Re: Entanglement

[agrayson2000]

On Saturday, June 9, 2018 at 12:22:40 AM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>
> From: >
>
>
> On Friday, June 8, 2018 at 12:55:13 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>
> The Schrödinger equation merely gives the time evolution of the system. To 
> define the problem you have to specify a wave function. It is in the 
> expansion of this wave function in terms of a set of possible eigenvalues 
> that the preferred basis problem arises. So it is not really down to the SE 
> itself, it is a matter for the wave function. Each expansion basis defines 
> a set of worlds, and all bases give different worlds.
>
>
>
> * If we measure E, aren't we defacto measuring p, since the two 
> observables are related by a simple mathematical expression? Yet you assert 
> they represent different worlds. Is this because the measuring apparatus 
> differs if the observable are different? AG *
>
>
> Measuring E or p can be related, as for a photon, or unrelated, as for a 
> measurement of the energy levels of a molecule. But in either case, there 
> are an infinite number of possible bases in which to express the energy or 
> momentum of a state. These are the different worlds to which I am referring 
> -- the difference between an energy or a momentum measurement is not 
> relevant in this context.
>





*I don't follow. What is the distinguishing feature of worlds created by 
measuring E and p? Isn't what is measured, distinguishes worlds, which are 
allegedly copied under the assumption that what could have been measured in 
this world, but were not, were measured in some identical copy?On the other 
issue, if you find a cat alive and dead simultaneously absurd (or 
fallacious), why is it any less absurd (or fallacious) if it happens for 
only a short time, until decoherence occurs? And if you find Many Worlds 
absurd (or fallacious) on multiple grounds, why do you affirm it when it's 
implied by decoherence superpositions?AG*


That is correct, but the choice of the basis don’t change the relative 
“proportion of histories”.


The choice of basis makes all the difference in the world. Now that we 
understand decoherence, the only bases that are useful are those that are 
robust against environmental decoherence. That is why we don't see 
superpositions of live and dead cats -- that superposition base is not 
robust.

*You seem to be regressing, or shall we say relapsing into the fallacy. 
ISTM you have previously acknowledged that we don't see superpositions of 
live and dead cats because of the fallacy of including macro entities in a 
superposition -- which is what Edwin was trying to warn us against. Nothing 
to do about robustness against environmental decoherence, which assumes an 
actual superposition exists for some short duration. CMIIAW. AG*


Are you trolling? Who claimed that having macrosopic entities in a 
superposition was a fallacy? Such superpositions are generally very short 
lived because of decoherence, but they can certainly be formed. The basis 
which would described such macrosopic superpositions is not robust against 
decoherence -- which is all that I have ever claimed.

Bruce

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Re: Entanglement

[agrayson2000]

On Saturday, June 9, 2018 at 1:52:21 AM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>
> From:  
>
>
> On Saturday, June 9, 2018 at 12:22:40 AM UTC, Bruce wrote: 
>>
>>
>> Are you trolling? Who claimed that having macrosopic entities in a 
>> superposition was a fallacy? 
>>
>
> *Edwin Schrodinger. AG*
>
>
> Schrödinger thought it was an absurdity, not a fallacy because he saw it 
> as a consequence of his wave equation. But decoherence theory remove the 
> absurdity.
>
> Bruce
>

*And the distinction between Absurdity and Fallacy is what? You used macro 
superpositions in decoherence theory and what did you get? Copies of 
worlds! I rest my case. AG*

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Re: Entanglement

[agrayson2000]

On Saturday, June 9, 2018 at 1:52:21 AM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>
> From:  
>
>
> On Saturday, June 9, 2018 at 12:22:40 AM UTC, Bruce wrote: 
>>
>>
>> Are you trolling? Who claimed that having macrosopic entities in a 
>> superposition was a fallacy? 
>>
>
> *Edwin Schrodinger. AG*
>
>
> Schrödinger thought it was an absurdity, not a fallacy because he saw it 
> as a consequence of his wave equation. But decoherence theory remove the 
> absurdity.
>
> Bruce
>

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Re: Entanglement

[Bruce Kellett]

From: mailto:agrayson2...@gmail.com>


On Saturday, June 9, 2018 at 12:22:40 AM UTC, Bruce wrote:


Are you trolling? Who claimed that having macrosopic entities in a
superposition was a fallacy?


*Edwin Schrodinger. AG*


Schrödinger thought it was an absurdity, not a fallacy because he saw it 
as a consequence of his wave equation. But decoherence theory remove the 
absurdity.


Bruce

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Re: Entanglement

[agrayson2000]

On Saturday, June 9, 2018 at 12:22:40 AM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>
> From: >
>
>
> On Friday, June 8, 2018 at 12:55:13 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>
> The Schrödinger equation merely gives the time evolution of the system. To 
> define the problem you have to specify a wave function. It is in the 
> expansion of this wave function in terms of a set of possible eigenvalues 
> that the preferred basis problem arises. So it is not really down to the SE 
> itself, it is a matter for the wave function. Each expansion basis defines 
> a set of worlds, and all bases give different worlds.
>
>
>
> * If we measure E, aren't we defacto measuring p, since the two 
> observables are related by a simple mathematical expression? Yet you assert 
> they represent different worlds. Is this because the measuring apparatus 
> differs if the observable are different? AG *
>
>
> Measuring E or p can be related, as for a photon, or unrelated, as for a 
> measurement of the energy levels of a molecule. But in either case, there 
> are an infinite number of possible bases in which to express the energy or 
> momentum of a state. These are the different worlds to which I am referring 
> -- the difference between an energy or a momentum measurement is not 
> relevant in this context.
>
>
> That is correct, but the choice of the basis don’t change the relative 
> “proportion of histories”.
>
>
> The choice of basis makes all the difference in the world. Now that we 
> understand decoherence, the only bases that are useful are those that are 
> robust against environmental decoherence. That is why we don't see 
> superpositions of live and dead cats -- that superposition base is not 
> robust.
>
> *You seem to be regressing, or shall we say relapsing into the fallacy. 
> ISTM you have previously acknowledged that we don't see superpositions of 
> live and dead cats because of the fallacy of including macro entities in a 
> superposition -- which is what Edwin was trying to warn us against. Nothing 
> to do about robustness against environmental decoherence, which assumes an 
> actual superposition exists for some short duration. CMIIAW. AG*
>
>
> Are you trolling? Who claimed that having macrosopic entities in a 
> superposition was a fallacy? 
>

*Edwin Schrodinger. AG*
 

> Such superpositions are generally very short lived because of decoherence, 
> but they can certainly be formed. The basis which would described such 
> macrosopic superpositions is not robust against decoherence -- which is all 
> that I have ever claimed.
>
> Bruce
>
>

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Re: Entanglement

[Bruce Kellett]

From: mailto:agrayson2...@gmail.com>>


On Friday, June 8, 2018 at 12:55:13 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
The Schrödinger equation merely gives the time evolution of the 
system. To define the problem you have to specify a wave function. 
It is in the expansion of this wave function in terms of a set of 
possible eigenvalues that the preferred basis problem arises. So it 
is not really down to the SE itself, it is a matter for the wave 
function. Each expansion basis defines a set of worlds, and all 
bases give different worlds.

*
If we measure E, aren't we defacto measuring p, since the two 
observables are related by a simple mathematical expression? Yet you 
assert they represent different worlds. Is this because the measuring 
apparatus differs if the observable are different? AG

*


Measuring E or p can be related, as for a photon, or unrelated, as for a 
measurement of the energy levels of a molecule. But in either case, 
there are an infinite number of possible bases in which to express the 
energy or momentum of a state. These are the different worlds to which I 
am referring -- the difference between an energy or a momentum 
measurement is not relevant in this context.




That is correct, but the choice of the basis don’t change the 
relative “proportion of histories”.


The choice of basis makes all the difference in the world. Now 
that we understand decoherence, the only bases that are useful are 
those that are robust against environmental decoherence. That is why 
we don't see superpositions of live and dead cats -- that 
superposition base is not robust.


*You seem to be regressing, or shall we say relapsing into the 
fallacy. ISTM you have previously acknowledged that we don't see 
superpositions of live and dead cats because of the fallacy of 
including macro entities in a superposition -- which is what Edwin was 
trying to warn us against. Nothing to do about robustness against 
environmental decoherence, which assumes an actual superposition 
exists for some short duration. CMIIAW. AG*


Are you trolling? Who claimed that having macrosopic entities in a 
superposition was a fallacy? Such superpositions are generally very 
short lived because of decoherence, but they can certainly be formed. 
The basis which would described such macrosopic superpositions is not 
robust against decoherence -- which is all that I have ever claimed.


Bruce

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Re: Classical E&M vs Quantum E&M (QED)

[agrayson2000]

On Sunday, June 3, 2018 at 2:28:24 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
> What are the main unsolved problems in classical E&M? Are they solved in 
> quantum E&M (aka QED)? TIA, AG
>

Does a moving electron, say, interact with the field it creates? Has this 
problem been solved? TIA, AG 

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Re: Entanglement

[agrayson2000]

On Friday, June 8, 2018 at 12:55:13 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>
> From: *Bruno Marchal* >
>
> On 8 Jun 2018, at 02:32, Bruce Kellett < 
> bhke...@optusnet.com.au > wrote:
>
>
> The SWE does not give a preferred basis. Basing MWI on the Schrödinger 
> equation runs into the basis problem. Few MWI advocates actually take this 
> seriously. And they should.
>
>
> The relative proportion of histories do not depend on the choice of the 
> base, so the base we use are chosen endemically, like the present moment 
> for example, in the whole of physics. Obviously, we needs brain to assess 
> our results and communicating, and some works, like sure and others, 
> justify the indexical importance of the position base, with respect to the 
> branch where intelligence can develop.
>
>
> What on earth are you talking about? The position basis is not 
> well-defined either. The Hilbert space corresponding to the position 
> operator X has an infinite number of possible bases -- just like any other 
> Hilbert space. Any linear vector space has an infinite number of possible 
> bases. How do you choose which one you are going to use? Talking about the 
> relative proportion of histories sounds just like the long-since refuted 
> branch counting approach to probabilities. And the probabilities for 
> various outcomes most certainly depend on the chosen base, as do the 
> outcomes themselves.
>

 

* In this situation, what is the role of the SWE since the wf is usually 
asserted without any reference to it? Now consider a general case where the 
wf for a system is determined using the SWE. Since the solution can be 
expanded using difference bases, say E or p, does each possible expansion, 
each implying a different possible set of measurements, imply a different 
set of worlds using the SWE? TIA, AG*


The Schrödinger equation merely gives the time evolution of the system. To 
define the problem you have to specify a wave function. It is in the 
expansion of this wave function in terms of a set of possible eigenvalues 
that the preferred basis problem arises. So it is not really down to the SE 
itself, it is a matter for the wave function. Each expansion basis defines 
a set of worlds, and all bases give different worlds.



*If we measure E, aren't we defacto measuring p, since the two observables 
are related by a simple mathematical expression? Yet you assert they 
represent different worlds. Is this because the measuring apparatus differs 
if the observable are different? AG *


That is correct, but the choice of the basis don’t change the relative 
“proportion of histories”.


The choice of basis makes all the difference in the world. Now that we 
understand decoherence, the only bases that are useful are those that are 
robust against environmental decoherence. That is why we don't see 
superpositions of live and dead cats -- that superposition base is not 
robust.


*You seem to be regressing, or shall we say relapsing into the fallacy. 
ISTM you have previously acknowledged that we don't see superpositions of 
live and dead cats because of the fallacy of including macro entities in a 
superposition -- which is what Edwin was trying to warn us against. Nothing 
to do about robustness against environmental decoherence, which assumes an 
actual superposition exists for some short duration. CMIIAW. AG *

It threats only the naïve conception of “worlds”, which has led to the 
works of Griffith and Omnes (and Gel Mann & Hartle). That works remains 
still a bit naïve with respect of the type of histories we can encounter in 
arithmetic.


The consistent histories approach is just another way of considering many 
worlds. The histories are no more unique than are the worlds.

Bruce

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Re: Entanglement

[agrayson2000]

On Friday, June 8, 2018 at 12:06:33 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 8 Jun 2018, at 03:30, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
> On Thursday, June 7, 2018 at 9:07:37 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> [snip]
>
> *   So consciousness anticipates all quantum experiment that MIGHT 
> occur in the future, *
>
> The arithmetical relations do that. Consciousness only select the histories
>
> *and creates those worlds in anticipation? Now we're really 
> getting deep into woo-woo territory.*
>
> On the contrary, we explain how the quantum physical illusion arise from 
> all computations which are already realised in the block-mindspace given by 
> very elementary arithmetic, that we never leave.
>
> Here are all my assumptions: classical logic + the axioms of arithmetic 
> (“s” is intended to denote the successor function x+1):
>
> *  Please describe ambiguous (for me) symbols,  AG*
>
>
> OK.
>
>
>
>
> 0 ≠ s(x)OK
> s(x) = s(y) -> x = yOK
> x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))?
>
>
> A natural number is either null, or has a predecessor. Read “Ex” by it 
> exists a number x such that ...
>
>
>
>
> x+0 = xOK
> x+s(y) = s(x+y) OK
> x*0=0?   *Does * mean multiplication? AG*
>
>
> Yes. “x” looks to much like the variable x. 
>
>
>
> x*s(y)=(x*y)+x?
>
>
> x multiplied by the successor of y gives the same as x * y + x. Exemple 6 
> * 4 = (6 * 3) + 6.
>
>
> I use mechanism only to help people that this has to be a theory of 
> everything. It explains very well consciousness (I think), and matter (as 
> confirmed up to now).
>
> *What is the first step from these postulates, to anything? I mean 
> anything. What is mechanism? *
>
>
> Mechanism is the hypothesis that our body is a machine, or a natural 
> machine-like entity. (It has been discussed in the antic China, India and 
> greek philosopher/theologians. But you need to wait Descartes and Diderot 
> to see it coming back, but, notably with Diderot, also its use by 
> materialists to hide the mind-body problem.
>
> Digital Mechanism as I use it in this list, is slightly more precise. The 
> notion of digital machine is the notion of Emil Post, Alonzo Church, Alan 
> Turing, and best explained by Stephen Kleene in his papers and book, 
> notably his “Introduction to Metamathematics” (1952). 
> Just ask me, and I gave more on this … after the June exams, as my 
> scheduling get tighter and tighter those days.
>
> *Why do we need these postulate to fix anything? *
>
>
> My goal was to reformulate the mind-body problem in the frame of the 
> Mechanist hypothesis in the cognitive science/philosophy-o-mind/theology.
> Unfortunately I have been asked to solve it, which I did, but that 
> requires some familiarity with Mathematical Logic, which is not well taught.
> Also, the solution is disliked by the “religious” materialists, and I have 
> underestimate the number of those in some academical circles, and their 
> influence (I got a price for my PhD which has disappears without 
> explanation, just to give one example …).
>



*What happened with your Ph'D? Are you associated with a university? Which 
one? Just curious. AG *

> *What is the problem you're trying to fix? *
>
>
> The mind-body problem. How a grey brain can create a color perception, for 
> example. 
>



*Unsolved IMO, Not a trivial problem. AG *

> But it is more deep than that, as eventually, Mechanism is shown 
> incompatible with materialism and/or physicalism, which is the actual 
> paradigm in most metaphysics and theologies.
>

*What is Materialism? If Mechanism is as you defined above -- that the body 
is a machine or like a machine -- why is it incompatible with materialism? 
AG*

> *How can these postulates explain consciousness? TIA, AG*
>
>
> Eventually by the logics of self-reference discovered by Gödel and Löb in 
> arithmetic, and axiomatised completely (at the propositional level) by 
> Solovay. 
>
> If you agree that for a conscious being, consciousness is true, non 
> doubtable, but also non provable and non definable, then it is long but not 
> difficult to show that all universal machine (in the sense of Church …) can 
> introspect itself (in the sense provided by Gödel), and discover some thing 
> obeying to those axiomatic description of consciousness. 99% of 
> consciousness is explained, + an explanation why the last 1% has to be felt 
> by the machine as utterly not explainable. 
>


*Introspection -- the great unsolved problem. I have difficulty giving you 
the benefit of the doubt if you believe in a silly theory such as the MWI. 
AG *

>
> More on this later, perhaps.
>
> Bruno 
>

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Re: Primary matter

[John Clark]

On Fri, Jun 8, 2018 at 6:49 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

​
>> ​>> ​
>> Here? Where? You said there were many improvements in theology between
>> 500BC and 500AD and I asked for examples, and for the second time you were
>> unable to provide a single one. ​
>
>
> ​>* ​*
> *I provided them; already twice in this thread. You are simply lying here.
> I gave the references.*
>

You provided a list of people, you did not provide one single example of an
improvement in theology made between 500BC and 500AD . Not one.

​>> ​
>> ​Be specific! What improvement in theology are you referring to? ​
>
>
> *​> ​This who led to the first of mathematics, physics,  up to
> mathematical logic.*
>

I don't care who led what, and neither physics nor mathematical logic is
religion.  I asked 3 times but you did not provide one single example of an
improvement in theology between 500BC and 500AD . Not one.


> ​> ​
> *I gave the references, just read them.*
>

So you don't know of an example of a improvement in theology  made between
500BC and 500AD but for some unspecified reason you believe there may be
such a example somewhere in some book and you want me to try to find one.
Bruno, is that really the best you can do? If it was reversed and I had
said something like that in our debates would it have convince you that I
was right? If so I could have saved a lot of time by just writing “some
book shows that you are wrong”
​ over and over.​


​ ​
John K Clark

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Re: Is the Continuum Hypothesis a) really true or really false, or b) something else ?

[John Clark]

On Fri, Jun 8, 2018 at 6:41 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

​>>​
>> Today "you" means the man who is currently experiencing H, tomorrow "you"
>> means the man who is currently experiencing W and remembers experiencing H
>> yesterday; and tomorrow "you" also means the man who is currently
>> experiencing M and remembers experiencing H yesterday. And please don't
>> rebut with your standard "from the 1p" rubber stamp reply unless it is made
>> clear which "THE 1p" is being referred to.
>
>
> *​>​That is simply not true. The first person “I” means always the H-guy,*
>

​OK, but what do you mean by "the H-guy"? I can tell you exactly what I
mean by "the H-guy", somebody who remembers being in Helsinki yesterday.
Can you be as precise?

> ​>>
>>> ​>>​
>>> ​
>>> so which ONE is Mr. You??
>>
>>
>> *​>​>>​ ​If I could answer that question, there would, of course, no be
>> any first person indeterminacy. *
>>
>
> ​
> ​>>​
> If Bruno can not answer that question then Bruno has absolutely no
> business ever using the word "you" in any thought experiment and all the
> grand sounding term "
> first person indeterminacy
> ​" means is that gibberish questions have no answers.   ​
>
> *​>​No, you are only setting up a trap. If I could answer your question in
> one word, then and only then the first person indeterminacy would be
> gibberish. *
>

​So in a world that contains people duplicating machines Bruno is unable to
say what the personal pronoun "You" means, therefore in Brunospeak we could
replace the question "what will you see?" with "what will flobkneegob see?"
because both "you" and "flobkneegob" have exactly the same meaning in
Bruno's native language, and that would be none at all.

​
>> ​>>​
>> What the M-guy says or doesn't say is irrelevant.
>
>
> *​>​Why?*
>

​Because if the W-guy is seeing Washington, and if the W-guy remembers
being the H-guy yesterday, and if "the H-guy" means remembering being in
Helsinki yesterday, then that's the end of the story; the H-guy ended up
seeing Washington just as I predicted. The fact that the M-guy (who is also
the H-guy) saw something different will not change what the W-guy is seeing
right now nor what he remembers seeing yesterday. And if something is
copied that means there are 2 of them, and there is nothing contradictory
about 2 things seeing 2 things.

John K Clark

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Re: Entanglement

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 8 Jun 2018, at 14:55, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>>> On 8 Jun 2018, at 02:32, Bruce Kellett < 
>>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au 
>>> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> The SWE does not give a preferred basis. Basing MWI on the Schrödinger 
>>> equation runs into the basis problem. Few MWI advocates actually take this 
>>> seriously. And they should.
>> 
>> The relative proportion of histories do not depend on the choice of the 
>> base, so the base we use are chosen endemically, like the present moment for 
>> example, in the whole of physics. Obviously, we needs brain to assess our 
>> results and communicating, and some works, like sure and others, justify the 
>> indexical importance of the position base, with respect to the branch where 
>> intelligence can develop.
> 
> What on earth are you talking about? The position basis is not well-defined 
> either. The Hilbert space corresponding to the position operator X has an 
> infinite number of possible bases -- just like any other Hilbert space. Any 
> linear vector space has an infinite number of possible bases. How do you 
> choose which one you are going to use? Talking about the relative proportion 
> of histories sounds just like the long-since refuted branch counting approach 
> to probabilities.

Measure is quite different from counting.


> And the probabilities for various outcomes most certainly depend on the 
> chosen base, as do the outcomes themselves.

Well, we can use what we call in French “le peigne de Dirac”. To make that 
precise Laurent Schwartz has invented the theory of distribution. I simplify 
things here. Consider that space has been quantised, like in Loop-Gravity or 
something. Here, you do a 1004 fallacy, with respect to the goal (helping 
Grayson to have an idea of what is QM-without-collapse).



> 
> 
> 
 In this situation, what is the role of the SWE since the wf is usually 
 asserted without any reference to it? Now consider a general case where 
 the wf for a system is determined using the SWE. Since the solution can be 
 expanded using difference bases, say E or p, does each possible expansion, 
 each implying a different possible set of measurements, imply a different 
 set of worlds using the SWE? TIA, AG
>>> 
>>> The Schrödinger equation merely gives the time evolution of the system. To 
>>> define the problem you have to specify a wave function. It is in the 
>>> expansion of this wave function in terms of a set of possible eigenvalues 
>>> that the preferred basis problem arises. So it is not really down to the SE 
>>> itself, it is a matter for the wave function. Each expansion basis defines 
>>> a set of worlds, and all bases give different worlds.
>> 
>> That is correct, but the choice of the basis don’t change the relative 
>> “proportion of histories”.
> 
> The choice of basis makes all the difference in the world.

Everett prove the contrary, and he convinced me when I read it. I found “his 
proof” used in many books on quantum computing, although with different 
motivation. Thee result of an experiment, obviously depend of what you measure, 
but when you embed the observer in the wave, you get that what they find is 
independent of the choice of the base used to describe the “observer” and the 
“observed”. If not, the MW would already be refuted.



> Now that we understand decoherence, the only bases that are useful are those 
> that are robust against environmental decoherence. That is why we don't see 
> superpositions of live and dead cats -- that superposition base is not robust.

No problem with this.


> 
>> It threats only the naïve conception of “worlds”, which has led to the works 
>> of Griffith and Omnes (and Gel Mann & Hartle). That works remains still a 
>> bit naïve with respect of the type of histories we can encounter in 
>> arithmetic.
> 
> The consistent histories approach is just another way of considering many 
> worlds. The histories are no more unique than are the worlds.

Yes, indeed. Only the math makes more sense here, but many-histories belongs to 
the "many-worlds” family, I agree. I prefer it, because the word “world” is 
much ambiguous, and never defined.

Bruno



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Re: Primary matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 8 Jun 2018, at 13:10, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/8/2018 3:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> You confuse religion with argument per authority, and tat will continue as 
>> long as theology does not come back to science, which put reason before 
>> texts, and is modest in never claiming truth, but only means of testing 
>> ideas.
> 
> No, you are confusing religion and theology. 

OK. I do that sometimes. I try to use theology, the field. Religion means for 
me “conception of reality”, but its popular meaning is often impregnated with 
its current authoritarian trend.




> Very few religious people are theologians.  They believe things on faith 
> because they are told they are written in sacred texts.  It is a form of 
> social control which works fairly well. That is why it is so widespread. It 
> depends though on poisoning the minds of children with myths and elevating 
> faith without reason to a virtue.

I agree. Obviously that is not the religion or theology I am talking about. 

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> “When we come to believe, we have no desire to believe  anything else, for we 
> begin by believing that there is nothing else  which we have to believe….  I 
> warn people not to seek for anything  beyond what they came to believe, for 
> that was all they needed to  seek for. In the last resort,  however, it is 
> better for you to remain ignorant, for fear that you  come to know what you 
> should not know….  Let curiosity give place to  faith, and glory to 
> salvation. Let them at least be no hindrance, or  let them keep quiet.  To 
> know nothing against the Rule [of faith] is  to know everything.”
> --- Tertullian
> 
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Re: Is the Continuum Hypothesis a) really true or really false, or b) something else ?

[John Clark]

On Fri, Jun 8, 2018 at 6:31 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>>  I said information was as close as you can get to the traditional
> religious concept of the soul and still remain within the scientific
> method. In the past I pointed out exactly what those similarities and
> differences were, I will repeat them now:
>
> * The soul is non material and so is information.
>
> * It's difficult to pin down a unique physical location for the soul, and
> the same is true for information.
>
> *The soul is the essential, must have, part of consciousness, exactly the
> same situation is true for information.



*The soul is immortal and so, potentially, is information.



> *Well. Thanks. Brent was quoting me, but your answer is not too bad.*


> >>But there are important differences too.
>
> *A soul is unique but information can be duplicated.
>
> >  *With mechanism, obviously a soul, or a first person experience can be
> duplicated from a third person pov. But not from a first person pov,*


And that is one (of many) problems with your “proof”. You start off by
assuming a physical mechanism can duplicate everything EXCEPT for
​the​
 first person pov, and then at the end you conclude you have proven
mechanism can duplicate everything EXCEPT for
​the​
 first person pov .

*> you say that with Everett the observer does not feel the split.*


Yes, but observers will feel things after both the Everett type split and
the duplicating machine type split, and if the environments they are put
into are different then what they feel will be different and they will
become different people from that point on, although both will remember
being the same person before the split (or walking into the copying
machine).

>> *The soul is and will always remain unfathomable, but information is
>> understandable, in fact, information is the ONLY thing that is
>> understandable.
>
>
> >* Theaetetus is *the* counterexample to this,*


That is of course Bullshit, and like most of the wise men you recommend on
this list the guy who dreamed up Theaetetus would flunk a freshman algebra
test and didn't even know where the sun went at night. You've recommended
many many books on this list but only a very small number of them were
written by authors who have been dead for less than a century, but even
those books are unable to calculate 2+2.

 John K Clark

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Re: Entanglement

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
On 8 Jun 2018, at 02:32, Bruce Kellett > wrote:



The SWE does not give a preferred basis. Basing MWI on the 
Schrödinger equation runs into the basis problem. Few MWI advocates 
actually take this seriously. And they should.


The relative proportion of histories do not depend on the choice of 
the base, so the base we use are chosen endemically, like the present 
moment for example, in the whole of physics. Obviously, we needs brain 
to assess our results and communicating, and some works, like sure and 
others, justify the indexical importance of the position base, with 
respect to the branch where intelligence can develop.


What on earth are you talking about? The position basis is not 
well-defined either. The Hilbert space corresponding to the position 
operator X has an infinite number of possible bases -- just like any 
other Hilbert space. Any linear vector space has an infinite number of 
possible bases. How do you choose which one you are going to use? 
Talking about the relative proportion of histories sounds just like the 
long-since refuted branch counting approach to probabilities. And the 
probabilities for various outcomes most certainly depend on the chosen 
base, as do the outcomes themselves.




*In this situation, what is the role of the SWE since the wf is 
usually asserted without any reference to it? Now consider a general 
case where the wf for a system is determined using the SWE. Since 
the solution can be expanded using difference bases, say E or p, 
does each possible expansion, each implying a different possible set 
of measurements, imply a different set of worlds using the SWE? TIA, AG*


The Schrödinger equation merely gives the time evolution of the 
system. To define the problem you have to specify a wave function. It 
is in the expansion of this wave function in terms of a set of 
possible eigenvalues that the preferred basis problem arises. So it 
is not really down to the SE itself, it is a matter for the wave 
function. Each expansion basis defines a set of worlds, and all bases 
give different worlds.


That is correct, but the choice of the basis don’t change the relative 
“proportion of histories”.


The choice of basis makes all the difference in the world. Now that we 
understand decoherence, the only bases that are useful are those that 
are robust against environmental decoherence. That is why we don't see 
superpositions of live and dead cats -- that superposition base is not 
robust.


It threats only the naïve conception of “worlds”, which has led to the 
works of Griffith and Omnes (and Gel Mann & Hartle). That works 
remains still a bit naïve with respect of the type of histories we can 
encounter in arithmetic.


The consistent histories approach is just another way of considering 
many worlds. The histories are no more unique than are the worlds.


Bruce

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Re: Entanglement

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 8 Jun 2018, at 03:30, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> On Thursday, June 7, 2018 at 9:07:37 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> [snip]
> 
>So consciousness anticipates all quantum experiment that MIGHT occur 
> in the future,
> 
> The arithmetical relations do that. Consciousness only select the histories
> 
> and creates those worlds in anticipation? Now we're really getting 
> deep into woo-woo territory.
> 
> On the contrary, we explain how the quantum physical illusion arise from all 
> computations which are already realised in the block-mindspace given by very 
> elementary arithmetic, that we never leave.
> 
> Here are all my assumptions: classical logic + the axioms of arithmetic (“s” 
> is intended to denote the successor function x+1):
> 
>   Please describe ambiguous (for me) symbols,  AG

OK.



> 
> 0 ≠ s(x)OK
> s(x) = s(y) -> x = yOK
> x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))?

A natural number is either null, or has a predecessor. Read “Ex” by it exists a 
number x such that ...




> x+0 = xOK
> x+s(y) = s(x+y) OK
> x*0=0?   Does * mean multiplication? AG

Yes. “x” looks to much like the variable x. 



> x*s(y)=(x*y)+x?

x multiplied by the successor of y gives the same as x * y + x. Exemple 6 * 4 = 
(6 * 3) + 6.




> 
> I use mechanism only to help people that this has to be a theory of 
> everything. It explains very well consciousness (I think), and matter (as 
> confirmed up to now).
> 
> What is the first step from these postulates, to anything? I mean anything. 
> What is mechanism?

Mechanism is the hypothesis that our body is a machine, or a natural 
machine-like entity. (It has been discussed in the antic China, India and greek 
philosopher/theologians. But you need to wait Descartes and Diderot to see it 
coming back, but, notably with Diderot, also its use by materialists to hide 
the mind-body problem.

Digital Mechanism as I use it in this list, is slightly more precise. The 
notion of digital machine is the notion of Emil Post, Alonzo Church, Alan 
Turing, and best explained by Stephen Kleene in his papers and book, notably 
his “Introduction to Metamathematics” (1952). 
Just ask me, and I gave more on this … after the June exams, as my scheduling 
get tighter and tighter those days.




> Why do we need these postulate to fix anything?

My goal was to reformulate the mind-body problem in the frame of the Mechanist 
hypothesis in the cognitive science/philosophy-o-mind/theology.
Unfortunately I have been asked to solve it, which I did, but that requires 
some familiarity with Mathematical Logic, which is not well taught.
Also, the solution is disliked by the “religious” materialists, and I have 
underestimate the number of those in some academical circles, and their 
influence (I got a price for my PhD which has disappears without explanation, 
just to give one example …).



> What is the problem you're trying to fix?

The mind-body problem. How a grey brain can create a color perception, for 
example. But it is more deep than that, as eventually, Mechanism is shown 
incompatible with materialism and/or physicalism, which is the actual paradigm 
in most metaphysics and theologies.



> How can these postulates explain consciousness? TIA, AG

Eventually by the logics of self-reference discovered by Gödel and Löb in 
arithmetic, and axiomatised completely (at the propositional level) by Solovay. 

If you agree that for a conscious being, consciousness is true, non doubtable, 
but also non provable and non definable, then it is long but not difficult to 
show that all universal machine (in the sense of Church …) can introspect 
itself (in the sense provided by Gödel), and discover some thing obeying to 
those axiomatic description of consciousness. 99% of consciousness is 
explained, + an explanation why the last 1% has to be felt by the machine as 
utterly not explainable. 

More on this later, perhaps.

Bruno 






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Re: Entanglement

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 8 Jun 2018, at 02:32, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> From: mailto:agrayson2...@gmail.com>>
>> 
>> On Thursday, June 7, 2018 at 11:32:23 AM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>> From: >
>>> 
>>> On Tuesday, June 5, 2018 at 3:05:40 AM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>>> From: < agrays...@gmail.com 
>>> >
 
 On Tuesday, June 5, 2018 at 1:18:29 AM UTC, Bruce wrote:
 From: < agrays...@gmail.com 
 >
> 
> Remember that the analysis I have given above is schematic, representing 
> the general progression of unitary evolution. It is not specific to any 
> particular case, or any particular number of possible outcomes for the 
> experiment.
> 
> Bruce
> 
> OK. For economy we can write,  (|+>|e+> + |->|e->),  where e stands for 
> the entire universe other than the particle whose spin is being measured. 
> What is the status of the interference between the terms in this 
> superposition? For a quantum superposition to make sense, there must be 
> interference between the terms in the sum. At least that's my 
> understanding of the quantum principle of superposition. But the universe 
> excluding the particle being measured seems to have no definable wave 
> length; hence, I don't see that this superposition makes any sense in how 
> superposition is applied. Would appreciate your input on this issue. TIA, 
> AG
 
 A superposition is just a sum of vectors in Hilbert space. If these 
 vectors are orthogonal there is no interference between them. Your quest 
 for a wavelength in every superposition is the wrong way to look at 
 things. Macroscopic objects have vanishingly small deBroglie wavelengths, 
 but the can still be represented as vectors in a HIlbert space, so can 
 still form superpositions. I think you are looking for absolute 
 classicality in quantum phenomena -- that is impossible, by definition.
 
 Bruce
 
 If that's the case, why all the fuss about Schrodinger's cat? AG
>>> 
>>> Is there a fuss about Schrödinger's cat? Whatever fuss there is, is not 
>>> about the possibility of a superposition of live and dead cats. It is about 
>>> choosing the correct basis in which to describe the physical situation. The 
>>> Schrödinger equation does not specify a basis, and that is its main 
>>> drawback. In fact, that observation alone is sufficient to sink the naive 
>>> many-worlds enthusiast -- he doesn't know in which basis the multiplication 
>>> of worlds occurs.
>>> 
>>> Bruce
>>> 
>>> Interesting point. Do you mean that if one solved the SE for some standard 
>>> quantum problem (nothing fancy, no decoherence modeled), one can generally 
>>> expand the solution in different bases, say p, E, or x, and each expansion 
>>> would imply a different set of worlds using the MWI?  Are there other bases 
>>> besides these three? I'm thinking there could be an infinite set of basis 
>>> vectors since, by analogy, IIUC, for the simple 2-dimensional vector space 
>>> of "little pointy things", I think every pair of non co-linear vectors 
>>> could form a basis (so most bases are not orthogonal). AG
>> 
>> There are an indefinite number of possible sets of basis vectors in any 
>> Hilbert space. Think of the 2-dimensional space for a spin half particle -- 
>> one can form a set of orthonormal basis vectors for every direction in the 
>> 3-sphere. Different bases are not different observables such as p, E, or x. 
>> Each such observable has its own Hilbert space and an infinite set of 
>> possible bases. Each set of basis vectors is just a linearly independent set 
>> of sums over some other basis. It is easier to visualize this in the case of 
>> a simple linear vector space. Think of 3-dimensional Euclidean space. You 
>> can choose a set of three axes, but these can be rotated into any direction. 
>> Or linear combinations can be formed that are not necessarily orthogonal. 
>> For physical situations in QM, some bases are more useful than others, but 
>> the choice of basis is by no means unique.
>> 
>> Bruce
>> 
>> OK. I understand your comments .But let me rephrase the issues as I 
>> conflated some of them above. In the spin half case, were you claiming that 
>> each orientation of the SG device implies a different world according to the 
>> MWI, and if so, does the MWI make no sense since the SWE does not indicate 
>> which orientation is in play?
> 
> The SWE does not give a preferred basis. Basing MWI on the Schrödinger 
> equation runs into the basis problem. Few MWI advocates actually take this 
> seriously. And they should.

The relative proportion of histories do not depend on the choice of the base, 
so the base we use are chosen endemically, like the present moment for example, 
in the whole of physics. Obviously, we needs brain to assess our results and 
communicating, and some works, like 

Re: Primary matter

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/8/2018 3:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
You confuse religion with argument per authority, and tat will 
continue as long as theology does not come back to science, which put 
reason before texts, and is modest in never claiming truth, but only 
means of testing ideas.


No, you are confusing religion and theology.  Very few religious people 
are theologians.  They believe things on faith because they are told 
they are written in sacred texts.  It is a form of social control which 
works fairly well. That is why it is so widespread. It depends though on 
poisoning the minds of children with myths and elevating faith without 
reason to a virtue.


Brent
“When we come to believe, we have no desire to believe  anything else, 
for we begin by believing that there is nothing else  which we have to 
believe….  I warn people not to seek for anything  beyond what they came 
to believe, for that was all they needed to  seek for. In the last 
resort,  however, it is better for you to remain ignorant, for fear that 
you  come to know what you should not know….  Let curiosity give place 
to  faith, and glory to salvation. Let them at least be no hindrance, 
or  let them keep quiet.  To know nothing against the Rule [of faith] 
is  to know everything.”

    --- Tertullian

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Re: Primary matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 7 Jun 2018, at 23:11, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/7/2018 10:12 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 7 Jun 2018, at 02:26, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/6/2018 10:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 It does. When the machine opts for <>p in the doubt between p and <>p, if 
 it let it go, in some sense, it transforms itself into a more speedy and 
 more efficacious machine, with respect to its most probable history.
 So, consciousness brings a self-speedable ability, which is quite handy 
 for self-moving being living in between a prey and a predator.
>>> 
>>> Do you play tennis, Bruno?  Try thinking consciously about your strokes to 
>>> speed up your game.
>> 
>> Consciousness speed all computations (to be sure it is only on all inputs 
>> except a finite number of exception, so it might not be directly practical), 
>> but if that happen, you can guess that the one computing more quickly will 
>> be better at tennis.
> 
> Computing more quickly, but unconsciously.  However, I don't see anyplace for 
> the unconscious in your theory.  Yet almost all thinking, as information 
> processing, is unconscious.


?

What you say is coherent with mechanism. Consciousness requires sophisticated 
loop. The unconscious is anything without that loop. No numbers sequences will 
support consciousness without having the relations making it emulating a 
universal machine, for example.




> 
>> When its opponent strike the ball, he feels (rightly) that has more time to 
>> react.
>> 
>> I did not say that trying to be conscious cannot also impair. Just that 
>> consciousness speed-up the whole process. (Admittedly not in a usable 
>> algorithmic way). That still can be self for entities not aware of the first 
>> person delays, confronted to the limiting sum on all computations, here and 
>> now, below their substitution level.
> 
> The "limiting sum on all computations" refers to your model of the UD. 

My model? 

The UD and its execution is a consequence of Kxy = x and Sxyz = xy(zy), or 
arithmetic. 



> But that is timeless, i.e. exists in Platonia.

The natural numbers are timeless, and with the addition and multiplication 
laws, that defines a block mindscape. It is not more platonic that a quantum 
field or GR, or any model of any physical theories, but it assumes much less, 
solves the mind-body problem up to verifiable consequences, and indeed, it 
match well the theories inferred from observation so far, which is not the case 
of physicalism which has still to use an indent thesis refuted in the indexical 
Digital Mechanis theory.

Bruno



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Re: Primary matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 7 Jun 2018, at 21:58, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/7/2018 1:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> ee above, i.e. because it is necessary.  Science may well determine when 
>>> and where and what relations there are.  But not why.  That's the 
>>> "engineering" solution to the hard problem of consciousness for which I am 
>>> often criticized.
>> Because you limit science. Like the modern Muslim (since Al Ghazali)  and 
>> christians (since the Roman Empire) , you want to separate religion from 
>> science. This lead to obscurantism and authorianism, as the video on the 
>> decline of science in islam illustrates well.
> 
> No, I want to eliminate religion. 

But then you will transform some science into a religion.

That explains why you seem to defend materialism, despite the ack of any 
evidences and actually may evidence against it. 

It is just impossible, for any universal machine, to eliminate religion. When 
you do that, you impose automatically your own religion upon the others.




> The reliance on mystic insights of prophets to tell us why things are and why 
> we must do X and not Y.

You confuse religion with argument per authority, and tat will continue as long 
as theology does not come back to science, which put reason before texts, and 
is modest in never claiming truth, but only means of testing ideas.

Bruno




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Re: Primary matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 7 Jun 2018, at 20:01, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> 
> On Thu, Jun 7, 2018 at 12:50 PM, Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> ​> ​I meant: here are the improvements described, in the works of Pythagorus 
> to Damascus.
> 
> ​Here? Where? You said there were many improvements in theology between 500BC 
> and 500AD and I asked for examples, and for the second time you were unable 
> to provide a single one. ​

I provided them; already twice in this thread. You are simply lying here. I 
gave the references.



>  
> ​> ​Stopped by the fake religion
> 
> ​That's redundant, fake is the only type of religion there is, or at least it 
> is in every language except for Brunospeak where words like "religion" and 
> "God" mean whatever Bruno wants them to ​mean today, and what they mean 
> tomorrow could be entirely different.  

You confuse religion before and after it is mixed with authoritarian powers. 
Doing that, you let it in the hand of the authoritarian powers. That rhetoric 
has been used by Al Ghazali, with the decline of Science in Islam as a 
consequence, and of course that has been done by the christians 6 centuries 
before.




> 
> ​​>>​What progress?? ​
>  
> ​> ​The one from Pythagorus to Damascus in Occident.
> 
> ​Be specific! What improvement in theology are you referring to? ​ 

This who led to the first of mathematics, physics,  up to mathematical logic. I 
gave the references, just read them. It is part of the history of science. It 
works only when people are spiritually mature enough to subdue the texts to 
reason, instead of the contrary. 

You confine theology in the hand of those who misuse it for personal power. A 
bit like today, health is confined in the hand of those who invest on disease 
and catastrophes. 

Bruno




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Re: Is the Continuum Hypothesis a) really true or really false, or b) something else ?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 7 Jun 2018, at 19:40, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Thu, Jun 7, 2018 at 10:23 AM, Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> ​> ​I know perfectly well what the personal pronoun “you” will mean, as its 
> meaning will not change.
> 
> Of course it will change. Today "you" means the man who is currently 
> experiencing H, tomorrow "you" means the man who is currently experiencing W 
> and remembers experiencing H yesterday; and tomorrow "you" also means the man 
> who is currently experiencing M and remembers experiencing H yesterday. And 
> please don't rebut with your standard "from the 1p" rubber stamp reply unless 
> it is made clear which "THE 1p" is being referred to.


That is simply not true. The first person “I” means always the H-guy, even when 
his experience differentiates into two histories. Or you cannot say “I will 
survive with an artificial brain”, and computationalism is made senseless.



> 
> ​>> ​so which ONE is Mr. You??
> 
> ​> ​If I could answer that question, there would, of course, no be any first 
> person indeterminacy. 
> 
> ​If Bruno can not answer that question then Bruno has absolutely no business 
> ever using the word "you" in any thought experiment and all the grand 
> sounding term "first person indeterminacy​" means is that gibberish questions 
> have no answers.   ​

No, you are only setting up a trap. If I could answer your question in one 
word, then and only then the first person indeterminacy would be gibberish. 
Well tried!




>> ​>​>>​ One will say “oh, I am the H-guy having survived in W” and he is right
>> 
>> ​>>​​I agree.​​ ​So what is the probability the H-​guy will see W? 100% 
> 
> ​> ​No,
> 
> ​No? So you think the H-guy will see W ​no question about it,

?



>  ​but there is not a 100% chance the H-guy will see W​. This is logic?​

?

I explain this later … Let us see.


> 
>  
> ​> ​because if that is the prediction made in Helsinki, as asked, it will be 
> refuted by the M-guy.
> 
> ​What the M-guy says or doesn't say is irrelevant.


Why?



> ​If the W-guy is the H-guy and the W-guy sees W then that's the end of the 
> story, the H guy will see W with absolute certainty.


Oh, just to evacuate the counter-example. That is not valid.





> Yes the H-guy is no longer unique ​but that is to be expected because that's 
> what "being copied" means.​

But that enforce you to listen to the M-guy. Simply enough.



> 
> ​> ​We want the prediction be correct for both copies
> 
> ​What you want is contradictory, its ridiculous!

Obviously not. If the H-guy, when still in H, predicts W v M, that prediction 
is verified, when all the others are contradicted by one of the copies, if not 
both.




> If they are dropped into different environments, like in different cities, 
> then they can't have the same fate so no one prediction can be correct about 
> what will happen to both of them; and that is all utterly predictable. So 
> where is the indeterminacy?

It is on the first person that the H-guy will live *from its first person point 
of view*.





> The only grand mystery in all this is what does the word "you" mean when 
> Bruno asks "What one and only one city will YOU see after YOU step out of a 
> YOU duplicating machine?”


The “you” is an indexical. If you were genuinely interested, you would study 
the translation in arithmetic. The 3-you is mathematically defined with 
Kleene’s second recursion theorem, and the 1p-you is defined with applying 
Theaetus’s definition on it. 

Bruno


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Re: Is the Continuum Hypothesis a) really true or really false, or b) something else ?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 7 Jun 2018, at 16:44, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Wed, Jun 6, 2018 at 3:15 PM, Brent Meeker  > wrote:
> 
> ​> ​I don't want to get into arguments about pronouns,
> 
> Then you don't want to talk about Bruno's ideas because personal pronouns are 
> vitally important to it, they are the rug that Bruno uses to cover the gaping 
> holes in Bruno's logic.

That you have not succeeded to debunk, without changing the question asked, and 
the definitions used.



>  
> ​> ​ you've explicitly admitted that you believe there is soul
>  
> No. I said information was as close as you can get to the traditional 
> religious concept of the soul and still remain within the scientific method. 
> In the past I pointed out exactly what those similarities and differences 
> were, I will repeat them now: 
> 
> * The soul is non material and so is information.
> * It's difficult to pin down a unique physical location for the soul, and the 
> same is true for information. 
> *The soul is the essential, must have, part of consciousness, exactly the 
> same situation is true for information. 
> *The soul is immortal and so, potentially, is information.  

Well. Thanks. Brent was quoting me, but your answer is not too bad.



>  
> 
> But there are important differences too. 
> 
> *A soul is unique but information can be duplicated.

With mechanism, obviously a soul, or a first person experience can be 
duplicated from a third person pov. But not from a first person pov, in the 
sense that each duplicated soul will still feel unique from its first person 
pov. You have used this when you say that with Everett the observer does not 
feel the split. Likewise, I could duplicate you during the light, you wold not 
be aware of this.




> *The soul is and will always remain unfathomable, but information is 
> understandable, in fact,information is the ONLY thing that is 
> understandable.

Theaetetus is *the* counterexample to this, an doubly so when translated in 
arithmetic, in the 3p way.




> *Information unambiguously exists, I don't think anyone would deny that, but 
> if the soul exists it will never be proven scientifically.

Using Theatetus’ definition, and using “provable” as “believable” (the modesty 
enforce by incompleteness), it becomes a theorem of arithmetic that all 
universal machines have a soul

That is important. Incompleteness enforces []p to have a logic distinct of the 
logic of knowledge (S4 like) and the distinction of the logic of []p and of []p 
& p, which last one do acts as a logic of knowledge. So a first person knower 
is canonically attached to any machine, and its logic is close to the epistemic 
interpretation of intuitionism, brought by Brouwer in his attempts to found 
mathematics on (first person) intuition.

Bruno




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