (making it an involuted monism, since 1p exists within 3p as 'energy', and 3p exists within 1p as body/matter.) The 3p quant correlation is not yellow, nor does it need yellowness to accomplish any computational purpose whatsoever. Even if it did, where would it get yellowness from? Why not gribbow or shlue instead? Of all beings in the universe, we are the only ones we know of who can even conceive of a 3p quant correlation to 1p qualities. Most things will live and die with nothing but the 1p descriptions, We have access only to 1p, but this does not mean that there are no 1p-3p relation. The cat lives the 1p experience of the mouse, but sometimes the cat catch a mouse, also. Sure, yes. Every 3p is the back door of some other 1p. They are the same thing in one sense, and opposite things in the opposite sense. therefore we cannot assume the universe to be incomplete for those beings. If they had the power to create a copy of their universe, they could do it based only on their naive perception, just as our ability to create a copy of the universe we understand would not be limited by our incomplete understanding of the universe. The 1p experiences make sense on their own. This is too fuzzy. Comp can agree or disagree with this. I am still waiting for a list of what you assume and derive. I assume that you don't need to assume in order to derive, and I derive that there are many overlapping channels of sense which themselves make sense relative to each other. By reaching for a list of a priori assumptions, we subscribe to a logos-centric cosmology. We are saying, in effect, first we must care about logical ideas before we can explain anything. This is not how we organically make sense of the world. Logic is always an a posteriori analysis and never precedes or causes a sense experience (outside of more verbal-symbolic sense experiences). Logic and arithmetic is a late afterthought in the history of the development of the psyche and is always rooted in emotion and sensation first, both individually and evolutionarily. What must we assume to become ourselves? What must we assume to feel the wind? Nothing. Machine 1p = (3p(3p(1p))) - Machine subjectivity is limited to hardware level sense modalities, which can be used to
Re: The free will function
On Fri, Feb 10, 2012 at 8:24 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: Apparently what's next is imagining that machines are people and people are machines. I certainly hope so. In the last 3 or 4 centuries we have gradually (too gradually for my taste) gotten away from the idea that things happened because of the soul or gods or God or vague amorphous free floating glows that nobody can see, instead we have started to embrace the notion that everything happens because of natural law, including life. The discovery in the 1950's about how DNA can not only duplicates itself but contains the program that tells cellular machinery how to assemble enormously complex proteins confirms the idea that a living cell is a purely mechanical factory. And invoking God or stooping so low as to resort to vital life forces to explain its operation is no more necessary than saying you can't understand how a steel mill works unless there is a steel mill god or a mysterious steel mill force that nobody can see. We'll be imprisoning software soon I suppose. It's already happened, web browsing software is banned in North Korea and until a few weeks ago it looked like certain types of file sharing programs were about to be banned in the USA. But long term the far more important scenario is AI software imprisoning us. What a computer does is arithmetic to us, but [...] To hell with the but, just answer the simple question is computer math simulated arithmetic or real arithmetic to us?. For once give me a straight yes or no answer. And don't try to weasel out with its real to X but not to Y because then it would be subjective and real means objective. If your answer is yes then there is no reason the computer couldn't also do geometry that is real to us, or real algebra, or real logic, or real physics, or real poetry or do anything that seems intelligent to us. If your answer is no then there is no unique answer to the question how much is 2+2?, the value of 2+2 varies from person to person and its true value can be anything you want it to be. I'll tell you one thing, I'd refuse to walk over a bridge designed by a engineer that had that philosophy because in the end nature always wins out over delusion. The original email is my subjective experience of composing it, therefore it cannot be sent. What can be sent is neither a simulation nor an imitation but rather a completely separate semiotic text which can be used by human beings to communicate And that very semiotic stuff is how we tell the difference between stupid human beings and brilliant human beings; and if the semiotic stuff is really good we also judge that the thing that produced it was conscious. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Intelligence and consciousness
On Sun, Feb 12, 2012 at 2:13 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Not only that, a computer implementing AI would be able to learn from it's discussion. Even if it started with an astronomically large look-up table, the look-up table would grow. That is very true! John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP theology
On 11 Feb 2012, at 23:09, Joseph Knight wrote: On Sat, Feb 11, 2012 at 11:41 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: The diagram is strictly 3p. It would be helpful if you wrote up an informal article on the octolism. It is very difficult to comprehend it from just your discussion of the hypostases. I agree, this would be very helpful. I wouldn't mind if it got a little technical, either. Have you read the part 2 of sane04? (which starts at the page 12). It is a concise version of AUDA. When I reread it now, I am frightened by my own style, and spelling. I also see little mistakes here and there. But it explains the main thing. To interview a universal machine about itself (at some level) makes necessary to describe the universal machine in its language (there is no miracle). That part is usually long and tedious, but for someone capable of programming in some universal language (be it fortran or lisp, or whatever) the principle are not different from programming an interpreter or a compiler. It is the writing of the code of an interpreter in the language of that intepreter. I often skip that part, but refer to the basic literature (Gödel 1931, ...). The more the universal system is simple, the more the translation is long and tedious. In case the universal system is extremely simple (like a universal degree 4 diophantine polynomial) the proof of universality is very complex (it is the Putnam-Davis-Robinson- Matiyasevitch-Jones story). If you can write an interpreter lisp in the language lisp, an easy task, you can better conceive that it is possible (and has been done) to write an interpreter of arithmetic in arithmetic. That is mainly the one I call B for Gödel's beweisbar predicate, which define Peano Arithmetic (say) in (Peano, Robinson) Arithmetic. Beweisbar(x) is the arithmetical predicate for x is provable, with x coding arithmetically a proposition. Arithmetical means that it is defined only with E, f, -, s, 0, and parenthesis). What is your familiarity with Gödel 1931? Gödel's original paper use Principia Mathematica (a formal version of a Russell typed set theory). Do you see the relation between Gödel numbering/beweisbar and programming/universal-interpreter. Both RA and PA are sigma_1 complete, so you can use them as programming language, and B refer to Turing universal arithmetical predicate. But as a provability predicate, its range is personal and different for RA, PA, ZF, you, me, etc. Hmm... I might have to insist that computability is an absolute notion (with CT), but provability is always relative to a machine/number. Provability becomes universal (with respect to the computable) when it is Sigma_1 complete (like RA and PA). Sigma_1 complete provability is Turing universal, and this ease the talk on computer science, and beyond, with the machine. The (meta) theories (G, G*, S4Grz, ...) applies on all sound recursively enumerable extensions of Peano Arithmetic. With comp it applies to us as far as we are self-referentially correct, which is hard to know, especially when betting on a personal digital substitution level. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The free will function
On Feb 12, 12:55 pm, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Feb 10, 2012 at 8:24 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: Apparently what's next is imagining that machines are people and people are machines. I certainly hope so. In the last 3 or 4 centuries we have gradually (too gradually for my taste) gotten away from the idea that things happened because of the soul or gods or God or vague amorphous free floating glows that nobody can see, instead we have started to embrace the notion that everything happens because of natural law, including life. What's the difference? We've only changed the name from God's Will to evolution/mechanism/probability and see the universe as the absence of soul or gods instead. It's the same unreality only turned on it's head. The discovery in the 1950's about how DNA can not only duplicates itself but contains the program that tells cellular machinery how to assemble enormously complex proteins confirms the idea that a living cell is a purely mechanical factory. Which would have solved the problem, except that we don't experience ourselves as enormously complex proteins. We don't experience the world as irrelevant spectators to a purely mechanical process. The complete failure of mechanism to generate any possible explanation for consciousness or experience, let alone a possible mechanism by which biochemical gears can seem like anything other than what they are cannot be brushed aside. If the discovery of DNA explained the existence of the feeling and awareness of life, then we would not be having this conversation, but it didn't explain anything, it only opened the door to more complex mechanisms, which may actually be taking us further away from understanding the wholeness and simplicity of I. And invoking God or stooping so low as to resort to vital life forces to explain its operation is no more necessary than saying you can't understand how a steel mill works unless there is a steel mill god or a mysterious steel mill force that nobody can see. Invoking vitalism or religion to characterize my views is a similar low stooping resort. I have specifically argued against pseudosubstance conceptualizations to model life or awareness. It is not a phlogiston, an elan vital, aether, etc. It is exactly what it seems to be. Experience, feeling...private, signifying sensorimotive events. My view has no woo or religion at all. It is a description of the cosmos precisely as we experience it, nothing more and nothing less. We'll be imprisoning software soon I suppose. It's already happened, web browsing software is banned in North Korea What does that have to do with imprisonment? Does North Korea intend to rehabilitate the software? Does it employ behavior modification techniques to discourage recidivism? Censorship is not incarceration of software, and the fact that your argument is that desperate to make a connection like that tells me that there is nothing there to defend. and until a few weeks ago it looked like certain types of file sharing programs were about to be banned in the USA. But long term the far more important scenario is AI software imprisoning us. It has already happened. It's called corporatism. What a computer does is arithmetic to us, but [...] To hell with the but, just answer the simple question is computer math simulated arithmetic or real arithmetic to us?. For once give me a straight yes or no answer. It's real arithmetic to us, but not to the computer. Just as a traffic signal is a real signal to us, but not to the signal itself. And don't try to weasel out with its real to X but not to Y because then it would be subjective and real means objective. Do you think that a traffic signal understands traffic? And don't try to weasel out by saying it's the whole system or some other apologetic. If your answer is yes then there is no reason the computer couldn't also do geometry that is real to us, or real algebra, or real logic, or real physics, or real poetry or do anything that seems intelligent to us. It seems real to us, of course. That was never my argument. Our entire subjective experience is a 'seems like', so that a realistic imitation accomplishes the goal of allowing us to suspend disbelief of the imitation. We see through the medium. This is photography, movies, books, music, drugs, etc. A trash can that says THANK YOU seems polite to us in one sense, but we can also understand that literally, objectively, it's only a plastic lid, and the other things are only emulsions, pixels, ink in paper, grooves or pits in a plastic disc, psychoactive molecules, etc. If your answer is no then there is no unique answer to the question how much is 2+2?, the value of 2+2 varies from person to person and its true value can be anything you want it to be. No, it doesn't vary from person to person as long as the logic of the system matches. 2+2 is meaningless if you are talking about
Re: The free will function
On 2/12/2012 7:56 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Feb 12, 12:55 pm, John Clarkjohnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Feb 10, 2012 at 8:24 PM, Craig Weinbergwhatsons...@gmail.comwrote: Apparently what's next is imagining that machines are people and people are machines. I certainly hope so. In the last 3 or 4 centuries we have gradually (too gradually for my taste) gotten away from the idea that things happened because of the soul or gods or God or vague amorphous free floating glows that nobody can see, instead we have started to embrace the notion that everything happens because of natural law, including life. What's the difference? We've only changed the name from God's Will to evolution/mechanism/probability and see the universe as the absence of soul or gods instead. It's the same unreality only turned on it's head. The discovery in the 1950's about how DNA can not only duplicates itself but contains the program that tells cellular machinery how to assemble enormously complex proteins confirms the idea that a living cell is a purely mechanical factory. Which would have solved the problem, except that we don't experience ourselves as enormously complex proteins. We don't experience the world as irrelevant spectators to a purely mechanical process. The complete failure of mechanism to generate any possible explanation for consciousness or experience, let alone a possible mechanism by which biochemical gears can seem like anything other than what they are cannot be brushed aside. If the discovery of DNA explained the existence of the feeling and awareness of life, then we would not be having this conversation, but it didn't explain anything, it only opened the door to more complex mechanisms, which may actually be taking us further away from understanding the wholeness and simplicity of I. And invoking God or stooping so low as to resort to vital life forces to explain its operation is no more necessary than saying you can't understand how a steel mill works unless there is a steel mill god or a mysterious steel mill force that nobody can see. Invoking vitalism or religion to characterize my views is a similar low stooping resort. I have specifically argued against pseudosubstance conceptualizations to model life or awareness. It is not a phlogiston, an elan vital, aether, etc. It is exactly what it seems to be. Experience, feeling...private, signifying sensorimotive events. My view has no woo or religion at all. It is a description of the cosmos precisely as we experience it, nothing more and nothing less. We'll be imprisoning software soon I suppose. It's already happened, web browsing software is banned in North Korea What does that have to do with imprisonment? Does North Korea intend to rehabilitate the software? Does it employ behavior modification techniques to discourage recidivism? Censorship is not incarceration of software, and the fact that your argument is that desperate to make a connection like that tells me that there is nothing there to defend. and until a few weeks ago it looked like certain types of file sharing programs were about to be banned in the USA. But long term the far more important scenario is AI software imprisoning us. It has already happened. It's called corporatism. What a computer does is arithmetic to us, but [...] To hell with the but, just answer the simple question is computer math simulated arithmetic or real arithmetic to us?. For once give me a straight yes or no answer. It's real arithmetic to us, but not to the computer. Just as a traffic signal is a real signal to us, but not to the signal itself. And don't try to weasel out with its real to X but not to Y because then it would be subjective and real means objective. Do you think that a traffic signal understands traffic? And don't try to weasel out by saying it's the whole system or some other apologetic. If your answer is yes then there is no reason the computer couldn't also do geometry that is real to us, or real algebra, or real logic, or real physics, or real poetry or do anything that seems intelligent to us. It seems real to us, of course. That was never my argument. Our entire subjective experience is a 'seems like', so that a realistic imitation accomplishes the goal of allowing us to suspend disbelief of the imitation. We see through the medium. This is photography, movies, books, music, drugs, etc. A trash can that says THANK YOU seems polite to us in one sense, but we can also understand that literally, objectively, it's only a plastic lid, and the other things are only emulsions, pixels, ink in paper, grooves or pits in a plastic disc, psychoactive molecules, etc. If your answer is no then there is no unique answer to the question how much is 2+2?, the value of 2+2 varies from person to person and its true value can be anything you want it to be. No, it doesn't vary from person to person as long as the logic of the system matches. 2+2 is meaningless if you are
Re: COMP theology
On Sun, Feb 12, 2012 at 11:14 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote: On 2/11/2012 5:09 PM, Joseph Knight wrote: On Sat, Feb 11, 2012 at 11:41 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote: On 2/11/2012 6:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Feb 2012, at 07:32, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi ACW, Thank you for the time and effort to write this up!!! On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote: Bruno has always said that COMP is a matter of theology (or religion), that is, the provably unprovable, and I agree with this. However, let's try and see why that is and why someone would take COMP as an assumption: - The main assumption of COMP is that you admit, at some level, a digital substitution, and the stronger assumption that if you were to implement/run such a Turing-emulable program, it would be conscious and you would have a continuation in it. Isn't that a strong theological assumption? [SPK] Yes, but it is the substitution of one configuration of stuff with another such that the functionality (that allows for the implementation/running of the Turing-emulable (Turing equivalence!)) program to remain invariant. One thing interesting to point out about this is that this substitution can be the replacement of completely different kinds of stuff, like carbon based stuff with silicon based stuff and does not require a continuous physical process of transformation in the sense of smoothly morphism the carbon stuff into silicon stuff at some primitive level. B/c of this it may seem to bypass the usual restrictions of physical laws, but does it really? What exactly is this physical stuff anyway? If we take a hint from the latest ideas in theoretical physics it seems that the stuff of the material world is more about properties that remain invariant under sets of symmetry transformations and less and less about anything like primitive substances. So in a sense, the physical world might be considered to be a wide assortment of bundles of invariants therefore it seems to me that to test COMP we need to see if those symmetry groups and invariants can be derived from some proposed underlying logical structure. This is what I am trying to do. I am really not arguing against COMP, I am arguing that COMP is incomplete as a theory as it does not yet show how the appearance of space, time and conservation laws emerges in a way that is invariant and not primitive. So you miss the UDA point. The UDA point is that if COMP is true, it has to be complete as a theory, independently of the fact that the shorter time to derive physics might be 10^1000 millenia. Comp explains, by the UDA, that whatever you add to comp, or to RA, or to the UD, cannot play any role in consciousness, including the feeling that the worlds obeys some role. So if comp is correct the las of physics have to be derived from arithmetic alone. Then AUDA makes a non trivial part of the derivation. We have already the symmetry of the core bottom physics, the quantum indeterminacy, non locality, non cloning. But this is just for illustrating the consistency: the UDA conclusion is that no matter what, the appearance of matter cannot use any supplementary assumption to comp and/or arithmetic. You can sum up the UD by comp is not completable. It is the Bell-von Neuman answer to Einstein, in your analogy below. Arithmetic is made conceptually complete. Whatever you add to it will prevent the comp solution of the mind-body problem, a bit like evruthing you add to the SWE will reintroduce the measurement problem in quantum physics. Comp and arithmetic are conceptually complete, but of epistemologically highly incomplete and uncompletable. Also, once you agree that stuff is not primitive, you have to define it from your primitive terms, which I don't see possible given that your primitive is the word existence which is not defined, nor even a theory. Hi Bruno, You are still not addressing my questions and what I see as a problem. The speed issue and completeness is not just addressing from an internal perspective since we have to have invariance over many different internal perspectives and these can vary over speed and complexity. This is illustrated by the discussion of how stuff can vary while preserving the functionality. The 'theory' of existence follows naturally from neutral monism, you just need spend the effort to understand it. Think of this another way, we have a choice between belief that COMP is true or COMP is false. In order to have a coherent notion of a bet, both COMP is True and COMP is false have to exist side by side as equivalently possible. [JK] Yet COMP is true AND COMP is false is necessarily false. Hi Joseph, I agree, they are false as a proposition iff they are given in a single proposition or evaluated as such, as your usage of bracketing shows. This is one of the problems that I see in the COMP based theory and why one
Re: COMP theology
On Sun, Feb 12, 2012 at 1:07 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 11 Feb 2012, at 23:09, Joseph Knight wrote: On Sat, Feb 11, 2012 at 11:41 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote: The diagram is strictly 3p. It would be helpful if you wrote up an informal article on the octolism. It is very difficult to comprehend it from just your discussion of the hypostases. I agree, this would be very helpful. I wouldn't mind if it got a little technical, either. Have you read the part 2 of sane04? (which starts at the page 12). It is a concise version of AUDA. I read it, and will review it further, but I feel like I don't have a good understanding of what's going on toward the very end of the paper (last 3-4 pages particularly). But take that with a grain of salt, since I haven't read most of the other papers on your website, which also discuss the matter. When I reread it now, I am frightened by my own style, and spelling. I also see little mistakes here and there. But it explains the main thing. To interview a universal machine about itself (at some level) makes necessary to describe the universal machine in its language (there is no miracle). That part is usually long and tedious, but for someone capable of programming in some universal language (be it fortran or lisp, or whatever) the principle are not different from programming an interpreter or a compiler. It is the writing of the code of an interpreter in the language of that intepreter. I often skip that part, but refer to the basic literature (Gödel 1931, ...). The more the universal system is simple, the more the translation is long and tedious. In case the universal system is extremely simple (like a universal degree 4 diophantine polynomial) the proof of universality is very complex (it is the Putnam-Davis-Robinson-Matiyasevitch-Jones story). If you can write an interpreter lisp in the language lisp, an easy task, you can better conceive that it is possible (and has been done) to write an interpreter of arithmetic in arithmetic. That is mainly the one I call B for Gödel's beweisbar predicate, which define Peano Arithmetic (say) in (Peano, Robinson) Arithmetic. Beweisbar(x) is the arithmetical predicate for x is provable, with x coding arithmetically a proposition. Arithmetical means that it is defined only with E, f, -, s, 0, and parenthesis). What is your familiarity with Gödel 1931? Gödel's original paper use Principia Mathematica (a formal version of a Russell typed set theory). Do you see the relation between Gödel numbering/beweisbar and programming/universal-interpreter. Both RA and PA are sigma_1 complete, so you can use them as programming language, and B refer to Turing universal arithmetical predicate. But as a provability predicate, its range is personal and different for RA, PA, ZF, you, me, etc. Hmm... I might have to insist that computability is an absolute notion (with CT), but provability is always relative to a machine/number. Provability becomes universal (with respect to the computable) when it is Sigma_1 complete (like RA and PA). Sigma_1 complete provability is Turing universal, and this ease the talk on computer science, and beyond, with the machine. The (meta) theories (G, G*, S4Grz, ...) applies on all sound recursively enumerable extensions of Peano Arithmetic. With comp it applies to us as far as we are self-referentially correct, which is hard to know, especially when betting on a personal digital substitution level. It's all very exciting. I have a lot of learning to do. Right now I'm doing a lot of self study on logic, categories, toposes, sets, and so forth. Slow but rewarding work. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The free will function
Stephen, In my mind, autopoeitic cognitive systems (advanced enough to use symbols to do cognition) do not have a symbol grounding problem. In these organizationally-closed systems, symbols can only be grounded in internal patterns - patterns that emerge from the way the world perturbs its boundaries. As far as I know the only examples of autopoeitic cognitive systems capable of symbol manipulation are higher animals... nothing artificial yet. Terren On Sun, Feb 12, 2012 at 8:09 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: Hi Craig, Great post! Check this out! http://newempiricism.blogspot.com/2009/02/symbol-grounding-problem.html Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
