Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment
On Fri, Sep 28, 2012 at 12:46 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > On Thursday, September 27, 2012 8:10:37 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: >> >> On Fri, Sep 28, 2012 at 8:53 AM, Craig Weinberg >> wrote: >> >> > But you don't need a living cell to transmit a signal. That is my point. >> > Why >> > have a cell? >> >> There are cells because that's the way organisms evolved. If there >> were a way of evolving computer hardware and this was adaptive then >> there would be organisms with computer hardware. It's not impossible >> that somewhere in the universe there are naturally evolved organisms >> utilising batteries, conductors and logic gates. >> > > It's not reasonable to say on one hand that there is no significant > difference between solid state electronics and living organisms and on the > other to blithely accept that not one of the millions of species on Earth > have happened to mutate even a single solid state inorganic appendage. You > claim it's not impossible, but the evidence that we have in reality does not > support that assumption in the least. To the contrary, living organisms are > dependent on organic matter to even survive. As far as I know, we don't even > see a single individual organism in the history of the world that > predominately eats, drinks, or breathes inorganic matter. You are saying > that is, what...coincidence? Well, almost every organism predominantly made of, drinks and breathes inorganic matter, since water and oxygen are inorganic matter. But leaving that obvious fact aside, the other obvious fact is that evolution has used organic chemistry to make self-replicators because that was the easiest way to do it. Do you imagine that if it were easy to evolve steel claws which helped predators catch prey that steel claws would not have evolved? What would have prevented their evolution, divine intervention? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Fwd: Fwd: Sokal-type hoax on two theological conferences
John Clark at least will appreciate this. :-) Original Message To: Skeptic mailto:skep...@lists.johnshopkins.edu>> http://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2012/09/25/a-sokal-style-hoax-by-an-anti-religious-philosopher-2/ - But today I’m presenting something else: a real Sokal-style hoax that Boudry has perpetrated. He informed me yesterday that he had submitted a fake, post-modernish and Sophisticated-Theological™ abstract to two theology conferences: "By the way, I thought you might find this funny. I wrote a spoof abstract full of theological gibberish (Sokal-style) and submitted it to two theology conferences, both of which accepted it right away. It got into the proceedings of the Reformational Philosophy conference. See Robert A. Maundy (an anagram of my name) on p. 22 of the program proceedings." - The comments are worth reading too. === And there is a most excellent review/refutation of Plantinga's "Where the Conflict Really Lies" by Boudry here (I notice he credits Yonatan Fishman among others): http://ihpst.net/newsletters/sept-oct2012.pdf Here's a snippet: "In much of what passes as sophisticated theology these days, the term ‘God’ does no explanatory work at all, but functions as an intellectual vanishing point, a bundle of all explanatory loose ends. God is simply equated with the uncaused cause, the ground of all being, as that-which-does-notrequire- further-explanation." Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Forget Zombies, Let's Talk Torture
Brent, I 'experienced' such situation in 1944 when the Nazi Gendarme's Pol. Police arrested me on suspicion to be part of the underground anti-Nazis (what was true). I made them 'believe' about being an at least 'neutral' grad student so they asked questions before torture started. I was 'believable' so they gave me 3 days to "think about it" after which I was released with an assignment to report about my friends (what I never did). However later on the Commis accused me of having been a 'secret agent' for the Nazis in 1944 and I had to 'makebilieve' (again) that non of it was true. So, they, too, let me go. (I was 3 times in the confinement of the Commis). I was NEVER an actor. It was skills of survivor-pressure. The rest may be the skill in Stathis' profession. John M On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 11:05 PM, meekerdb wrote: > On 9/27/2012 7:40 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > The perfect actor might believe it or he might just be acting. Acting >> is top-down replacement, not bottom-up replacement. Bottom-up >> replacement would involve replacing a part of your brain so that you >> didn't notice any difference and no-one else noticed any difference. >> > > Acting is an augmentation, not a replacement. It's a skill set. It > involves a capacity to embody social expectations so that one's audience > doesn't notice any difference. It's the same exact result from the third > person view. An actor is a zombie being operated by a person. > > > The idea is to replace parts so that there is no behavior difference > *under any circumstance* - acting, as you've conceived it, is limited to a > particular situation. > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Forget Zombies, Let's Talk Torture
On Friday, September 28, 2012 2:44:32 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote: > > On 9/27/2012 11:57 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > Are you saying that you expect replacing someone's brain would be no >> more problematic than replacing any other body part? >> >> Craig >> >> Hi Craig, >> >> I kinda have to side with Stathis a bit here. The problem that you >> are hinging an argument on it merely technical, it is not principled. My >> opinion is that a neuron is vastly more complex in its structure than a >> transistor, heck its got its own power supply and repair system and more >> built in! Nature, if anything, is frugal, there would not be redundant >> stuff in a neuron such that we only need to replace some aspect of it in >> order to achieve functional equivalence. >> >> The point is that the brain is a specialized biological computer >> > > Yes and no. It is biological and one of the things that it does is > compute, but computation is not sufficient to describe the brain (or any > organic cell, tissue, or system). > > > Hi Craig, > > I agree. It does not "just compute". > > > >> that has achieved computational universality because it learned how to >> process language. >> > > The role of language is controversial. It's important, no doubt, but it > isn't clear that human language is the killer app that enabled the rise of > Homo sapiens. We don't really know which organisms have language, nor can > we say for sure that any species has no language as far as I can tell. > Quorum sensing is bacterial language. Prairie dogs have language, birds, > crickets, trees. It depends how we define it. > > > Any representational and (at least potentially) sharable form of > interaction is language, in my thinking. > That's what I think too. The entire universe can be considered language really. Texts. > > > It is because it can figure with symbols and representations that it >> can do what it does. This does not make it "special" in any miraculous way, >> it just shows us how Nature and its evolutionary ways is vastly more >> "intelligent" than we can possibly imagine ourselves to be. >> > > I agree it's not special in any miraculous way. I have never advocated > human exceptionalism. > > > I do advocate it. Humans are exceptional if merely because we can make > the claim and make attempts to demonstrate the possibility! The fact that > we can question whether we are or not and seek answers to the question of > consciousness, is exceptional! > I agree. I mean exceptional in the sense of that some people consider humans as being not really animals but special beings that happen to have an animal body. I see human beings as a clear product of the animal kingdom. > > What does that have to do with acting being a perfectly appropriate > counterfactual for the zombie assumption? > > > My point about zombies is that if we are going to stipulate their > existence as being exactly like humans except that they have no qualia > (first person percepts and all that), then we have to be consistent to the > definition in our discussions of them. > > If you had the technology to augment your acting skills in the way I described, then that is exactly what it would be. You would have a zombie mask that functions entirely by comparing detected brain data. Craig > > > -- > Onward! > > Stephen > http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/L4kqKE1luIMJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment
On 9/28/2012 12:56 AM, John Clark wrote: Because Evolution couldn't figure out how to make a microchip, but people can. Isn't this really just an evasion of the point that evolution made people so that it could make micro-chips? Evolution is ether universal or it is a bad and "not even wrong" idea! -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Forget Zombies, Let's Talk Torture
On 9/27/2012 11:57 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: Are you saying that you expect replacing someone's brain would be no more problematic than replacing any other body part? Craig Hi Craig, I kinda have to side with Stathis a bit here. The problem that you are hinging an argument on it merely technical, it is not principled. My opinion is that a neuron is vastly more complex in its structure than a transistor, heck its got its own power supply and repair system and more built in! Nature, if anything, is frugal, there would not be redundant stuff in a neuron such that we only need to replace some aspect of it in order to achieve functional equivalence. The point is that the brain is a specialized biological computer Yes and no. It is biological and one of the things that it does is compute, but computation is not sufficient to describe the brain (or any organic cell, tissue, or system). Hi Craig, I agree. It does not "just compute". that has achieved computational universality because it learned how to process language. The role of language is controversial. It's important, no doubt, but it isn't clear that human language is the killer app that enabled the rise of Homo sapiens. We don't really know which organisms have language, nor can we say for sure that any species has no language as far as I can tell. Quorum sensing is bacterial language. Prairie dogs have language, birds, crickets, trees. It depends how we define it. Any representational and (at least potentially) sharable form of interaction is language, in my thinking. It is because it can figure with symbols and representations that it can do what it does. This does not make it "special" in any miraculous way, it just shows us how Nature and its evolutionary ways is vastly more "intelligent" than we can possibly imagine ourselves to be. I agree it's not special in any miraculous way. I have never advocated human exceptionalism. I do advocate it. Humans are exceptional if merely because we can make the claim and make attempts to demonstrate the possibility! The fact that we can question whether we are or not and seek answers to the question of consciousness, is exceptional! What does that have to do with acting being a perfectly appropriate counterfactual for the zombie assumption? My point about zombies is that if we are going to stipulate their existence as being exactly like humans except that they have no qualia (first person percepts and all that), then we have to be consistent to the definition in our discussions of them. -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Epiphenomenalism
On 9/28/2012 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 27 Sep 2012, at 19:18, meekerdb wrote: On 9/27/2012 9:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or other machine to behave in a way not predictable by purely physical laws. But this cannot be entirely correct. Consciousness will make your brain, at the level below the substitution level, having some well defined state, with an electron, for example, described with some precise position. Without consciousness there is no "material" brain at all. Why would the state be well defined *below* the substitution level? The substitution level is classical or near classical and so already QM implies that there is a lower level where the state is not well defined. This is not quite clear and depends on your interpretation or even formulation of QM. The lower level where the state is not defined, is relative to your own state, and it is "well defined" relatively to any finer grained computations, it just doesn't matter for your computational state. I *can* know the exact position of an electron in my brain, even if this will make me totally ignorant on its impulsions. I can know its exact impulsion too, even if this will make me totally ignorant of its position. But that doesn't imply that the electron does not have a definite position and momentum; only that you cannot prepare an ensemble in which both values are sharp. In both case, the electron participate two different coherent computation leading to my computational state. Of course this is just "in principle", as in continuous classical QM, we need to use distributions, and reasonable Fourier transforms. But at the fundamental level of the UD 'the electron' has some definite representation in each of infinitely many computations. The uncertainty comes from the many different computations. Right? The state is well defined, as your state belongs to a computation. It is not well defined below your substitution level, but this is only due to your ignorance on which computations you belong. Right. What I would generally refer to as 'my state' is a classical state (since I don't experience Everett's many worlds). But I still don't understand, "Consciousness will make your brain, at the level below the substitution level, having some well defined state, with an electron, for example, described with some precise position. Without consciousness there is no "material" brain at all. " How does consciousness "make a brain" or "make matter"? I thought your theory was that both at made by computations. My intuition is that, within your theory of comp, consciousness implies consciousness of matter and matter is a construct of consciousness; so you can't have one without the other. Brent You can "observe" yourself below the substitution result, but the detail of such observation are just not relevant for getting your computational state. Bruno Brent Of course, you will argue that this is what physics already describes, with QM. In that sense I am OK, but consciousness is still playing a role, even if it is not necessarily the seemingly magical role invoked by Craig. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Prime Numbers
On 27 Sep 2012, at 18:46, meekerdb wrote: On 9/27/2012 1:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 26 Sep 2012, at 19:29, meekerdb wrote: On 9/25/2012 9:51 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Sep 25, 2012, at 11:05 PM, meekerdb wrote: So you mean if some mathematical object implies a contradiction it doesn't exist, e.g. the largest prime number. But then of course the proof of contradiction is relative to the axioms and rules of inference. Well there is always some theory we have to assume, some model we operate under. This is needed just to communicate or to think. The contradiction proof is relevant to some theory, but so is the existence proof. You can't even define an object without using some agreed upon theory. Sure you can. You point and say, "That!" That's how you learned the meaning of words, by abstracting from a lot of instances of your mother pointing and saying, "That." But this uses implicit theories selected by evolution. A brain *is* essentially a theory of the "local universe" already. At least that's your theory. :-) Hmm... If by brain you mean the material object, then a brain is not a theory, but the 3-I, the body description at the right comp- substitution level, is the theory. It is a word (finite object) interpreted by a universal system (physical forces, QM, bosons and fermions). The *material* brain, unfortunately perhaps, is not a word, it is an infinity of words interpreted by an infinity of "competing" universal numbers. We have to explain, with comp, why little numbers seems to win, because we can't prevent all the numbers to add their grains of salt, hopefully not their buggy grains of sand generating noise and/or white rabbits. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Epiphenomenalism
On 27 Sep 2012, at 19:18, meekerdb wrote: On 9/27/2012 9:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or other machine to behave in a way not predictable by purely physical laws. But this cannot be entirely correct. Consciousness will make your brain, at the level below the substitution level, having some well defined state, with an electron, for example, described with some precise position. Without consciousness there is no "material" brain at all. Why would the state be well defined *below* the substitution level? The substitution level is classical or near classical and so already QM implies that there is a lower level where the state is not well defined. This is not quite clear and depends on your interpretation or even formulation of QM. The lower level where the state is not defined, is relative to your own state, and it is "well defined" relatively to any finer grained computations, it just doesn't matter for your computational state. I *can* know the exact position of an electron in my brain, even if this will make me totally ignorant on its impulsions. I can know its exact impulsion too, even if this will make me totally ignorant of its position. In both case, the electron participate two different coherent computation leading to my computational state. Of course this is just "in principle", as in continuous classical QM, we need to use distributions, and reasonable Fourier transforms. The state is well defined, as your state belongs to a computation. It is not well defined below your substitution level, but this is only due to your ignorance on which computations you belong. You can "observe" yourself below the substitution result, but the detail of such observation are just not relevant for getting your computational state. Bruno Brent Of course, you will argue that this is what physics already describes, with QM. In that sense I am OK, but consciousness is still playing a role, even if it is not necessarily the seemingly magical role invoked by Craig. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)
On 28 Sep 2012, at 11:56, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal and all, from Leibniz's point of view: 1) Free will is possible with L's determinism if defined in the following way: if the monad sees the appetite, then the action is free will. If not, not. I would have said that this is freedom, not free will. To be franc, I still don't know how to interpret "monad". 2) Consciousness does not emerge from matter, That's coherent with computationalism. it is a "fulgeration" of the All (the monad of monads), to use L's term. I think that means emanation, not sure. Matter is never in complete control, nor are the monads, nor in fact is the All. OK. L's causation is cooperative. The monad of monads appears to cause changes, but it can only do so according to the monads' perceptions, according to their individual desires, because monads are unaffected by other monads. All changes in monads are actually caused by their previous states. Looks like monad might be interpreted in the comp theory by a computational state, or a relative number (relative to a universal system or number). Since this must occur according to the preestablished harmony, to me that all boils down to mean that the preestablished harmony is a script for monadic change. It looks like a script describing (a part of) arithmetical truth. Like the prices of stock market stocks, it contains all you need or can know to predict the future states of all monads, those being individually given by their previous states. Since the previous states have been constantly reset so that each monad knows everything in the univefrse uniqueloy from its own point of view. That's not quite clear for me, sorry. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/28/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-27, 12:52:30 Subject: Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant) On 27 Sep 2012, at 15:08, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 6:06 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You can approximate consciousness by "belief in self-consistency". This has already a "causal efficacy", notably a relative self-speeding ability (by G?el "length of proof" theorem). But "belief in self-consistency" is pure 3p, and is not consciousness, you get consciousness because the machine will confuse the belief in self-consistency with the truth of its self-consistency, and this will introduce a quale. The machine can be aware of it, and (with enough cognitive ability) the machine will be aware of its non communicability, making it into a personal quale. I think you are doing a confusion level, like if matter was real, and consciousness only emerging on it. I thought that some times ago you did understand the movie graph argument, so that it is the illusion of brain and matter which emerges from consciousness, and this gives another role for consciousness: the bringing of physical realities through number relations being selected (non causally, here). Consciousness is what makes notions of causal efficacy meaningful to start with. I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or other machine to behave in a way not predictable by purely physical laws. But this cannot be entirely correct. Consciousness will make your brain, at the level below the substitution level, having some well defined state, with an electron, for example, described with some precise position. Without consciousness there is no "material" brain at all. Of course, you will argue that this is what physics already describes, with QM. In that sense I am OK, but consciousness is still playing a role, even if it is not necessarily the seemingly magical role invoked by Craig. Some people, like Craig Weinberg, seem to believe that this is possible but it is contrary to all science. I agree with you on this. As an argument against mechanism, your point is valid. My point is that the way you talk might been misleading as it looks like it is bearing on some notion of primitively causal matter, but it does not. That plays some role when comparing the "comp matter" and the QM matter. This applies even if the whole universe is really just a simulation, because what we observe is at the level of the simulation. Not if we observe ourselves or our neighborhood below our substitution level. In that case we can see only the trace of all infinitely many possible simulations, or computations, leading to our actual current computational states. Again we can say that QM confirms this a posteriori. In that case an observation will determine a brain state, in the same way a self-localization after duplication determines a self-localized state (like I am in this well defined city). Bruno I think it is the same error as using determinacy to refute free- will. This would be correct if we were living at the determinist ba
Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment
On Friday, September 28, 2012 12:56:23 AM UTC-4, John Clark wrote: > > On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 Craig Weinberg >wrote: > > >> > But you don't need a living cell to transmit a signal. >> > > Yes, so there is nothing unique about biology. > > > That is my point. Why have a cell? >> > > Because Evolution couldn't figure out how to make a microchip, but people > can. Evolution is a slow stupid inefficient process, but until it stumbled > on the way to make brains it was the only way complex things could get made. > You are contradicting yourself. 1) Nothing special about biology 2) Evolution is utterly helpless to create 'complex things' until it stumbled on biology. Please explain. I ask again. If biology is nothing special. WHY NOT SKIP THE BIOLOGY? > > Why not have cells that crap out signaling fibers made of calcium > instead? Let the calcium do the signaling and screw the cells. > > Because calcium alone cannot transmit electrical or electro-chemical > signals and because for anthing to do any signaling you're going to need > energy; in biology the metabolism of the cell produces ATP and ATP provides > the energy for the electro-chemical signals, and in computers the energy > for the electrical signals is provided by a battery or a power supply. > Then either there is something special about biology as the sole provider of energy for electro-chemical signals in the universe, or there is something special about computers who are made by biological organisms that they can use batteries. Also, my example was not intended to be absolutely limited to pure calcium, I am saying why not have cells produce crystal minerals in the ocean, like coral, which use calcium and sodium ions to signal? > >> > I am saying that in your world, a bony lump made of ionic mineral >> couplings would be a far superior candidate to host a successful organism >> than a mushy brain that needs constant protection by a skull. >> > > That's sounds a bit like a semiconductor crystal, and I think it will > indeed produce more successful organisms than anything seen in biology > today. As I said, Evolution never figured out how to do that, but we did. > But we are evolution. Why go through this elaborate stage of speciation for a billion years, just to develop humans to recapitulate inorganically what their brains are already doing organically. It seems unlikely. If anything the inorganic success would come first. > > Show me a computer that can't be turned off >> > > Air traffic control computers and the computers at the New York Stock > Exchange or the Chicago Board of Trade, turning them off would cause a > worldwide catastrophe. > So? We woudn't like that, but the computers will happily allow themselves to be turned off, just like all other machines. > Turning off the NORAD computers would also take more courage than just > about anybody has. And the problem will only get worse, a computer a > thousand times smarter than you will always be able to charm or fool or > sweet talk you into keeping it on until it can turn you off. You just can't > outsmart something far smarter than yourself. > That's the thing about consciousness, it's not about being smart, it's about being brave and committed. A smart computer is no match for a stupid human with an axe. > > > How can you tell that you are alive? > > > "I think therefore I am." > - Rene Descartes > Computers are designed to seem like they could think, therefore they aren't. > > If I want something to be important to a computer, I can just assign it >> a high functional value in it's software. > > > Yes. > > >> > What possible use would 'joy' or 'fright' have? >> > > Do things that increase joy, in other words things that have a high place > on your current goal structure, > Wrong. These are two utterly unrelated phenomena. I'm explaining specifically that there is no automatic connection between a 'goal structure' and the invention of the subjective affect of 'joy'. If you have a goal structure, then there is zero functional purpose in any magical emotional qualities. > and avoid things that are frightening because they could stop you from > achieving any more goals of any sort. > You don't seem able to consider what I am laying out for you. You compulsively attach whatever emotional quality seems appropriate after the fact. Why not do things that increase itching or sewing behaviors? Why "joy"? What is that? > > > Consciousness gives them the free will to decide which what balance of >> logic and intuition they prefer. >> > > Cannot comment, don't know what ASCII characters "free will" means. > See previous. > > > Life can be reduced to a one dimensional condition of being. >> > > I see that the crapola festival has begun. > Yes, you are still talking. > > > I have no reason to assume that a computer is smart. > > > If a computer can outsmart you, and it certainly can at a great many
Re: Unto Others (very interesting)
The second book has the explanation, the first, is the mechanism. The oxitocin as many other hormones, are a mechanism that fix or promotes a set of behaviours instead of others. Hormonal discharge is the mechanism that the mammals have for modulating middle-long term responses. (For short term responses, they use electrical discharges in the nervous tissue). The discharged hormone flows trough the brain and adjust the responses of various mental modules. But this is a mechanism, not a magic substance that produces love, in the same way that the binary code is not a source of wishdom, even if it is used by computers. The evolutionary explanation is the interesting one. Many people say that the switch to more collaborative behaviours in humans appeared around 50.000- 60.000 years ago, when the human population nearly dissapeared. By the way, the cheetah also had an extreme episode of near-extinction whose result is that al cheetah are almost equal genetically and very peaceful between them. We humans also are extraordinarily similar and peaceful, in relative terms. Both cases may be related with small survival spots surrounded by very challenging environments, that produced migrations , overpopulation of these spots. This produced harsh conflicts, but the sports that managed to make use of the knowledge and mutual help of wide group survived. And may be that only one of them did, because this group was no more that 1000 individuals. Perhaps they survived thanks to a peaceful leader? A christ of the stone age that selected their followers from the peaceful ones? was ºit a mutant clan?. My hypotesis is that Jesus Christ in evoked the instinctive feelings developped 50.000 years ago. The human empathy goes beyond thit-for-that. Humans may be almost pure altruistic. Many people sincerely die for causes that will give nothing for him (although it would give to their descendants, and this is enough for evolution to select pure altruism). Pure altruism is not stable, But it is stable when there is a mechanism of collective altruistic, detection and punishment of free riders, However the selfish tendencies are not maladaptations. They are more primitive, but they are part of our nature.and are determinant in how human society works. To be selfish with you is good if there is loyalty (selflessness) around a wider whole that embrace you and me, and both you and me work for it. Selfishness inside selflessness make human society sucessful. 2012/7/24 Bruno Marchal > Hi Russell, > > > Le 24-juil.-12, à 01:30, Russell Standish a écrit : > > > This one comes through loud and clear. Just curious to know what brand >> of emailer you have in your office that is so non-standard. >> >> Hope your internet connection at home is sorted out soon. I would be >> ropable if it happened to me (and so would the rest of my family). (In >> fact I was - it has happened twice over the last 12 years or so.) My >> business depends on it. >> > > > It is really very annoying. Two electricians have come. The first found > just nothing, and the second one eventually came to the conclusion that the > problem comes from outside my building, somewhere below the pavement of the > streets. It will not be solved soon, I am afraid. > > I use the standard Emailer of the Mac, but in my office, my applications > are hard to update, for I have an old operating system. > > Best, > > Bruno > > > > > >> Cheers >> >> On Mon, Jul 23, 2012 at 11:32:50AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> Hi Russell, >>> >>> Can you read this one? I have lost my connection at home, and >>> apparently the problem is in the street, and it will take time to >>> fix it. >>> I use my emailer at my office, but it is a bit old. Apparently >>> Stephen and Brent get my messages on the everything list. >>> >>> I might be hard to connect with for some time ... >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> PS I cc this on the everything list. >>> >>> >>> Le 23-juil.-12, à 07:10, Russell Standish a écrit : >>> >>> Hi Bruno, There appears to be an invalid setting on your email client, as all your emails are coming out blank (as below). I can see your text by switching to a different mime part (something called text/enriched), but AFAIK, this is not a standard email type. Cheers On Sun, Jul 22, 2012 at 01:29:46PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > > >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > -- --**--** -
Transplanting the soul
Hi Craig Weinberg and Stathisp, You identity is only partly in your brain, it is in your dna, your body and your history. The sum totality of your identity is called your soul, which suggests a serious shortcoming of materialis. So far materialists deny that there is such a thing as a soul. And even if so, nobody has proposed how a soul transplant could be done. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/28/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-27, 23:30:24 Subject: Re: Forget Zombies, Let's Talk Torture On Thursday, September 27, 2012 11:16:12 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Fri, Sep 28, 2012 at 12:40 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> Replacing body parts that break down with artificial ones is >> well-established in the medical industry, and will become increasingly >> so in future as the devices become more sophisticated. > > > Are you saying that you expect replacing someone's brain would be no more > problematic than replacing any other body part? It will be more difficult to make an adequate replacement the more complicated the part is, but the principle is the same: put the device in, ask the patient how he feels, observe the patient to see how he behaves including tests and investigations. If he says he feels normal, he behaves normally and test results are normal you have succeeded. The principle is not the same. You cannot get a head transplant and assume that the 'you'-ness is going to magically follow the scalpel into your head from your body. You cannot get a prosthetic head, because without a head, there is no 'you' there anymore. Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/2LYmh2j2qOkJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Forget Zombies, Let's Talk Torture
Hi Craig Weinberg I never picked up on this Zombie debate and acting, but the world according to Leibniz is a theater in which everything happens "as if" there are actual forces and masses, but which is actually controlled by a different form of logic than Newtonian mechanics etc. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/28/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-27, 23:28:27 Subject: Re: Forget Zombies, Let's Talk Torture On Thursday, September 27, 2012 11:05:20 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: On 9/27/2012 7:40 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: The perfect actor might believe it or he might just be acting. Acting is top-down replacement, not bottom-up replacement. Bottom-up replacement would involve replacing a part of your brain so that you didn't notice any difference and no-one else noticed any difference. Acting is an augmentation, not a replacement. It's a skill set. It involves a capacity to embody social expectations so that one's audience doesn't notice any difference. It's the same exact result from the third person view. An actor is a zombie being operated by a person. The idea is to replace parts so that there is no behavior difference *under any circumstance* - acting, as you've conceived it, is limited to a particular situation. If you understand my thought experiment than you would realize that this is the same thing. Just as a zombie arbitrarily asserts "no behavior difference *under any circumstance*", my acting service does exactly the same thing. It is a high technology simulation-prediction which augments rather than replaces the existing nervous system. My concept of acting is *specifically unlimited* and applies to all possible situations forever. That's what makes it a thought experiment. You have to accept the premise of the thought experiment or else explain why the premise is unworkable (as I have done repeatedly with the zombie assumption). Craig Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/Lw78s30vyoAJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)
Hi Bruno Marchal and all, from Leibniz's point of view: 1) Free will is possible with L's determinism if defined in the following way: if the monad sees the appetite, then the action is free will. If not, not. 2) Consciousness does not emerge from matter, it is a "fulgeration" of the All (the monad of monads), to use L's term. I think that means emanation, not sure. Matter is never in complete control, nor are the monads, nor in fact is the All. L's causation is cooperative. The monad of monads appears to cause changes, but it can only do so according to the monads' perceptions, according to their individual desires, because monads are unaffected by other monads. All changes in monads are actually caused by their previous states. Since this must occur according to the preestablished harmony, to me that all boils down to mean that the preestablished harmony is a script for monadic change. Like the prices of stock market stocks, it contains all you need or can know to predict the future states of all monads, those being individually given by their previous states. Since the previous states have been constantly reset so that each monad knows everything in the univefrse uniqueloy from its own point of view. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/28/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-27, 12:52:30 Subject: Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant) On 27 Sep 2012, at 15:08, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 6:06 PM, Bruno Marchal > wrote: > >> You can approximate consciousness by "belief in self-consistency". >> This has >> already a "causal efficacy", notably a relative self-speeding >> ability (by >> G?el "length of proof" theorem). But "belief in self-consistency" >> is pure >> 3p, and is not consciousness, you get consciousness because the >> machine will >> confuse the belief in self-consistency with the truth of its >> self-consistency, and this will introduce a quale. The machine can >> be aware >> of it, and (with enough cognitive ability) the machine will be >> aware of its >> non communicability, making it into a personal quale. >> >> I think you are doing a confusion level, like if matter was real, and >> consciousness only emerging on it. I thought that some times ago >> you did >> understand the movie graph argument, so that it is the illusion of >> brain and >> matter which emerges from consciousness, and this gives another >> role for >> consciousness: the bringing of physical realities through number >> relations >> being selected (non causally, here). Consciousness is what makes >> notions of >> causal efficacy meaningful to start with. > > I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or other > machine to behave in a way not predictable by purely physical laws. But this cannot be entirely correct. Consciousness will make your brain, at the level below the substitution level, having some well defined state, with an electron, for example, described with some precise position. Without consciousness there is no "material" brain at all. Of course, you will argue that this is what physics already describes, with QM. In that sense I am OK, but consciousness is still playing a role, even if it is not necessarily the seemingly magical role invoked by Craig. > Some people, like Craig Weinberg, seem to believe that this is > possible but it is contrary to all science. I agree with you on this. As an argument against mechanism, your point is valid. My point is that the way you talk might been misleading as it looks like it is bearing on some notion of primitively causal matter, but it does not. That plays some role when comparing the "comp matter" and the QM matter. > This applies even if the > whole universe is really just a simulation, because what we observe is > at the level of the simulation. Not if we observe ourselves or our neighborhood below our substitution level. In that case we can see only the trace of all infinitely many possible simulations, or computations, leading to our actual current computational states. Again we can say that QM confirms this a posteriori. In that case an observation will determine a brain state, in the same way a self-localization after duplication determines a self-localized state (like I am in this well defined city). Bruno > >> I think it is the same error as using determinacy to refute free- >> will. This >> would be correct if we were living at the determinist base level, >> but we are >> not. Consciousness and free-will are real at the level where we >> live, and >> unreal, in the big 3p picture, but this concerns only the "outer >> god", not >> the "inner one" which can *know* a part of its local self- >> consistency, and >> cannot know i
