Re: you are a thought

[Jacques M. Mallah]

On Thu, 13 Jan 2000, Fritz Griffith wrote:
> what is it that links two observer moments?  The answer: memory.  ...

In a sense ... 

> it is not necessary for any previous observer moments to exist

I think what you meant by that is that having memories does not
mean those memories must be true or that other observer-moments
must be the source of them.  That is correct, and somewhat negates the
first statement I quoted.  (e.g. faulty memories, implanted false
memories, etc.)  (So really, there are no such links, but there is the
illusion of links.)

> GSLevy said that time is an illusion created by the logical linking of 
> observer moments; really, though, the illusion is created by the logical 
> structure of memory.  All of our memories must exist within a single 
> observer moment.

Yes, in the sense that memory is responsible for our sensation of
time.  But I do not believe time is just an illusion.  It is a feature of
our models of the physical world, except for some models of quantum
gravity, and may be needed for computation.

> Not only must we remember everything that has happened in 
> our lives, but we must remember what we remembered within all of the 
> remembered observer moments in order to have a perception of time.

We certainly don't remember everything.

> easiest way to do this is with a linked-list type of memory.  The actually 
> existing observer moment need only remember the most recent observer moment; 
> the rest are automatically remembered because the memory of every remembered 
> observer moment includes the memory of the previous observer moment.
> Basically, our entire lives are just a logically structured linked-list 
> memory within a single moment of reality that exists independant of time.  
> Let me know what you think about this theory.

I don't think that's how memory actually works at all.  Some
experiences are (imperfectly) rembered; most are forgotten; and we don't
consciously rember everything at once.
It is more like, during a particular observer moment, we might
either be concentrationg on the present or on a memory.  In either case,
of course, it is more complicated than that because our unconscious mind
has a big effect on what we experience.
As far as our sensation of time, I should probably point out that
most likely we don't usually think about that and for most observer
moments, therefore, it can not be said that we have a sensation of
time.

 - - - - - - -
   Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
 Physicist  /  Many Worlder  /  Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
 My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Re: normalization

[Jacques M. Mallah]

[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: \/
> In my opinion, the RSSA is the conditional probability of you observing 
> something happening given that you are alive to observe it. Thus is it a 
> first person probability measure. 

In that case, if by "is" you mean "gives results equal to", it
would just be a matter of definition, no?  So it could not give results in
conflict with the ASSA.

> In my (unpublished) book I have developed the concept of "relative 
> probability", which may be called in this group "first-person
> probability. By extension, the ASSA (I think) is the third person
> probability.

I don't know what you mean by those terms.  As far I'm concerned,
the ASSA gives the (effective) probabilities of observer-moments, and
that's all there is to it since all other questions can be phrased in
terms of that.

> Thus the computation of probability requires 
> 1) specifying if the probability is for the first or third person (ie. RSSA 
> or ASSA)
> 2) the definition of measure at two points. 

I, of course, would say that #2 determines everything and that #1
does not make any sense since the RSSA doesn't.

> The example provided by Jacques about teleporting Bruno, was excellent.

Thanks.

> The following post is an attempt on my part to go through Jacques' reasonning. 
> Thus if Bruno is teleported from:
> 1) state A: one copy in Brussel to 
> 2) state B  9 copies in Moscow and one copy in Washington, 
> 
> then for the transition AB, the 1st person probability that Bruno finds 
> himself in Moscow is 9 times higher than in Washington. In this particular 
> case, the first person probability of observing such an event is also equal 
> to the 3rd person probability. Thus, in this case, the results from ASSA and 
> RSSA coincide. Looking at this result, it is clear that Bruno while still in 
> Brussel should buy himself a Russian dictionnary to prepare himself for the 
> trip.
>  
> --
> 
> Consider now, as Jacques suggested, a state C created such that 8 out of the 
> 9 copies in Moscow are killed by the Chechnians and 8 copies are created from 
> the single copy in Washington by a Hollywood Jurassic Park project.
> 
> Let us now calculate the first and third person probabilities for the 
> transition AC.
>  
> The ASSA says that the 3rd person probability of finding Bruno in Washington 
> is 9 times higher than finding him in Moscow, since the measure is 9 times 
> larger.

No - the ASSA says that the (effective) probability of Bruno-like 
observer-moments that see Washington is 9 times higher than that of
those that see Moscow, after the second event.  For a "3rd person",
self-sampling would not be at issue.  Note also, as I said, no one of the
copies is more connected to the original than the other copies; so either
they are all Bruno, or only the original observer-moment was Bruno,
depending on the definition.

> Thus, according to ASSA, Bruno should have bought himself an English 
> dictionnary while he was in Brussel.  

Yes - that is true, independent of any quibbles about what
"you" (in this case "Bruno") means.

> Now let us compute the probability of transition AC from the first person 
> point of view (RSSA). This probability is the product of the first person 
> probabilities for transition AB and BC. 
> First person probability of transition AB from Brussel to Moscow trip = 9/10
> First person probability of transition BC for destruction of 8 out of 9 of 
> Bruno's copies = 1 !!! (Bruno is not aware of the carnage of his own copies 
> in Moscow) (Note here that I do not include the Washington experience yet 
> -See note on renormalization **)
> Hence combined first person probability for being in Moscow for transition AC 
> = 9/10.
> 
> Now for the Washington trip:
> First person probability of transition AB from Brussel to Washington = 1/10
> First person probability of transition BC for Jurassic Park cloning of Bruno 
> = 1. (Here I do not include the Moscow experience - See note on 
> renormalization **)
> Combined first person probability for being in Washington for transition AC = 
> 1/10
> 
> Thus according to RSSA, looking back on his purchase choice, Bruno should 
> have bought a Russian dictionnary while he was in Brussel.
> 
> This case illustrates how the decision making process differs if the world is 
> viewed from a first person or third person perspective.

Impossible.  Either he should get one dictionary, or the other (or
both but let's ignore that possibility and make his decision easier by
shortening the time between events AB and BC to one second instead of a
year.)  The ASSA tells him to do one thing; the RSSA something
different; so they are proved to be in direct conflict.  Only one can be
correct.  The RSSA is not another way of viewing the world; it is a
category error.
There is no damn such thing as a "1st person probability".  There
is only the effective pr

Re: normalization

[Jacques M. Mallah]

On Tue, 18 Jan 2000 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
> >  The RSSA is not another way of viewing the world; it is a
> >  category error.
> 
> I use the RSSA as the basis for calculating what I call the relative 
> probability, in this group the first person probability, or, equivalently,  
> the probability conditional on the life of the observer. The ASSA is by 
> extension, the assumption for calculating the 3rd person probability.
> 
> Let us perform a thought experiment.
> Imagine that you are the scientist in the Schroedinger cat experiment.

Scratch that.  Right now let's stick to the example with Bruno and
the 3 cities, because it's better for the current point.
Suppose Bruno, in 1999, wants to know if he is more likely to be
in Washington or in Moscow during 2001.
First of all, that is not a well defined question, because
"Bruno" must be defined.  Suppose we define it to mean the set of all
Bruno-like observations, where by "Bruno-like" we can assume we know what
qualifies.
But then the question becomes meaningless, because it is 100%
certain that he will be in *both* cities.  A 3rd person would have to
agree with that, he is in *both* cities.
So let's ask a meaningful question.  Among the set of Bruno-like
observations in 2001, what is the effective probability of such an
observation being in Moscow?
This is just a conditional effective probability so we use the
same rule we always use:
p(Moscow|Bruno in 2001) = 
M(Moscow, Bru. 2001) / [M(Moscow, Bru. 2001) + M(Washington, Bru. 2001)]
where M is the measure.
So in this case the conditional effective probability of him
seeing Moscow at that time is 10%, and in *1999* he knows he should brush
up on his English because his future 'selves' will be affected by that.

 - - - - - - -
   Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
 Physicist  /  Many Worlder  /  Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
 My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

interpretation of TM (Turing mechanics)

[Jacques M. Mallah]

On Thu, 25 Nov 1999, Russell Standish wrote:
> There may be a problem with this Universal Prior scheme if just any
> interpretation of a bitstring is allowed. (eg one can somehow interpret
> the string containing an infinite number of zeros as encoding
> Shakespeares "Romeo and Juliet"). Because of this rather bizarre
> "counter-example" I assume that there is some restriction on how
> bitstrings can be interpreted. I'm not sure how to formalise this, but

You should realize that, as I have said before in my discussions
with Wei Dai, this is really almost the same problem I have been
confronting regarding implementation of a computation.  However, you are
missing an important element: to single out an 'output string' from a
'junk string (which is present before running the program)', require the
causal relations of a computation to be satisfied.  'Output strings' tend
to be simple (~ universal prior); 'junk' does not (random).

> However should we go all the way to requiring a single interpretation 

I see two types of possibility.  First, and I hope this is the
one that works! a scheme such as I have been trying to develop might work,
based on an objective formulation of algorithmic complexity (which, as
I've discussed before, I have some ideas on how one might find it, but it
has not yet been formulated.  I'm talking about e.g. a uniquely self
consistent way to average over all Kolmogorov complexities).
Second, and this works better if instead of just a Turing machine
there is a high-dimensional computer, let certain particular computations
give rise to consciousness and *don't* allow implementations within it!
In other words, for each 'run' or simulation of an entire multiverse
history, there is an output of one 'brain state' for ONE person.
(Almost like Wei Dai's idea, but also requiring an initial 'brain state'
AND the right causal relations).  My arguments about the problems with the
measure distribution produced, as told to Wei Dai, still stand.
As crazy as it sounds, this is almost equivalent (given that all
possible programs are run) to letting the measure of an implementation be
exponentially suppressed by its complexity in an AUH.  In fact the
requirement of a unique complexity measure is still there since the
distribution of 'all computations' must still be defined.  There is one
advantage though: it may be that in this case, complexity comes in in a
more natural way, merely through the initial distribution of programs
rather than through the interpretation of the outputs to give rise to
consiousness.

 - - - - - - -
  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Re: zombie wives

[Jacques M. Mallah]

On Fri, 27 Aug 1999, Russell Standish wrote:
> > I use the terms SSA, ASSA, RSSA only because others on the list
> > insist on using them.  In my opinion the 'ASSA' is a tautology and not
> > an assumption, while the 'RSSA' is an error.
> 
> ASSA  SSA. ASSA makes explicit the sample set over which SSA is
> applied. So does RSSA (the sample set being different to the ASSA
> case). A third possibility is SSA of birth rank, as used in Leslie
> Carter's arguments.

Ok.  Nothing in your paragraph contradicts what I said.

> > > Under relative SSA, there is time. Each observer moment is connected
> > > to a range (presumably infinite) of future observer moments. The
> > 
> > Here's where the position of the QS camp appears to diverge from
> > other positions of QSers, notably Higgo James, who of course endorses both
> > seemingly contradictory positions.
> 
> Sorry - what are the seemingly contradictory position? Whether one
> assumes ASSA or RSSA?  (these are contradictory positions, and
> give rise to different predictions about QTI)

No, the role of time.  Higgo James has often stated his belief
that moments in time are really not connected.

> > No.  If every observer sees all future moments, then the amount of
> 
> Whoa there! Noone said anything about every observer seeing all future
> moments. Where did this piece of nonsense come from?

It's the QTI claim together with the claim that an observer is
extended over all times at which he exists.  Nonsense, yes.

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

>Thank you Jacques for your detailed reply to my post asking about your 
>concept of measure.

>It seems to me that you have made the assumption that the MWI only deals
>with "splitting" of the observer and not the "merging". This leads to the 
>conclusion that under the Relative SSA the measure keeps increasing and we 
>find ourselves to be very old in the most probable worlds. 
>However, if we include merging of the observer, then we could end up with a 
>Relative SSA in which measure is conserved. 

Nope.  The measure is conserved in the RSSA leading to the
infinite expected value for the age.

>This said, I find it difficult to talk about increase and decrease and making 
>comparisons of the measure when the quantity in question is infinite. 

Then take a calculus course.  I consider the question a non-issue,
and I just spelled it out explicitly to try to get past it.  Some limiting
proceedure is required.  Same as always when dealing with infinities in
physics.

 - - - - - - -
  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Re: zombie wives

[Jacques M. Mallah]

On Mon, 16 Aug 1999, Russell Standish wrote:
[Jack wrote]
> > What I am trying to do is to look at the consequences of the
> > claims made by the quantum suicide camp.  The claim is that consciousness
> > 'flows into' possible continuations of oneself and is, in effect,
> > conserved as long as such continuations exist.  I by no means accept this
> > claim.  However I see no reason why you say it would deny the existence of
> > copying machines.
> 
> Because copying machines increase one's measure, but not effective
> probability, which remains normalised.

I agree with that statement but don't agree that it's consistent
with QS.

> In this copying machine incident, we assume that a person experiencing
> the event has a 50% chance of experiencing being either copy. However,
> each Jane will be fully concsious - there is no diluting of that
> conciousness. An outside observer will be unable to distinguish who
> was the "real Jane".

Neither would an inside observer.  I maintain that the distinction
is meaningless.

[I wrote]
> > If the problem is that QSers may deny that measure is conserved,
> > that problem is not my fault.  By their other words it is clear that they
> > believe it is.  (You may be included in the group I mean by 'them'.)  I am
> > the one using the term correctly.
[this paragraph still applies]

> I still don't see what measure has to do with conciousness!

That is the problem.

From: Higgo James <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>We of the 'quantum suicide camp' deny absolutely that consciousness, or
>anything else 'flows'. Flow is a function of time, which is subjective, not
>an objective feature of reality. To say consciousness flows, is like saying
>a program creates the hardware on which it runs, and the programming
>language in which it is written. 

I'd say there's a split in your camp - and you have been on both
sides of it!  I don't see how you can say the above but reject the SSA.

>Consciousness is not some special property you can bottle, for God's sake.
>But if I am conscious in this universe, and the next one is virtually
>identical, then I am virtually certain that I will be conscious in that one.

The above paragraph is incomprehensible, starting with your use of
the letter 'I'.  I am not sure what this letter is supposed to signify in
that context.

 - - - - - - -
  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Any hope for Higgo?

[Jacques M Mallah]

On Wed, 19 May 1999, Higgo James wrote:
> Jacques, nobody denies that our measure decreases with time. Do you deny
> that there is a billion-year Jacques somewhere out there in the infinite
> universe?

Are you trying to pass the disagreement off as some kind of
semantics?  It's not.  Of course you know that I do believe there is a
billion year old Jacques, so why are you asking that?
If you really didn't deny that measure decreases with time, you
would not believe in immortality.  You do deny it in your own words, you
just don't know how to express it properly.

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: QTI, SSI

>Russell, I must recant for I have erred!
>
>For anyone else, the sight of a billion-year-old man
>would not prove or disprove the Quantum Theory of Immortality.
>But for you, at age 1 billion, the probability that you
>would reach a billion, given QTI, is one. And the
>probability that you would reach a billion given not-QTI
>is very tiny. So it is not unreasonable to believe QTI.
>I'm not sure you can really quantify this.

And there's the proof of my above statement.
Wei Dai has previously argued that the 'quantum suicide' crowd
really just had a weird sense of morality regarding measure, rather than a
wrong view of the math.  I think the above proves that not to be the case:
since Higgo now thinks that being old would be evidence of QTI, that
proves that he does believe that the predictions of QTI would not be the
standard predictions of QM as Wei and I understand it.  
I find it incredible that Higgo can state that being old would be
statistical evidence for QTI, since one would not expect that without
QTI, but still not realize that being young is statistical evidence
against it.

From: Higgo James <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: RE: SSA

>Jacques wrote:
>"Nature must have a mathematical criterion for it, if it is going
>to figure in a theory of physics."
>
>Which implies he has a divine right to figure in a theory for physics.
>No, you don't, Jacques. Human identity does not figure in any physical
>theory; it is merely a useful social construct.

I hope even you have realized by now that an argument against
immortality quoted above is that if immortality were true, identity would
have to figure in physics.  So you are supporting my point above, not
opposing it.

 - - - - - - -
  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Re: tautology

[Jacques M. Mallah]

On Tue, 26 Oct 1999, Russell Standish wrote:
[JM wrote] [&BTW I am getting tired of RS omitting the attribution]
> > That's total BS.
> > I'll review, although I've said it so many times, how effective
> > probabilities work in the ASSA.  You can take this as a definition of
> > ASSA, so you can NOT deny that this is how things would work if the ASSA
> > is true.  The only thing you could try, is to claim that the ASSA is
> > false.
> > The effective probability of an observation with characteristic
> > 'X' is (measure of observations with 'X') / (total measure).
> > The conditional effective probability that an observation has
> > characteristic Y, given that it has characteristic X, is
> > p(Y|X) = (measure of observations with X and with Y) / (measure with X).
> > OK, these definitions are true in general.  Let's apply them to
> > the situation in question.
> > 'X' = being Jack Mallah and seeing an age for Joe Shmoe and for
> > Jack Mallah, and seeing that Joe also sees both ages and sees that Jack
> > sees both ages.
> 
> I shall take X = being Jack Mallah. The rest is irrelevant.
> 
> > Suppose that objectively (e.g. to a 3rd party) Jack and Joe have
> > their ages drawn from the same type of distribution.  (i.e. they are the
> > same species).
> > Case 1: 'Y1' = the age seen for Joe is large.
> > Case 2: 'Y2' = the age seen for Jack is large.
> > Clearly P(Y1|X) = P(Y2|X).
> 
> Sorry, not so clear. It is true by symmetry that p(Y1)=p(Y2).
> 
> p(Y1|X) = p(Y1&X)/p(X)
> p(Y2|X) = p(Y2&X)/p(X)
> 
> Why do you assume p(Y1&X) = p(Y2&X)? I can see no reason. They
> certainly aren't symmetrical. About all one can say from symmetry is
> p(Y1&X) = p(Y2&Z), where Z = being Joe Schmoe.

I must disrespectfully disagree.
It is obvious that p(Y1&X) = p(Y1&Z), because in all instances in
which there is an observation with Y1 & X, there is observation by Joe
Shmoe with Y1 & Z, of equal measure.  That's why I added the extra
conditions, to make it real obvious.
(Since there are no near-zombies in the ASSA.  They are both there
(in that branch/universe), both with human brains, so they get the same
measure.)
So p(Y1&X) = p(Y2&Z) = p(Y1&Z).  OK we have shown it for Joe,
Jack's case works the same way: p(Y1&X) = p(Y2&X).

 - - - - - - -
  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Re: who's on 1st

[Jacques M Mallah]

On Sun, 25 Apr 1999, Gilles HENRI wrote:
> But "COMP" is (if I understood it correctly)
> a stronger hypothesis: it is that at some finite level, you could reproduce
> or duplicate EXACTLY your conscious state, or at least you could simulate
> it "to an arbitrary degree of accuracy" (which is already somewhat
> different!) (James):

I will not speak about "COMP" - it is not my term - but as far as
duplicating your conscious state, you can.  The idea is that by
duplicating some computation, your conscious state would be duplicated,
since consciouness is just as aspect of certain computations.

> >that's necessary. I built an arificial neurone out of integrated circuits in
> >1984; I have no doubt that if I had enough of them I could simulate myself
> >to an arbitrary degree of accuracy. To deny this is to bring in sprit by
> >another name.
> >James

James' claim is wrong.  The brain is much more complicated that
that; there are chemical signals and many other connections of various
strengths.  Neurons are not simple systems of transistors.  The brain
could be simulated but only with a more complicated algorithm.

> Jacques, how do you define " If he is implementing the
> >same conscious computation as me?"

See my web page for my ideas on what 'implementing' means.
Knowing which computations are conscious is another matter, but I use the
Turing test as a rough guideline within the restricted set of computations
that brains perform.  (e.g. Huge look up tables could pass the Turing
test, but are not used by the brain.)

> If you think that you have built a neural network almost identical to
> yourself, you know that YOU have built A MACHINE. But what does YOUR
> MACHINE know?

If computationalism is true, it knows and feels pretty much what
you know and feel.

> And if you succeed in building an intelligent
> machine (which IS possible in my opinion), this machine SHOULD know that it
> is a machine, and hence that it is not you, exactly for the same reason why
> you know that you are you, and not anybody else.

That just depends on the view it has of the external world.  You,
Giles, *could* be an artificial digital intelligence in a simultated
environment in a supercomputer, and you'd never know it if it's done well
enough.

 - - - - - - -
  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Re: Jacques, champion of truth, justice and the American way

[Jacques M Mallah]

> On Tue, Jan 26, 1999 at 09:51:53AM -, Higgo James wrote:
> > Jacques, Darwin has a lot of work to do before I become a slave to my genes,
> > which is what you advocate.  I don't say consciousness jumps magically.
> > Our consciousness, like anything, exists in the same form in very many sets
> > of universes. It doesn't make sense to say 'I am that one' or 'no, I'm that
> > one'.  You are all of them, and as many sets you could call 'you' get 'shut
> > down' because of a vacuum collapse or supernova or quantum suicide
> > experiemnt, they become no longer you, and irrelevant to you.

If the number of copies did not affect the measure, which is what
you just said, then all possible observations would have the same measure,
since at least one copy would exist somewhere.  In that case there would
be nothing to favor, say, observing consistent laws of physics.  Our
observations would be quite atypical.
So we can dismiss that possibility right away.  The only
alternative is that the number of copies is relevant and does determine
the measure.

On Tue, 26 Jan 1999, Wei Dai wrote:
> Seriously, why can't we agree that there is no single right answer here,
> just like there is no single right answer for the Coke vs Pepsi
> question. Whether or not QS is rational depends on one's subjective
> values.

That's never been the issue.  We all agree it depends on one's
values.  But if the QS advocates understood the facts, the values they
have expressed clearly indicate that they would not want to commit
suicide.  They don't understand that it would reduce their measure, and
while some may say they do but don't care about measure, it is obvious
that they still don't understand measure.
If they really didn't care about measure, they wouldn't care about
immortality for instance; they would be content to have a short but good
time, then die (really die).  They would have a small amount of
measure, but all of it 'good times'.  But they don't want that; they want
more life, more measure.

p.s.I just got a Li & Vitanyi and it looks like just what my toolkit
can use.

 - - - - - - -
  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Re: Quantum Time Travel

[Jacques M. Mallah]

On Wed, 23 Feb 2000 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
> > On Mon, 21 Feb 2000 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >  > Since I do not buy the concept of objective reality, I do not 
> >  
> >   Then you are no better than a Copenhagenist.  It's precisely the
> >  fact that non-belief in objective reality is a form of insanity that
> >  spawned the MWI in the first place.
> 
> The Copenhagen school lost faith in the power of reason and they did not 
> believe  100% in QM. They failed to explore the full implications of QM 
> (without the wave collapse phenomemon). 
> 
> Einstein who opposed the Copenhagen School, died in 1955 in Princeton. That 
> same year, a young graduate student, Hugh Everett III, joined Princeton 
> University and two years later, under the guidance of John Archibald Wheeler, 
> he published his doctoral dissertation which he called a "Relative State 
> Formulation of quantum mechanics" in the Reviews of Modern Physics, Volumer 
> 29, No. 3, pages 454-462, July 1957. This paper clearly positions him as a 
> relativist.  
> 
> Einstein claimed that no observer in an inertial frame is privileged; Everett 
> asserted that no observer state in superposition is privileged. Everett had 
> the courage and vision to continue the quest that Einstein started. He is the 
> true inheritor of Einstein's mantle.

It is well known that Einstein believed in an objective
reality.  That's why he made the EPR argument to Bohr.
Everett did indeed extend the work of Einstein.  That part I agree
with.  Like Einstein, he believed in an objective reality.  When he talked
about observers in a superposition, he clearly believed that they exist in
some objective sense.  That's how he could go beyond Copenhagen.

> Jacques, to call me "no better than a Copenhagenist" shows me your true 
> measure and your unfortunate lack of comprehension in this matter. I am a 
> relativist. 

No, you yourself said you're a subjectivist, anti-realist.  That's
the problem, not the fact that you don't privilege one term in a
superposition, because neither do I.
As far as your own measure I took that long ago.

 - - - - - - -
   Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
 Physicist  /  Many Worlder  /  Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
 My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

zombie wives

[Jacques M. Mallah]

referring to
>  t0  |
>  |
>  t1   T / \ H
>/   \
>  t2   /   / \
>   |   |  \
>  t3   Y   R   B

Assume that all three branches occur (two copying events).

Gilles Henri wrote:
>With the color cards, each Jane will measure subjectively a probability 1/2
>of yellow, 1/4 of red (1/2 H *1/2 "being chosen as Jane 1") and 1/4 blue,
>so again p(H) = p(T)=1/2 with the conditional probability formula.
>The probability 2/3 is indeed the chance of finding someone who saw H after
>the first experiment from a bird perspective, because duplicating
>introduces a bias.

I agree that according to the approach taken by the q-su's, namely
that one's measure is somehow distributed among the so called
computational continuations of one's brain activity, the probabilities
would be (1/2,1/4,1/4).  It is a history dependent claim:
>  t0  |
>  |
>  t1   W / \ H
>/   \
>  t2  T/ \H  \
>   |  \   \
>  t3   Y   R   B

where W=wait to show the coin to her until the second copying
event.  Since she doesn't know when copying occurs this looks identical
from her perspective, but the measure distribution is (1/4,1/4,1/2)
according to the QS claim.  Presumably this measure distribution would
remain the same years later.
I think this is already both ill-defined and anti-intuitive.
To extend the example suppose that to counter the unfortunate
demographic imbalance in China, someone figures out how to instantly make
a million copies of Gong Li.  According to the flow of measure claim, each
of these copies would have just one millionth of a normal human measure.
So these women would practically be zombies.  It would not be
justified to give them equal rights since they have so much less
consciousness.  This would remain true even as life experiences give them
different perspectives and evolved personalities, some of them come to
America, etc.  I think this shows how ridiculous the claim is.

 - - - - - - -
  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Re: who's on 1st

[Jacques M Mallah]

On Thu, 22 Apr 1999, Gilles HENRI wrote:
(note: I wrote)
>   The point is that a human brain implements some digital
> >computations.  An analog system is perfectly capable of implementing
> >digital computations; usually only for a certain set of initial
> >conditions.  The basic unit which is associated with consciousness
> >is one time step of such a computation.  To reproduce a particular
> >observation - which you can call 'you' - you only need to implement the
> >given computation by any means.
> 
> The question I raise is: how do you define different implementations of the
> same person vs implementations of different persons (or thinking machines)?

You don't.  At least, you don't have to, but could for practical
purposes.  It's not a fundamental distinction.

> If you meet somebody who insures you
> that he is you, would you believe him and if not, why?

It depends on the definition you use.  If he is implementing the
same conscious computation as me, then he's the same as me in that sense.
(And this is the one that's involved in the duplication thought experiment.)
But he's not me in the sense that there are still two of us.  If he's just
implementing ones that are very closely related to mine, such as my future
self would do, or my counterparts in other MWI 'worlds' would do, then
he's close enough to me for many practical purposes.  For legal purposes
(e.g. property rights), he's not me.

> You seem to adopt a very large definition of "consciousness" (any
> computation?) and "you" (any reproduction of any computation that you made
> at any time?). As any definition, it is perfectly respectable. But it does
> not fit into what is usually meant by these words in the all day life.

No, only a conscious computation counts.  Most computations have
no consciouness, presumably.  And no, it has to be the one I'm making now
- so I'm a different person now than in the past, technically.  And yes,
it is different, because technical applications require precise
definitions that describe the new way of thinking.

 - - - - - - -
  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Re: tautology

[Jacques M. Mallah]

On Wed, 15 Sep 1999, Russell Standish wrote:
[JM wrote]
> > Obviously you don't understand.  With the ASSA, it is always
> > possible to find the conditional probability of an observation given a
> > suitable condition.  Choosing a condition and asking a question about it
> > changes nothing about the real situation.
> > The difference between the ASSA and RSSA really becomes apparent
> > when the ASSA predicts nonconservation of measure as a function of time.
> > Obviously this does not happen in most everyday, nonfatal situations.
> 
> Unless you've changed your spots Jacques, you are starting to become
> incoherent. ASSA is not defined with reference to time, so therefore
> cannot make any statements about it. The RSSA is.

What are you talking about?  I really don't know.
The ASSA states, and always has, that the effective probability of
an observer moment is proportional to it measure.  Time doesn't enter
this definition, in the same way that seeing a color doesn't enter; the
general rule needs no modification to be applied in either case.
It was super-obvious in my post that when I talked about a function
of time above I was referring to the fact that the measure of observer
moments along a computational continuation varies with time.
The RSSA, as far as I can see, is not defined at all.  I have
tried to extropolate the descriptions you guys give into some kind of
coherent position for me to attack, but it seems to me that you often
contradict yourselves while denying any such contradictions.  The role of
time in the RSSA is a case in point.

BTW, while I'm posting I might as well ask, if you guys are so
darn sure consciousness is continuous and that it somehow means it cannot
end, how come you seem to have no problem with birth?  It seems to me that
your arguments would apply equally in that direction.  How come you have
no trouble picturing a boundary for it in the past?  I'm sure you'll come
up with some BS answer but this once again shows the foolishness of your
position.

 - - - - - - -
  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Re: Decision theory

[Jacques M Mallah]

Happy new year, everyone!

On Thu, 31 Dec 1998, Wei Dai wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 30, 1998 at 04:41:47PM -0500, Jacques M Mallah wrote:
> > Certainly any theory with no free parameters will predict many
> > cases in which a being like you will be faced with that decision, and in
> > some of them he will make one decision, in the rest he will make the
> > other.  You can find out which of those cases you are in by making the
> > decision, and you can make the decision because the theory predicts the
> > results for both cases.  Of course there must then be a small chance that
> > a 'random factor' might cause you to make the 'wrong' decision; QM
> > certainly predicts that there is such a chance, ditto a theory with 'all
> > possible structures'.
> 
> I think you're suggesting that we think of decisions as selecting which of
> the you-like beings is really you, instead of as changing the universe
> somehow. This seems like a promising approach, and I've tried it too, but
> I haven't figured out how it can be formalized. It may require a
> different formal framework from "classical" decison theory.

I don't see the problem.  You were right when you said the problem
is a practical one: if it is impossible to calculate the effects of a
decision because that decision is physically impossible according to a
theory with no free parameters, that's a problem.  I don't see that
problem ever occuring.  In order to have no free parameters, the price
that a theory has to pay is precisely that all possible courses of action
will occur.
Or to put it another way, even if the universe as a whole has no
free parameters, one is still free to consider a subsystem and has free
parameters available to specify what subsystem one chooses to look at.
The bottom line is still that the only thing that matters is the
ability to calculate the effect of the decision.

 - - - - - - -
  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Re: Doom2k

[Jacques M. Mallah]

On Tue, 7 Dec 1999 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Suppose there are two possibilities: you live in a universe where there
> will be 100 billion people total, or in a universe where there will be
> 100 trillion people total, and a priori you think there is a 50-50 chance
> which one is the case.  You check your birth order and find that you are
> about number 50 billion.
> 
> Now, that would be pretty likely if you were in the 100-billion universe,
> but it would be very unlikely if you were in the 100-trillion universe.
> Hence by Bayesian reasoning you find you are more likely to be in the
> 100-billion universe, and therefore the human race is likely to end
> relatively soon.  This is the Doomsday argument.
> 
> However introducing the all-universe model and the self-selection
> assumption (that you are a random individual from among all individuals in
> all universes) then a priori the chances that you are in the 100-trillion
> universe are ten times greater than that you are in the 100-billion
> universe.  This exactly counters the shift which you made in the Doomsday
> argument, based on your birth order, which made you think you were more
> likely to be in the 100-billion universe.

The Doomsday argument still works.  The uncertainty is not which
"universe" you're in; as you say, if both universes exist and you know
that, there's no Doomsday argument.  But the thing is, you don't know
that.  Suppose there are N "universes" that all exist.  Some X of them
have 10^11 people, (N-X) have 10^14, but you don't know what fraction X/N
is.  If your number is 5*10^10, this suggests X/N is large: Doomsday.  Of
course, if you could calculate X/N from first principles, there would be
no argument.  The one-world case is just N=1; again, if you could
calculate whether X=0 or X=1 in this case, there would be no argument.

 - - - - - - -
  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Re: zombie wives

[Jacques M. Mallah]

On 18 xxx -1, Marchal wrote:
> Jacques M. Mallah wrote:
> >> Russell Standish wrote: 
> >> I still don't see what measure has to do with conciousness!
> > That is the problem.
> I don't see that either.
> The measure is defined on the set of computations and gives the
> relative probability of living such and such experiences.
> It has nothing to do with the intensity of each experience.

No one ever suggested it might, so I don't know what you're
talking about.  Measure is the amount of consciousness, and effective
probability is proportional to measure.
There is no reason to be confused about amount vs. intensity.  If
you want an analogy you can think of paint.  Intensity, quality, or
whatever you want to call it describes the *color* of the paint, but the
*amount* of paint is another issue.  If you have two colors, red and blue,
the "effective probability" of red is analagous to the amount of red
paint divided by the total amount of paint.

> It is the same with your physical computationalism, because if 
> a computation is well-implemented (in your "physical" sense), then
> the duplication will be well-implemented too.
> Needless to say your zombie argument doesn't work with COMP (Pure COMP),
> but I don't see how it works with your 
> own (hybrid) PHYSical COMPutationalism.

I repeat: the zombies are an artefact of the approach that is used
to justify QS.  I do NOT think there would be zombies.  It's an attempt to
expose the absurdity of QS.

> Nor does it work with Everett MWI. Your argument looks a little
> like the argument against MWI from which it follows that Energy is 
> not conserved in the 'multiplication of worlds'.

Not at all.  Obviously if there is no copying or killing (or
birthing), we all agree that the measure of observers stays the same in
the MWI (at least to a good approximation).

 - - - - - - -
  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Re: Fwd: Implementation/Relativity

[Jacques M Mallah]

On Fri, 30 Jul 1999, someone wrote:
> This is from Tegmark's paper (although I think he was paraphrasing
> Tipler from Physics of Immortality):
> 
>   In fact, since we can choose to picture our Universe
>   not as a 3D world where things happen, but as a 4D world that merely
>   is, there is no need for the computer to compute anything at all --
>   it could simply store all the 4D data, and the "simulated" world 
>   would still have PE.

I haven't read that much of Tegmarks paper.  Obviously he's not a
computationalist, but so far sounds like a structuralist.

>   Clearly the way in which the data is stored
>   should not matter, so the amount of PE we attribute to the stored
>   Universe should be invariant under data compression.

But at this point he no longer sounds like a regular stucturalist.
What he says above seems silly.

>   Now the ultimate question forces itself 
>   upon us:  for this Universe to have PE, is the CD-ROM really needed
>   at all?  If this magic CD-ROM could be contained within the simulated
>   Universe itself, then it would "recursively" support its own PE.  
>   This would not involve any catch-22 "hen-and-egg" problem regarding 
>   whether the CD-ROM or the Universe existed first, since the Universe 
>   is a 4D structure which just is ("creation" is of course only a 
>   meaningul notion within a spacetime).

Here he doesn't answer his own question.

>   In summary, a mathemtaical 
>   structure with SASs would have PE if it could be described purely 
>   formally (to a computer, say) -- and this is of course little else 
>   than having mathematical existence.

A case for that can be made and has been on this list, but not in
the quotes from his paper above.

 - - - - - - -
  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Re: tautology

[Jacques M. Mallah]

On Mon, 15 Nov 1999, Russell Standish wrote:
> > Given the measure distribution of observation-moments, as a
> > function on observables (such as Y1 and X),
> > p(Y1|X) = p(Y1 and X) / p(X)
> > Not so hard, was it?
> > [Note that here X was the observation of being Jack Mallah, and
> > Y1 was basically the observation of being old.  See previous posts on
> > this thread if you want exact details of Y1; nothing else about it is
> > relevent here I think.]
> 
> ASSA doesn't give p(Y1 and X) either.

Obviously, and as I've repeatedly said, some prescription for the
measure distribution is also needed.  That is true even to just get p(X).

> > Huh?  Why should p(not Y1, and X) = 0 ?  Especially since my
> > current observations are (not Y1, and X)!!!
> 
> Your current observations are [sic] p(Y3|X), where Y3 = Jacques Mallah's
> is observed to be young. Y3 is not equivalent to (not Y1). Just because
> you see yourself young does not preclude seeing yourself old at a
> later date!

Here your misunderstanding is clearly exposed.  The way I've
defined p(A), it is the effective probability of an observation-moment
with the property 'A'.
Definitions of identity, of 'me' or 'not me', are irrelevant to
finding p(A).  By definition, if my current observation is A, and A and B
are such that it is not possible for the same observation-moment to have
both, then I observe (not B).
If you want to talk about the probability that, using some
definition of identity that ties together many observation moments, "I"
will eventually observe Y1 - that will depend on the definition of
identity.  It is NOT what I have been talking about, nor do I wish to talk
about it until you understand the much more basic concept of the measure
of an observer-moment.

 - - - - - - -
  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Re: who's on 1st

[Jacques M Mallah]

On Fri, 16 Apr 1999, Gilles HENRI wrote:
> A computer has a number of physical degrees of freedom
> (physical entropy) enormously greater than the number of its computational
> degrees of freedom (memory and processor size); that allows to reproduce
> the same computational complexity with many different material structures.
> So it is clear that if you want to simulate a physical system (down to
> detailed molecular structure) with a computer, you will need a computer
> huger than this system. But then this computer cannot behave PHYSICALLY
> like this system. The only possibility is to built a "molecular" computer
> that has exactly the same PHYSICAL behaviour than your system, that is in
> fact an exact PHYSICAL copy of you (usually what SF authors assume!).

It's not necessary to simulate exactly 'your' behavior for all
time.  The point is that a human brain implements some digital
computations.  An analog system is perfectly capable of implementing
digital computations; usually only for a certain set of initial
conditions.  The basic unit which is associated with consciousness
is one time step of such a computation.  To reproduce a particular
observation - which you can call 'you' - you only need to implement the
given computation by any means.
If a computer 'fails' due to thermal coupling to the environment,
then it + the environment did not implement the given computation.  It +
the environment implemented a different computation.  (Of course in the
MWI we don't expect to be able to observe the final state of such a
system, which is given by its full wavefunction; presumably it will
have many implementations of the same computation; see my web page for
more details.)

 - - - - - - -
  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Re: zombie wives

[Jacques M. Mallah]

I use the terms SSA, ASSA, RSSA only because others on the list
insist on using them.  In my opinion the 'ASSA' is a tautology and not
an assumption, while the 'RSSA' is an error.

On Mon, 23 Aug 1999, Russell Standish wrote:
> Now this implies that an individual's measure decreases the older that
> individual gets. This is the basis of Jacques' argument against
> QTI. In absolute SSA, an individual concious being is a sample from
> the set of all observer moments. There is no time, one just is. Under
> this picture, one could never expect to be all that old.

Ok so far.
 
> Under relative SSA, there is time. Each observer moment is connected
> to a range (presumably infinite) of future observer moments. The

Here's where the position of the QS camp appears to diverge from
other positions of QSers, notably Higgo James, who of course endorses both
seemingly contradictory positions.

> relative SSA predicts that the observer will see at the next instant
> of time an observer moment with the greatest measure, subject to its
> lying in the future of the current observer moment. That measure may
> be fantastically small (eg just prior to a fatal crash) - it just has
> to be the largest from that set.

No.  If every observer sees all future moments, then the amount of
consciousness does not decrease with time, and thus the measure stays
constant over time.  This has the consequence that, for a given observer,
over most of his lifetime he will find himself to be very old.  It may
seem that I am mixing in the ASSA when I say that, therefore, the fact
that we do not find ourselves old is evidence against the RSSA.  The truth
is I can not avoid this way of thinking any more than I could believe that
1+1=3.

 - - - - - - -
  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Re: Decision theory

[Jacques M Mallah]

On Tue, 29 Dec 1998, Wei Dai wrote:
> I realize now the problem with decision theory is really about the absence
> of free parameters in a physical theory, and the problem is practical, not
> metaphysical. So let me redescribe it. Decision theory depends on a
> physical theory to compute the consequences of actions, statements like
> "If I do X, Y will happen." But a physical theory with no free parameters
> cannot be used for this purpose. Either the theory says I in fact do X, in
> which case Y will happen but it's the same Y for every X, or it says in
> fact I don't do X, in which case it doesn't give any predictions about Y 
> at all.

The problem would seem to arise when it is not possible to
calculate the effect of a decision within the physical theory.  However,
if that did happen, I doubt it would be a problem because with only one
physically possible option, a decision is hardly needed.
In most cases, of course, and certainly in practical cases, it is
not a problem in principle.  Both courses of action can be treated 
without having to assume violation of any physical laws.
Certainly any theory with no free parameters will predict many
cases in which a being like you will be faced with that decision, and in
some of them he will make one decision, in the rest he will make the
other.  You can find out which of those cases you are in by making the
decision, and you can make the decision because the theory predicts the
results for both cases.  Of course there must then be a small chance that
a 'random factor' might cause you to make the 'wrong' decision; QM
certainly predicts that there is such a chance, ditto a theory with 'all
possible structures'.

 - - - - - - -
  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Re: tautology

[Jacques M. Mallah]

On Wed, 20 Oct 1999, Russell Standish wrote:
> The measure of Jack Mallah is irrelevant to this situation. The
> probability of Jack Mallah seeing Joe Schmoe with a large age is
> proportional to Joe Schmoe's measure - because - Joe Schmoe is
> independent of Jack Mallah. However, Jack Mallah is clearly not
> independent of Jack Mallah, and predictions of the probability of Jack
> Mallah seeing a Jack Mallah with large age cannot be made with the
> existing assumptions of ASSA. The claim is that RSSA has the
> additional assumptions required.

That's total BS.
I'll review, although I've said it so many times, how effective
probabilities work in the ASSA.  You can take this as a definition of
ASSA, so you can NOT deny that this is how things would work if the ASSA
is true.  The only thing you could try, is to claim that the ASSA is
false.
The effective probability of an observation with characteristic
'X' is (measure of observations with 'X') / (total measure).
The conditional effective probability that an observation has
characteristic Y, given that it has characteristic X, is
p(Y|X) = (measure of observations with X and with Y) / (measure with X).
OK, these definitions are true in general.  Let's apply them to
the situation in question.
'X' = being Jack Mallah and seeing an age for Joe Shmoe and for
Jack Mallah, and seeing that Joe also sees both ages and sees that Jack
sees both ages.
Suppose that objectively (e.g. to a 3rd party) Jack and Joe have
their ages drawn from the same type of distribution.  (i.e. they are the
same species).
Case 1: 'Y1' = the age seen for Joe is large.
Case 2: 'Y2' = the age seen for Jack is large.
Clearly P(Y1|X) = P(Y2|X).

 - - - - - - -
  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Re: Q Wars Episode 10^9: the Phantom Measure

[Jacques M Mallah]

On 31 xxx -1, Marchal wrote:
> I have probably missed something (in the 10^9 episodes!), but I still 
> cannot figure out why should "my"  measure decrease with "time".

At least, unlike some q-immorters, you admit that you do not think
measure decreases with time.

> At least with comp, it seems to me that the measure can only grow, 
> for I can have only a countable set of past histories, and (even "without 
> immortality") "I" have a uncountable set of futur "histories" 
> (continuations).
> 
> If you (or any one else) could elaborate on this, and/or refer me to the 
> discussion-list, or to an URL, it would help me to understand the point.

Before that, I want to establish a key point.  Do you admit that
if, in fact, your measure were to decrease (for example) exponentially
with time, you would not be immortal in any meaningful sense?
If you admit that, then we could have a discussion about whether
measure does decrease or not.  If you do not admit it, then we can't have
much of a discussion since we apparently wouldn't be speaking the same
language.

> I'm still
> open to the idea that such a measure doesn't exist (in wich case comp 
> would be false).
> Where does your assurance come from ?

If implementations of computations are well defined, I take the
measure to be proportional to the number of such (there may be possible
generalizations); more generally one could have a new law of physics to
assign some other measure.  If computationalism is false, one would need
some new law to assign a measure on observations.  Either way I don't see
a problem with the idea of measure.

 - - - - - - -
  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Re: minimal theory of consciousness

[Jacques M Mallah]

On Fri, 16 Jul 1999 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Do you think this variant would work.  Suppose that there are multiple
> possible distinct universes, forming a set U of all possible universes,
> and a probability measure P() defined over elements of U, which tells
> how much contribution that universe makes.  I think that is the direction
> many of us start from.
> 
> Now suppose we need only answer the question, does anything in each
> universe from U give rise to my consciousness.  Q(x) where x is selected
> from U is the probability that universe x instantiates my consciousness
> (I'm not sure whether we'd get probabilities other than 0 and 1 though).
> 
> My motivation is to avoid the replay problem as it seems that so many
> of these paradoxes involve replays.  I only have to decide whether my
> consciousness is ever instantiated in a universe, I don't have to decide
> whether each replay is separately conscious.

Excuse me, what do you mean by 'paradoxes'?  I recall no
discussion of such.

> I can then apply your formula, letting x vary over all universes in U,
> computing sum over x of P(x)Q(x).  I don't fully understand the meaning
> of the result, "the probability that I feel the way I do", but I wonder
> if this would be a valid alternative way of getting to it.

That makes NO sense.  If you say all 'universes' exist, that's the
same as saying one big universe exists.  And if two copies of the same
computation give you twice the measure when they are in different
'subuniverses', there's no reason that shouldn't be true in general.

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  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

MWI of QM

[Jacques M Mallah]

On Fri, 29 Jan 1999 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Hal describes the popular version of the MWI according to which the whole
> universe branching for every quantum event taking place. Needless to say, this
> interpretation invokes a highly nonlocal process.
> My views of MWI (and I am probably not the first one to think that way) is
> that locality can be restored by assuming that the universe is already split
> in a very large number of dimensions and it is WE, the observers, who split as
> the wave function propagates through this superspace. Each point of the wave
> function provides a three dimensional "perspective" of this superspace simply
> because the (everyday) laws of physics are restricted to operate in 3D. I am
> curious to know what the common view of the MWI is: 1) either the whole
> universe splitting for every quantum event, 2) or the wave function
> propagating (and splitting) in a very large dimensional superuniverse.

Everett's view, and the view of all MWIers I know, is that nothing
really splits.  There exists the wavefunction, which obeys Shrodinger's
equation.  That's it.  Qualitatively, the behavior of the solution to that
equation can be described as 'a tree of branches or worlds', regions of
large measure tending to form such shapes in configuration space.  The
effective probabilities are due to the fact that consciousness has greater
measure in regions of large |psi|.  See my home page for a computationalist 
interpretation of that.

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  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Re: tautology

[Jacques M. Mallah]

On Thu, 4 Nov 1999, Russell Standish wrote:
> > On Tue, 26 Oct 1999, Russell Standish wrote:
> > [JM wrote] [&BTW I am getting tired of RS omitting the attribution]
> 
> ^^^ Blame my email software. I almost always leave the .signatures in
> to make it obvious who I'm responding to.

Since your software is bad, you should add it manually.

> > It is obvious that p(Y1&X) = p(Y1&Z), because in all instances in
> 
> It is not obvious, for the same reason that p(Y1&X) = p(Y2&X) is not obvious.
> If QTI is true, then it is clearly not true. Don't assume what you're
> trying to prove.

Perhaps I should have been a little more clear.  I am discussing
the ASSA, not trying to prove it but to show that it is self consistent.
You are right in the sense that I left something out.  I am
assuming a reasonable measure distribution based on the physical
situation.  For example, the measure could be proprtional to the number of
implementations of a computation, as I like to assume.
It is also possible to assume an unreasonable measure
distribution, like the RSSA.  This of course would require new, strange
and complicated laws of psycho-physics.
So what I am really doing is showing that (ASSA + reasonable
measure (RM)) is self consistent.  However, the way we have been using the
term ASSA, RM has almost always been assumed.
In any case it is always true that some way of calculating the
measure distribution is needed.  Your claim was that the RSSA is needed.
My example shows that RM does the job.

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  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Re: valuable errors

[Jacques M Mallah]

On 14 xxx -1, Marchal wrote:
> OK, so you agree that a computationalist could, in case it is 
> technologically feasible, use teletransport to "move" herself.
> Remember that the "original" is destroyed, and "reconstituted" elsewhere.
> 
> I guess you agree that if someone survives teletransport, she will still
> survives teletransport in case of multiple and independent 
> reconstitutions.
> 
> Now, you were saying that the "entrenched trivial" errors concerns the 
> measure issue.
> 
> Could you tell me if there is already an "entrenched trivial error" for 
> those who believes, like myself, that if people tell us in advance that 
> there will be multiple reconstitutions, then, before teletransportation, 
> their "immediate" futur is undetermined ?
> 
> This is what I like to call Mechanist or Computationnalist Indeterminism. 
> So my question is "do you believe in Mechanist Indeterminism ?".

The situation you described is completely deterministic, much like
the MWI of QM.
For all practical purposes, a person who is copied should expect
their future selves to be effectively randomly chosen.
If you want to talk about what is actually going on though, I
don't even accept that 'individual identity' carries over from one time
step of a computation to the next.  It's just that the future self or
selves are sufficiently similar to the current self to motivate an
interest in his (or their) well being.

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  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

everything-list@googlegroups.com

[Jacques M Mallah]

On Tue, 13 Apr 1999, Nick Bostrom wrote:
> The Self-Sampling Assumption (SSA), the idea that you should reason 
> as if you were a random sample form the set of all observers, 
> underlies many of the discussions we have had on this list. About 
> half a year ago I discovered some paradoxical consequences of this 
> assumption. It seems to imply that weird backwards causation and 
> psychokinesis(!) is feasible in our world. In this small paper I 
> describe these possible counterexamples and discuss whether they 
> really are as paradoxical as they appear at first blush:
> http://www.anthropic-principle.com/preprints/cau/causation.doc

There may actually be an interesting issue related to this.
It's not surprising that the Copernican principle (or SSA as you
call it) fails to be useful when the observer, like Adam, just happens to
be in an atypical position.  It remains true that it will work for most
observers and that one should use it; even Adam.
The interesting thing is that if Adam believed in the MWI, he
could calculate (roughly) the distribution of observers, and then he would
realize that the effective probability of him seeing himself have a child,
and therefore of any correlated coin flips or deer crossings, was the same
as a third party observer would calculate.

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  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Re: tautology

[Jacques M. Mallah]

On Mon, 6 Sep 1999, Russell Standish wrote:
> > On Fri, 3 Sep 1999, Russell Standish wrote:
> > > > > Then maybe I misunderstood you. A tautology is a term with redundant
> > > > > parts, ie it is equivalent to some subset of itself. I took your
> > > > > statement that "ASSA is a tautology" to mean that ASSA is equivalent
> > > > > to SSA (symbolically ASSA <=> SSA). I directly contradict this in my
> > > > > first sentence.
> > > > 
> > > > > [JM wrote]
> > > > From WordNet (r) 1.6 (wn)
> > > > tautology n 1: (in logic) a statement that is necessarily true; "the
> > > > statement `he is brave or he is not brave' is a tautology" 2: useless
> > > > repetition; "to say that something is `adequate enough' is a tautology" 
> > > > 
> > > > I was not aware of meaning 2 of the word, while I have
> > > > frequently encountered the word used for meaning 1.
> > > > 
> > > The definition I gave and the one you quoted are equivalent.
> > 
> > I quoted two very different definitions.  The one you gave is
> > equivalent to #2.  The one I meant in my 'zombie wives' post was #1.
> 
> Sorry, I missed the second definition. It is merely a colloquial
> generalisation of definition 1, and is definitely the one I was using.

Generalization?  That's BS.  They are totally different.
Example of def. 1:  A or not A
Example of def. 2:  A and A

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  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Re: Q Wars Episode 10^9: the Phantom Measure

[Jacques M Mallah]

On Sun, 23 May 1999 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Jacques M Mallah, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, writes:
> > It is surely true that in the MWI, old copies of you-like beings 
> > will exist.  It is also true that they will be of very small measure, and
> > that the effective probability of being one of those copies is very tiny.
> 
> We would agree that "someone" is going to be those people.  One way to
> ask the question at hand is, would that "someone" be "you".  This then
> depends on the definition of identity.
> 
> If you define all beings who follow from your present state by the laws
> of physics as "you", then that "someone" will be "you".  In that case,
> "you" will eventually find yourself to be very old.

Things that are consequences of such a definition:
"You" would have multiple futures.  In some worlds "you" will
become physically identical to a being such as "I" currently am.  "You"
(IIRC) will die and be reborn many times.  "Your" measure would decrease
with time.  In some worlds there will be many of "you" that reproduce by
dividing like ameobas.
Things that are NOT consequences of such a definition:
Immortality, since you can't manufacture measure with word games.

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  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Heed Clarification on MW

[Jacques M. Mallah]

On Wed, 8 Dec 1999, Russell Standish wrote:
> > In a MW or all-universe model, all your decisions can do is to change
> > the percentage of people-like-you who do certain things, or equivalently
> > the percentage of universes in which people-like-you have taken various
> > actions.
> 
> I disagree with this statement strongly. The evolution of the MW model
> is completely deterministic, and the ratios of measures of different
> worlds is completely determined at the start.

I discussed this one, decision theory in the MWI, with Wei Dai
pretty thoroughly a while ago; look it up.
Basically, your decisions *do* still determine the outcome, just
like in a single-universe deterministic model.  Which is the same as
saying that the laws of physics + initial conditions determine the
outcome; just another way of talking about the same thing, as you are not 
something outside of physics.

> What your free will does is affect the likelihood of what branch your
> 1st person experience will take. Free will is a 1st person phenomenon,
> not a 3rd person phenomenon. 

There is no free will; in fact, as I say above, realizing that
solves the problem.  As for "1st person" you will not be surprised that I
see no basis for such distinctions.

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  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Re: Infinite Universe analogy for MWI

[Jacques M Mallah]

On Tue, 4 May 1999, Gale wrote:
> Jacques M Mallah wrote:
> > It never ceases to amaze me that many people who are adamantly
> > opposed to the MWI accept an infinite universe without blinking an eye.
> > This analogy also shows that the MWI is really a conservative hypothesis.
> 
> That is quite interesting.  Especially since priors on how a universe
> might form tend to suggest finite universes.  
>
> > Right.  Although I suppose one could generalize the idea of a
> > non-MWI infinite universe to include such things as Lee Smolin's universes
> > that are produced by black holes.
> > Current observations indicate that our universe is open and
> > suggest that the expansion is accelerating.
> 
> I read current findings as general agreement on a hyperbolic geometry
> (with accelerating expansion even) but that whether this is associated
> with a closed or open universe is still undecided.

That's interesting.  I thought most people agreed that a
non-collapsing universe would be open.  It remains true, that many people 
believe that, but maybe not the most knowledgeable people.  I don't really
know that much about current hypotheses on universe formation ...

 - - - - - - -
  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Re: Bayesian boxes and expectation value

[Jacques M Mallah]

On Sat, 15 May 1999 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> In a message dated 99-05-14 15:55:53 EDT, Jacques Mallah writes:
>   Ok, now you seem to think that the expected value for the other
>  box is exp((log(2m)+log(m/2))/2) given that the first box contains m and
>  given a 50% chance that the second box contains 2m.  Ok, that's
>  unconventional logic all right!  Weird conclusions from unrelated
>  assumptions. >>
> 
>  I agree the conclusion is weird. However, As Wei Dai mentioned we need to 
> revise the concept of probability in the context of the MW. The logarithmic 
> distribution was just an example. IN FACT THE DISTRIBUTION CAN BE ANYTHING AS 
> LONG AS IT SATISFIES THE EXPECTATION VALUE = m FOR THE SECOND BOX.. 

You don't seem to understand:  that's NOT how to take an
expectation value.  It bears little resemblance to the formula for an
expectation value, regardless of what "the distribution of m" is.

> I didn't know I had "allies" and enemies. I thought we were all friends 
> striving toward truth.

I'm not your enemy, any more than NATO is the enemy of the Serbian
people.  But I am your opponent in this debate.
Neither have you earned my friendship.

 - - - - - - -
  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Re: Q Wars Episode 10^9: the Phantom Measure

[Jacques M Mallah]

On Wed, 2 Jun 1999 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> And by the way, if the measure was NOT continuous along some branches of the 
> MW, then we could simply ignore those branches since they are irrelevent to 
> immortality, and concern ourselves only with those branches which are 
> relevent where the measure is continuous. (Anthropic reasoning)

What if ALL branches terminate?
Note 1: this is perfectly compatible with an ensemble of branches
which does not terminate even though each individual branch does, if there
are infinitely many branches.
Note 2: this is really the situation in QM, if a 'branch' is
understood as an implementation of a brain computation.  If you disagree I
must ask for a mathematically precise definition of branch.

Note 3: I have not been active recently because I have a lot of
work to do, and I will have for the next few weeks.  To all Qiciders: Do
not interpret silence on my part as a lack of contempt for your writings.
Note 4: George, you still owe me an apology re: Bayesian Boxes.

 - - - - - - -
  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Re: Quantum Time Travel

[Jacques M. Mallah]

On Sat, 19 Feb 2000 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Build a conditional suicide machine that instantly kills the user unless a 
> particular set of conditions in the environment is satisfied. With 
> "conventional" quantum suicide these conditions could be a winning lottery 
> ticket for example. With time travel suicide, these conditions would be that 
> prespecified factors in the environment should match the past to which we 
> would like to travel to.

This shit's sounding sillier by the second.
I'll note, once again, that "quantum suicide" does not *move* you
to the surviving branches.  Those branches would have existed anyway.  All
it does is kill off what would have been perfectly acceptable copies of
you.
Suppose there are two guys, one happy and one medium.  All QS is
is killing off the medium guy so everyone (surviving) can be happy.

As for regular time travel, I doubt it's possible.  Certainly, if
a wormhole could exist, it would be submicroscopic.  I'll have to wait for
quantum gravity to know for sure, but I doubt even that's possible.

 - - - - - - -
   Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
 Physicist  /  Many Worlder  /  Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
 My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Re: valuable errors

[Jacques M Mallah]

On 13 Mar -1, Marchal wrote:
> Jacques M Mallah wrote:
> > Yes, that's why I've enjoyed my discussions with Wei Dai.  My
> >problem is with what I see as the trivial errors that are so entrenched in
> >many of the opinions.
> 
> Could you be a little more explicit ? Could you give examples of 
> "trivial errors". I suspect everybody here want to make some progress.
> Or are you just thinking that the "trivial errors" are so much entrenched 
> that you don't believe you will be able to correct them ?

Yes, that has already been demonstrated - e. g. on the measure
issue - and is consistent with my experience in other forums.

> I know that you present yourself as a computationalist, but just to clear 
> things up, does it mean you are willing to accept a substitution of your 
> brain (or body) by a digital one, at some level of substitution?

I don't know why that would be unclear.  In my view, in principle,
a digital computer could simulate me in all the important respects and
could be conscious.

 - - - - - - -
  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Re: implementations

[Jacques M Mallah]

On 9 xxx -1, Marchal wrote:
> Oh ! It could help me if you answer the following question:
> Suppose you are right and you solve the implementation 
> problem (in your sense).
> So you get a correctly implemented computer. This one is still
> emulable by a Turing Machine, correctly programmed, OK ?
> 
> The running of that Turing machine will, if I understand you,
> be responsible for the presence of consciousness. OK ?
> 
> What will happen, in this case, if a part of the machine doesn't
> work, and if an accidental bunch of cosmic rays, supplies to the
> non-functionning during some time. Will there still be
> consciousness during that time ?

It depends how important the broken part is.  The rest of the
computer would still function and the data from the broken part (supplied
by the coincidental rays) would act as input.  The human brain has several
backup systems.  If the broken part was big and of major importance, then
there would not be consciousness during that time.

 - - - - - - -
  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Re: Implementation

[Jacques M Mallah]

On 27 Mar -1, Marchal wrote:
> Jacques Mallah wrote:
> > Bruno, I think it is now abundently clear that Maudlin's paper
> >does not rule out physical computationalism, and other people on the list
> >have seen that as well.
> 
> Clear would be enough. Abundently clear is a little to much.

OK, 'obvious' is enough.

> I don't understand what really means 'physical' in physical 
> computationalism.
> It is clear that we have not the same primitive elements.
> I believe in numbers and number's dreams. Some dreams are deep and
> partially sharable among UTMs, those are their relative realities.
> 
> I appreciate the everythinger's work on these questions, and I guess it
> is not easy to abandon the physical supervenience thesis.

As I've said, it works the same whether there is a physical world
described by math, or any other mathematical stucture, in terms of what is
needed to find computations that are implemented.

 - - - - - - -
  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Re: tautology

[Jacques M. Mallah]

On Thu, 16 Sep 1999, Gilles HENRI wrote:
> A 21:12 -0700 15/09/99, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit:
> >Closely tied to the self selection assumption is the Doomsday argument,
> >which says that we are probably about halfway along in the lifetime of
> >the human race, hence (if you count by observers or observer-moments)
> >the human race should go extinct within a few thousand years.

This is a prediction of the ASSA.  Remember, though, that it just
sets up a prior Bayesian probability distribution which is easily modified
by additional observations.

Gilles wrote:
> maybe [] prediction should read: there is probably no alien race
> which outnumbers the sum of all other races?

Yes (with the ASSA).  Of course it is only probable, not certain.

 - - - - - - -
  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Re: zombie wives

[Jacques M. Mallah]

On Mon, 23 Aug 1999, Jacques M. Mallah wrote:
>   Life will continue but with decreasing measure.  Still it seems
> that you can make a refutable prediction: namely, that the universe we are
> in is not optimised for us to be here, but is optimised to give you a long
> lifetime.  Basically you are saying that what the measure ratio (say,
> between two universes) will be in the future affects the measure ratio in
> the present.  For example a universe in which lives decay polynomially
> would be favored over one in which they decay exponentially.

This may be confusing since I mixed apples with oranges.  I should
have said "the universes in which the (absolute) SSA would predict a
slower decrease in measure", since, with the relative SSA, those universes
would *increase* in measure.

 - - - - - - -
  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Re: Turing vs math

[Jacques M. Mallah]

On Tue, 26 Oct 1999, Juergen Schmidhuber wrote:
> Jacques Mallah wrote:
> >  A continuous structure is a perfectly good
> > mathematical structure, but no Turing based scheme can include it.
> 
> Why assume non-computable stuff without compelling reason?
> Shaved by Occam's razor.

On the contrary.  Why assume the lack of *any* given type of
mathematical stucture?  A true everything-hypothesis surely would not.
Occam's razor says: don't add extra distinctions such as a restriction
like that.
Note also that, as I said, computability isn't the real issue.  A
Turing machine can not be a continuous (but computable) structure.  Of
course the non-computable stuctures should exist too in an everything -
hypothesis.

 - - - - - - -
  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Re: The Game of Life

[Jacques M. Mallah]

On Fri, 7 Jan 2000 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
> >   James, should we interpret this to mean that you now accept the
> >  ASSA rather than the RSSA?

> Now to respond to Jacques: 

Funny since I asked James the question, not you.

> Since all experience is based on first person logic and first person 
> observation, the frame of reference is necessarily the Self. Hence the 
> validity of the RSSA. In so far as the ASSA is concerned, it can be thrown in 
> the same basket as the idea of the Ether.  

Bullshit, and not amusing bullshit at that.  I grow tired of you.
All experience, of course, is based on the NOW - a single
observer-moment.  Hence the tautological validity of the ASSA.

 - - - - - - -
   Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
 Physicist  /  Many Worlder  /  Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
 My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

Re: Quantum suicide

[Jacques M Mallah]

Hello.  Max, you haven't responded to the arguments I've made
against it.  (e.g. http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/msg00287.html, 
http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/msg00306.html,
http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/msg00313.html,
http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/msg00349.html, etc.)
If you will be in NYC again or want to come up here and have a
discussion about about it, we could arrange a meeting, since that would
probably allow a more effective discussion than by email.

 - - - - - - -
  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/
| Add   C |
| ono |
|   n |
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|ooxc |
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| J.M.  4 |

Re: How does this probability thing work in MWI?

[Jacques M. Mallah]

On Sat, 4 Dec 1999, Christopher Maloney wrote:
> "Jacques M. Mallah" wrote:
> > On Wed, 17 Nov 1999, Fritz Griffith wrote:
> > > Let me know if and why this doesn't make sense.
> > ...
> > I hope this helps.  My only request is that, when you understand
> > this stuff, you agree with me on the quantum immortality heresy :-)
> 
> Shame on you, Jacques, for trying to corrupt the hearts of the
> innocent and impressionable!

I'm not the heretic!  You guys are.  It's just that most of the
MWI establishment does not subscribe to this list.

 - - - - - - -
  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/

RE: Quantum Physics

[Jacques M Mallah]

On Fri, 9 Jul 1999, Higgo James wrote:
> So why don't we observe vacuum collapses, Jacques?

I guess it never occurred to you that the vacuum might be stable?

 - - - - - - -
  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/