On 7/28/2016 9:20 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/07/2016 12:32 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 7/28/2016 6:55 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/07/2016 5:56 am, John Clark wrote:
If
computationalism
is correct then everything about "you" can be duplicated as long
at the atoms have the correct position and velocity, not almost
everything, not everything except for the 1-view, EVERYTHING! If
the machine can't do that then
computationalism
is wrong, but you can't just assume
computationalism
can't do something (like duplicate the 1-view pov) and then claim
you've proven something about computationalism.
Except that you have provided no evidence that it is not true, you
just assume it's not true ( by assuming "
The duplicating machine never duplicates the 1-view from the 1-view
pov
") and then a few steps later claim to have proven something.
That is an interesting point. If I have understood Bruno correctly,
his claim is that by computationalism, 'you' are the sum over all
computations passing through your conscious state, or something
similar. Consequently, if 'you' are duplicated in complete detail,
then you have nothing more than yet another computation that passes
through your conscious state, so there can be only one consciousness!
The fact that these duplicates might see different cities becomes
irrelevant because other computations that pass through my current
conscious state might correspond to computations relevant to other
cities, universes, or whatever (physics is only the 'statistics'
over such multiple computations). After the duplication, there is
still only one consciousness, albeit in a divided body. So the one
consciousness does see both cities at once. This possibility cannot
be ruled out /a priori/ -- that might in fact be the result of such
a duplication experiment. I think this is a question that can only
be resolved empirically -- produce a person duplicating machine and
see what happens!
Computationalism must entail that running the same computation twice
necessarily produces (numerically) the same consciousness, so,
despite what Bruno claims, entirely faithful duplication of a person
does not produce another consciousness (or another 1-view from the
3p perspective),
It's not the duplication that is supposed to produce another person,
it's the divergence of experiences, and perhaps also physics that is
below or indirectly related conscious experience. This is what makes
you a different person from who you were in the past.
That is one of the paradoxical aspects of duplication -- the
duplicates become different persons because of the divergence of
experience. But, by the same token, their experiences differ from the
original, so how come they can be said to be the same person as the
original?
They both remember being that person.
Personal identity through time seems to be related to psychological
continuity; the two (divergent) duplicates are both psychologically
continuous with the original, so both are the original person.
I'm not sure what you mean by "psychological continuity". I've argued
that thoughts have a duration in time and they overlap, so they produce
a continuum of experiences. But this doesn't bridge concussions and
anesthesia, and probably not duplication machines. Or do you mean
something like "character" or "values" or "tendencies" that would
presumably carry over to duplicates as do memories but are less explicit.
Such considerations led some, such as Parfit, to question whether
personal identity was all that important, considering 'survival' to be
a more significant consideration. Survival as in psychological
continuity. So one could 'survive' as several. But then, is one
psychologically continuous with oneself as a foetus?
Insofar as my fetal state had a psychology, I'd say yes. It doesn't
seem any more problematic than being continuous with my 50yr old self.
But I agree that it might not be the case empirically. Bruno, based
on his experimentation with salvia, seems to think there is some
essence or soul of Bruno which is indepedent of his memories and
hence of his past experience. If it's independent of experience then
it can't be bifurcated by experience.
That seems to be a perilously dualist position. Experience seems to be
important to personhood.
But maybe not explicit memories. If I suffered amnesia and didn't
remember any of my past life, I would still retain many characteristics
that would make me recognizable to my friends. These may derive from
experience, but they would be encoded in the physics of my brain and
wouldn't imply dualism.
Brent
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