date:20121128

RE: Biography, roger clough, Soles, 1963

2012-11-28 Thread William R. Buckley

Nice to know something of the man on the other end of these emails!

 

wrb

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Roger Clough
Sent: Wednesday, November 28, 2012 7:25 AM
To: everything-list
Subject: Biography, roger clough, Soles, 1963

 

 

 

 

Hi guys,

 

Attached is my just-written biography for 

an upcoming 50th year reunion book.  

I thougbht I'd pass it on.

 

Layette Collage is in Easton, PA

 

 

 

 [rclo...@verizon.net]  

11/28/2012 

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

 

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Ben GOERTZEL on "What is Real?"

2012-11-28 Thread Stephen P. King

Hi Folks,

An example of my kind of thinking:

http://multiverseaccordingtoben.blogspot.com/2011/12/what-are-these-things-called-realities.html

"Nietzsche, in The Twilight of the Idols, argues against Kant's
philosophical theory of noumena (fundamentally real entities, not
directly observable but underlying all the phenomena we observe). Kant
viewed noumena as something that observed phenomena (the perceived,
apparent world) can approximate, but never quite find or achieve -- a
perplexing notion.

But really, to me, the puzzle isn't Kant's view of fundamental reality,
it's the everyday commonsense view of a "real world" distinct from the
apparent world. Kant dressed up this commonsense view in fancy language
and expressed it with logical precision, and there may have been
problems with how he did it (in spite of his brilliance) -- but, the
real puzzle is the commonsense view underneath."

...

"Something is real to a certain mind in a certain interval of time, to
the extent that perceiving it leads that mind to make correct
predictions about the mind's future reality.

Reality is a Property of Systems

Yeah, yeah, I know that characterization of reality is circular: it
defines an entity as "real" if perceiving it tends to lead to correct
predictions about "real" things.

But I think that circularity is correct and appropriate. It means that
"reality" is a property attributable to systems of entities. There could
be multiple systems of entities, constituting alternate realities A and
B, so we could say

an entity is real_A if perceiving it tends to lead to correct
predictions about real_A things
an entity is real_B if perceiving it tends to lead to correct
predictions about real_B things

I think this is a nicer characterization of reality than Philip K.
Dick's wonderful quote, "Reality is whatever doesn't go away when you
stop believing in it.""

--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-11-28 Thread Jason Resch

On Tue, Nov 27, 2012 at 3:36 PM, John Clark  wrote:

>
>
> On Tue, Nov 27, 2012 at  Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> > You keep confusing the 3-views on the 1-views and the 1-views about
>> themselves,
>>
>
> You should get a rubber stamp of that phrase made, it's your standard
> reply to all criticisms, and as I've said before if something is identical
> from the 3-view it is certainly identical from the 1-view (although the
> reverse is not always true); it you don't understand this point it is you
> that is confused, very confused indeed.
>
>

John,

You are correct, computationalism implies two objectively identical brains
will support subjectively identical consciousness.  This is not what Bruno
means when he says you confuse the 1st and 3rd person views, however.  The
experiment requires that you place yourself in the place of someone about
to be duplicated and ask yourself what you expect to experience after that
duplication.  You continue to refuse to put yourself in this place and
instead inspect it as a external observer of the experiment rather than an
active participant.

Are you familiar with the quantum suicide thought experiment? (
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_suicide_and_immortality ) Do you
understand how the predicted outcome of the experiment differs depending on
whether you are the experimenter or you are the experimenter's assistant?
This is the confusion Bruno alludes to.  It is like seeing only the
assistant's third person view when you are asked to make a prediction from
the experimenter's first person view when carrying out the experiment.
Like it or not, in science the observer can never be fully separated from
the observation.

Jason

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-11-28 Thread meekerdb

On 11/28/2012 2:05 PM, John Clark wrote:

> Same with the two slits: QM describes the two different outcomes of the
measurement

Yes QM predicts the photon will hit here or there with a certain probability, but
afterward the measurement produces only one outcome, as can be seen when we develop the
photographic plate and see only one point not two, its a point right there plain as day
with no doubt whatsoever. Your theory predicts "or", it says there will be one and only
one result so all I want to know is what that result is, was the outcome of the
measurement, W or M?

That's crux of the matter, Bruno (and most people on this "Everything" list) think that
the photon hits in many different places, but these events happen in different 'worlds'
per Hugh Everett's interpretation of QM. The point of Bruno's argument is to show how
this kind of QM could be realized by a computation that computes everything computable
(i.e. the Universal Dovetailer). It's called an 'Everything' list because of this
assumption that, in some sense, everything (possible, mathematical, computable,...) happens.

Brent
P.S. I don't share this assumption - I consider it, at best, an interesting
hypothesis.

Re: Against Mechanism

2012-11-28 Thread John Clark

On Wed, Nov 28, 2012 at 11:09 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> > you agreed that the W and M experience are exclusive, making the 1-view
> unique from the 1-view point.
>

 Everybody has a unique viewpoint looking back into the past, nobody has a
unique viewpoint looking to the future.

> you have to disbelieve comp.
>

OK, you know more about your homemade word that I do so I defer to your
greater expertise, I don't believe in this thing called "comp".

>> it just means that if you define "the Helsinki Man" as the man who's
>> experiencing Helsinki and after the button is pressed nobody is
>> experiencing Helsinki anymore then there is no Helsinki man anymore; but of
>> course that's no problem to the former Helsinki man, he's doing fine in
>> Washington AND Moscow.
>>
>
> > This contradicts what you say above. We have agree that the Helsinky man
> survive in both M and W
>

John Clark can't agree with anything about "the Helsinki man" until John
Clark knows what "the Helsinki man" means. If "the Helsinki man" is defined
as "the man that is currently experiencing Helsinki" then nobody fits that
description after the button is pushed.  If "the Helsinki man" is "anyone
who remembers being in Helsinki before the button is pushed" then 2 people
fit that description.

This shows that Bruno Marchal is being incredibly sloppy not just with
pronouns but with noun phrases too, John Clark doesn't understand how Bruno
Marchal expects to construct a precise mathematical proof with that sort of
ambiguity.

 OK Bruno, the experiment is long over and now that you have all the
 information you will ever have on the matter what would have been the
 correct prediction back in Helsinki, W or M? I'm not asking for a
 prediction, the experiment is now in the past so interview anybody and
 everybody and tell me  did "you" see W or M? Bruno Marchal insists there is
 one unique answer so let's hear it!

>>>
>>> >>>  they all agree with "W or M", ad they all live W, or M.
>>>
>>
>> >> Well which is it?
>>
>
> > One of them.
>

  Well which is it?

>> The experiment is over and it's time to find out, did it turn out to be
>> W or M? It's silly to assign a 50-50 probability, or any other probability
>> (except 100% or 0%) AFTER something has happened.
>>
>
> > This is done before. But we can confirm or refute it after.
>

OK, you predicted it would turn out to be W or M but not both, so to
confirm your prediction and claim victory all you have to do is tell me how
the experiment turned out, was it W or M?

>> If you send a photon toward 2 slits quantum mechanics can give you
>> probabilities about where the photon will hit a photographic plate, but
>> that's all. it can't give you certainty. However once the experiment is
>> over you can tell where it hit the plate with no doubt whatsoever
>>
>
> > Suppose that you and me enter the same duplication box simultaneously. I
> can also describe the probability on which city we will both see, like with
> P(W) = P(M) = 1/2, and after the duplication, we open the door and we both
> can agree if we see W, or if we see M.

So which was it W or M?

> It is the same with the quantum was without collapse.
>

It's not the same at all! If I send a bunch of photons at 2 slits I can use
quantum mechanics to predict that 90% of them will hit in that area of the
photographic plate and 10% in that other area, and after the experiment is
over we can see if my prediction was correct by developing the plate and
counting the photons. But I can also send one and only one photon toward
the slits and I can still have a pretty good idea about what area it will
probably hit, if you bet me it would hit in the 10% area I'd take that bet
because there is a 90% probability I'll double my money and only a 10%
chance I'll loose it. However I'd take no bets with you on your thought
experiment because you've made it clear you'd renege on the bet, even
though you predicted it would be W or M but not both and even though AFTER
the experiment you still could not say which one you'd still refuse to pay
up.

>>and you don't need abstruse philosophy or advanced equations to do it,
>> you just develop the photographic plate. This experiment is over too and
>> Bruno Marchal predicted there would be one and only one answer, either W or
>> M.
>>
>
> > Like the photon will hit the screen here or there, despite the wave does
> not. Even after the measurement is done, in the QM without collapse.
>

Before QM says the photon will hit here or there but AFTER the experiment
you know with 100% certainty that the photon hit the photographic plate
here and not there, and so we can test theories. In your thought experiment
you used your theory and said it would be W or M but not both, AFTER the
experiment you claim that all you can still say is W or M, so you really
haven't made a prediction at all, thus we can conclude that it's a bad
theory or a bad thought experiment or both.

> When we open the door of the r

Re: Biography, roger clough, Soles, 1963

2012-11-28 Thread John Mikes

Dear Roger, several things...
1. Congrats to your bio, I could've detected that 'too much' engineering in
your background. I give you (free!) a ZERO (add it to your retirement year:
it should be 200+0).
2. You seem to be efficient in your (lately) studies of the advanced
(onto-) ideas of 300 years ago (Leibnitz). You have pretty interesting
ideas.
3. And please: give back our list to us who have participated in different
aspects for the past 15 years on it. As I said you have interesting ideas
and the deluge of posts you submit attract too many responses from the
established (and very smart) Stammgasts.
4. I think whatever I call 'Infinite Complexity' - you call 'God'. Easier,
because th4r43 is ample lit to extract fir answers from to questions in
doubt. I chose agnosticism in (my) science. Not in religion and not as an
atheism (requiring a God to deny).
5. I wish I had SOME of your rich reading memories in theoretical topics.

I graduated in 1944 (Ph.D.:1948-chemistry, D.Sc. 1967 - mostly colloidal
sci. FOR polymers, ion exchangers and environmental engineering). Ret:
Ciba Geigy 1987 - Sen. Res. Fllw.) - 38 patents, ~100 sci. papers, books

John Mikes

On Wed, Nov 28, 2012 at 10:25 AM, Roger Clough  wrote:

>
>
>
>  Hi guys,
>
> Attached is my just-written biography for
> an upcoming 50th year reunion book.
> I thougbht I'd pass it on.
>
> Layette Collage is in Easton, PA
>
>
>
>   [rclo...@verizon.net] 
> 11/28/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>

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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-28 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 28 Nov 2012, at 02:12, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Tuesday, November 27, 2012 7:29:42 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
On 11/27/2012 10:52 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

The question though is how does that happen? How do tangible things
interface with logic - how do they know the logic is there, how do
they 'obey' it, and through what capacity can they express that
obedience?

It's the other way around. Language was invented to describe things
and logic is just some rules about making inferences in a way such
that you don't end up inadvertently contradicting yourself.

Right. That's what I'm getting at. Logic didn't invent consciousness.

OK.

Even if logic could invent something, it wouldn't be able to tell
that it had.

Not really.
PA can discover and prove the existence of prime numbers, and can also
prove that PA can prove the existence of the prime numbers. In at
least a sense, she can know the prime numbers exist, and she can know
that she can know that prime numbers exist.

Before arithmetic truths or physical laws can exist, there must
first exist the capacity to detect, discern, and participate in
sensory experience of some kind.

OK.
And the comp hypothesis suggest to explain or defined the capacity to
detect, discern, and participate in sensory experience of some kind by
mechanical, or arithmetical (it is equivalent, with CT), relation.
The riddle of consciousness is explained by the existence of truth
about numbers, that numbers can develop many beliefs about, sometimes
true, yet unjustifiable, and in some case knowingly unjustifiable by
them.

At the propositional level we inherit for the ideal sound machines two
logics of self-reference, one give the provable part of self-reference
(G) and the other (G*) give the true, including the non provable, part
of self-reference.

That is the only conceivable universal primitive: sense.

Which sense? Mine? Yours? The jumping spider's sense? The computer's
sense?

Sorry but it is easier for me to make sense of numbers making sense,
than making sense of sense making numbers not making sense.

There is a theory of self-reference for the relative numbers, relative
to *probable* universal numbers.
Physics origin is explained by that probability calculus on the
universal number histories competing for your continuation (from your
1p view).

Comp extends "Darwin and Everett" on arithmetic, somehow. And I don't
say the result is the true physics, I say that it is testable.

Bruno

Craig

Brent

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-28 Thread meekerdb


On 11/28/2012 2:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

The question though is how does that happen?


Actually comp is better than physics here. in physics we don't know why and how electron 
obey the SWE. It is the ureasonable use of math in physics. With comp there is only math 
(arithmetic) and from this we can explain why numbers develop beliefs (axiomatically 
defined) and why they obey apparent laws


So you say.  But where is the explanation and the explanation of why this electron instead 
of that electron?  It seems your arguments are all of the form, "If comp is true, then 
everything true is explained by comp."


Brent

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-11-28 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 27 Nov 2012, at 22:36, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Nov 27, 2012 at  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> The you are all the guy who feel to be you, all the time.

So you is you. Thanks for clearing that up.

Yes.

> You are using the pronouns in the confusing way, as you use "you",  
when I use always 1-you, and 3-you. In the mulitiplication, the 3- 
yous multiplies, and the 1-you mutliply too, in the 3-views, but not  
from any of each possible 1-views. So from the 1-views, it is like a  
sequence of random event,

Bruno Marchal says John Clark is confusing in the use of the pronoun  
"you" and then give us the above incredible stew of mashed yous.

I said that in the experience, "you" can be applied to all the H-man,  
the original in Helsinki, and the copies in W and M. And you agree on  
that, like you agreed that the W and M experience are exclusive,  
making the 1-view unique from the 1-view point.

>>  But it's not just "you", Bruno Marchal is also inconsistent on  
who the Helsinki guy is, sometimes he's the guy experiencing  
Helsinki and then the Helsinki guy will see no city at all when he  
pushes that button, not even Helsinki;

>This contradicts comp.
If you say so. This confirms that I know almost nothing about  
"comp", and have little desire to know more.

OK, so you say "no" to the doctor, now. This makes my point, as if you  
don't believe in the consequence of comp, like the fact that you can  
survive a teleportation (here), then indeed you have to disbelieve  
comp. That's the point.

> It would mean he did not survive classical teleportation

No it does not,

Ah! you still believe in comp.

it just means that if you define "the Helsinki Man" as the man who's  
experiencing Helsinki and after the button is pressed nobody is  
experiencing Helsinki anymore then there is no Helsinki man anymore;
but of course that's no problem to the former Helsinki man, he's  
doing fine in Washington AND Moscow.

This contradicts what you say above. We have agree that the Helsinky  
man survive in both M and W in the 3view, and in W or M in the 1-view  
(as it is exclusive).

And this illustrates why precision of language is so important in a  
world with duplicating chambers.

> Just look at the context, and chose the meaning which makes the  
point consistent. It seems obvious for most.

As a mathematician you must know that it is the step that is so  
"obviously" true that you don't even bother to mention it that has  
brought many a proof to grief.

No I proved it, but you refute it systematically by confusing the 3- 
view on the 1-views and the 1-views on the 1view, as asked in the  
protocol.

>> It might be helpful  if Bruno Marchal could explain, without  
using pronouns but by giving the subject a actual name, how  "the 3p  
view on the 1p views" (whatever that is) differs from some other view.

>After the duplication:

There is one relevant 3p view, and it is:
 "John-Clark-M enjoys Russian coffee and John-Clark-W enjoys  
American coffee".

There are two relevant 1-p views, which are
"I enjoy a russian coffee". And,
"I enjoy American coffee".

And I am John Clark the Helsinki guy and after the button is pushed  
I John Clark the former Helsinki guy will enjoy a russian coffee and  
I John Clark the former Helsinki guy will enjoy a American coffee.

Which makes it obvioulsy a 3-view on the 1-view. But as you agree  
those 1-view are exclusive, it entails there were no predictable with  
certainty.

>> obviously there is no unique future 1 view for the  
Helsinki man,

> Why?
Even in the 3p views, they are two unique (subjectively unique)  
futures.

That is a blatant contradiction, if there are 2 of something then  
it's not unique.

Then the two people should feel the two experience simulatneously, and  
wrote "I feel to be in M and I feel to be in W", with the same  
referent for "I". You get Chalmers idea that copies of human acquires  
telepathic means.

However even with duplicating chambers the past first person view  
remains unique, the Washington man was the Helsinki man and only  
the Helsinki man and the Moscow man was the Helsinki man and only  
the Helsinki man

Very good!

Thank you, but it doesn't work the other way because time has a  
direction, entropy increases the the present to the future.

>> So the pronoun "you" doesn't refer to anything

>Why? It refers clearly to two persons,

One pronoun is used to refer to two entirely different people in  
complex thought experiment involving personal identity and Bruno  
Marchal wonders why such a "clear" pronoun could possibly cause  
confusion. But then again, for advocates of bad ideas confusion is a  
good thing.

You add the confusion by failing to distinguih, at one place, (nor  
everywhere) the 1 and 3 views.

>>> The prediction W is wrong

 >> But I find Bruno Marchal in Washington and Bruno Marchal informs  
me that the prediction was correct.

> You have

Peirce, comp, the monads, and the tripartite brain

2012-11-28 Thread Roger Clough


My previous analysis possibly suggests the following (?):

III Thirdness= comp= quantitative or objective brain = ? cerebreal cortex, 
thinking = b of bdi agent

II Secondness = monads = qualitative or subjective brain = ? limbic brain, 
sensing or feeling = d of bdi agent

I Firstness = Supreme monad= consciousness = ? reptilian brain = i of bdi agent 





[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/28/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

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Re: Re: intuitional logic and comp

2012-11-28 Thread Roger Clough

Hi Bruno Marchal 

Perhaps one can say that intuitionist logic is a personalized modal logic,
while classic logic is impersonal necessary logic ?


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/28/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content - 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-27, 14:08:13
Subject: Re: intuitional logic and comp




On 27 Nov 2012, at 11:58, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal 

Then since the brain is earth, shouldn't we use intuitionist logic ?


To get money, or to build bridges, or to put a man on the moon, we can argue 
that this is what we do.
To search aliens on other planet, or to explore the realm of elementary 
particles, or to search a coherent view on the mind and body, we have to bet on 
non constructive object, like the "others", the "unknown" etc.


Once I have the time I can give an example of a simple non intuitionist proof 
in math, so you can appreciate better.


Bruno








[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/27/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content - 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-26, 12:49:38
Subject: Re: intuitional logic and comp




On 26 Nov 2012, at 12:34, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno,

Since intuitional logic seems to be a form of "pure logic", inapplicable to
the outside world, 


Why do you say that? On the contrary, most people believe that intuitionist 
logic is the logic most suited for the application in the real world. I tend to 
think that woman and engineers are intuitionist by nature. The believe in what 
they can construct, where a classical logician extends its beliefs into what is 
impossible to not exist, even if we can't construct it. Intuitionism is Earth 
logic, classical logic is Heaven logic.






can or does comp implement intuitional logic ? 


Yes, in many ways, but what is nice is that we get freely an intuitionistic 
subject  associated to the machine, by applying the theaetus' definition of the 
knower (true justified belief) with "justified belief" interpreted by the 
machine (sound) provability ability. It is the []p : Bp & p definition that I 
mentioned earlier. But this can'be made clear without doing a bit more of 
logic. This works because Bp -> p, although true, is unprovable by the machine, 
so that from both her 3p and 1p self views, they behave differently.  Bp and Bp 
& p leads to two veru different view on the Arithmetical truth that he machine 
can be aware of.


Bruno 









[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/26/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content - 
From: Platonist Guitar Cowboy 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-25, 20:00:12
Subject: Re: arithmetic truth





On Sun, Nov 25, 2012 at 5:10 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

Hi Cowboy, 


On 24 Nov 2012, at 19:52, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:


Hi Everybody,

At several points the discussions of the list led us to hypothesis of 
arithmetic truth. Bruno mentioned once that the basis for this hypothesis was 
quite strong, requiring studies in logic to grasp.



You might quote the passage. Comp (roughly "I am machine", with the 3-I, the 
body) is quite strong, compared to "strong AI" (a machine can be conscious).
Although the comp I use is the weaker of all comp; as it does not fix the 
substitution level. But logically it is still stronger than strong AI.

But arithmetical truth itself is easy to grasp. Even tribes having no names for 
the natural numbers get it very easily, and basically anyone capable of given 
sense (true or false or indeterminate, it does not matter) to sentences like
"I will have only a finite number of anniversary birthdays", already betrays 
his belief in arithmetical truth (the intuitive concept). So I would say it is 
assumed and know by almost everybody, more or less explicitly depending on 
education.



I still have difficulty with intuition as "ability to understand something no 
reasoning" in this loose linguistic sense and how mathematicians frame that. 
When Kleene makes this precise in "The Foundations of Intuitionistic 
Mathematics"... this is a bit too much for cowboys with guitars, but for some 
reason I am intrigued. 




But as a non-logician, I have some trouble wrapping my brain around G?el and 
Tarski's Papers concerning this.


Well, this is quite different. It concerns what machine and theories can said 
about truth. This is far more involved and requires some amount of study of 
mathematical logic. I will come back on this, probably in the FOAR list (and 
not soon enough, as we have to dig a bit on the math needed for this before).





What I do see is that Tarski generalizes the notion and its difficulties to all 
formal languages: truth isn't arithmetically definable without higher order 
language. Post attacking the problem with Turin

Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-28 Thread Richard Ruquist

Bruno,
Does any or all forms of energy come from arithmetic?

On Wed, Nov 28, 2012 at 5:49 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> On 27 Nov 2012, at 19:52, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, November 27, 2012 1:01:26 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 26 Nov 2012, at 20:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 26, 2012 1:46:53 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 26 Nov 2012, at 13:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, November 23, 2012 11:54:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 22 Nov 2012, at 18:38, Stephen P. King wrote:




 How exactly does the comparison occur?


 By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from observation (the
 quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear positive
 operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical quantization, which
 exists already.
 
>>>
>>>
>>> UDA refers to an argument. It is the argument showing that if we are
>>> machine (even physical machine) then in fine physics has to be justified by
>>> the arithmetical relations, and some internal views related to it.
>>
>>
>> Isn't an argument a logical construct though? I can't argue a piece of
>> iron into being magnetized. There has to be a plausible interface between
>> pure logic and anything tangible, doesn't there? It doesn't have to be
>> matter, even subjective experience is not conjured by logic alone. Can we
>> use logic to alone to deny that we see what we see or feel what we feel?
>>
>>
>> Of course not. Why would logic ever deny this?
>> On the contrary tangible things obeys some logic usually.
>
>
> The question though is how does that happen?
>
>
> Actually comp is better than physics here. in physics we don't know why and
> how electron obey the SWE. It is the ureasonable use of math in physics.
> With comp there is only math (arithmetic) and from this we can explain why
> numbers develop beliefs (axiomatically defined) and why they obey apparent
> laws
>
>
>
> How do tangible things interface with logic -
>
>
> I guess they would not tangible if they do not. tangibility ask for some
> amount of consistency.
>
>
>
> how do they know the logic is there, how do they 'obey' it, and through what
> capacity can they express that obedience?
>
>
> With comp this can be derived from the laws to  which the entities (actually
> 0, 1, 2, 3, ...) obeys.
>
> The number tree does not need to know anything for being able to divide 6,
> for example.
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Is your answer to 'what makes logic happen?' rooted in the presumption of
>>> logic?
>>>
>>>
>>> At the basic ontological level, I can limit the assumption in logic quite
>>> a lot.
>>
>>
>> I'm not sure why that changes anything at all. I think it makes it even
>> worse, because if you have a basic ontological level with very limited
>> logical assumptions, and everything is reducible to that, then what is it
>> that you are reducing it from?
>>
>>
>> ?
>
>
> If a roast pork loin is really a string of binary instructions,
>
>
> It can be that, but a string + a universal number can be decoded by a
> universal numbers into the apperance of a roast pork.
>
>
>
> then why isn't it a string of binary instructions? We do we need the pork
> loin?
>
>
> Worst, we cannot make sense of it in some absolute ontological sense, bu
> assuming comp, we can't avoid the delusion by the universal numbers about
> it.
>
>
>
> Why do binary instructions make themselves seem like pork (or shapes or
> anything other than what they actually are)?
>
>
> By the decoding process, like 10001100 can be decoded into add 0 to the
> content of register 1000. Of course it is more involved in the "real case"
> of the "roasted pork smelly experiences".
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Actually we don't need logic at the base ontological level, only simple
>>> substitution rules and the +, * equality axioms.
>>
>>
>> Aren't rules and axioms the defining structures of logic? It sounds like
>> this:
>>
>> C: "How can you justify the existence of logic with logic alone?"
>>
>>
>> We can't. But we can derive the beliefs in logics in arithmetic.
>> (We can't derive arithmetic from logic alone, already).
>
>
> We can derive logic from sense though. All logic makes sense but not
> everything that makes sense is logical.
>
>
> You are right, even with comp. You need arithmetic above. At least, and with
> UDA: at most.
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> B: "Well, you don't need much logic. In fact you don't need any logic. All
>> you really need is logic."
>>
>>
>>
>> You need logic and arithmetic. Technically it can be shown that you don't
>> need so much logic (equality axioms are almost enough). The arithmetic (or
>> equivalent) part is more important. It is a technical detail.
>
>
> What does logic and arithmetic need?
>
>
> ?
> Nothing, I would say.
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Only later we candefine an observer, in that ontolog

Re: Against Mechanism

2012-11-28 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 27 Nov 2012, at 19:10, meekerdb wrote:

On 11/27/2012 9:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But at the instant the box is opened and different things revealed
"you" is turned into the Washington man and "you" is turned into
the Moscow man, so back in Helsinki to ask "what will "you" see?"
is ambiguous.

No it is not. It is indeterminate, but no less ambiguous than
talking on my future in case I am proposed interesting job in bit
Washington and Moscow and I am hesitating about which one.

But it is less ambiguous in that "you" will experience both so there
is no choice for you to make.

Indeed, if it was a matter of choice, there would be no indeterminacy
with the duplication. The point is that my identity is as well defined
in the choice case as in the duplication case.

Bruno

Brent

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RE: Biography, roger clough, Soles, 1963

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