two types of structure creation- subjective and objective
Hi Bruno Marchal I have to confess that I have been of two minds on the subject of creation of structure and life: a) creation of structure by an intelligent (meaning living) body or self (which requires subjectivity) b) the act of structure creation without a self (and hence is objective) or life which would apply to comp and it looks like Peirce's categories and also self-organizing systems. This would be sumulated life. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/18/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-17, 13:19:09 Subject: Re: Computational Autopoetics 1 On 17 Oct 2012, at 08:07, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 03:39:18PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Oct 2012, at 23:27, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Oct 14, 2012 at 04:44:11PM -0400, Roger Clough wrote: Computational Autopoetics is a term I just coined to denote applying basic concepts of autopoetics to the field of comp. You mathematicians are free to do it more justice than I can. I cannot guarantee that the idea hasn't already been exploited, but I have seen no indication of that. The idea is this: that we borrow a basic characteristic of autopoetics, namely that life is essentially not a thing but the act of creation. This means that we define life as the creative act of generating structure from some input data. By this pramatic definition, it is not necessarily the structure that is produced that is alive, but life consists of the act of creating structure from assumedly structureless input data. Life is not a creation, but instead is the act of creation. So any self-organised system should be called alive then? Sand dunes, huricanes, stars, galaxies. Hey, we've just found ET! I am not sure a galaxy, or a sand dune has a self, unlike a cell, or a person. You are, of course, correct that the self/other distinction is crucial to life (and also of evolution - there has to be a unit of selection - the replicator). I was responding initially to Roger's claim that life is the act of creating structure. Any self-organised system can do that. Yes. The self is directly related to the Dx = xx trick, for me. The Dx=xx trick is about self-replication. Of course entities with a sense of the self/other distinction needn't replicate (eg certain robots). Self-replication and self-reference. And many self-transformation (in fact self-phi_i, for all i). Self-reference and self-replication, are basically the same processes, except that in replication you reproduce yourself relatively to some universal numbers grossly different than you, (the most probable physical world), and with self-reference you reproduce yourself mentally, that is with respect to the universal number you are. Actually, I was just reading an interview with my old mate Charley Lineweaver in New Scientist, and he was saying the same thing :). If life is such a creative act rather than a creation, then it seems to fit what I have been postulating as the basic inseparable ingredients of life: intelligence and free will. I don't believe intelligence is required for creativity. Biological evolution is undeniably creative. Is life more creative than the Mandelbrot set?, or than any creative set in the sense of Post (proved equivalent with Turing universality)? I would say yes. The Mandelbrot set is self-similar, isn't it, so the coarse-grained information content must be bounded, no matter how far you zoom in. The M set is not just similar, the little M sets are surrounded by more and more complex infiltration of their filaments. So the closer you zoom, the more complex the set appears, and is, locally. It is most plausibly a compact, bounded, version of a universal dovetailer. Life, on the other hand, exhibits unbounded information through evolution, in contrast to all ALife simulations to date. To be fair you must look at some artificial evolution as long as life evolution. And both the M set and all creative set, or subcreative, (UD, UMs, LUMs, but also you and me, even without assuming comp) are like that in their extensions. Unbounded complexity. The M set is not only self-similar, but all its parts are similarly self-similar, making all zoom repeated 2, 4, 8, 16, ... times when you decide to focus on a minibrot. I had a look at the Wikipedia entry on creative sets, and it didn't make much sense, alas. OK. On the FOAR list, I will do soon, or a bit later, Church thesis, the phi_i and the W_i, and that will give the material to get the creative sets. Roughly speaking, a creative set is a machine (a recursively enumerable set of numbers) who complementary is constructively NOT recursively
Re: A test for solipsism
On 18/10/2012, at 4:12 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and perception is a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain though it behaves exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say ouch and recoil from the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain). My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say that if it has no mind, it cannot converse with you, which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in typing the first part of this sentence. So if you met a computer that behaved in a human-like way you would assume that it had a mind? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
The Peirce-Leibniz triads Ver.1
The Peirce-Leibniz triads Ver.1 This will need some clearing up later, but I have to write down what I think I know in order to understand it. Help and comments are appreciated. It appears that Peirce's three categories match the Leibniz monadic structures as follows: I. = object = Leibniz substance = quale II. Secondness = sign = monad representing that substance. In Peirce, the sign is a word for the experience of that object . In Leibniz, the monads are mental, which I think means subjective. III. Thirdness = interprant (meaning of I and II ) = by the monad of monads. In addition to this, Peirce says that his categories are predicates of predicates, where the first predicate (dog) is extensive and the second predicate (brown) is intensive. then the overall object might be animal--dog--brown. Leibniz says that a monad is a complete concept, meaning all of the possible predicates. I suggest that the first or extensive predicate (dog) is objective and the second predicate (brown) is qualitative or subjective. So that the object as per ceived is a quale or Firstness. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/18/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Why self-organization programs cannot be alive
Hi Russell Standish I apologize for using two different concepts of creation of structure from randomness. There are two types of creation of structure: by life, where there is an agent or self to create things, and by a computer program, where creation is mechanical. Self-organization is purely mechanical and does not require nor does it have a self. It just uses a computer program written elsewhere. But photosynthesis is by a living cell entity. The organization of light into cell structure is not self-organization, which is purely mechanical. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/18/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Russell Standish Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-17, 17:39:38 Subject: Re: Why self-organization programs cannot be alive On Wed, Oct 17, 2012 at 06:54:31AM -0400, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Russell Standish Creating structure out of a random environment requires intelligence, the ability to make choices on one's own. Self-organization does not have that capacity, it merely follows a computer program. So self-organization programs cannot be alive, having no intelligence and no free will. In short, they have no self. Instead, they are slaved to a computer programmer. This is confusing. How do you explain how self-organisation creates structure from initially disordered states? In the first sentence, you claim this requires intelligence. In the second sentence, you claim self-organisation is not. This is a contradiction. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: A test for solipsism
Hi Stathis Papaioannou If a zombie really has a mind it could converse with you. If not, not. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/18/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stathis Papaioannou Receiver: everything-list@googlegroups.com Time: 2012-10-18, 13:26:16 Subject: Re: A test for solipsism On 18/10/2012, at 4:12 AM, Roger Clough wrote: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and perception is a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain though it behaves exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say ouch and recoil from the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain). My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say that if it has no mind, it cannot converse with you, which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in typing the first part of this sentence. So if you met a computer that behaved in a human-like way you would assume that it had a mind? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p
Hi Bruno Marchal I think you can tell is 1p isn't just a shell by trying to converse with it. If it can converse, it's got a mind of its own. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/18/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-17, 13:36:13 Subject: Re: Solipsism = 1p On 17 Oct 2012, at 13:07, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Solipsism is a property of 1p= Firstness = subjectivity OK. And non solipsism is about attributing 1p to others, which needs some independent 3p reality you can bet one, for not being only part of yourself. Be it a God, or a physical universe, or an arithmetical reality. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/17/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-16, 09:55:41 Subject: Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if rather thanis 2012/10/11 Bruno Marchal On 10 Oct 2012, at 20:13, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 2012/10/10 Bruno Marchal : On 09 Oct 2012, at 18:58, Alberto G. Corona wrote: It may be a zombie or not. I can? know. The same applies to other persons. It may be that the world is made of zombie-actors that try to cheat me, but I have an harcoded belief in the conventional thing. ? Maybe it is, because otherwise, I will act in strange and self destructive ways. I would act as a paranoic, after that, as a psycopath (since they are not humans). That will not be good for my success in society. Then, ? doubt that I will have any surviving descendant that will develop a zombie-solipsist epistemology. However there are people that believe these strange things. Some autists do not recognize humans as beings like him. Some psychopaths too, in a different way. There is no authistic or psichopathic epistemology because the are not functional enough to make societies with universities and philosophers. That is the whole point of evolutionary epistemology. If comp leads to solipsism, I will apply for being a plumber. I don't bet or believe in solipsism. But you were saying that a *conscious* robot can lack a soul. See the quote just below. That is what I don't understand. Bruno I think that It is not comp what leads to solipsism but any existential stance that only accept what is certain and discard what is only belief based on ?onjectures. It can go no further than ?cogito ergo sum OK. But that has nothing to do with comp. That would conflate the 8 person points in only one of them (the feeler, probably). Only the feeler is that solipsist, at the level were he feels, but the machine's self manage all different points of view, and the living solipsist (each of us) is not mandate to defend the solipsist doctrine (he is the only one existing)/ he is the only one he can feel, that's all. That does not imply the non existence of others and other things. That pressuposes a lot of things that I have not for granted. I have to accept my beliefs as such beliefs to be at the same time rational and functional. With respect to the others consciousness, being humans or robots, I can only have faith. No matter if I accept that this is a matter of faith or not. ? I still don't see what you mean by consciousness without a soul. Bruno 2012/10/9 Bruno Marchal : On 09 Oct 2012, at 13:29, Alberto G. Corona wrote: But still after this reasoning, ? doubt that the self conscious philosopher robot have the kind of thing, call it a soul, that I have. ? You mean it is a zombie? I can't conceive consciousness without a soul. Even if only the universal one. So I am not sure what you mean by soul. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything
Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle in Doubt
Is anyone here aware of the following? http://www.tgdaily.com/general-sciences-features/66654-heisenbergs-uncertainty-principle-in-doubt Does it have implications for MW interpretations of quantum physics? I'd love to see comments about this. Cheers, Dan -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/4BAboNjZ7DoJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: The objective world of autopoesis
TERREN: Hi Roger, Autopoeisis says there is a boundary between the environment and the system through which no information crosses (structural closure)... ROGER: OK, it is alive. TERREN: if we apply that model to our nervous system, we can say that the reality we experience is a construction, a virtual reality dynamically generated by the brain as it organizes the signals coming from our sense neurons. ROGER: OK, the world we see is phenomenal. TERREN: We see this in the nervous system in the sense that nerves are line-labelled. It doesn't matter how the photoreceptors are stimulated - whether by light or pressure, the result is a visual quale (as when you rub your eyes hard). Likewise, thermoreceptors stimulated by heat or by capsaisin both result in the quale of 'hotness'. ROGER: You know more about this than I do. Sounds reasonable, except my concept of quale is that they are the raw unprocessed input signals. TERREN: So to your point that autopoeitic structure only applies to 3p models, I agree, but if we accept that consciousness arises from, or is the inside-view of, certain 3p structures, then theorizing about those 3p structures can yield testable claims about consciousness. ROGER: That is the main thrust of the discussion here. In my view, there is the subjective experience (which I am trying to understand), and then there is the description of that experience, I think we call 3p, which I think is what most people (and autopoesis (?)) use. I know there are loose ends in my thought, I'm still trying to clarify it. Terren On Wed, Oct 17, 2012 at 8:25 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Terren Suydam IMHO autopoesis, like all of AI, is a tool for the public, objective world (Thirdness) That is fine, but the real nitty-gritty (such as mind or consciousness) dwells in subjective experiences (quale) (Firstness). So I don't find autopoesis that useful or profound. er Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/17/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Terren Suydam Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-16, 11:37:05 Subject: Re: Re: Re: autopoesis Hi Russell, I think if autopoeisis has failed to achieve some practical measure, it is a reflection of how under-developed our collective toolbox is for working with complexity and holistic systems in general. Imaginary numbers are a good example of an idea whose practical measure didn't emerge until well after its conception. Thanks for the link to Barry McMullin... interesting stuff. Terren On Mon, Oct 15, 2012 at 5:13 PM, Russell Standish wrote: Whilst I agree with Terren that autopoesis is an important part of what it is to be alive, it is not a very practical thing to measure. I wouldn't know if my artificial life simulations were autopoetic or not, except where the concept has been explicitly designed in (eg see Barry McMullin's aritificial chemistry work). Actually, its a refreshing change to have some (a-)life topics being discussed on this list. Cheers On Mon, Oct 15, 2012 at 11:45:47AM -0400, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Terren Suydam You needn't agree with me. I respect that. It wasn't really a thought process, I just couldn't find anything to hold on to, something that works, and I am a pragmatist. Hence my use of the term mind-boggling. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/15/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Terren Suydam Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-15, 11:23:43 Subject: Re: Re: autopoesis Hi Roger, I'm interested in the thought process that led you to reject autopoeisis. I was intrigued by your recent post about life that defined it as the process of creation, rather than the object of it. Personally I think autopoeisis is an important concept, one of the best yet put forward towards the goal of defining life. I think there is a lot of potential in the idea in terms of applying it beyond the biological domain. As it only deals with relations among a network of processes, it does not assume the physical. At the very least is is indispensable as a framework for understanding autonomy. Best, Terren On Mon, Oct 15, 2012 at 10:31 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Platonist Guitar Cowboy I agree. I was wrong about autopoesis. It is a mind-boggling definition of life, maybe not even that. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/15/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Platonist Guitar Cowboy Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-14, 09:26:19 Subject: Re: autopoesis Hi Roger, On Sun, Oct 14, 2012 at 2:41 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Autopoesis is a useful
Re: Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle in Doubt
Dan, I think the implication for MWI is that such weak measurements do not cause the universe to split into a different version for each possible quantum state. I also think that most of us are aware of these results. Richard On Thu, Oct 18, 2012 at 2:16 PM, freqflyer07281972 thismindisbud...@gmail.com wrote: Is anyone here aware of the following? http://www.tgdaily.com/general-sciences-features/66654-heisenbergs-uncertainty-principle-in-doubt Does it have implications for MW interpretations of quantum physics? I'd love to see comments about this. Cheers, Dan -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/4BAboNjZ7DoJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Representation Of, Representation As
I have started reading Scientific Representation by Bas C Van Fraasen and I have just finished the first chapter, Representation Of, Representation As. Here there is a discussion what we mean by representation in a normal language. The author defends that a representation is p. 21 Z uses X to depict Y as F I am curious to see how this will be applied to science as the author argues that Z uses is an important part of the representation and cannot be removed. Below there is a couple of quotes related to a discussion on whether a copy could be a representation. It could be used to bring a new look at Yes, Doctor. p. 19 Socrates' thought experiment ... has a quite contemporary ring, if we replace gods (as it usual now) with mad scientists. p. 19 Quote from Cratylus (Socrates talks to Cratylus). Let us suppose the existence of two objects. One of them shall be Cratylus, and the other the image of Cratylus, and we will suppose, further, that some god makes not only a representation such as a painter would make of your outward form and color, but also creates an inward organization like yours, having the same warmth and softness, and into this infuses motion, and soul, and mind, such as you have, and in a word copies all your quantities, and places them by you in another form. Would you say this was Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, or that there were two Cratyluses? p. 22 Look back now at Socrates, Cratylus, and the god they imagine. Did the god make an image of Cratylus or did he not make a representation of anything, but a clone? That depends. Cratylus was too nasty in his response. Did this god go on to display what he made to the Olympic throng as a perfect image of Greek manhood? Or did he display it as an example his prowess at creature-making? Or did he do neither, but press the replica into personal service, since he couldn't have Cratylus himself? Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: The objective world of autopoesis
Hi Roger, A quale as I understand it is simply a unit of subjective experience. It's a bit of an abstraction since experience does not reduce to constituent units, but as a convention for talking about subjective experience, I suppose it is sometimes useful to be able to refer to a singular 'quale' rather than the plural qualia. Personally I think we could do away with the word and not suffer much for it. To go further and refer to qualia as raw unprocessed input signals presupposes a theory, namely that it is possible to experience qualia without any processing, or even that they correspond with input signals. It is not necessary to imbue qualia with the baggage of a particular theory to make it a useful construct for discussion. In the present conversation, it would hinder our ability to understand one another, as the autopoietic model cannot make sense of a phrase like raw unprocessed input signals. I would say that the autopoietic model I am considering would posit that human subjective experience as we know it is the *result* of the processing of the output signals produced by various neuroreceptors, as they are perturbed (or not) by the environment outside the body. IOW in this model it is not helpful to identify quales with the inputs to the receptors, as we don't have access to whatever is perturbing the receptors, due to the autopoietic closure. This is the same as saying that our brains don't know the difference between heat and capsaicin. One might instead identify qualia with the outputs or signals coming from the receptors to the brain, but that leads to an absurdity since at the physical level, there is nothing to distinguish the signals themselves among different receptor types. IOW, if all you had was an oscilloscope that traced the relative voltages of spike trains as they traveled through nerves of various types (optic, auditory, pain), you would not be able to distinguish what the source of receptor was. Therefore it seems logical that the brain distinguishes the stimuli on the basis of where the nerves plug into the cognitive architecture. This implies then that it is the brain's architecture and relevant processing which makes one data source (auditory, visual, etc) feel different from one another. Terren On Thu, Oct 18, 2012 at 2:27 PM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: TERREN: Hi Roger, Autopoeisis says there is a boundary between the environment and the system through which no information crosses (structural closure)... ROGER: OK, it is alive. TERREN: if we apply that model to our nervous system, we can say that the reality we experience is a construction, a virtual reality dynamically generated by the brain as it organizes the signals coming from our sense neurons. ROGER: OK, the world we see is phenomenal. TERREN: We see this in the nervous system in the sense that nerves are line-labelled. It doesn't matter how the photoreceptors are stimulated - whether by light or pressure, the result is a visual quale (as when you rub your eyes hard). Likewise, thermoreceptors stimulated by heat or by capsaisin both result in the quale of 'hotness'. ROGER: You know more about this than I do. Sounds reasonable, except my concept of quale is that they are the raw unprocessed input signals. TERREN: So to your point that autopoeitic structure only applies to 3p models, I agree, but if we accept that consciousness arises from, or is the inside-view of, certain 3p structures, then theorizing about those 3p structures can yield testable claims about consciousness. ROGER: That is the main thrust of the discussion here. In my view, there is the subjective experience (which I am trying to understand), and then there is the description of that experience, I think we call 3p, which I think is what most people (and autopoesis (?)) use. I know there are loose ends in my thought, I'm still trying to clarify it. Terren On Wed, Oct 17, 2012 at 8:25 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Terren Suydam IMHO autopoesis, like all of AI, is a tool for the public, objective world (Thirdness) That is fine, but the real nitty-gritty (such as mind or consciousness) dwells in subjective experiences (quale) (Firstness). So I don't find autopoesis that useful or profound. er Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/17/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Terren Suydam Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-16, 11:37:05 Subject: Re: Re: Re: autopoesis Hi Russell, I think if autopoeisis has failed to achieve some practical measure, it is a reflection of how under-developed our collective toolbox is for working with complexity and holistic systems in general. Imaginary numbers are a good example of an idea whose practical measure didn't emerge until well after its conception. Thanks for the link to Barry McMullin... interesting stuff. Terren On Mon, Oct 15, 2012 at 5:13 PM,
Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if ratherthanis
On Wed, Oct 17, 2012 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: You are the one that is saying everything happens for a reason or not for a reason. Yes. Which category do laws fall under? I haven't the slightest idea, but I do know that it's got to be one or the other. Yet you claim that it had to originate I don't claim reason had to originate at all because it may have had no origin, or maybe it did, if so I have no idea how or why if came to be. Unlike you I have the wisdom to know when I don't know. for a reason or randomly, right? Yes, If it originated at all then it originated for a reason or it originated for no reason. You claim to have gotten a A is algebra, so why you find the concept X is Y or X is not Y so difficult to grasp is a mystery. And since reason can't originate for its own reason I'm just speculating but maybe there is something rather than nothing because nothing is a logical contradiction of some sort. Or maybe not. then it has to be random. Then It had to happen for no reason. I don't know why you keep beating this simple point to death. If reason can come out of randomness however, then it can't really be random. What?! If reason, or anything else, came out of randomness then by definition it came out of nothing, it came about for no reason, and there is nothing wrong with something happening for no reason. And it's amusing that you keep attempting (very unsuccessfully) to use reason to prove that reason is not of primary importance. And why would you want to do that? Because reason makes a hash out of your silly theories. I don't know if there was a very first time, logic does not demand that there be one; and even if there were logic doesn't demand that everything happen for a reason. All you have to do is apply your excuse to your own experience and you have free will. Maybe maybe not, I don't know because I don't know what free will is supposed to mean and neither do you. fails because it is circular Describe that circle. If the first reason Logic allows for the existence of a first reason but it doesn't demand there be one. happened for a reason then it can't be the first reason, Obviously. Reasons can't just appear out of nowhere and proliferate Why not? Things happen for no reason all the time in modern physics. So I repeat my question, describe that circle. Free will is supposed to mean the capacity to try to execute your private will publicly with relative personal autonomy. So you have free will if you have personal autonomy and you have personal autonomy if you have free will, and around and around we go. If I am locked in a dungeon, the effect of my will is constrained. I have said many times that will is a clear non circular idea, I want some things and don't want others; if I'm in a dungeon and want to leave my chains constrain my will and if I want to jump over a mountain gravity constrains my will. It is only when the word free joins up with will that we enter the wonderful world of gibberish. you claim to know that free will does not exist. No I don't claim that at all! If the only problem with free will is that it had the property of non-existence then it would not be gibberish, dragons don't exist but the word is not gibberish, it means something, just something that doesn't happen to exist; but free will is gibberish because it doesn't even mean something mythical, free will is just a noise. Cannot comment, don't know what ASCII sequence free will means. What's the difference between that ASCII sequence and the other one, reasons The difference is 2, one contains 9 ASCII characters and the other only 7. Didn't you study subtraction in that algebra class you got a A in. Gravity sucks is a rule. Eggs thrown off Leaning Tower of Pisa break. Breaking eggs is physical change. How do the eggs follow the rule? And just as saying not X whenever your opponent says X blindly saying why X? when he says X isn't a winning debate strategy either. How does the need for social contact factor into a worldview which lacks free will? I can see that's a question because there is a question mark at the end, but that's all I know; I don't have a answer because I don't understand the question, don't know what the ASCII sequence free will means. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Representation Of, Representation As
On Thursday, October 18, 2012 3:12:54 PM UTC-4, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: I have started reading Scientific Representation by Bas C Van Fraasen and I have just finished the first chapter, Representation Of, Representation As. Here there is a discussion what we mean by representation in a normal language. The author defends that a representation is p. 21 Z uses X to depict Y as F Right. This is what I keep telling everyone about puppets instead of zombies. The doctor uses an artificial brain to depict a computer program as a person. There is no zombie there, it's a puppet - a representation. Craig I am curious to see how this will be applied to science as the author argues that Z uses is an important part of the representation and cannot be removed. Below there is a couple of quotes related to a discussion on whether a copy could be a representation. It could be used to bring a new look at Yes, Doctor. p. 19 Socrates' thought experiment ... has a quite contemporary ring, if we replace gods (as it usual now) with mad scientists. p. 19 Quote from Cratylus (Socrates talks to Cratylus). Let us suppose the existence of two objects. One of them shall be Cratylus, and the other the image of Cratylus, and we will suppose, further, that some god makes not only a representation such as a painter would make of your outward form and color, but also creates an inward organization like yours, having the same warmth and softness, and into this infuses motion, and soul, and mind, such as you have, and in a word copies all your quantities, and places them by you in another form. Would you say this was Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, or that there were two Cratyluses? p. 22 Look back now at Socrates, Cratylus, and the god they imagine. Did the god make an image of Cratylus or did he not make a representation of anything, but a clone? That depends. Cratylus was too nasty in his response. Did this god go on to display what he made to the Olympic throng as a perfect image of Greek manhood? Or did he display it as an example his prowess at creature-making? Or did he do neither, but press the replica into personal service, since he couldn't have Cratylus himself? Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/J25Ip1vS5IIJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle in Doubt
This must be what the Heisenberg compensators do in star trek. :-) Jason On 10/18/12, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: Dan, I think the implication for MWI is that such weak measurements do not cause the universe to split into a different version for each possible quantum state. I also think that most of us are aware of these results. Richard On Thu, Oct 18, 2012 at 2:16 PM, freqflyer07281972 thismindisbud...@gmail.com wrote: Is anyone here aware of the following? http://www.tgdaily.com/general-sciences-features/66654-heisenbergs-uncertainty-principle-in-doubt Does it have implications for MW interpretations of quantum physics? I'd love to see comments about this. Cheers, Dan -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/4BAboNjZ7DoJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle in Doubt
There was another article about this group's work back in September, at http://www.nature.com/news/quantum-uncertainty-not-all-in-the-measurement-1.11394-- it seems as though this is not really about contradicting the mathematical form of uncertainty in the equations of quantum mechanics, but rather about certain interpretations of uncertainty which say it's all induced by measurement. As Steinberg says in that article: 'Don't get too excited: the uncertainty principle still stands, says Steinberg: “In the end, there's no way you can know [both quantum states] accurately at the same time.” But the experiment shows that the act of measurement isn't always what causes the uncertainty. “If there's already a lot of uncertainty in the system, then there doesn't need to be any noise from the measurement at all,” he says.' Also see the abstract of a paper by Rozema et al (the main scientist they quoted in Dan's link) at http://physics.aps.org/synopsis-for/10.1103/PhysRevLett.109.100404 which says: When first taking quantum mechanics courses, students learn about Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, which is often presented as a statement about the intrinsic uncertainty that a quantum system must possess. Yet Heisenberg originally formulated his principle in terms of the “observer effect”: a relationship between the precision of a measurement and the disturbance it creates, as when a photon measures an electron’s position. Although the former version is rigorously proven, the latter is less general and—as recently shown—mathematically incorrect. On Thu, Oct 18, 2012 at 2:16 PM, freqflyer07281972 thismindisbud...@gmail.com wrote: Is anyone here aware of the following? http://www.tgdaily.com/general-sciences-features/66654-heisenbergs-uncertainty-principle-in-doubt Does it have implications for MW interpretations of quantum physics? I'd love to see comments about this. Cheers, Dan -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/4BAboNjZ7DoJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if ratherthanis
On Thursday, October 18, 2012 5:04:10 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Oct 17, 2012 Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript:wrote: You are the one that is saying everything happens for a reason or not for a reason. Yes. Which category do laws fall under? I haven't the slightest idea, but I do know that it's got to be one or the other. But I have just proved to you that it cannot be either one. The first category doesn't exist yet and the second category negates all possibilities. Yet you claim that it had to originate I don't claim reason had to originate at all because it may have had no origin, or maybe it did, if so I have no idea how or why if came to be. Unlike you I have the wisdom to know when I don't know. Yet you don't have the wisdom to know when you don't know about free will. for a reason or randomly, right? Yes, If it originated at all then it originated for a reason or it originated for no reason. You claim to have gotten a A is algebra, so why you find the concept X is Y or X is not Y so difficult to grasp is a mystery. The universe is not algebra. And since reason can't originate for its own reason I'm just speculating but maybe there is something rather than nothing because nothing is a logical contradiction of some sort. Or maybe not. then it has to be random. Then It had to happen for no reason. I don't know why you keep beating this simple point to death. Because you have no problem with things happening for no reason, yet you have a problem with people causing things to happen for their own personal reasons. If reason can come out of randomness however, then it can't really be random. What?! If reason, or anything else, came out of randomness then by definition it came out of nothing, it came about for no reason, and there is nothing wrong with something happening for no reason. If something can come out of it, then it's not nothing. If a cave produces automobiles, then what is in the cave is not randomness or nothing - it is something which has the potential to produce automobiles. And it's amusing that you keep attempting (very unsuccessfully) to use reason to prove that reason is not of primary importance. And why would you want to do that? Because reason makes a hash out of your silly theories. You have no idea where reason came from. It's voodoo to you. I don't know if there was a very first time, logic does not demand that there be one; and even if there were logic doesn't demand that everything happen for a reason. All you have to do is apply your excuse to your own experience and you have free will. Maybe maybe not, I don't know because I don't know what free will is supposed to mean and neither do you. If you think that you know what I know, then you must have psychic powers. fails because it is circular Describe that circle. If the first reason Logic allows for the existence of a first reason but it doesn't demand there be one. happened for a reason then it can't be the first reason, Obviously. Reasons can't just appear out of nowhere and proliferate Why not? Things happen for no reason all the time in modern physics. So I repeat my question, describe that circle. Because that is the very embodiment of un-reason. If reason itself can pop into existence for no reason, then who is to say that everything doesn't also do the same? Free will is supposed to mean the capacity to try to execute your private will publicly with relative personal autonomy. So you have free will if you have personal autonomy and you have personal autonomy if you have free will, and around and around we go. No, a loose brick has autonomy. It would need a private will to hurl itself into the air. If I am locked in a dungeon, the effect of my will is constrained. I have said many times that will is a clear non circular idea, I want some things and don't want others; Why would it matter if you want some things and don't want others if you have no power to freely choose between them? if I'm in a dungeon and want to leave my chains constrain my will and if I want to jump over a mountain gravity constrains my will. It is only when the word free joins up with will that we enter the wonderful world of gibberish. Free just makes the difference between being in the dungeon and being released. Why is it controversial? you claim to know that free will does not exist. No I don't claim that at all! If the only problem with free will is that it had the property of non-existence then it would not be gibberish, dragons don't exist but the word is not gibberish, it means something, just something that doesn't happen to exist; but free will is gibberish because it doesn't even mean something mythical, free will is just a noise. How do you know this? What
Re: Re: Why self-organization programs cannot be alive
On Thu, Oct 18, 2012 at 01:56:14PM -0400, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Russell Standish I apologize for using two different concepts of creation of structure from randomness. Its good to clarify these thoughts. Great! There are two types of creation of structure: by life, where there is an agent or self to create things, and by a computer program, where creation is mechanical. Not just a computer program. Physical systems can self-organise in purely mechanical ways too - eg Per Bak's sandpile, or Benard cells. Self-organization is purely mechanical and does not require nor does it have a self. It just uses a computer program written elsewhere. But photosynthesis is by a living cell entity. The organization of light into cell structure is not self-organization, which is purely mechanical. I wouldn't be so sure that photosynthesis isn't a purely mechanical process in your classification. Certainly, it is about as agent-like as some computer programs. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/18/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Russell Standish Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-17, 17:39:38 Subject: Re: Why self-organization programs cannot be alive On Wed, Oct 17, 2012 at 06:54:31AM -0400, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Russell Standish Creating structure out of a random environment requires intelligence, the ability to make choices on one's own. Self-organization does not have that capacity, it merely follows a computer program. So self-organization programs cannot be alive, having no intelligence and no free will. In short, they have no self. Instead, they are slaved to a computer programmer. This is confusing. How do you explain how self-organisation creates structure from initially disordered states? In the first sentence, you claim this requires intelligence. In the second sentence, you claim self-organisation is not. This is a contradiction. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: A test for solipsism
On Thu, Oct 18, 2012 at 01:58:29PM -0400, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stathis Papaioannou If a zombie really has a mind it could converse with you. If not, not. If true, then you have demonstrated the non-existence of zombies (zombies, by definition, are indistinguishable from real people). However, somehow I remain unconvinced by this line of reasoning... -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
The Peirce-Leibniz triads Ver. 2
Hi Craig Thanks very much for your comments Craig. I still need to digest them. Meanwhile, a flood of new ideas came to me and I just want to set them down. There are no doubt mistakes, esp. with regard to subjective/objective. The Peirce-Leibniz triads Ver.2 I Firstness objectsubstance perception (quale) aesthetics beauty1st person feeling subjective II Secondness sign monadthought logic truth 2nd person thinking subj/obj III Thirdness interprant supreme monad expression morality goodness 3rd person doing objective It appears that Peirce's three categories match the Leibniz monadic structures as follows: I. = object = Leibniz substance = quale II. Secondness = sign = monad representing that substance. In Peirce, the sign is a word for the experience of that object . In Leibniz, the monads are mental, which I think means subjective. III. Thirdness = interprant (meaning of I and II ) = by the monad of monads. In addition to this, Peirce says that his categories are predicates of predicates, where the first predicate (dog) is extensive and the second predicate (brown) is intensive. then the overall object might be animal--dog--brown. Leibniz says that a monad is a complete concept, meaning all of the possible predicates. I suggest that the first or extensive predicate (dog) is objective and the second predicate (brown) is qualitative or subjective. So that the object as per ceived is a quale or Firstness. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/18/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
RE: A test for solipsism
Just because the individual holds the position that he/she is the only living entity in all the universe does not imply that such a person (the solipsist) is incapable of carrying on a conversation, even if that conversation is with an illusion. For instance, I have no logical reason to believe that you, Roger Clough, exist. You may in fact exist, and you may in fact be a figment of my imagination; logically, I cannot tell the difference. Yet, I can exchange written dialog with you, in spite of any belief I may hold regarding your existence in the physical universe. wrb -Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything- l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Roger Clough Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2012 10:13 AM To: everything-list Subject: A test for solipsism Hi Bruno Marchal Sorry, I lost the thread on the doctor, and don't know what Craig believes about the p-zombie. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and perception is a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain though it behaves exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say ouch and recoil from the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain). My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say that if it has no mind, it cannot converse with you, which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in typing the first part of this sentence. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/17/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-17, 08:57:36 Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overlycomplexcomputations ? On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:33, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that consciousness, arises at (or above ?) the level of noncomputability. He just seems to say that intuiton does. But that just seems to be a conjecture of his. ugh, rclo...@verizon.net 10/16/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen Hi Roger, IMHO, computability can only capture at most a simulation of the content of consciousness, but we can deduce a lot from that ... So you do say no to the doctor? And you do follow Craig on the existence of p-zombie? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything- list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle in Doubt
On 10/18/2012 2:16 PM, freqflyer07281972 wrote: Is anyone here aware of the following? http://www.tgdaily.com/general-sciences-features/66654-heisenbergs-uncertainty-principle-in-doubt Does it have implications for MW interpretations of quantum physics? I'd love to see comments about this. Cheers, Dan -- Hi Dan, This article is rubbish. The writer does not understand the subtleties involved and does not understand that nothing like the tittle was found to be true. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
