On 29/07/2016 2:42 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 7/28/2016 9:20 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/07/2016 12:32 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 7/28/2016 6:55 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/07/2016 5:56 am, John Clark wrote:
If
computationalism
is correct then everything about "you" can be duplicated as long
at the atoms have the correct position and velocity, not almost
everything, not everything except for the 1-view, EVERYTHING! If
the machine can't do that then
computationalism
is wrong, but you can't just assume
computationalism
can't do something (like duplicate the 1-view pov) and then
claim you've proven something about computationalism.
Except that you have provided no evidence that it is not true,
you just assume it's not true ( by assuming "
The duplicating machine never duplicates the 1-view from the
1-view pov
") and then a few steps later claim to have proven something.
That is an interesting point. If I have understood Bruno correctly,
his claim is that by computationalism, 'you' are the sum over all
computations passing through your conscious state, or something
similar. Consequently, if 'you' are duplicated in complete detail,
then you have nothing more than yet another computation that passes
through your conscious state, so there can be only one consciousness!
The fact that these duplicates might see different cities becomes
irrelevant because other computations that pass through my current
conscious state might correspond to computations relevant to other
cities, universes, or whatever (physics is only the 'statistics'
over such multiple computations). After the duplication, there is
still only one consciousness, albeit in a divided body. So the one
consciousness does see both cities at once. This possibility cannot
be ruled out /a priori/ -- that might in fact be the result of such
a duplication experiment. I think this is a question that can only
be resolved empirically -- produce a person duplicating machine and
see what happens!
Computationalism must entail that running the same computation
twice necessarily produces (numerically) the same consciousness,
so, despite what Bruno claims, entirely faithful duplication of a
person does not produce another consciousness (or another 1-view
from the 3p perspective),
It's not the duplication that is supposed to produce another person,
it's the divergence of experiences, and perhaps also physics that is
below or indirectly related conscious experience. This is what
makes you a different person from who you were in the past.
That is one of the paradoxical aspects of duplication -- the
duplicates become different persons because of the divergence of
experience. But, by the same token, their experiences differ from the
original, so how come they can be said to be the same person as the
original?
They both remember being that person.
Sure, and if that is your sole criterion of identity, they are still the
one person.
Personal identity through time seems to be related to psychological
continuity; the two (divergent) duplicates are both psychologically
continuous with the original, so both are the original person.
I'm not sure what you mean by "psychological continuity". I've argued
that thoughts have a duration in time and they overlap, so they
produce a continuum of experiences. But this doesn't bridge
concussions and anesthesia, and probably not duplication machines. Or
do you mean something like "character" or "values" or "tendencies"
that would presumably carry over to duplicates as do memories but are
less explicit.
Psychological continuity means that one can find a series of overlapping
periods between which the changes in memories, character, values,
desires, and so on, change in a regular and explicable way. During
periods of unconsciousness, these psychological characteristics may not
change at all, or if they do change, they change in explicable ways.
The problem with psychological continuity as a criterion of identity is
that it is not a one-one relation (it is not transitive). Parfit argues
that psychological continuity a ground for speaking of identity when it
is one-one. If it took a one-many or branching form, then Parfit argues
that we have to abandon the language of identity. "If psychology took a
branching form, no coherent set of judgements of identity could
correspond to, and thus be used to imply, the branching form of this
relation."
Such considerations led some, such as Parfit, to question whether
personal identity was all that important, considering 'survival' to
be a more significant consideration. Survival as in psychological
continuity. So one could 'survive' as several. But then, is one
psychologically continuous with oneself as a foetus?
Insofar as my fetal state had a psychology, I'd say yes. It doesn't
seem any more problematic than being continuous with my 50yr old self.
Or your 70 yo. self reduced to a vegetative state?
But I agree that it might not be the case empirically. Bruno, based
on his experimentation with salvia, seems to think there is some
essence or soul of Bruno which is indepedent of his memories and
hence of his past experience. If it's independent of experience then
it can't be bifurcated by experience.
That seems to be a perilously dualist position. Experience seems to
be important to personhood.
But maybe not explicit memories. If I suffered amnesia and didn't
remember any of my past life, I would still retain many
characteristics that would make me recognizable to my friends. These
may derive from experience, but they would be encoded in the physics
of my brain and wouldn't imply dualism.
No, but it does imply that memories are only one of the many dimensions
that are important in defining the self, or in determining personal
identity. Is physical continuity one of the other important dimensions?
Bruce
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