Re: Radioactive Decay States

[agrayson2000]

On Wednesday, July 18, 2018 at 2:00:47 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>  
> On Tuesday, July 17, 2018 at 12:00:08 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 16 Jul 2018, at 23:08, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, July 16, 2018 at 8:30:58 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 13 Jul 2018, at 01:55, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, July 11, 2018 at 2:16:24 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
>>> wrote:



 On Tuesday, July 10, 2018 at 4:42:44 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 7/10/2018 3:01 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
> *IIRC, the above quote is also in the Wiki article. It's not a 
> coherent argument; not even an argument but an ASSERTION. Let's raise the 
> level of discourse. It says we always get a or b, no intermediate result 
> when the system is in a superposition of states A and B.. Nothing new 
> here. 
> Key question: why does this imply the system is in states A and B 
> SIMULTANEOUSLY before the measurement? AG  *
>
>
> Because, in theory and in some cases in practice, there is a direct 
> measurement of the superposition state, call it C, such that you can 
> directly measure C and always get c, but when you have measured and 
> confirmed the system is in state c and then you measure A/B you get a or 
> b 
> at random.   The easiest example is SG measurements of sliver atom spin 
> orientation where spin UP can be measured left/right and get a LEFT or a 
> RIGHT at random, but it can be measured up/down and you always get UP.  
> Any 
> particular  orientation can be *written* as a superposition of two 
> orthogonal states.  
>

 *When you're trying to explain esoteric issues to a moron in physics, 
 you need to be more explicit. These are the issues that cause confusion 
 and 
 caused me to fail to "get it". After some subsequent posts, you seem to be 
 saying that in an SG spin experiment where the measurement base is UP/DN, 
 the system being measured is ALSO in a superposed LEFT/RIGHT state which 
 is 
 also measured (by an SG device designed to measure spin?), and that the 
 LEFT/RIGHT superposed state persists with some persistent eigenvalue after 
 UP/DN is measured. It's murky for us morons.  How does one get the system 
 to be measured in a superposition of RIGHT/LEFT; what is the operator for 
 which that superposition is an eigenstate, and what is the value of the 
 persistent eigenvalue?*

 *Furthermore, you finally assert that since the RIGHT/LEFT state 
 persists -- meaning that particle is in some DEFINITE state after the spin 
 is measured -- and since (as you finally, finally assert) that that state 
 can be written as a superposition of UP/DN, all is well -- in the sense 
 that we can now be certain that the system is physically and 
 simultaneously 
 in the UP and DN states (which I am claiming is a fallacy). *

 *HOWEVER, assuming that I understand your argument after filing the 
 gaps in your presentation (and pointing to some unanswered issues), I now 
 must "rant" again that the UP/DN superposed representation is NOT unique. 
 Thus, since there are finitely many or uncountable many such 
 representations, and since (as per LC) QM has no preferred basis, your 
 argument for the physical simultaneity of UP and DN states fails. I mean, 
 I 
 could write the superposed states in the basis (UP + DN) and (UP - DN), or 
 in many other bases. Absent uniqueness of bases, one cannot assert that 
 the 
 system is physically and simultaneously in any particular pair of basis 
 vectors.*

 *AG*

>>>
>>> *I've been looking over your references to Peres. CMIIAW, but AFAICT he 
>>> doesn't deal with the issue I have been "ranting" about; namely, the 
>>> non-uniqueness of bases, implying IMO that the concept of simultaneous 
>>> physical states of the components of a superposition is an additional, 
>>> unsupported assumption of QM which leads to some popular misconceptions of 
>>> what QM is telling us. *
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Then you need to find a new explanation of the interference that occurs 
>>> in basically all quantum experiments, like the two slits, the statistics of 
>>> results with Stern-Gerlach spin measuring apparatus, etc.
>>>
>>
>> *I am not trying to explain the interference. *
>>
>>
>> You should. That is the whole problem. How can we get interference if the 
>> wave describes only our knowledge state. The reason why we consider the 
>> wave physically real is that the wave interfere, even the wave associate to 
>> a single particle. 
>>
>>
>>
>> *Rather I am pointing out an unnecessary assumption that leads to 
>> paradoxes.*
>>
>>
>> ?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> * See comment below. AG*
>>  
>>
>>> The whole point of the physical wave amplitudes is that the 

Re: Radioactive Decay States

[agrayson2000]

 
On Tuesday, July 17, 2018 at 12:00:08 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 16 Jul 2018, at 23:08, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, July 16, 2018 at 8:30:58 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 13 Jul 2018, at 01:55, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, July 11, 2018 at 2:16:24 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, July 10, 2018 at 4:42:44 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:



 On 7/10/2018 3:01 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

 *IIRC, the above quote is also in the Wiki article. It's not a coherent 
 argument; not even an argument but an ASSERTION. Let's raise the level of 
 discourse. It says we always get a or b, no intermediate result when the 
 system is in a superposition of states A and B.. Nothing new here. Key 
 question: why does this imply the system is in states A and B 
 SIMULTANEOUSLY before the measurement? AG  *


 Because, in theory and in some cases in practice, there is a direct 
 measurement of the superposition state, call it C, such that you can 
 directly measure C and always get c, but when you have measured and 
 confirmed the system is in state c and then you measure A/B you get a or b 
 at random.   The easiest example is SG measurements of sliver atom spin 
 orientation where spin UP can be measured left/right and get a LEFT or a 
 RIGHT at random, but it can be measured up/down and you always get UP.  
 Any 
 particular  orientation can be *written* as a superposition of two 
 orthogonal states.  

>>>
>>> *When you're trying to explain esoteric issues to a moron in physics, 
>>> you need to be more explicit. These are the issues that cause confusion and 
>>> caused me to fail to "get it". After some subsequent posts, you seem to be 
>>> saying that in an SG spin experiment where the measurement base is UP/DN, 
>>> the system being measured is ALSO in a superposed LEFT/RIGHT state which is 
>>> also measured (by an SG device designed to measure spin?), and that the 
>>> LEFT/RIGHT superposed state persists with some persistent eigenvalue after 
>>> UP/DN is measured. It's murky for us morons.  How does one get the system 
>>> to be measured in a superposition of RIGHT/LEFT; what is the operator for 
>>> which that superposition is an eigenstate, and what is the value of the 
>>> persistent eigenvalue?*
>>>
>>> *Furthermore, you finally assert that since the RIGHT/LEFT state 
>>> persists -- meaning that particle is in some DEFINITE state after the spin 
>>> is measured -- and since (as you finally, finally assert) that that state 
>>> can be written as a superposition of UP/DN, all is well -- in the sense 
>>> that we can now be certain that the system is physically and simultaneously 
>>> in the UP and DN states (which I am claiming is a fallacy). *
>>>
>>> *HOWEVER, assuming that I understand your argument after filing the gaps 
>>> in your presentation (and pointing to some unanswered issues), I now must 
>>> "rant" again that the UP/DN superposed representation is NOT unique. Thus, 
>>> since there are finitely many or uncountable many such representations, and 
>>> since (as per LC) QM has no preferred basis, your argument for the physical 
>>> simultaneity of UP and DN states fails. I mean, I could write the 
>>> superposed states in the basis (UP + DN) and (UP - DN), or in many other 
>>> bases. Absent uniqueness of bases, one cannot assert that the system is 
>>> physically and simultaneously in any particular pair of basis vectors.*
>>>
>>> *AG*
>>>
>>
>> *I've been looking over your references to Peres. CMIIAW, but AFAICT he 
>> doesn't deal with the issue I have been "ranting" about; namely, the 
>> non-uniqueness of bases, implying IMO that the concept of simultaneous 
>> physical states of the components of a superposition is an additional, 
>> unsupported assumption of QM which leads to some popular misconceptions of 
>> what QM is telling us. *
>>
>>
>>
>> Then you need to find a new explanation of the interference that occurs 
>> in basically all quantum experiments, like the two slits, the statistics of 
>> results with Stern-Gerlach spin measuring apparatus, etc.
>>
>
> *I am not trying to explain the interference. *
>
>
> You should. That is the whole problem. How can we get interference if the 
> wave describes only our knowledge state. The reason why we consider the 
> wave physically real is that the wave interfere, even the wave associate to 
> a single particle. 
>
>
>
> *Rather I am pointing out an unnecessary assumption that leads to 
> paradoxes.*
>
>
> ?
>
>
>
>
> * See comment below. AG*
>  
>
>> The whole point of the physical wave amplitudes is that the diverse 
>> superposed components have a physical role, through destructive or 
>> constructive, or in between, interference.
>>
>
> *The amplitudes give probabilities of occurrence, confirmed by 
> measurements. Nothing more. You forget that the 

Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *smitra* mailto:smi...@zonnet.nl>>


On 16-07-2018 23:04, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 7/16/2018 8:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


I would like to think that this were the case, but you
keep coming up with irrelevancies that contradict the
straightforward account of these phenomena. If you forget
about the metaphysics and just concentrate on Alice and
Bob making real measurements and recording them in their
lab books, then all these superfluities vanish. There are
no counterfactuals, no worries with other unobserved
worlds, and Bell's theorem goes through exactly as he
intended. Many-worlds does not invalidate Bell's argument.
In fact, deflecting Bell's theorem would do no more than
allow for the possibility of a local hidden variable
account. That alone does not prove that many-worlds is
local -- that would still have to be established by
developing such a local hidden variable theory. No one has
to date developed such a theory. But since Bell's theorem
has not been deflected, we do not have to worry about such
contingencies.



So we really agree. You have been probably misguided when
trying to defend John Clark who claimed that there are still
FTL influence in Everett, when the Bell’s inequality relations
implies FTL only when we assume unique outcomes of the
experiences (i.e. some collapse, or Bohm’s type of hidden
variable).

No need of patronizing remark either, especially when
rephrasing what I was just saying. If you agree that there is
no FTL in the many-worlds, we do agree, that was the point I
was making to J. Clark. Not sure why you defended it,
especially that you have shown implicitly that you have no
problem with the step 3 of the Universal Dovetailer Paradox.
You might eventually understand that with mechanism, Everett’s
task is still incomplete, as we need to justify the wave from
all computations, as seen from some self-referential modes
(fortunately and constantly implied by incompleteness).


Not to reignite the argument, but it originated because Bruno claimed
that MWI does away with non-locality in QM.

Brent


It reduces the non-locality to trivial common cause effects. Bruce has 
been trying to prove that it doesn't by invoking the argument that you 
can pick a single branch where Alice and Bob wrote their measurement 
results in their lab books, and that one should therefore be allowed 
to apply Bell's theorem by pretending that the other branches do not 
exist and reach the same conclusion as in collapse theories. However, 
one has to ask here what the violation of Bell's inequalities implies. 
It only constrains extensions of "standard instrumental QM".


It has become clear that the real argument by advocates of MWI is that 
many-worlds deflects Bell's theorem, so that its implications do not 
apply in MWI. I have, as Saibal points out, been arguing against this, 
and I still consider my proof that selecting one branch out of the MWI 
superposition is sufficient to apply Bell's theorem in its full rigour. 
Since the argument applies to any branch, it applies to the 
superposition as a whole, and MWI does not avoid the implications of 
Bell's theorem. The implication is that no local hidden variable theory 
can account for the observed EPR-type correlations. In particular, any 
common cause, or Bertlmann's socks type argument, fails in MWI for the 
same reasons that it fails in a single world account.


I have no idea what Saibal means when he claims that Bell's theorem only 
constrains extensions of "standard instrumental QM". Saibal has not 
offered any convincing counter argument to my proof that Bell's theorem 
applies in MWI.



If we assume that, in general (and not just in case of Bell-type 
experiments) measurement results are deterministic, that they are 
specified by hidden variables, then the violation of Bell's inequality 
implies constraints on such theories. Such theories must necessarily 
be non-local. But then there is no evidence for a hidden variable 
theory, so there is no need to invoke non-locality on these grounds.


That does not follow. Just because you think you have shown that Bell's 
theorem does not apply, it does not follow that MWI is thereby local, or 
that a local account of the correlations is available in MWI. Similarly, 
the claim that there are no hidden variables says nothing at all about 
whether reality is local or non-local.



Now, what is true is that if Alice and Bob perform measurements on 
entangled spins such that their results are perfectly correlated and 
they are space-like separated, that the non-existence of local hidden 
variables has a non-local aspect to it because Bob has the 

Re: Do we live within a Diophantine equation?

[Jason Resch]

On Mon, Jul 16, 2018 at 12:09 PM, John Clark  wrote:

> On Sat, Jul 14, 2018 at 2:23 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>
>> *​>​Suppose Abby the guinea pig wants to travel long distance, say from
>> Earth to Mars. On Earth she enters the scanner which scans her body and
>> brain cells in great detail at an instant of time, down to all molecular
>> details that are functionally relevant. At the same time, her body is
>> instantly destroyed, and the scanned data is sent to the replicator station
>> located at the journey’s target. There, the replicator instantly builds a
>> perfect copy of Abby’s body and brain, based on the transmitted
>> data​. Clearly the material body is destroyed (and rebuilt) in this
>> process, which leads to instant feelings of unease to most guinea pigs or
>> humans who think about this scenario.*
>>
>
> There would be no logical reason for you being uneasy about this and there
> wouldn't even be a illogical reason for being uneasy unless somebody told
> you about the destruction and reconstruction of your body, and even then
> you probably wouldn't believe them because subjectively you would feel no
> different whatsoever. Our ancestors would be terrified at getting into an
> aluminum tube and flying 40,000 feet up in the air at 600 mph, but if the
> weather was calm they wouldn't even know they were doing so unless they
> looked out the window.
>
>
>> *​>​a malfunction disturbs the daily routine: a malicious admirer of Abby
>> hacks into the transmitter’s computer system and causes the teleporter to
>> create two perfectly identical copies of Abby at exactly the same local
>> time on Mars, next to each other. How does Abby experience this situation? *
>>
>
> Abby #1 finds herself on Mars as usual but notices somebody who looks just
> like her standing to her right.  Abby #2 finds herself on Mars as usual but
> notices somebody who looks just like her standing to her left. Looking
> backward through time neither remembers experiencing any branching,
> everything will seem perfectly continuous to both. Looking forward through
> time neither remembers any branching, and in fact neither remembers
> anything at all because we can remember the past but not the future, so the
> future can not tell Abby what it means to be Abby, only the past can do
> that. And so both Abbys will insist they are Abby. And both will be equally
> correct.
>
> *​>​Directly after the replication, there will be two identical twins —
>> let us call them Abby-1 and Abby-2. An instant later, due to differing
>> experiences, Abby-1 and Abby-2 will become different in the information
>> content of their brain.*
>>
>
> Yes.
>
> ​> ​
>> *So how will Abby subjectively experience this situation?*
>>
>
> We're right back to Bruno's definition problem. I can't answer your
> question until you make clear what you mean by "Abby".   I can tell you
> exactly precisely what I mean by "Abby", its whoever remembers being Abby
> before the duplication. Yes its odd that there are 2 people that meet that
> criteria, but odd is not the same thing as paradoxical. I've given you mine
> so what is your precise definition of "Abby"?
>
>

Given the "will" my assumption is the author is referring to Earth Abby,
the Abby before the teleportation.  Let us work with that assumption for
now.



> *​>​This seems like a tricky question, even in terms of our terminology of
>> successor states. According to the previous section, we must conclude that
>> Abby will (after the malfunction) experience a successor state.*
>>
>
> If you're interested in consciousness and subjectivity you will get
> nowhere pondering on the nature of successor states, it would be like
> pushing on a string. If you don't want to get tied up in logical knots and
> self contradictions you've got to define personal identity based on
> previous states not successor states; otherwise you wouldn't even know who
> you are because you don't know what your successor state will be. But you
> do know what your previous state was. We don't live in the future because
> we never know what the future will be, we live in the present and the past
> through memory because we know what the past was.
>

But we can have more than one precursor state too (e.g., the quantum
erasure experiment).

Does this mean your theory of personal identity is like that of the
Buddhists (i.e. we are no more than a single thought-moment and that is all
we will ever be)?


>
>
>> *​>​But now, there are two successor states in the world: that of Abby-1
>> and that of Abby-2.*
>>
>
> ​That always happens when something has been duplicated. The only reason
> it seems odd is that nothing as complex as a person has been duplicated
> before, but this is only due to current technological limitations, it has
> nothing to do with any fundamental scientific or philosophic limitation.
>

Do you believe persons are duplicated ala many-worlds?


>
>
>> ​>​
>> Thus Abby will end up as Abby-1 or Abby-2, but which one of them?
>>
>

Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[smitra]

On 16-07-2018 23:04, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 7/16/2018 8:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


I would like to think that this were the case, but you keep coming up 
with irrelevancies that contradict the straightforward account of 
these phenomena. If you forget about the metaphysics and just 
concentrate on Alice and Bob making real measurements and recording 
them in their lab books, then all these superfluities vanish. There 
are no counterfactuals, no worries with other unobserved worlds, and 
Bell's theorem goes through exactly as he intended. Many-worlds does 
not invalidate Bell's argument. In fact, deflecting Bell's theorem 
would do no more than allow for the possibility of a local hidden 
variable account. That alone does not prove that many-worlds is local 
-- that would still have to be established by developing such a local 
hidden variable theory. No one has to date developed such a theory. 
But since Bell's theorem has not been deflected, we do not have to 
worry about such contingencies.



So we really agree. You have been probably misguided when trying to 
defend John Clark who claimed that there are still FTL influence in 
Everett, when the Bell’s inequality relations implies FTL only when we 
assume unique outcomes of the experiences (i.e. some collapse, or 
Bohm’s type of hidden variable).


No need of patronizing remark either, especially when rephrasing what 
I was just saying. If you agree that there is no FTL in the 
many-worlds, we do agree, that was the point I was making to J. Clark. 
Not sure why you defended it, especially that you have shown 
implicitly that you have no problem with the step 3 of the Universal 
Dovetailer Paradox. You might eventually understand that with 
mechanism, Everett’s task is still incomplete, as we need to justify 
the wave from all computations, as seen from some self-referential 
modes (fortunately and constantly implied by incompleteness).


Not to reignite the argument, but it originated because Bruno claimed
that MWI does away with non-locality in QM.

Brent


It reduces the non-locality to trivial common cause effects. Bruce has 
been trying to prove that it doesn't by invoking the argument that you 
can pick a single branch where Alice and Bob wrote their measurement 
results in their lab books, and that one should therefore be allowed to 
apply Bell's theorem by pretending that the other branches do not exist 
and reach the same conclusion as in collapse theories. However, one has 
to ask here what the violation of Bell's inequalities implies. It only 
constrains extensions of "standard instrumental QM".


If we assume that, in general (and not just in case of Bell-type 
experiments) measurement results are deterministic, that they are 
specified by hidden variables, then the violation of Bell's inequality 
implies constraints on such theories. Such theories must necessarily be 
non-local. But then there is no evidence for a hidden variable theory, 
so there is no need to invoke non-locality on these grounds.


Now, what is true is that if Alice and Bob perform measurements on 
entangled spins such that their results are perfectly correlated and 
they are space-like separated, that the non-existence of local hidden 
variables has a non-local aspect to it because Bob has the information 
about what Alice will find and the non-existence of local hidden 
variables rules out that this piece of information is not somehow 
present locally at Alice's location.


But this non-local effect is entirely due to a correlation mediated by 
the entangled spins, in the MWI this is a common cause effect, while in 
the Copenhagen interpretation it cannot be explained in that way. 
Bruce's elaborate argument about verifying the violation of Bell's 
inequality in single branches doesn't change that conclusion. Yes, you 
can verify that Bell's inequality is violated in single branches, but as 
pointed out above, that violation is part of the argument why in the MWI 
the non-local aspects of entangled states are completely trivial.


Saibal

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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Tuesday, July 17, 2018 at 6:45:17 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> > On 16 Jul 2018, at 23:04, Brent Meeker  > wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > On 7/16/2018 8:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> >>> 
> >>> I would like to think that this were the case, but you keep coming up 
> with irrelevancies that contradict the straightforward account of these 
> phenomena. If you forget about the metaphysics and just concentrate on 
> Alice and Bob making real measurements and recording them in their lab 
> books, then all these superfluities vanish. There are no counterfactuals, 
> no worries with other unobserved worlds, and Bell's theorem goes through 
> exactly as he intended. Many-worlds does not invalidate Bell's argument. In 
> fact, deflecting Bell's theorem would do no more than allow for the 
> possibility of a local hidden variable account. That alone does not prove 
> that many-worlds is local -- that would still have to be established by 
> developing such a local hidden variable theory. No one has to date 
> developed such a theory. But since Bell's theorem has not been deflected, 
> we do not have to worry about such contingencies. 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> So we really agree. You have been probably misguided when trying to 
> defend John Clark who claimed that there are still FTL influence in 
> Everett, when the Bell’s inequality relations implies FTL only when we 
> assume unique outcomes of the experiences (i.e. some collapse, or Bohm’s 
> type of hidden variable). 
> >> 
> >> No need of patronizing remark either, especially when rephrasing what I 
> was just saying. If you agree that there is no FTL in the many-worlds, we 
> do agree, that was the point I was making to J. Clark. Not sure why you 
> defended it, especially that you have shown implicitly that you have no 
> problem with the step 3 of the Universal Dovetailer Paradox. You might 
> eventually understand that with mechanism, Everett’s task is still 
> incomplete, as we need to justify the wave from all computations, as seen 
> from some self-referential modes (fortunately and constantly implied by 
> incompleteness). 
> > 
> > Not to reignite the argument, but it originated because Bruno claimed 
> that MWI does away with non-locality in QM. 
>
> Precisely, I claim MWI does with the FTL influence. 
>
> (Non locality + single world (or hidden variable))  entails FTL. 
> (MW + Non locality) does not. 
>
> Bruno 
>

MWI does not negate nonlocality. MWI just says that a shift in entanglement 
phase from a system to  an reservoir of set according to some level of 
complexity results in the phenomenological apparent splitting of worlds 
 This has some ill-defined aspects to it, such as what is the level of 
complexity? There must be some Kolmogoroff complexity threshold, but that 
is not defined. However, this does not remove nonlocality and it does not 
mean there is some nonlocal signalling in any form.

LC

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Re: Do we live within a Diophantine equation?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 16 Jul 2018, at 19:09, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Sat, Jul 14, 2018 at 2:23 PM, Jason Resch  > wrote:
>  
> ​>​Suppose Abby the guinea pig wants to travel long distance, say from Earth 
> to Mars. On Earth she enters the scanner which scans her body and brain cells 
> in great detail at an instant of time, down to all molecular details that are 
> functionally relevant. At the same time, her body is instantly destroyed, and 
> the scanned data is sent to the replicator station located at the journey’s 
> target. There, the replicator instantly builds a perfect copy of Abby’s body 
> and brain, based on the transmitted data​. Clearly the material body is 
> destroyed (and rebuilt) in this process, which leads to instant feelings of 
> unease to most guinea pigs or humans who think about this scenario.
> 
> There would be no logical reason for you being uneasy about this and there 
> wouldn't even be a illogical reason for being uneasy unless somebody told you 
> about the destruction and reconstruction of your body, and even then you 
> probably wouldn't believe them because subjectively you would feel no 
> different whatsoever. Our ancestors would be terrified at getting into an 
> aluminum tube and flying 40,000 feet up in the air at 600 mph, but if the 
> weather was calm they wouldn't even know they were doing so unless they 
> looked out the window.  
>  
> ​>​a malfunction disturbs the daily routine: a malicious admirer of Abby 
> hacks into the transmitter’s computer system and causes the teleporter to 
> create two perfectly identical copies of Abby at exactly the same local time 
> on Mars, next to each other. How does Abby experience this situation? 
>  
> Abby #1 finds herself on Mars as usual but notices somebody who looks just 
> like her standing to her right.  Abby #2 finds herself on Mars as usual but 
> notices somebody who looks just like her standing to her left. Looking 
> backward through time neither remembers experiencing any branching, 
> everything will seem perfectly continuous to both. Looking forward through 
> time neither remembers any branching, and in fact neither remembers anything 
> at all because we can remember the past but not the future, so the future can 
> not tell Abby what it means to be Abby, only the past can do that. And so 
> both Abbys will insist they are Abby. And both will be equally correct. 
> 
> ​>​Directly after the replication, there will be two identical twins — let us 
> call them Abby-1 and Abby-2. An instant later, due to differing experiences, 
> Abby-1 and Abby-2 will become different in the information content of their 
> brain.
> 
> Yes.
> 
> ​> ​So how will Abby subjectively experience this situation?
> 
> We're right back to Bruno's definition problem. I can't answer your question 
> until you make clear what you mean by "Abby".   I can tell you exactly 
> precisely what I mean by "Abby", its whoever remembers being Abby before the 
> duplication. Yes its odd that there are 2 people that meet that criteria, but 
> odd is not the same thing as paradoxical. I've given you mine so what is your 
> precise definition of "Abby”?  


It is my definition of “Abby”, since the beginning. It is exactly the one we 
need to understand that Abby is unable to predict what experience he will live 
after the duplication, because, assuming comp, both abby will remember being 
Abby before the duplication. It is odd, as now there are two people, but, 
OBVIOUSLY (with mechanism) both live a single experience in only one city, and 
OBVIOUSLY, as they are both abby, it makes that experience (seeing one city) 
different and incompatible after, which makes it necessary to be not 
predictible before.

I am happy you insist so much on this. You do understand the first person 
indeterminacy. Time to move to step 4.

Bruno



>  
> ​>​This seems like a tricky question, even in terms of our terminology of 
> successor states. According to the previous section, we must conclude that 
> Abby will (after the malfunction) experience a successor state.
> 
> If you're interested in consciousness and subjectivity you will get nowhere 
> pondering on the nature of successor states, it would be like pushing on a 
> string. If you don't want to get tied up in logical knots and self 
> contradictions you've got to define personal identity based on previous 
> states not successor states; otherwise you wouldn't even know who you are 
> because you don't know what your successor state will be. But you do know 
> what your previous state was. We don't live in the future because we never 
> know what the future will be, we live in the present and the past through 
> memory because we know what the past was.
>  
> ​>​But now, there are two successor states in the world: that of Abby-1 and 
> that of Abby-2.
> 
> ​That always happens when something has been duplicated. The only reason it 
> seems odd is that nothing as complex as a person has been 

Re: Radioactive Decay States

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 16 Jul 2018, at 23:08, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, July 16, 2018 at 8:30:58 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 13 Jul 2018, at 01:55, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, July 11, 2018 at 2:16:24 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
>>  wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Tuesday, July 10, 2018 at 4:42:44 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 7/10/2018 3:01 PM, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> IIRC, the above quote is also in the Wiki article. It's not a coherent 
>>> argument; not even an argument but an ASSERTION. Let's raise the level of 
>>> discourse. It says we always get a or b, no intermediate result when the 
>>> system is in a superposition of states A and B.. Nothing new here. Key 
>>> question: why does this imply the system is in states A and B 
>>> SIMULTANEOUSLY before the measurement? AG  
>> 
>> Because, in theory and in some cases in practice, there is a direct 
>> measurement of the superposition state, call it C, such that you can 
>> directly measure C and always get c, but when you have measured and 
>> confirmed the system is in state c and then you measure A/B you get a or b 
>> at random.   The easiest example is SG measurements of sliver atom spin 
>> orientation where spin UP can be measured left/right and get a LEFT or a 
>> RIGHT at random, but it can be measured up/down and you always get UP.  Any 
>> particular  orientation can be written as a superposition of two orthogonal 
>> states.  
>> 
>> When you're trying to explain esoteric issues to a moron in physics, you 
>> need to be more explicit. These are the issues that cause confusion and 
>> caused me to fail to "get it". After some subsequent posts, you seem to be 
>> saying that in an SG spin experiment where the measurement base is UP/DN, 
>> the system being measured is ALSO in a superposed LEFT/RIGHT state which is 
>> also measured (by an SG device designed to measure spin?), and that the 
>> LEFT/RIGHT superposed state persists with some persistent eigenvalue after 
>> UP/DN is measured. It's murky for us morons.  How does one get the system to 
>> be measured in a superposition of RIGHT/LEFT; what is the operator for which 
>> that superposition is an eigenstate, and what is the value of the persistent 
>> eigenvalue?
>> 
>> Furthermore, you finally assert that since the RIGHT/LEFT state persists -- 
>> meaning that particle is in some DEFINITE state after the spin is measured 
>> -- and since (as you finally, finally assert) that that state can be written 
>> as a superposition of UP/DN, all is well -- in the sense that we can now be 
>> certain that the system is physically and simultaneously in the UP and DN 
>> states (which I am claiming is a fallacy). 
>> 
>> HOWEVER, assuming that I understand your argument after filing the gaps in 
>> your presentation (and pointing to some unanswered issues), I now must 
>> "rant" again that the UP/DN superposed representation is NOT unique. Thus, 
>> since there are finitely many or uncountable many such representations, and 
>> since (as per LC) QM has no preferred basis, your argument for the physical 
>> simultaneity of UP and DN states fails. I mean, I could write the superposed 
>> states in the basis (UP + DN) and (UP - DN), or in many other bases. Absent 
>> uniqueness of bases, one cannot assert that the system is physically and 
>> simultaneously in any particular pair of basis vectors.
>> 
>> AG
>> 
>> I've been looking over your references to Peres. CMIIAW, but AFAICT he 
>> doesn't deal with the issue I have been "ranting" about; namely, the 
>> non-uniqueness of bases, implying IMO that the concept of simultaneous 
>> physical states of the components of a superposition is an additional, 
>> unsupported assumption of QM which leads to some popular misconceptions of 
>> what QM is telling us.
> 
> 
> Then you need to find a new explanation of the interference that occurs in 
> basically all quantum experiments, like the two slits, the statistics of 
> results with Stern-Gerlach spin measuring apparatus, etc.
> 
> I am not trying to explain the interference.

You should. That is the whole problem. How can we get interference if the wave 
describes only our knowledge state. The reason why we consider the wave 
physically real is that the wave interfere, even the wave associate to a single 
particle. 



> Rather I am pointing out an unnecessary assumption that leads to paradoxes.

?




> See comment below. AG
>  
> The whole point of the physical wave amplitudes is that the diverse 
> superposed components have a physical role, through destructive or 
> constructive, or in between, interference.
> 
> The amplitudes give probabilities of occurrence, confirmed by measurements. 
> Nothing more. You forget that the components of the superposition are usually 
> assumed to be orthogonal states, which don't mutually interfere. Thus, you 
> are claiming to explain interference from component states which don't 
> 

Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 16 Jul 2018, at 23:04, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 7/16/2018 8:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
>>> I would like to think that this were the case, but you keep coming up with 
>>> irrelevancies that contradict the straightforward account of these 
>>> phenomena. If you forget about the metaphysics and just concentrate on 
>>> Alice and Bob making real measurements and recording them in their lab 
>>> books, then all these superfluities vanish. There are no counterfactuals, 
>>> no worries with other unobserved worlds, and Bell's theorem goes through 
>>> exactly as he intended. Many-worlds does not invalidate Bell's argument. In 
>>> fact, deflecting Bell's theorem would do no more than allow for the 
>>> possibility of a local hidden variable account. That alone does not prove 
>>> that many-worlds is local -- that would still have to be established by 
>>> developing such a local hidden variable theory. No one has to date 
>>> developed such a theory. But since Bell's theorem has not been deflected, 
>>> we do not have to worry about such contingencies.
>> 
>> 
>> So we really agree. You have been probably misguided when trying to defend 
>> John Clark who claimed that there are still FTL influence in Everett, when 
>> the Bell’s inequality relations implies FTL only when we assume unique 
>> outcomes of the experiences (i.e. some collapse, or Bohm’s type of hidden 
>> variable).
>> 
>> No need of patronizing remark either, especially when rephrasing what I was 
>> just saying. If you agree that there is no FTL in the many-worlds, we do 
>> agree, that was the point I was making to J. Clark. Not sure why you 
>> defended it, especially that you have shown implicitly that you have no 
>> problem with the step 3 of the Universal Dovetailer Paradox. You might 
>> eventually understand that with mechanism, Everett’s task is still 
>> incomplete, as we need to justify the wave from all computations, as seen 
>> from some self-referential modes (fortunately and constantly implied by 
>> incompleteness).
> 
> Not to reignite the argument, but it originated because Bruno claimed that 
> MWI does away with non-locality in QM.

Precisely, I claim MWI does with the FTL influence. 

(Non locality + single world (or hidden variable))  entails FTL.
(MW + Non locality) does not.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
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