Re: Holiday Exercise

[Bruce Kellett]

On 29/07/2016 2:42 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:


On 7/28/2016 9:20 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 29/07/2016 12:32 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:


On 7/28/2016 6:55 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 29/07/2016 5:56 am, John Clark wrote:


If
computationalism
​ is correct then everything about "you" can be duplicated as long 
at the atoms have the correct position and velocity, not almost 
everything, not everything except for the 1-view, EVERYTHING! If 
the machine can't do that then

computationalism
​ is wrong, ​but you can't just assume
computationalism
​ can't do something (like duplicate the 1-view pov) and then 
claim you've proven something about computationalism.


​Except that you have provided no evidence that it is not true, 
you just assume it's not true ( by assuming "
The duplicating machine never duplicates the 1-view from the 
1-view pov

​ ") and then a few steps later claim to have proven something.​


That is an interesting point. If I have understood Bruno correctly, 
his claim is that by computationalism, 'you' are the sum over all 
computations passing through your conscious state, or something 
similar. Consequently, if 'you' are duplicated in complete detail, 
then you have nothing more than yet another computation that passes 
through your conscious state, so there can be only one consciousness!


The fact that these duplicates might see different cities becomes 
irrelevant because other computations that pass through my current 
conscious state might correspond to computations relevant to other 
cities, universes, or whatever (physics is only the 'statistics' 
over such multiple computations). After the duplication, there is 
still only one consciousness, albeit in a divided body. So the one 
consciousness does see both cities at once. This possibility cannot 
be ruled out /a priori/ -- that might in fact be the result of such 
a duplication experiment. I think this is a question that can only 
be resolved empirically -- produce a person duplicating machine and 
see what happens!


Computationalism must entail that running the same computation 
twice necessarily produces (numerically) the same consciousness, 
so, despite what Bruno claims, entirely faithful duplication of a 
person does not produce another consciousness (or another 1-view 
from the 3p perspective), 


It's not the duplication that is supposed to produce another person, 
it's the divergence of experiences, and perhaps also physics that is 
below or indirectly related conscious experience.  This is what 
makes you a different person from who you were in the past.


That is one of the paradoxical aspects of duplication -- the 
duplicates become different persons because of the divergence of 
experience. But, by the same token, their experiences differ from the 
original, so how come they can be said to be the same person as the 
original? 


They both remember being that person.


Sure, and if that is your sole criterion of identity, they are still the 
one person.


Personal identity through time seems to be related to psychological 
continuity; the two (divergent) duplicates are both psychologically 
continuous with the original, so both are the original person. 


I'm not sure what you mean by "psychological continuity".  I've argued 
that thoughts have a duration in time and they overlap, so they 
produce a continuum of experiences.  But this doesn't bridge 
concussions and anesthesia, and probably not duplication machines.  Or 
do you mean something like "character" or "values" or "tendencies" 
that would presumably carry over to duplicates as do memories but are 
less explicit.


Psychological continuity means that one can find a series of overlapping 
periods between which the changes in memories, character, values, 
desires, and so on, change in a regular and explicable way. During 
periods of unconsciousness, these psychological characteristics may not 
change at all, or if they do change, they change in explicable ways.


The problem with psychological continuity as a criterion of identity is 
that it is not a one-one relation (it is not transitive). Parfit argues 
that psychological continuity a ground for speaking of identity when it 
is one-one. If it took a one-many or branching form, then Parfit argues 
that we have to abandon the language of identity. "If psychology took a 
branching form, no coherent set of judgements of identity could 
correspond to, and thus be used to imply, the branching form of this 
relation."



Such considerations led some, such as Parfit, to question whether 
personal identity was all that important, considering 'survival' to 
be a more significant consideration. Survival as in psychological 
continuity. So one could 'survive' as several. But then, is one 
psychologically continuous with oneself as a foetus?


Insofar as my fetal state had a psychology, I'd say yes.  It doesn't 
seem any more problematic than being continuous with my 50yr old self.


Or your 70 yo. self reduced to a 

Re: Holiday Exercise

[Brent Meeker]

On 7/28/2016 9:20 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 29/07/2016 12:32 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:


On 7/28/2016 6:55 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 29/07/2016 5:56 am, John Clark wrote:


If
computationalism
​ is correct then everything about "you" can be duplicated as long 
at the atoms have the correct position and velocity, not almost 
everything, not everything except for the 1-view, EVERYTHING! If 
the machine can't do that then

computationalism
​ is wrong, ​but you can't just assume
computationalism
​ can't do something (like duplicate the 1-view pov) and then claim 
you've proven something about computationalism.


​Except that you have provided no evidence that it is not true, you 
just assume it's not true ( by assuming "
The duplicating machine never duplicates the 1-view from the 1-view 
pov

​ ") and then a few steps later claim to have proven something.​


That is an interesting point. If I have understood Bruno correctly, 
his claim is that by computationalism, 'you' are the sum over all 
computations passing through your conscious state, or something 
similar. Consequently, if 'you' are duplicated in complete detail, 
then you have nothing more than yet another computation that passes 
through your conscious state, so there can be only one consciousness!


The fact that these duplicates might see different cities becomes 
irrelevant because other computations that pass through my current 
conscious state might correspond to computations relevant to other 
cities, universes, or whatever (physics is only the 'statistics' 
over such multiple computations). After the duplication, there is 
still only one consciousness, albeit in a divided body. So the one 
consciousness does see both cities at once. This possibility cannot 
be ruled out /a priori/ -- that might in fact be the result of such 
a duplication experiment. I think this is a question that can only 
be resolved empirically -- produce a person duplicating machine and 
see what happens!


Computationalism must entail that running the same computation twice 
necessarily produces (numerically) the same consciousness, so, 
despite what Bruno claims, entirely faithful duplication of a person 
does not produce another consciousness (or another 1-view from the 
3p perspective), 


It's not the duplication that is supposed to produce another person, 
it's the divergence of experiences, and perhaps also physics that is 
below or indirectly related conscious experience.  This is what makes 
you a different person from who you were in the past.


That is one of the paradoxical aspects of duplication -- the 
duplicates become different persons because of the divergence of 
experience. But, by the same token, their experiences differ from the 
original, so how come they can be said to be the same person as the 
original? 


They both remember being that person.

Personal identity through time seems to be related to psychological 
continuity; the two (divergent) duplicates are both psychologically 
continuous with the original, so both are the original person. 


I'm not sure what you mean by "psychological continuity".  I've argued 
that thoughts have a duration in time and they overlap, so they produce 
a continuum of experiences.  But this doesn't bridge concussions and 
anesthesia, and probably not duplication machines. Or do you mean 
something like "character" or "values" or "tendencies" that would 
presumably carry over to duplicates as do memories but are less explicit.


Such considerations led some, such as Parfit, to question whether 
personal identity was all that important, considering 'survival' to be 
a more significant consideration. Survival as in psychological 
continuity. So one could 'survive' as several. But then, is one 
psychologically continuous with oneself as a foetus?


Insofar as my fetal state had a psychology, I'd say yes.  It doesn't 
seem any more problematic than being continuous with my 50yr old self.




But I agree that it might not be the case empirically.  Bruno, based 
on his experimentation with salvia, seems to think there is some 
essence or soul of Bruno which is indepedent of his memories and 
hence of his past experience.  If it's independent of experience then 
it can't be bifurcated by experience.


That seems to be a perilously dualist position. Experience seems to be 
important to personhood.


But maybe not explicit memories.  If I suffered amnesia and didn't 
remember any of my past life, I would still retain many characteristics 
that would make me recognizable to my friends. These may derive from 
experience, but they would be encoded in the physics of my brain and 
wouldn't imply dualism.


Brent

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Re: Holiday Exercise

[Bruce Kellett]

On 29/07/2016 12:32 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:


On 7/28/2016 6:55 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 29/07/2016 5:56 am, John Clark wrote:


If
computationalism
​ is correct then everything about "you" can be duplicated as long 
at the atoms have the correct position and velocity, not almost 
everything, not everything except for the 1-view, EVERYTHING! If the 
machine can't do that then

computationalism
​ is wrong, ​but you can't just assume
computationalism
​ can't do something (like duplicate the 1-view pov) and then claim 
you've proven something about computationalism.


​Except that you have provided no evidence that it is not true, you 
just assume it's not true ( by assuming "

The duplicating machine never duplicates the 1-view from the 1-view pov
​ ") and then a few steps later claim to have proven something.​


That is an interesting point. If I have understood Bruno correctly, 
his claim is that by computationalism, 'you' are the sum over all 
computations passing through your conscious state, or something 
similar. Consequently, if 'you' are duplicated in complete detail, 
then you have nothing more than yet another computation that passes 
through your conscious state, so there can be only one consciousness!


The fact that these duplicates might see different cities becomes 
irrelevant because other computations that pass through my current 
conscious state might correspond to computations relevant to other 
cities, universes, or whatever (physics is only the 'statistics' over 
such multiple computations). After the duplication, there is still 
only one consciousness, albeit in a divided body. So the one 
consciousness does see both cities at once. This possibility cannot 
be ruled out /a priori/ -- that might in fact be the result of such a 
duplication experiment. I think this is a question that can only be 
resolved empirically -- produce a person duplicating machine and see 
what happens!


Computationalism must entail that running the same computation twice 
necessarily produces (numerically) the same consciousness, so, 
despite what Bruno claims, entirely faithful duplication of a person 
does not produce another consciousness (or another 1-view from the 3p 
perspective), 


It's not the duplication that is supposed to produce another person, 
it's the divergence of experiences, and perhaps also physics that is 
below or indirectly related conscious experience. This is what makes 
you a different person from who you were in the past.


That is one of the paradoxical aspects of duplication -- the duplicates 
become different persons because of the divergence of experience. But, 
by the same token, their experiences differ from the original, so how 
come they can be said to be the same person as the original? Personal 
identity through time seems to be related to psychological continuity; 
the two (divergent) duplicates are both psychologically continuous with 
the original, so both are the original person. Such considerations led 
some, such as Parfit, to question whether personal identity was all that 
important, considering 'survival' to be a more significant 
consideration. Survival as in psychological continuity. So one could 
'survive' as several. But then, is one psychologically continuous with 
oneself as a foetus?


But I agree that it might not be the case empirically.  Bruno, based 
on his experimentation with salvia, seems to think there is some 
essence or soul of Bruno which is indepedent of his memories and hence 
of his past experience.  If it's independent of experience then it 
can't be bifurcated by experience.


That seems to be a perilously dualist position. Experience seems to be 
important to personhood.


Bruce


Brent

it merely increases the chances that the one consciousness survives 
in an uncertain world. (The one consciousness may inhabit two 
physical bodies, but computationalism claims that it is the 
computation that constitutes consciousness, not the physical 
location, substrate, or number of copies of that computation.)


Bruce


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Re: Holiday Exercise

[Brent Meeker]

On 7/28/2016 6:55 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 29/07/2016 5:56 am, John Clark wrote:


If
computationalism
​ is correct then everything about "you" can be duplicated as long at 
the atoms have the correct position and velocity, not almost 
everything, not everything except for the 1-view, EVERYTHING! If the 
machine can't do that then

computationalism
​ is wrong, ​but you can't just assume
computationalism
​ can't do something (like duplicate the 1-view pov) and then claim 
you've proven something about computationalism.


​Except that you have provided no evidence that it is not true, you 
just assume it's not true ( by assuming "

The duplicating machine never duplicates the 1-view from the 1-view pov
​ ") and then a few steps later claim to have proven something.​


That is an interesting point. If I have understood Bruno correctly, 
his claim is that by computationalism, 'you' are the sum over all 
computations passing through your conscious state, or something 
similar. Consequently, if 'you' are duplicated in complete detail, 
then you have nothing more than yet another computation that passes 
through your conscious state, so there can be only one consciousness!


The fact that these duplicates might see different cities becomes 
irrelevant because other computations that pass through my current 
conscious state might correspond to computations relevant to other 
cities, universes, or whatever (physics is only the 'statistics' over 
such multiple computations). After the duplication, there is still 
only one consciousness, albeit in a divided body. So the one 
consciousness does see both cities at once. This possibility cannot be 
ruled out /a priori/ -- that might in fact be the result of such a 
duplication experiment. I think this is a question that can only be 
resolved empirically -- produce a person duplicating machine and see 
what happens!


Computationalism must entail that running the same computation twice 
necessarily produces (numerically) the same consciousness, so, despite 
what Bruno claims, entirely faithful duplication of a person does not 
produce another consciousness (or another 1-view from the 3p 
perspective), 


It's not the duplication that is supposed to produce another person, 
it's the divergence of experiences, and perhaps also physics that is 
below or indirectly related conscious experience.  This is what makes 
you a different person from who you were in the past.


But I agree that it might not be the case empirically.  Bruno, based on 
his experimentation with salvia, seems to think there is some essence or 
soul of Bruno which is indepedent of his memories and hence of his past 
experience.  If it's independent of experience then it can't be 
bifurcated by experience.


Brent

it merely increases the chances that the one consciousness survives in 
an uncertain world. (The one consciousness may inhabit two physical 
bodies, but computationalism claims that it is the computation that 
constitutes consciousness, not the physical location, substrate, or 
number of copies of that computation.)


Bruce


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Re: Holiday Exercise

[Bruce Kellett]

On 29/07/2016 5:56 am, John Clark wrote:


If
computationalism
​ is correct then everything about "you" can be duplicated as long at 
the atoms have the correct position and velocity, not almost 
everything, not everything except for the 1-view, EVERYTHING! If the 
machine can't do that then

computationalism
​ is wrong, ​but you can't just assume
computationalism
​ can't do something (like duplicate the 1-view pov) and then claim 
you've proven something about computationalism.


​Except that you have provided no evidence that it is not true, you 
just assume it's not true ( by assuming "

The duplicating machine never duplicates the 1-view from the 1-view pov
​ ") and then a few steps later claim to have proven something.​


That is an interesting point. If I have understood Bruno correctly, his 
claim is that by computationalism, 'you' are the sum over all 
computations passing through your conscious state, or something similar. 
Consequently, if 'you' are duplicated in complete detail, then you have 
nothing more than yet another computation that passes through your 
conscious state, so there can be only one consciousness!


The fact that these duplicates might see different cities becomes 
irrelevant because other computations that pass through my current 
conscious state might correspond to computations relevant to other 
cities, universes, or whatever (physics is only the 'statistics' over 
such multiple computations). After the duplication, there is still only 
one consciousness, albeit in a divided body. So the one consciousness 
does see both cities at once. This possibility cannot be ruled out /a 
priori/ -- that might in fact be the result of such a duplication 
experiment. I think this is a question that can only be resolved 
empirically -- produce a person duplicating machine and see what happens!


Computationalism must entail that running the same computation twice 
necessarily produces (numerically) the same consciousness, so, despite 
what Bruno claims, entirely faithful duplication of a person does not 
produce another consciousness (or another 1-view from the 3p 
perspective), it merely increases the chances that the one consciousness 
survives in an uncertain world. (The one consciousness may inhabit two 
physical bodies, but computationalism claims that it is the computation 
that constitutes consciousness, not the physical location, substrate, or 
number of copies of that computation.)


Bruce

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Re: musings on time

['Chris de Morsella' via Everything List]

  From: Bruno Marchal 
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
 Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2016 8:38 AM
 Subject: Re: musings on time
   

On 26 Jul 2016, at 19:59, 'cdemorse...@yahoo.com' via Everything List wrote:

      -- Original message--From: Bruno Marchal Date: Mon, 7/25/2016 
7:31 AM 
On 25 Jul 2016, at 01:45, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List wrote:

Hey it’s been a while… been following some discussions from time to time, 
lurking I guess….without further ado this is what I am musing on – today at 
least --  in the form of a poem.  Time a Musing  Time, this tapestry upon which 
the stories of the universe are written.This weave, spun from dancing 
kaleidoscope threadsGiving us our view of the world, but whose cloth, yet.. has 
always been.This chaotic wave of emerging reality sweeping all in the foamy 
curl of collapsing superposition.Fixing in time, becoming written, juxtaposed, 
interpolated, incorporatedIn the mind… reifying each moment just lived, (as it 
dawns on us) into our living stories, our edifices of memories, convictions, 
dreams, hopes and fears as well.  Each moment perceived an inner splash… with 
all the follow on repercussions!The private inner narrative of our minds -- 
that which we sense as being ourselves – itself emerges from this complex 
roiling sea of interactionsAppearing within us out from the mist of this 
reified stream of perceived instants, clanging about in the chatty electric 
circus of the brain, engaging in a loud shouting match with what just 
happened.Out of this noise of introspection, argument and emergent consensus, 
events become sown into ourselves, becoming assumed and adopted through 
interaction with our inner prisms.Our voice, speaking the narrative of our 
mind’s inner reflections on life… on time… is itself like an afterglow.Each 
moment becoming the next, gone before the experience of the former has 
happened… we are propelled forward in time.  Time itself may not exist 
(maybe?), but the experience of time very much does.Perhaps… it is our 
introspective theater of and reflection on our experience that, in the end, is 
the meaning and purpose of time itself.Time… how the universe engages in 
thinking about itself.    Cheers… and be nice to each other… from time to time.


Thank you Chris. Marvelous poem. It might use some implicitly physicalist 
formulations though but we can't comment a poem 'course:) Thank you Bruno... it 
was an afternoon's musing :)


Like it happens in hot summer holyday :)



I freely confess I have no certainty to know what underpins everything, whether 
it's on some level "turtles all the way down"... or instead, as I find more 
ethsetic, the quantum instability of nothing itself making everything probable! 

Unfortunately, the "nothing" of QM assumes a lot of thing, if not the whole of 
QM. Then, thanks to computationalism, we have some hope to understand where the 
QM assumptions are originating themselves from the elementary school math 
assumption. 
Agreed, there is much in terms of information already present in this 
nothing... and it is valid to ask where does all of this non-physical stuff 
(QM) arise from itself. 



 
Of course "time" and "experience of time" are very different. The first one is 
an "illusion" (in relativity theory, or GR), the second one can hardly be an 
illusion (a point of disagreement between me and ... salvia (!)). I also find 
it exceedingly hard to imagine a meaningful existence without causality! 

Without any causality? I can understand. Without physical causality, I guess it 
might be due to 1500 years of pseudo-religious brainwashing.We need some 
causality, but the implication relation in Turing-complete theories is quite 
enough. Deducitive relation are in the eyes' beholder.
Instead I feel that without causality we have no grip with which to identify 
our being with some specific MWI pathways, which give uniqueness & meaning to 
our identity... if all paths are taken instantaneously and in every instant I 
feel the ensuing experiential qualia would be a total blinding white out, which 
obliterates our self identity. We require information hiding (and can only ever 
witness the universe which manifests our given sequence of quantum choices) in 
order to not become overwhelmed by the sheer infinity of our fully realized 
self -- e.g. the "self" that experiences and encompasses all possible choices 
that are realized.


Of course, this is the today's topics: physical causality emerges from 
infinitely many simple arithmetical relations. We have to retrieve the physical 
causality appearances from them (by UDA, say), and that is not hard with 
computationalism, as computationalism shows the existence of an intrinsic 
notion of causality already represented or realized  in arithmetic.
Apology for commenting a poem :)
No worries... Poems can become better with comments... and some kinds of poems 
have no beginning and so also no end :)
Chris

Bruno

Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[John Clark]

On Thu, Jul 28, 2016 at 9:05 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:


> ​> ​
> there are two 3-1 "I",
>

​No idea what ​

​"​
two 3-1 "I"
​ " is ​
and very much doubt it is worth knowing.



> ​> ​
> Turing emulable telepathy.
>

​No idea what ​

​"
Turing emulable telepathy
​" is ​
and very much doubt it is worth knowing.

> ​>
>>> ​>>​
>>> ​The duplicating machine never duplicates the 1-views from the 1-view
>>> pov.
>>
>>
> ​
>> ​>> ​
>> Why on earth not?​
>
> ​> ​
> Because, by computationalism, the M-guy and the W-guy are both the H-guy,
>

​Yes, both are the H-guy, but they are not equal to each other.


> ​> ​
> but now living incompatible first person experience.
>

​Obviously if they see different things, like different cities,  then they
will have different experiences and diverge, but I'm talking about the
capabilities ​of the duplicating machine itself and you said "
The duplicating machine never duplicates the 1-views from the 1-view pov.
​"​
And why are they ​
incompatible first person experience
​? Because ​the
duplicating machine never duplicates the 1-views from the 1-view pov
​. ​And round and round we go, you're assume what you're trying to prove.

If
computationalism
​ is correct then everything about "you" can be duplicated as long at the
atoms have the correct position and velocity, not almost everything, not
everything except for the 1-view, EVERYTHING! If the machine can't do that
then
computationalism
​ is wrong, ​but you can't just assume
computationalism
​ can't do something (like duplicate the 1-view pov) and then claim you've
proven something about computationalism.


> ​>
>>> ​>>​
>>> It duplicates only the 1-view in the 3-1 view picture
>>
>>
> ​>> ​
>> This gets to the
>> ​very ​
>> key of the issue! If true then it's not a people duplicating machine,
>> there is something about consciousness that no arrangement of atoms can
>> produce
>
> ​> ​
> Very excellent. yes, that's true, and that anticipates step 7.
>

​Except that you have provided no evidence that it is not true, you just
assume it's not true ( by assuming "
The duplicating machine never duplicates the 1-view from the 1-view pov
​") and then a few steps later claim to have proven something.​

​>> ​
>> and computationalism is
>> ​
>> dead wrong.
>> ​ ​
>>
> ​> ​
> Why?
>

​
Because if
​ ​
computationalism
​ is right then the
 duplicating machine
*​CAN​*
 duplicate the 1-view from the 1-view pov
​, if it can't then ​
​
computationalism
​ is wrong. It's as simple as that.​


> ​> ​
> On the contrary, you just derive this correctly from computationalism, and
> "yes" consciousness is not something produced by any arrangement of atoms.
>

​No, you've derived this not from
computationalism
​ but from the assumption that ​
computationalism
​ is wrong, if you do that it's easy to reach the conclusion that no
arrangement of atoms can produce consciousness. I'm surprised it took you 7
steps, you must work slow.

​
>> ​>> ​
>> Yesterday in Helsinki the HW-guy couldn't know anything at all because
>> until H-guy saw Washington the HW-guy didn't exist.​
>> ​
>>
>  ​

​> ​
> Until I see the coin, the head and tail people don't exist either, and so
> you are saying that all probabilities never make sense. It is obviously
> ridiculous, and so you make my point, by a reduction of absurdum.

​Before the coin toss I can tell you exactly who I want to make a
prediction about the outcome but in your scenario you tell me, ​if it's not
the Helsinki Man ​then who on earth is it that you want to make a
prediction before the duplication about what's going to happen afterward?
If it's the Helsinki Man (who else could it be?) then the correct
prediction would be "the copy that sees Moscow will become the Moscow Man
and the copy that sees Washington will become the Washington Man". What
more is there to say? What more is there to predict?

 John K Clark

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Re: Holiday Exercise

[John Clark]

On Thu, Jul 28, 2016 at 8:44 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

​>
>>> ​>> ​
>>> ​
>>> "I" designates the M guy experience in Moscow, and  the W experience of
>>> the W-guy in W.
>>
>>
>> ​>> ​
>> ​I know, and that's why that personal pronoun is ambiguous ​
>>
>
> ​> ​
> Only because you forget the 1-3 difference.
>

​I'll tell you what John Clark didn't forget, what Bruno Marchal just said
"​
 "I" designates the M guy experience in Moscow, and the W experience of the
W-guy in W
​" and if that's true then the personal pronoun "I" is ambiguous with no
ifs ands or buts about it. ​And that ambiguity is the one and only reason
Bruno Marchal persists in using personal pronouns despite numerous requests
to stop. Ambiguous language is a friend of sloppy thinking.

​> ​
> There is nothing ambiguous, as you know in Helsinki that you will survive
> one and unique with a probability one.
>

John Clark thinks "you" will survive two and non-unique with a probability
one, ​

​but if Bruno Marchal is right and John Clark is wrong then which ONE
unique thing is it, Moscow or Washington? ​ If Bruno Marchal doesn't have a
one word answer to this question and can only come up with a paragraph full
of peepee and views and FPIs then the personal pronoun "I" is ambiguous.


> it can only be one 1-1 I in one city.
>

​No idea what a "1-1 I" is and very much doubt it is worth knowing.

 John K Clark


>

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Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[Bruno Marchal]

On 28 Jul 2016, at 01:12, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Jul 27, 2016 at 11:23 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:
​>​>>​ ​In the 1-view, which remain both unique from the 1- 
view.


​>> ​​Then which one has​​  ​THE UNIQUE 1-view, the  
Moscow man or the Washington ​man?

​> ​Both, from the 1-p views,

​How on earth can both have THE 1-p view, or have anything else for  
that matter, if that thing is UNIQUE?   ​


Because there are two 3-1 "I", but they don't add to make some super-I  
present simultaneously in two cities, unless you add non Turing  
emulable telepathy.


So, they will both live a different 1p experience, and as the giy in  
Helsinki knew that in advance, "The" unique experience that he *will*  
live is just indeterminate. The best prediction is thus "W v M" and  
both confirm this when looking in their diaries. In W, the W-guy see  
in his diary "W v M", and he sees W, and so get the confirmation.  
Similarly in M. All you need is to read the definition of the 1 and 3  
views, and do the very simple math.











​>> ​​everybody involved​ K​new everything so nobody was  
surprised by any of events after the events that transpired after  
duplication so nobody learned anything new.


​> ​Wrong, both learns which cities they are in,

I just saw a black cat.
I have become The Black Cat Seeing Man.
Why am I The Black Cat Seeing Man and not The White Cat Seeing Man?
Because I just saw a black cat.

I just saw Moscow.
I have become the Moscow Seeing Man.
Why am I the Moscow Seeing Man and not the Washington Seeing Man?
Because I just saw Moscow.



Excellent. But in our case, that guy remembers also what he wrote in  
Helsinki, and so can confirm "W v M", and refute "W & M", and "M",  
etc. same for the M-guy.




​> ​and both knows that they could never have guess this.

This? It's true Neither the Washington Man nor the Moscow Man could  
have guessed "this", and they couldn't have guessed anything else  
either because before the duplication neither the Washington Man nor  
the Moscow man even existed.



That is just utterly ridiculous. You could say that when we throw a  
coin, there is no probability of outcome, because the guy having  
thrown the coin does not exist.






However the Helsinki Man could most certainly have predicted that  
the copy of himself who saw Moscow would become the Moscow Man and  
the copy of himself who saw Washington would become the Washington  
Man.  What else is there to predict? What is "this"?


The passage from the 3-1 description ("the copy of himself who saw  
Moscow would become the Moscow Man and the copy of himself who saw  
Washington would become the Washington Man"), to the specific W, or M  
experience that the H-guy is now actually living. The point is that  
both confirm the "W v M but I don't know which one" written in the  
diary.









​> ​The H-guy says there is 100% chance he will see M. Then the W- 
guy refutes this,


​Yesterday somebody predicted that today a male would see Moscow.


To which he is specially related, as we have agreed that the M-guy and  
the W-guy keep intact their H-guy identity.



I am a male and yet today I don't see Moscow. Therefore the  
prediction has been refuted and no male saw Moscow today. ​ ​


Answering a fuzzy version of the thought experience can hardly bring  
clarity to your point.







​> ​The duplicating machine never duplicates the 1-views from the  
1-view pov.


​Why on earth not?​


Because, by computationalism, the M-guy and the W-guy are both the H- 
guy, but now living incompatible first person experience.







​> ​It duplicates only the 1-view in the 3-1 view picture

This gets to the ​very ​key of the issue! If true then it's not a  
people duplicating machine, there is something about consciousness  
that no arrangement of atoms can produce



Very excellent. yes, that's true, and that anticipates step 7.





and computationalism is​ dead wrong.​ ​


Why? On the contrary, you just derive this correctly from  
computationalism, and "yes" consciousness is not something produced by  
any arrangement of atoms. the arrangement of the atoms is just a way  
for that consciousness to manifest itself in some place in the  
relative and indexical way.





​> ​The W guy has tto write W in his diary, and that is something  
he (the HW-guy) could never have known in advance


​Yesterday in Helsinki the HW-guy couldn't know anything at all  
because until H-guy saw Washington the HW-guy didn't exist.​ ​


Until I see the coin, the head and tail people don't exist either, and  
so you are saying that all probabilities never make sense. It is  
obviously ridiculous, and so you make my point, by a reduction of  
absurdum.


QED.

Bruno







​ ​John K Clark ​




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Re: Holiday Exercise

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 Jul 2016, at 18:59, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Jul 27, 2016 at 11:06 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


​> ​"I" designates the M guy experience in Moscow, and  the W  
experience of the W-guy in W.


​I know, and that's why that personal pronoun is ambiguous ​


Only because you forget the 1-3 difference. There is nothing  
ambiguous, as you know in Helsinki that you will survive one and  
unique with a probability one. So the 3-1 you will be in both places,  
and the 1-1 you will be one and unique in both places, and so the 1-1  
you will be either in Washington, or in Moscow.





and that's why any "question" containing such a word is not a  
question at all, it's gibberish with a question mark. If "I" ​  
designates the M guy experience in Moscow​ AND "I" ​also  
designates the ​Washington​ guy experience in​ Washington then  
asking what one and only one thing "I" in Helsinki will do after "I"  
step into a "I" duplicating machine is just ridiculous, and  
assigning probabilities to those actions is just asinine.



Not at all, as both copies will always confirmed as explained in the  
preceding posts. It became gibberish only because you forgot that in  
Helsinki, you know in advance that whatever you will feel to become,  
it can only be one 1-1 I in one city. The 1-3 difference transforms  
the ambiguity into an indeterminacy.


Bruno






 John K Clark







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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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