Bruno, Does any or all forms of energy come from arithmetic? On Wed, Nov 28, 2012 at 5:49 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 27 Nov 2012, at 19:52, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, November 27, 2012 1:01:26 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 26 Nov 2012, at 20:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >> >> On Monday, November 26, 2012 1:46:53 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 26 Nov 2012, at 13:42, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Friday, November 23, 2012 11:54:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 22 Nov 2012, at 18:38, Stephen P. King wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> How exactly does the comparison occur? >>>> >>>> >>>> By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from observation (the >>>> quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear positive >>>> operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical quantization, which >>>> exists already. >>>> <snip> >>> >>> >>> UDA refers to an argument. It is the argument showing that if we are >>> machine (even physical machine) then in fine physics has to be justified by >>> the arithmetical relations, and some internal views related to it. >> >> >> Isn't an argument a logical construct though? I can't argue a piece of >> iron into being magnetized. There has to be a plausible interface between >> pure logic and anything tangible, doesn't there? It doesn't have to be >> matter, even subjective experience is not conjured by logic alone. Can we >> use logic to alone to deny that we see what we see or feel what we feel? >> >> >> Of course not. Why would logic ever deny this? >> On the contrary tangible things obeys some logic usually. > > > The question though is how does that happen? > > > Actually comp is better than physics here. in physics we don't know why and > how electron obey the SWE. It is the ureasonable use of math in physics. > With comp there is only math (arithmetic) and from this we can explain why > numbers develop beliefs (axiomatically defined) and why they obey apparent > laws > > > > How do tangible things interface with logic - > > > I guess they would not tangible if they do not. tangibility ask for some > amount of consistency. > > > > how do they know the logic is there, how do they 'obey' it, and through what > capacity can they express that obedience? > > > With comp this can be derived from the laws to which the entities (actually > 0, 1, 2, 3, ...) obeys. > > The number tree does not need to know anything for being able to divide 6, > for example. > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Is your answer to 'what makes logic happen?' rooted in the presumption of >>> logic? >>> >>> >>> At the basic ontological level, I can limit the assumption in logic quite >>> a lot. >> >> >> I'm not sure why that changes anything at all. I think it makes it even >> worse, because if you have a basic ontological level with very limited >> logical assumptions, and everything is reducible to that, then what is it >> that you are reducing it from? >> >> >> ? > > > If a roast pork loin is really a string of binary instructions, > > > It can be that, but a string + a universal number can be decoded by a > universal numbers into the apperance of a roast pork. > > > > then why isn't it a string of binary instructions? We do we need the pork > loin? > > > Worst, we cannot make sense of it in some absolute ontological sense, bu > assuming comp, we can't avoid the delusion by the universal numbers about > it. > > > > Why do binary instructions make themselves seem like pork (or shapes or > anything other than what they actually are)? > > > By the decoding process, like 100011011110 can be decoded into add 0 to the > content of register 1000. Of course it is more involved in the "real case" > of the "roasted pork smelly experiences". > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> Actually we don't need logic at the base ontological level, only simple >>> substitution rules and the +, * equality axioms. >> >> >> Aren't rules and axioms the defining structures of logic? It sounds like >> this: >> >> C: "How can you justify the existence of logic with logic alone?" >> >> >> We can't. But we can derive the beliefs in logics in arithmetic. >> (We can't derive arithmetic from logic alone, already). > > > We can derive logic from sense though. All logic makes sense but not > everything that makes sense is logical. > > > You are right, even with comp. You need arithmetic above. At least, and with > UDA: at most. > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> B: "Well, you don't need much logic. In fact you don't need any logic. All >> you really need is logic." >> >> >> >> You need logic and arithmetic. Technically it can be shown that you don't >> need so much logic (equality axioms are almost enough). The arithmetic (or >> equivalent) part is more important. It is a technical detail. > > > What does logic and arithmetic need? > > > ? > Nothing, I would say. > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> Only later we candefine an observer, in that ontology, as a >>> machine/number having bigger set of logical beliefs. But the existence of >>> such machine does not require the belief or assumptions in that logic. >> >> >> I'm not even bringing observers into it. I'm not talking about awareness >> of participants, I'm talking about the emergence of the possibility of logic >> at all. >> >> >> Logic is defined by the minimum we assume like >> >> we will say that "p & q" is true, when p is true and q is true, and only >> then. >> We will accept that if we assume p and if we assume (p->q), then we cab >> derive q from those assumption. >> etc. >> Logicians and computer scientist studies those kind of relations between >> proposition. It is a branch of math, and it is not necessarily related to >> foundations. > > > So you are saying that logic comes from human teachings about how we can > simplify the relations of ideas, not a universal primitive which is capable > of animating matter or minds by itself. > > > Yes. > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> That's ok with me, but you don't need any smoke or mirrors after that, >>> you are pretty much committed to 'because maths' as the alpha and omega >>> answer to all possible questions. >>> >>> >>> On the contrary. The math is used to be precise, and then to realize that >>> we don't have the answers at all, but we do have tools to make the questions >>> clearer, and sometimes this can give already some shape of the answer, like >>> seeing that comp bactracks to Plato's conception of reality (even >>> Pythagorus). >>> This is not much. Just a remind that science has not decided between >>> Plato and Aristotle in theology. >> >> >> How do we know that we aren't making the questions clearer by amputating >> everything that doesn't fit our axioms? >> >> >> If you believe some axioms is missing, you can add it. >> If an axiom does not please to you, you can propose another theory. > > > I start from the entire universe as a single indivisible axiom and refine > focus from there. > > > > What entire universe? What is that, where does it come from? What is the > relation with consciousness. You start from what I want to explain. > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> when translated in arithmetic, makes a relative physical certainty into a >>> true Sigma_1 sentence, which has to be provable, and consistent. >>> >>> Proof and consistency, again, are already features of logic. What makes >>> things true? How does it actually happen? >>> >>> >>> We assume some notion of arithmetical truth. I hope you can agree with >>> proposition like "44 is a prime number or 44 is not a prime number". >> >> >> What are the mechanics of that assumption though? >> >> >> In comp we explains that mechanics with elementary arithmetic, universal >> numbers, etc. >> >> We start from what we agree on, since high school. >> >> It is not more circular than a brain scientist using his brain. > > > I agree it is no more circular than neuroscience, but I think the current > neuroscientific approach to explaining consciousness is ultimately circular > too. It might be a clue that the only way that we ourselves can disengage > from circular thoughts is by using our will to consciously shift our > attention from it. > > > Or resolve the circularity. Computer science provides tools for doing that. > > > > >> >> >> >> The details of the propositions are not interesting to me, rather it is >> the ontology of proposition itself. What is it? >> >> >> That is a very interesting question, but out of topic. Logician model >> often proposition by the set of worlds where those proposition are true, and >> they often defined world by the set of propositions true in that world, >> making eventually a proposition a set of set of worlds, and a world a set of >> set of worlds, and there are interesting "galois like" connection, meaning >> interesting mathematics. >> It is an entire field of subject. >> >> With comp we don't need to go that far yet, although it is clearly on the >> horizon. > > > So comp is a proposition which has not yet proposed a theory of what a > proposition is. > > > Indeed. Proposition, as opposed to mere syntactical sentences, is as > mysterious as consciousness, meaning, reality, etc. We need much more > progress to handle that kind of things. But we can avoid the difficulties in > comp by attaching proposition to couple "sentence" + "what a universal > machine can do with the sentences". But this does not solve the riddle, but > it can help. > Keep in mind that all what I show in how complex the mind-body issue is with > comp, if only because we must change our mind on the (currently > aristotelian) physics. > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Who proposes? >> >> >> Again, that is an interesting question too. here comp can answer, in the >> 3p view, a number relatively to a bunch of numbers. > > > Why and how does a number propose (undefined non-numbers?) to numerous other > numbers? > > > By virtue of the fact that they obeys the laws of addition and > multiplication, which enable them to have complex computational relations > with each others. > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> How do they do it exactly? >> >> >> By using their relations with each others. You need to study some books, >> or follow my explanations on FOAR. > > > What does it mean to use a relation though? It's sensory-motor metaphor. > > > You can't redefined all term. I use relation in the usual (mathematical > sense). A relation on a set A can be defined as a subset of AxA, for > example. > > > > > To use is to employ something as an object for a subjective motive. > > > That's an higher level notion. > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> That is the only magic that consciousness contains. >> >> >> You make some jump here. > > > Yes, it's only an editorial comment. > > > Lol > > > > >> >> >> >> Beyond that, it's just mind-numbing patterns playing themselves out >> forever. Participation is everything and no amount of interrogating >> functions can conceivably synthesize that from logic. Logic does not >> participate, it constrains and guides that which is participating as an >> inert codex of blind axioms. >> >>> >>> Not much is assumed, except for UDA, where you are asked if you are >>> willing to accept a computer in place of your brain. The computer is >>> supposed to be reconfigured at some level of course. We assume also Church >>> thesis, although it is easy to avoid it, technically (but not so much >>> "philosophically"). >> >> >> Church thesis is similarly reflexive logic. There is no reason to presume >> that because anything that can be put into a Boolean box has other logical >> commonalities that this (unquestionably important and worthwhile) >> commonality extends to causally efficacious presence. An air conditioner >> doesn't create air. Church assumes the air of sense making from the start >> and then shows how all manner of air conditioners can be assembled from the >> same fundamental blueprint. I'm not falling for it though. It's a sleight of >> hand maneuver. While functionalism does card tricks with logic, the power >> and reality of sense supplies the table, tablecloth, stage, lights, >> audience, and girl to saw in half. Yes, I see, you pulled my card, King of >> Diamonds, very impressive - truly, but how does it taste like chocolate and >> dance Gangnam style? >> >> >> >> Comp explains why we cannot completely explain the sense, and this is >> rather nice as it prevents reductionist theories of sense. >> >> On the contrary, by being open to sense in machine, comp is rather open in >> matter of others consciousness. > > > I don't see that explains the sense at all though. It explains how to use a > certain kind of sense in a very powerful and extensible way, but it doesn't > get to the hard problem. > > > Indeed, comp does not solve it per se. You need the G/G* incompleteness to > approach the explanation, which can be shown to be necessarily > incompletable. > > > > >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> So the observability with measure one is given by []p = Bp & Dt & p, with >>> p arithmetical sigma_1 (this is coherent with the way the physical reality >>> has to be redefined through UDA). Then the quantum logic is given by the >>> quantization []<>p, thanks to the law p -> []<>p, and this makes possible to >>> reverse the Goldblatt modal translation of quantum logic into arithmetic. >>> >>> >>> Way over my head, but it sounds like logic proving logic again. >>> >>> >>> It is not your fault. Nobody knows logic, except the professional >>> logicians, who are not really aware of this. >>> >>> >>> >>> I talk about logic, the branch of math, not logic the adjective for all >>> simple rational behavior that we all know. UDA does not use >>> logic-branch-math, but of course it use the logic that you are necessarily >>> using when sending a post to a list (implicitly). >>> AUDA needs logic-the branch of math, due to the link between computer >>> science and mathematical logic. >> >> >> That's reasonable to me, but what I'm talking about is getting behind the >> curtain of 'simple rational behavior that we all know', and what I find is >> not a Platonic monoilith of idealism, but the ordinary experience of >> discernment and participation. Logic supervenes on sense, but sense does not >> supervene on logic. >> >> >> You are right on this. Even with comp. >> With comp sense supervene on logic and arithmetic though, in a testable >> way as we get also physics. > > > Comp bases that supervenience on its own amputated axioms though. > > > Comp is the bet that we are machine (roughly speaking). This amputates > nothing, unless you amputate machines from thinking, consciousness, but then > it is your theory which amputates certain person. > > > > It says, 'whatever fits in this box also fits in every other box that is the > same size'. It disqualifies everything out of its own box though. > > > As a consequence we lost primitive matter, but then nobody has ever shown > even one evidence for the existence of primitive matter, beyond the natural > extrapolation of what we see (which proves nothing for the ontology). > > > > It has no theory of where logic and arithmetic emerge, > > > We need to start from simple truth on which you can agree. If you doubt that > 43 is prime, then I can explain nothing, indeed. But you seem to start from > the entire universe, and sense, which nobody can really agree on. It is only > recent that scientists approach the notion of sense, and the notion of > physical universe is controversial. > > > > while it is clear to me that they emerge from sense. > > > You are lucky. > > > > > Counting is the intellectual act of making sense of a quantity > > > OK, but how will you define quantity, then? > > > > - of naming experiences as an abstract collection. > > > From what, on what? > > > > >> >> >> >> >> Dreams prove that we are perfectly content to enjoy a universe without >> logical consistency, but there is not any proof that I know of which >> suggests that logic relies on qualia or matter. Therefore, it seems to me >> that logic must either be a psychic phenomenon and therefore not primitive, >> or that psychic phenomena is illogical and the universe which we think we >> live in is impossible. I don't think the latter is plausible because it >> would undermine our ability to have any kind of meaningful opinion about >> anything real if that were the case. >> >> >> It is unclear. Logic plays different role at many levels, and so do >> algebra, statistics, arithmetic, computer science. > > > It isn't clear that logic is the cause. To the contrary, I think it has to > be an effect. > > > No problem with this. I am a bit neutral on this issue. > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> Comparison is used in the everyday sense. >>> >>> Yes! Now that I understand. What's wrong with the 'everyday sense' being >>> the reality >>> >>> >>> That would cut all the funding in fundamental sciences, as this answer >>> everything. It is a bit like "why do you waste your time trying to >>> understanding the thermo-kinetics of car motor and how car moves? Why not >>> just accept that car moves when we press on the pedal?" >> >> >> I think just the opposite. My view says that thermo-kinetics is just the >> beginning, >> >> >> As a beginning it is fuzzy and assumes a priori much more. I do agree on >> the importance of the concept of heat, we might all be some sort of steam >> engine, but this is more a matter of implementation. >> >> >> >> we need to start studying what is the 'we' that presses the pedal also. >> More funding for interdisciplinary science as well as fundamental. >> >> >> I agree. >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> The everyday sense is a part of reality, and I would understand it in >>> term of the simplest assumption possible. Then my point is only that if comp >>> is true (that is, roughly, if we are machine) then we can already refute the >>> lasting current idea that there is a primitive physical universe. It gives >>> at least another rational conception of reality, which gives the hope to get >>> the origin of the physical laws, and the material patterns. >> >> >> I don't see the advantage of a reality which is primitively arithmetic or >> primitively physical. >> >> >> I just show that if comp is correct, then it is enough, and adding >> assumptions is cheating with respect to both mind and matter (and their >> relation). > > > Then I don't see the advantage of a reality which is comp or materialist. > > > If you search advantages, then you let your mind open to wishful thinking, > which is not a truth friendly attitude, even if the Löb formula seems to > give a sort of role to a form of arithmetical placebo (see sane04 part 2). > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Either way we are depersonalized and our lives are de-presented while >> subterranean abstractions crank out automatism with ourselves as vestigial >> deluded spectators, powerless in our inauthentic simulated worlds. >> >> >> No. I'm just afraid you get some bad math teachers. Or you are unable to >> understand that reductionism is provably dead about numbers and machines >> already. You are the one who put the cold in some place. >> > > It's hidden right in your words. "I'm just afraid you get some bad math > teachers" is admission that the beauty and warmth of mathematics requires > seeing them with the right eyes. > > > Yes, OK. > > > > It's your sense of numbers which is wonderful - your sensitivity to them, > not the numbers themselves. > > > That is debatable. I have learn to appreciate the numbers because some > people found amazing relations, and succeed in convincing me, and everyone > taking the time to do the work, about the truth of those relations. > > > > > They are just unconscious, automatic fragments of mirror which will refelect > whatever light is present. > > > Yes. > > > > If your reason is particularly illuminating in the mathematical-logical band > of sense, then it's like lighting up a fluorescent disco with a black light. > If I go in there with only my FM radio to listen to, I don't hear much of > anything. > > > > OK. > > > > > >> >> >> >> If instead we look at what we are looking at, and see realism for the >> sensory experience that it is, then arithmetic truth and Hermetic arts fall >> out of it organically. Algebra and geometry coexist to serve an >> experiential, theatrical agenda, not a functional one. >> >> >> The sensory realism is 1p, and non communicable, and complex to describe >> (you poetry, novel, movies, music, etc.), so we can't build on it. But it is >> not because we build on 3p things, that we stop to ascribe consciousness to >> them, and indeed comp ascribe consciousness to a much vaster set of entities >> than any form of non comp. >> >> You just illustrate your reductionist conception of number and machine. > > > Machine and number I think are as vast a universe as 1p experience, but in > the impersonal 3p mode. From my view, it is functionalism which overstates > 3p assumptions and compulsively assigns them to 1p, mainly out of a fear of > personal realism. > > > It assigns 1p to them, yes. Strong AI too. It is part of the assumption. The > opposite assumption treats them as zombie. In case of doubt I think the > attribution of consciousness to zombie is less damageable. > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> and the specialized logic being one category of specialized mechanisms >>> within that? >>> >>> >>> Logic is not fundamental at all, for UDA, you need only the everyday >>> logic that you need to be able to do a pizza. Arithmetic is far more >>> important, if only to understand how a computer functions. >> >> >> Haha, you're still telling me that a little bit of shit in the tuna salad >> doesn't count. If it tastes like logic, then I don't think you can use it to >> prop up a primitive that supervenes on logic. >> >> >> I never use the word logic. I use arithmetic which is infinitely richer >> and stronger. Logic is just a very good tool, like algebra. I assume comp, >> so it is normal that computer science plays some role, and many logics are >> related to computer science. > > > Isn't arithmetic a kind of logic though? > > > Not really. (of course with "kind of" you might say that everything is a > kind of something). > > > > > Doesn't counting and addition require that an output is guided by logical > transformations on an input? > > > Not purely logical. It needs to assume some stuff, like 0 is a number, and > that is not logical. The early 20th century logicians have tried to deduce > "0 is a number" from logic, but they failed, and eventually we understand > now what it has to fail (failure of logicism, discovery of the importance of > intuition in math). > > > > > > >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> Yet more advanced logic can help for two things, when doing reasoning: >>> >>> -showing that a proposition follows from other propositions (deduction) >>> -showing that a proposition does not follow from other propositions >>> (independence). >>> >>> Then, concerning the relation between mind, thinking, feeling, truth, >>> etc. many result in logic put some light, and that is not astonishing once >>> you bet on comp, even if temporarily for the sake of the argument. >>> >>> In logic, the branch of math, the beginning is the most difficult, >>> because you have to understand what you have to not understand, like formal >>> expressions. >>> >>> Logic is just like algebra, and those things imposes themselves once we >>> tackle precise theories, and relations between theories. It helps for >>> refuting them, or representing a theory in another, etc. >>> >>> I know that comp invites to math, and that this seems to be a problem for >>> many. >> >> >> To me the problem with comp is that it perfectly describes a universe that >> we don't actually live in. >> >> >> Not at all. Comp reformulate the problem into justifying what we live in >> from arithmetic with the internal views. If this don't match we abandon >> comp. Comp is just the assumption that we are machine emulable, at some >> level. > > > That assumption makes it so that all internal views are modeled in a way > which automatically justifies them to comp. It is the yellow glasses that > prove that everything is yellow. > > > All theories are such glasses. You statement attacks science, not just the > comp assumption. It criticize the act of doing assumption, it seems to me. > Of course we can stop science and enjoy the view, and that can be a good > philosophy of life, but it is not what scientists do. > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> In theory a formula could move my arm, because my arm could, in theory, be >> nothing but data, but in fact, that isn't what we see. Most of our lives are >> struggles for mathematically irrelevant resources - time, money, sex, more >> money, more sex, etc. They aren't arithmetically interesting problems. >> >> >> Don't confuse a tool and what humans do with it. > > > Why not? What is a tool for humans other than some implement with which > humans do things? > > > So human can be guilty, not the tools. Guns are pacific, when human let them > sleep in the closet. > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> The universe which comp describes should be one of florid plasticity and >> constant exploration, >> >> >> I agree! >> >> >> >> >> not struggle and frustration. How does a computer get frustrated? Why >> would it? >> >> >> >> When he explores and got punished, > > > I think that is an anthropomorphic projection. Is there any mathematical > evidence which shows outcomes effected by punishment? > > > As much as with human, by definition as humans are machine, by the comp > assumption. > > > > > Not talking about disadvantageous game conditions, but actual cruelty and > intention to cause hurt feelings. Do computers care if you punish them? > > > Yes. By definition of comp. I mean humans are computer and seems to care > about punishment. > > > > > >> >> when authoritative arguments abound, when the elders fear too much and the >> youth not enough. The universal machine get frustrated when her universal >> inspiration is constrained by the contingencies, despite they brought him >> here also. That's life. > > > That is life, but I don't think it's arithmetic. > > > Yes, but that is due to your a priori that machines cannot think, be > conscious, ... > > > > > >> >> But we can suggest better way, and listening to the others is a good >> heuristic, and when the other looks quite different, like with machine, we >> might learn something. > > > The way I see it, my way opens the door to a whole new universe of > impersonal artifacts and beauty, while I think with comp, all we will end up > doing is reinventing ourselves. > > > Perhaps. There is a sense to say that the creation is what God can use to > reivent himself all the time. But why would that prevent artifacts and > beauty? Is not more beautiful? Well, that's personal taste of course, a > priori independent of what is, or not. > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
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