Re: Interesting paper on consciousness, computation and MWI
On 07 Oct 2011, at 01:59, Brian Tenneson wrote: Thanks Bruno for patiently explaining things. It's interesting that you bring up computer science as I am doing a career change right now and am going into computer science. I eventually want to work in brain simulation. A lot of the ideas in this group are relevant. Thanks. From the paper, I'll quote again (mainly for myself when I look back at this message) From page 17 It is my contention that the only way out of this dilemma is to deny the initial assumption that a classical computer running a particular program can generate conscious awareness in the first place. If the author is correct that would seem to drive a nail in the coffin for the digital generation of conscious awareness though in some way that might not prove that brain simulation is impossible. Yes. the expression is ambiguous. Perhaps brain simulation would occur in such a way that the simulation is never consciously self-aware but if that were the case, how good is that simulation?? That would lead to zombie. Still, I don't believe any particular implementation of a computation generates awareness by itself (neither in a physical universe, nor in a immaterial arithmetical dovetailing). Awareness needs all implementation of all computations, as it follows from the step 8 in UDA. When I say yes to the doctor, I might survive in the usual sense, but this does not mean that the artificial brain generates my consciousness (which is more an heaven kind of object). but the artificial brain, if well done enough, might make it possible for my mind (existing only in hevan) to continue to manisfest itself here (on earth), like my brain seems to already be able to do. It is a subtle point, but if our bodies are machine, we provably have an independent soul, and machines (silicon or carbon based) just makes it possible fro a soul to manifest itself with respect to other souls with reasonable probabilities. If my doctor wanted to replace my brain with an artificial brain, I think I'd be scared out of my mind if LINUX wasn't an option hehe... Thanks Bruno. All right, but then everyone can get your code source, and your fist person indeterminacy might grow a lot. Expect to find your self in the nightmarish fantasy of your neighbors. Be careful :) I know this might seem like a naive observation but the Bolshoi universe simulation recently done on a supercomputer at UC Santa Cruz in California produced some images of an early universe that had an uncanny resemblance to the human brain. It is the filamentous web of cluster of galaxies, using information from Hubble and COBE, I think. It is very impressive and shows how big the physical cosmos is. I think that comp implies that the cosmos is infinite. The cosmos is the border of an infinite universal mind, and an infinity of computations plays some role. But this is hard to prove, because comp can also collapse, from the first person views, or renormalize, many infinities. The cosmos is a priori infinite, but some weird computational phenomenon collapsing infinities are hard to avoid especially before we understand better why the 'white rabbits' are so rare in our neighborhoods. It gives me hope that it is possible to simulate a brain on a classical computer. Perhaps the details would involve highly complex neural networks; Don't forget the glial cells. They are 20 times more numerous than neurons, and we know that they don't not only communicate (by chemical waves instead of ionic electricity) between themselves, but they do communicate with the neurons also (this plays a role notably in the chronic pains). They might be needed for the conscious background. the hope would be to rival the complexity of an actual brain. Good luck. It will be easier to copy highly plastic brain (like baby's brain) and let them organize themselves that to actually copy an adult brain, which contains tremendous amount of distributed information. Here is a link that includes video http://hipacc.ucsc.edu/Bolshoi/ It is beautiful. Have you look to this nice video (by SpaceRip): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CEQouX5U0fc Ah, but you can find impressive filamentous structure in the Mandelbrot set too, and even without digging deep: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9G6uO7ZHtK8 (Then of course we might get into some ethical quandaries regarding the personhood of a simulated brain such as can we run any experiment on it that we feel like running... is simulated suffering ethically equivalent to actual suffering... and that sort of thing.) With comp, simulated suffering is the same as suffering, and should be forbidden, unless someone accept it for its own brain, and this before doing the copy. (Like I think you have the right to kill or even torture yourself, as far as you are not making other suffering). The very complex case, is when
Re: Interesting paper on consciousness, computation and MWI
On 04 Oct 2011, at 23:14, Brian Tenneson wrote: Hmm... Unfortunately there are several terms there I don't understand. Digital brain. What's a brain? I ask because I'm betting it doesn't mean a pile of gray and white matter. Suppose that you have a brain disease, and you doctor propose to you an artificial brain, and he does not hide that this mean he will copy your brain state at the level of the molecules, processed by a computer. he adds that you can choose between a mac or a pc. Comp assumes that there is a level such that you can survive in the usual clinical sense with such a digital brain like you can already survive with an artificial pump at the place of the heart. Then you mention artificial brain. That's different from digital? Well, it could be for those studying an analog version of comp. But unless the analog system use actual infinities, it will be emulable by a digital machine. The redundancy of the brains and its evolution pleads for the idea that the brain is indeed digitally emulable. Is digital more nonphysical than artificial? Not a priori, at all. Sellable computers are digital and physical. Today the non physical universal machines are still free, and can be found in books or on the net. You might find a lot by looking toward yourself, but the study of computer science can accelerate that discovery a lot. Bruno On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 7:31 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 04 Oct 2011, at 05:33, Brian Tenneson wrote: From page 17 It is my contention that the only way out of this dilemma is to deny the initial assumption that a classical computer running a particular program can generate conscious awareness in the first place. What about the possibility of allowing for a large number of conscious moments that would, in a limit of some sort, approximate continuous, conscious awareness? In my mind, I liken the comparison to that of a radioactive substance and half-life decay formulas. In truth, there are finitely many atoms decaying but the half-life decay formulas never acknowledge that at some point the predicted mass of what's left measures less than one atom. So I'm talking about a massive number of calculated conscious moments so that for all intents and purposes, continuous conscious awareness is the observed result. Earlier on page 17... its program must only generate a finite sequence of conscious moments. I think I agree with you. I think that such a view is the only compatible with Digital Mechanism, but also with QM (without collapse). Consciousness is never generated by the running of a particular computer. If we can survive with a digital brain, this is related to the fact that we already belong to an infinity of computations, and the artificial brain just preserve that infinity, in a way such that I can survive in my usual normal (Gaussian) neighborhoods. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Interesting paper on consciousness, computation and MWI
Thanks Bruno for patiently explaining things. It's interesting that you bring up computer science as I am doing a career change right now and am going into computer science. I eventually want to work in brain simulation. A lot of the ideas in this group are relevant. From the paper, I'll quote again (mainly for myself when I look back at this message) From page 17 It is my contention that the only way out of this dilemma is to deny the initial assumption that a classical computer running a particular program can generate conscious awareness in the first place. If the author is correct that would seem to drive a nail in the coffin for the digital generation of conscious awareness though in some way that might not prove that brain simulation is impossible. Perhaps brain simulation would occur in such a way that the simulation is never consciously self-aware but if that were the case, how good is that simulation?? If my doctor wanted to replace my brain with an artificial brain, I think I'd be scared out of my mind if LINUX wasn't an option hehe... Thanks Bruno. I know this might seem like a naive observation but the Bolshoi universe simulation recently done on a supercomputer at UC Santa Cruz in California produced some images of an early universe that had an uncanny resemblance to the human brain. It gives me hope that it is possible to simulate a brain on a classical computer. Perhaps the details would involve highly complex neural networks; the hope would be to rival the complexity of an actual brain. Here is a link that includes video http://hipacc.ucsc.edu/Bolshoi/ (Then of course we might get into some ethical quandaries regarding the personhood of a simulated brain such as can we run any experiment on it that we feel like running... is simulated suffering ethically equivalent to actual suffering... and that sort of thing.) On Thu, Oct 6, 2011 at 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 04 Oct 2011, at 23:14, Brian Tenneson wrote: Hmm... Unfortunately there are several terms there I don't understand. Digital brain. What's a brain? I ask because I'm betting it doesn't mean a pile of gray and white matter. Suppose that you have a brain disease, and you doctor propose to you an artificial brain, and he does not hide that this mean he will copy your brain state at the level of the molecules, processed by a computer. he adds that you can choose between a mac or a pc. Comp assumes that there is a level such that you can survive in the usual clinical sense with such a digital brain like you can already survive with an artificial pump at the place of the heart. Then you mention artificial brain. That's different from digital? Well, it could be for those studying an analog version of comp. But unless the analog system use actual infinities, it will be emulable by a digital machine. The redundancy of the brains and its evolution pleads for the idea that the brain is indeed digitally emulable. Is digital more nonphysical than artificial? Not a priori, at all. Sellable computers are digital and physical. Today the non physical universal machines are still free, and can be found in books or on the net. You might find a lot by looking toward yourself, but the study of computer science can accelerate that discovery a lot. Bruno On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 7:31 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 04 Oct 2011, at 05:33, Brian Tenneson wrote: From page 17 It is my contention that the only way out of this dilemma is to deny the initial assumption that a classical computer running a particular program can generate conscious awareness in the first place. What about the possibility of allowing for a large number of conscious moments that would, in a limit of some sort, approximate continuous, conscious awareness? In my mind, I liken the comparison to that of a radioactive substance and half-life decay formulas. In truth, there are finitely many atoms decaying but the half-life decay formulas never acknowledge that at some point the predicted mass of what's left measures less than one atom. So I'm talking about a massive number of calculated conscious moments so that for all intents and purposes, continuous conscious awareness is the observed result. Earlier on page 17... its program must only generate a finite sequence of conscious moments. I think I agree with you. I think that such a view is the only compatible with Digital Mechanism, but also with QM (without collapse). Consciousness is never generated by the running of a particular computer. If we can survive with a digital brain, this is related to the fact that we already belong to an infinity of computations, and the artificial brain just preserve that infinity, in a way such that I can survive in my usual normal (Gaussian) neighborhoods. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the
Re: Interesting paper on consciousness, computation and MWI
On 04 Oct 2011, at 05:33, Brian Tenneson wrote: From page 17 It is my contention that the only way out of this dilemma is to deny the initial assumption that a classical computer running a particular program can generate conscious awareness in the first place. What about the possibility of allowing for a large number of conscious moments that would, in a limit of some sort, approximate continuous, conscious awareness? In my mind, I liken the comparison to that of a radioactive substance and half-life decay formulas. In truth, there are finitely many atoms decaying but the half-life decay formulas never acknowledge that at some point the predicted mass of what's left measures less than one atom. So I'm talking about a massive number of calculated conscious moments so that for all intents and purposes, continuous conscious awareness is the observed result. Earlier on page 17... its program must only generate a finite sequence of conscious moments. I think I agree with you. I think that such a view is the only compatible with Digital Mechanism, but also with QM (without collapse). Consciousness is never generated by the running of a particular computer. If we can survive with a digital brain, this is related to the fact that we already belong to an infinity of computations, and the artificial brain just preserve that infinity, in a way such that I can survive in my usual normal (Gaussian) neighborhoods. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Interesting paper on consciousness, computation and MWI
Hmm... Unfortunately there are several terms there I don't understand. Digital brain. What's a brain? I ask because I'm betting it doesn't mean a pile of gray and white matter. Then you mention artificial brain. That's different from digital? Is digital more nonphysical than artificial? On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 7:31 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 04 Oct 2011, at 05:33, Brian Tenneson wrote: From page 17 It is my contention that the only way out of this dilemma is to deny the initial assumption that a classical computer running a particular program can generate conscious awareness in the first place. What about the possibility of allowing for a large number of conscious moments that would, in a limit of some sort, approximate continuous, conscious awareness? In my mind, I liken the comparison to that of a radioactive substance and half-life decay formulas. In truth, there are finitely many atoms decaying but the half-life decay formulas never acknowledge that at some point the predicted mass of what's left measures less than one atom. So I'm talking about a massive number of calculated conscious moments so that for all intents and purposes, continuous conscious awareness is the observed result. Earlier on page 17... its program must only generate a finite sequence of conscious moments. I think I agree with you. I think that such a view is the only compatible with Digital Mechanism, but also with QM (without collapse). Consciousness is never generated by the running of a particular computer. If we can survive with a digital brain, this is related to the fact that we already belong to an infinity of computations, and the artificial brain just preserve that infinity, in a way such that I can survive in my usual normal (Gaussian) neighborhoods. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Interesting paper on consciousness, computation and MWI
On 02 Oct 2011, at 01:55, Russell Standish wrote: On Sat, Oct 01, 2011 at 05:15:34PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Oct 2011, at 09:31, Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Sep 22, 2011 at 07:02:28PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: OK. But note that in this case you are using the notion of 3-OM (or computational state), not Bostrom notion of 1-OM (or my notion of first person state). The 3-OM are countable, but the 1-OMs are not. Could you explain more why you think this? AFAICT, Bostrom makes no mention of the cardinality of his OMs. I don't think that Bostrom mentions the cardinality of his OMs, indeed. I don't think that he clearly distinguish the 1-OMs and the 3-OMs either. By 3-OM I refer to the computational state per se, as defined relatively to the UD deployment (UD*). Those are clearly infinite and countable, even recursively countable. The 1-OMs, for any person, are not recursively countable, indeed by an application of a theorem of Rice, they are not even 3-recognizable. Or more simply because you cannot know your substitution level. In front of some portion of UD*, you cannot recognize your 1-OMs in general. You cannot say I am here, and there, etc. But they are (non constructively) well defined. God can know that you are here, and there, ... And the measure on the 1-OMs should be defined on those unrecognizable 1-OMs. I'm still struggling to understand what you mean by 1-OM here. Are you talking about the infinite histories making up UD*? There are an uncountable number of these, it is true. Only those going through some computational state being mine, from my points of view. It looks like a relativistic cone, except that futures might be more numerous than past. Now the 1-OM is the subjective part of this: it is an indexical, whose logics will obey the modalities having a connection with truth (like Bp p, and Bp Dy p). But then, I wouldn't call these OMs. An OM must surely be related to the set of all such histories passing through your current here and now. Yes. And there are non countably many such histories. Such things, I am convinced, must be countable, implying that each such sets histories is a continuum. The states are countable, but not the (3-)states + the neighborhhood of (infinite) computations that you are mentioning yourselves. Not sure if I see where is the problem. It seems that you have answered it. The 1-OMs *are* set of histories, but with a particular 3- state, single out in the indexical way, and which will play the role of the Bp. The p will force the logic of the computational extensions to be different. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Interesting paper on consciousness, computation and MWI
On Mon, Oct 03, 2011 at 05:31:21PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: The states are countable, but not the (3-)states + the neighborhhood of (infinite) computations that you are mentioning yourselves. Not sure if I see where is the problem. It seems that you have answered it. The 1-OMs *are* set of histories, but with a particular 3-state, single out in the indexical way, and which will play the role of the Bp. The p will force the logic of the computational extensions to be different. The way I was talking about it, there is a 1:1 correspondence between the 3-states and the sets of histories making up the 1-OM. In that case the cardinality of 1-OM is the same as that of the 3-states - which you have already admitted is countable. Perhaps I'm missing something? I don't quite get the indexical bit for instance. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Interesting paper on consciousness, computation and MWI
From page 17 It is my contention that the only way out of this dilemma is to deny the initial assumption that a classical computer running a particular program can generate conscious awareness in the first place. What about the possibility of allowing for a large number of conscious moments that would, in a limit of some sort, approximate continuous, conscious awareness? In my mind, I liken the comparison to that of a radioactive substance and half-life decay formulas. In truth, there are finitely many atoms decaying but the half-life decay formulas never acknowledge that at some point the predicted mass of what's left measures less than one atom. So I'm talking about a massive number of calculated conscious moments so that for all intents and purposes, continuous conscious awareness is the observed result. Earlier on page 17... its program must only generate a finite sequence of conscious moments. Cheers Brian -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Interesting paper on consciousness, computation and MWI
On 01 Oct 2011, at 22:23, meekerdb wrote: On 10/1/2011 8:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Oct 2011, at 09:31, Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Sep 22, 2011 at 07:02:28PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: OK. But note that in this case you are using the notion of 3-OM (or computational state), not Bostrom notion of 1-OM (or my notion of first person state). The 3-OM are countable, but the 1-OMs are not. Could you explain more why you think this? AFAICT, Bostrom makes no mention of the cardinality of his OMs. I don't think that Bostrom mentions the cardinality of his OMs, indeed. I don't think that he clearly distinguish the 1-OMs and the 3-OMs either. By 3-OM I refer to the computational state per se, as defined relatively to the UD deployment (UD*). Those are clearly infinite and countable, even recursively countable. The 1-OMs, for any person, are not recursively countable, indeed by an application of a theorem of Rice, they are not even 3- recognizable. Or more simply because you cannot know your substitution level. In front of some portion of UD*, you cannot recognize your 1-OMs in general. You cannot say I am here, and there, etc. But they are (non constructively) well defined. God can know that you are here, and there, ... Wouldn't that require that all the infinite UD calculations be completed before all the you could be indentified? The infinite UD calculations are just number relations, which are out of space and time. And the measure on the 1-OMs should be defined on those unrecognizable 1-OMs. Are the 1-OMs countable? In the quote above, I say that they are not countable. What I meant by this is related to the measure problem, which cannot be made on the states themselves, but, I think, on the computational histories going through them, and, actually, on *all* computational histories going through them. This includes the dummy histories which duplicate you iteratively through some processes similar to the infinite iteration of the WM self-duplication. Even if you don't interact with the output (here: W or M) or the iteration, such computations multiplies in the non- countable infinity. (I am using implictly the fist person indeterminacy, of course). Those computation will have the shape: you M you M you W you M You W You W You W You M ad infinitum This gives a white noise, which is not necessarily available to you, but it still multiplies (in the most possible dumb way) your computational histories. Such infinite computations, which are somehow dovetailing on the reals (infinite sequence of W and M) have a higher measure than any finite computations and so are good candidates for the winning computations. Note that such an infinite background noise, although not directly accessible through your 1-OMs, should be experimentally detectable when you look at yourselves+neighborhood below the substitution level, and indeed QM confirms this by the many (up + down) superposition states of the particles states in the (assumed to be infinite) multi-universes. But aside from the quantum level, doesn't the measure problem have the same drawback and Boltzman's brains. Shouldn't I find myself in a world where everyone is Brent Meeker? Well, if you prove this, then you refute comp (and most of its super- Turing weakenings). The big difference between Boltzman brains and UD*, is that the first are not well defined and depends on physical assumption, the second is well defined and depends only of the addition and multiplication laws of non negative integers. Bruno This might be also confirmed by some possible semantics for the logic of the first person points of view (the quantified logic qS4Grz1, qX1* have, I think, non countable important models). 3-OMs are relatively simple objects, but 1-OMs are more sophisticated, and are defined together with the set of all computations going through their correspondent states. To be sure, I am not entirely persuaded that Bostrom's 1-OMs makes sense with digital mechanism, and usually I prefer to use the label of first person experiences/histories. With the rule Y = II, that is: a bifurcation of a computations entails a doubling of the measure even on its past (in the UD steps sense), this makes clear that we have a continuum of infinite histories. Again, this is made more complex when we take amnesia and fusion of histories) into consideration. I hope this helps a bit. In my opinion, only further progress on the hypostases modal logics will make it possible to isolate a reasonable definition of 1-OMs, which obviously is a quite intricate notion. Bruno -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South
Re: Interesting paper on consciousness, computation and MWI
On Thu, Sep 22, 2011 at 07:02:28PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: OK. But note that in this case you are using the notion of 3-OM (or computational state), not Bostrom notion of 1-OM (or my notion of first person state). The 3-OM are countable, but the 1-OMs are not. Could you explain more why you think this? AFAICT, Bostrom makes no mention of the cardinality of his OMs. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Interesting paper on consciousness, computation and MWI
On 01 Oct 2011, at 09:31, Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Sep 22, 2011 at 07:02:28PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: OK. But note that in this case you are using the notion of 3-OM (or computational state), not Bostrom notion of 1-OM (or my notion of first person state). The 3-OM are countable, but the 1-OMs are not. Could you explain more why you think this? AFAICT, Bostrom makes no mention of the cardinality of his OMs. I don't think that Bostrom mentions the cardinality of his OMs, indeed. I don't think that he clearly distinguish the 1-OMs and the 3- OMs either. By 3-OM I refer to the computational state per se, as defined relatively to the UD deployment (UD*). Those are clearly infinite and countable, even recursively countable. The 1-OMs, for any person, are not recursively countable, indeed by an application of a theorem of Rice, they are not even 3-recognizable. Or more simply because you cannot know your substitution level. In front of some portion of UD*, you cannot recognize your 1-OMs in general. You cannot say I am here, and there, etc. But they are (non constructively) well defined. God can know that you are here, and there, ... And the measure on the 1-OMs should be defined on those unrecognizable 1-OMs. Are the 1-OMs countable? In the quote above, I say that they are not countable. What I meant by this is related to the measure problem, which cannot be made on the states themselves, but, I think, on the computational histories going through them, and, actually, on *all* computational histories going through them. This includes the dummy histories which duplicate you iteratively through some processes similar to the infinite iteration of the WM self-duplication. Even if you don't interact with the output (here: W or M) or the iteration, such computations multiplies in the non-countable infinity. (I am using implictly the fist person indeterminacy, of course). Those computation will have the shape: you M you M you W you M You W You W You W You M ad infinitum This gives a white noise, which is not necessarily available to you, but it still multiplies (in the most possible dumb way) your computational histories. Such infinite computations, which are somehow dovetailing on the reals (infinite sequence of W and M) have a higher measure than any finite computations and so are good candidates for the winning computations. Note that such an infinite background noise, although not directly accessible through your 1-OMs, should be experimentally detectable when you look at yourselves+neighborhood below the substitution level, and indeed QM confirms this by the many (up + down) superposition states of the particles states in the (assumed to be infinite) multi-universes. This might be also confirmed by some possible semantics for the logic of the first person points of view (the quantified logic qS4Grz1, qX1* have, I think, non countable important models). 3-OMs are relatively simple objects, but 1-OMs are more sophisticated, and are defined together with the set of all computations going through their correspondent states. To be sure, I am not entirely persuaded that Bostrom's 1-OMs makes sense with digital mechanism, and usually I prefer to use the label of first person experiences/histories. With the rule Y = II, that is: a bifurcation of a computations entails a doubling of the measure even on its past (in the UD steps sense), this makes clear that we have a continuum of infinite histories. Again, this is made more complex when we take amnesia and fusion of histories) into consideration. I hope this helps a bit. In my opinion, only further progress on the hypostases modal logics will make it possible to isolate a reasonable definition of 1-OMs, which obviously is a quite intricate notion. Bruno -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at
Re: Interesting paper on consciousness, computation and MWI
On 10/1/2011 8:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Oct 2011, at 09:31, Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Sep 22, 2011 at 07:02:28PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: OK. But note that in this case you are using the notion of 3-OM (or computational state), not Bostrom notion of 1-OM (or my notion of first person state). The 3-OM are countable, but the 1-OMs are not. Could you explain more why you think this? AFAICT, Bostrom makes no mention of the cardinality of his OMs. I don't think that Bostrom mentions the cardinality of his OMs, indeed. I don't think that he clearly distinguish the 1-OMs and the 3-OMs either. By 3-OM I refer to the computational state per se, as defined relatively to the UD deployment (UD*). Those are clearly infinite and countable, even recursively countable. The 1-OMs, for any person, are not recursively countable, indeed by an application of a theorem of Rice, they are not even 3-recognizable. Or more simply because you cannot know your substitution level. In front of some portion of UD*, you cannot recognize your 1-OMs in general. You cannot say I am here, and there, etc. But they are (non constructively) well defined. God can know that you are here, and there, ... Wouldn't that require that all the infinite UD calculations be completed before all the you could be indentified? And the measure on the 1-OMs should be defined on those unrecognizable 1-OMs. Are the 1-OMs countable? In the quote above, I say that they are not countable. What I meant by this is related to the measure problem, which cannot be made on the states themselves, but, I think, on the computational histories going through them, and, actually, on *all* computational histories going through them. This includes the dummy histories which duplicate you iteratively through some processes similar to the infinite iteration of the WM self-duplication. Even if you don't interact with the output (here: W or M) or the iteration, such computations multiplies in the non-countable infinity. (I am using implictly the fist person indeterminacy, of course). Those computation will have the shape: you M you M you W you M You W You W You W You M ad infinitum This gives a white noise, which is not necessarily available to you, but it still multiplies (in the most possible dumb way) your computational histories. Such infinite computations, which are somehow dovetailing on the reals (infinite sequence of W and M) have a higher measure than any finite computations and so are good candidates for the winning computations. Note that such an infinite background noise, although not directly accessible through your 1-OMs, should be experimentally detectable when you look at yourselves+neighborhood below the substitution level, and indeed QM confirms this by the many (up + down) superposition states of the particles states in the (assumed to be infinite) multi-universes. But aside from the quantum level, doesn't the measure problem have the same drawback and Boltzman's brains. Shouldn't I find myself in a world where everyone is Brent Meeker? This might be also confirmed by some possible semantics for the logic of the first person points of view (the quantified logic qS4Grz1, qX1* have, I think, non countable important models). 3-OMs are relatively simple objects, but 1-OMs are more sophisticated, and are defined together with the set of all computations going through their correspondent states. To be sure, I am not entirely persuaded that Bostrom's 1-OMs makes sense with digital mechanism, and usually I prefer to use the label of first person experiences/histories. With the rule Y = II, that is: a bifurcation of a computations entails a doubling of the measure even on its past (in the UD steps sense), this makes clear that we have a continuum of infinite histories. Again, this is made more complex when we take amnesia and fusion of histories) into consideration. I hope this helps a bit. In my opinion, only further progress on the hypostases modal logics will make it possible to isolate a reasonable definition of 1-OMs, which obviously is a quite intricate notion. Bruno -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message
Re: Interesting paper on consciousness, computation and MWI
On Sat, Oct 01, 2011 at 05:15:34PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Oct 2011, at 09:31, Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Sep 22, 2011 at 07:02:28PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: OK. But note that in this case you are using the notion of 3-OM (or computational state), not Bostrom notion of 1-OM (or my notion of first person state). The 3-OM are countable, but the 1-OMs are not. Could you explain more why you think this? AFAICT, Bostrom makes no mention of the cardinality of his OMs. I don't think that Bostrom mentions the cardinality of his OMs, indeed. I don't think that he clearly distinguish the 1-OMs and the 3-OMs either. By 3-OM I refer to the computational state per se, as defined relatively to the UD deployment (UD*). Those are clearly infinite and countable, even recursively countable. The 1-OMs, for any person, are not recursively countable, indeed by an application of a theorem of Rice, they are not even 3-recognizable. Or more simply because you cannot know your substitution level. In front of some portion of UD*, you cannot recognize your 1-OMs in general. You cannot say I am here, and there, etc. But they are (non constructively) well defined. God can know that you are here, and there, ... And the measure on the 1-OMs should be defined on those unrecognizable 1-OMs. I'm still struggling to understand what you mean by 1-OM here. Are you talking about the infinite histories making up UD*? There are an uncountable number of these, it is true. But then, I wouldn't call these OMs. An OM must surely be related to the set of all such histories passing through your current here and now. Such things, I am convinced, must be countable, implying that each such sets histories is a continuum. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Interesting paper on consciousness, computation and MWI
On 21 Sep 2011, at 12:41, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Sep 19, 2011 at 01:14:04PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote: Exactly why are there not a continuum of OMs? It seems to me if we parametrize the cardinality of distinct OMs to *all possible* partitionings of the tangent spaces of physical systems (spaces wherein the Lagrangians and Hamiltonians exist) then we obtain at least the cardinality of the continuum. It is only if we assume some arbitrary coarse graining that we have a countable set of OMs. I do not assume an arbitrary coarse graining, but do think that each OM must contain a finite amount of information. This implies the set of OMs is countable. OK. But note that in this case you are using the notion of 3-OM (or computational state), not Bostrom notion of 1-OM (or my notion of first person state). The 3-OM are countable, but the 1-OMs are not. The problem with this argument is that all rational numbers, when expressed in base2, ultimately end in a repeating tail. In decimal notation, we write dots above the digits that repeat. Once the recurring tail has been reached, no further bits of information is required to specify the rational number. Another way of looking at it is that all rational numbers can be specified as two integers - a finite amount of information. I must dispute this claim because that reasoning in terms of 'two integer' encoding of rationals ignores the vast and even infinite apparatus required to decode the value of an arbitrary pair of 'specified by two integers' values. Both the human brain, and computers are capable of handling rational numbers exactly. Neither of these are infinite apparatuses. If you're using an arbitrary precision integer representation (eg the software GMP), the only limitation to storing the rational number (or decoding it, as you put it) is the amount of memory available on the computer. The amount of information needed to represent any rational number is finite (although may be arbitarily large, as is the case for any integer). Only real numbers, in general, require infinite information. Such numbers are known as uncomputable numbers. OK. This of course does not prevent a machine to discover and handle many non computable numbers. She can even generate them all, like in finite self-duplication experiences. The same applies to the notion of digital information. Sure, we can think that the observed universe can be represented by some finite collection of finite bit strings, but this is just the result of imposing an arbitrary upper and lower bound on the resolution of the recording/describing machinery. There is no ab initio reason why that particular upper/lower bound on resolution exists in the first place. It rather depends what we mean by universe. An observer moment, ISTM, is necessarily a finite information object. Moving from one observer moment to the next must involve a difference of at least one bit, in order for there to be an evolution in observer moments. A history, or linear sequence of observable moments, must therefore be a countable set of OMs, but this could be infinite. A collection of such histories would be a continuum. OK. And they define the structure of the 1-OMs. A world (or universe), in my view, is given by a bundle of histories satisfying a finite set of constraints. As such, an infinite amount of information in the histories is irrelevant (don't care bits). It might be for the 1-OM measure problem. Bruno But if you'd prefer to identify the world with a unique history, or even as something with independent existence outside of observation, then sure, it may contain an infinite amount of information. I notice this paper is an 02 arXiv paper, so rather old. It hasn't been through peer review AFAICT. There was a bit of a critique of it on Math Forum, but that degenerated pretty fast. Cheers Ideas are sometimes like vine or a single malt whiskey that must age before its bouquet is at its prime. Partly I was wondering how much effort to put into it. Unfortunately, it appears that the author's email addresses are no longer valid, as it would be very interesting to have him engage in our discussions. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
Re: Interesting paper on consciousness, computation and MWI
On Mon, Sep 19, 2011 at 01:14:04PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote: Exactly why are there not a continuum of OMs? It seems to me if we parametrize the cardinality of distinct OMs to *all possible* partitionings of the tangent spaces of physical systems (spaces wherein the Lagrangians and Hamiltonians exist) then we obtain at least the cardinality of the continuum. It is only if we assume some arbitrary coarse graining that we have a countable set of OMs. I do not assume an arbitrary coarse graining, but do think that each OM must contain a finite amount of information. This implies the set of OMs is countable. The problem with this argument is that all rational numbers, when expressed in base2, ultimately end in a repeating tail. In decimal notation, we write dots above the digits that repeat. Once the recurring tail has been reached, no further bits of information is required to specify the rational number. Another way of looking at it is that all rational numbers can be specified as two integers - a finite amount of information. I must dispute this claim because that reasoning in terms of 'two integer' encoding of rationals ignores the vast and even infinite apparatus required to decode the value of an arbitrary pair of 'specified by two integers' values. Both the human brain, and computers are capable of handling rational numbers exactly. Neither of these are infinite apparatuses. If you're using an arbitrary precision integer representation (eg the software GMP), the only limitation to storing the rational number (or decoding it, as you put it) is the amount of memory available on the computer. The amount of information needed to represent any rational number is finite (although may be arbitarily large, as is the case for any integer). Only real numbers, in general, require infinite information. Such numbers are known as uncomputable numbers. The same applies to the notion of digital information. Sure, we can think that the observed universe can be represented by some finite collection of finite bit strings, but this is just the result of imposing an arbitrary upper and lower bound on the resolution of the recording/describing machinery. There is no ab initio reason why that particular upper/lower bound on resolution exists in the first place. It rather depends what we mean by universe. An observer moment, ISTM, is necessarily a finite information object. Moving from one observer moment to the next must involve a difference of at least one bit, in order for there to be an evolution in observer moments. A history, or linear sequence of observable moments, must therefore be a countable set of OMs, but this could be infinite. A collection of such histories would be a continuum. A world (or universe), in my view, is given by a bundle of histories satisfying a finite set of constraints. As such, an infinite amount of information in the histories is irrelevant (don't care bits). But if you'd prefer to identify the world with a unique history, or even as something with independent existence outside of observation, then sure, it may contain an infinite amount of information. I notice this paper is an 02 arXiv paper, so rather old. It hasn't been through peer review AFAICT. There was a bit of a critique of it on Math Forum, but that degenerated pretty fast. Cheers Ideas are sometimes like vine or a single malt whiskey that must age before its bouquet is at its prime. Partly I was wondering how much effort to put into it. Unfortunately, it appears that the author's email addresses are no longer valid, as it would be very interesting to have him engage in our discussions. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Interesting paper on consciousness, computation and MWI
On 9/21/2011 6:41 AM, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Sep 19, 2011 at 01:14:04PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote: Exactly why are there not a continuum of OMs? It seems to me if we parametrize the cardinality of distinct OMs to *all possible* partitionings of the tangent spaces of physical systems (spaces wherein the Lagrangians and Hamiltonians exist) then we obtain at least the cardinality of the continuum. It is only if we assume some arbitrary coarse graining that we have a countable set of OMs. I do not assume an arbitrary coarse graining, but do think that each OM must contain a finite amount of information. This implies the set of OMs is countable. [SPK] Umm, how does the finiteness of the elements of a set X induce finiteness of X? I may have missed this in my studies of set theory. The problem with this argument is that all rational numbers, when expressed in base2, ultimately end in a repeating tail. In decimal notation, we write dots above the digits that repeat. Once the recurring tail has been reached, no further bits of information is required to specify the rational number. Another way of looking at it is that all rational numbers can be specified as two integers - a finite amount of information. I must dispute this claim because that reasoning in terms of 'two integer' encoding of rationals ignores the vast and even infinite apparatus required to decode the value of an arbitrary pair of 'specified by two integers' values. Both the human brain, and computers are capable of handling rational numbers exactly. Neither of these are infinite apparatuses. If you're using an arbitrary precision integer representation (eg the software GMP), the only limitation to storing the rational number (or decoding it, as you put it) is the amount of memory available on the computer. [SPK] True, but that misses my point. Brains and Computers are not entities existing in an otherwise empty universe; we have to consider a multiplicity of mutually observing and measuring entities and the internal interpretational and representational structures thereof. Consider a simple digital camera. The images that the camera can capture are limited by the pixel resolution of the camera, this is a constraint induced by the physical design of the camera. The camera itself, as a physical object, is not limited in the detail of its properties by those intrinsic constraints. We must take care to not assume that the limits of the observational or measurement process is not assumed to be that of the system that is making the observations/measurement. While a the measured properties of an object A as determined by object B is limited to the resolving abilities of B, this in no way is a constraint on the properties of A. To consider the properties of A one at least might consider the set of all possible measurements of A and one might notice that these involve real valued variations, say of relative position, and thus the total set of measurable information of A is infinite, at least in principle. BTW, this is one reason why the Hilbert space of a realistic QM system is infinite, even modulo linear superposition! The amount of information needed to represent any rational number is finite (although may be arbitarily large, as is the case for any integer). Only real numbers, in general, require infinite information. Such numbers are known as uncomputable numbers. [SPK] Surely Reality is not limited to the rationals! Are we to be crypto-Pythagoreans, claiming to believe that only the rationals exist, yet still using pi, e and other irrationals without question??? If Nature is computational, does it not make sense that its computations /information accessing and processing might not be limited to the rationals? The same applies to the notion of digital information. Sure, we can think that the observed universe can be represented by some finite collection of finite bit strings, but this is just the result of imposing an arbitrary upper and lower bound on the resolution of the recording/describing machinery. There is no ab initio reason why that particular upper/lower bound on resolution exists in the first place. It rather depends what we mean by universe. An observer moment, ISTM, is necessarily a finite information object. Moving from one observer moment to the next must involve a difference of at least one bit, in order for there to be an evolution in observer moments. A history, or linear sequence of observable moments, must therefore be a countable set of OMs, but this could be infinite. A collection of such histories would be a continuum. [SPK] I consider an Observer moment to be the content of experience on an ideal non-anthropomorphic observer that might obtain in a minimum quantity of time, thus there is a maximum quantity of energy involved, as per the energy-time uncertainty relation (which is controversial as time is not an observable per se!). If
Re: Interesting paper on consciousness, computation and MWI
On 9/21/2011 7:08 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: [SPK] I consider an Observer moment to be the content of experience on an ideal non-anthropomorphic observer that might obtain in a minimum quantity of time, thus there is a maximum quantity of energy involved, as per the energy-time uncertainty relation (which is controversial as time is not an observable per se!). If we assume that this observer is constrained by the laws of QM then its ability to communicate its information/knowledge to another via emission and/or absorption events is finite, it is quantized, but its observational content is only constrained by the Heisenberg Uncertainty relation, a relation that does not put an upper bound on any single observable, it only constrains simultaneous measurement of pairs of canonically conjugate variables. You seem to be invoking the Heisenberg uncertainty backwards. What is says is: delta-t*delta-E hbar not . So if you make delta-t small then you force delta-E hbar/delta-t. The HUP puts a *lower* bound on E. Or perhaps you are saying that since and observer has only a finite amount of energy there is a limit on how big delta-E can be and hence delta-t hbar/max[delta-E] and this provides a lower bound on the duration of an Observer Moment. ? Of course as you note time is not an observable in QM, but one can construct quantum mechanical clocks that provide a local measure of time and the HUP applies to them. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Interesting paper on consciousness, computation and MWI
On 9/21/2011 2:30 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 9/21/2011 7:08 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: [SPK] I consider an Observer moment to be the content of experience on an ideal non-anthropomorphic observer that might obtain in a minimum quantity of time, thus there is a maximum quantity of energy involved, as per the energy-time uncertainty relation (which is controversial as time is not an observable per se!). If we assume that this observer is constrained by the laws of QM then its ability to communicate its information/knowledge to another via emission and/or absorption events is finite, it is quantized, but its observational content is only constrained by the Heisenberg Uncertainty relation, a relation that does not put an upper bound on any single observable, it only constrains simultaneous measurement of pairs of canonically conjugate variables. You seem to be invoking the Heisenberg uncertainty backwards. What is says is: delta-t*delta-E hbar not . So if you make delta-t small then you force delta-E hbar/delta-t. The HUP puts a *lower* bound on E. Or perhaps you are saying that since and observer has only a finite amount of energy there is a limit on how big delta-E can be and hence delta-t hbar/max[delta-E] and this provides a lower bound on the duration of an Observer Moment. ? Of course as you note time is not an observable in QM, but one can construct quantum mechanical clocks that provide a local measure of time and the HUP applies to them. Brent Hi Brent, Thank you for pointing this out. You are correct in that I was considering that since an observer has only a finite amount of energy ... But the same situation would occur if the observer has only a finite duration within which to make an observation... Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Interesting paper on consciousness, computation and MWI
On Wed, Sep 21, 2011 at 10:08:55AM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote: On 9/21/2011 6:41 AM, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Sep 19, 2011 at 01:14:04PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote: Exactly why are there not a continuum of OMs? It seems to me if we parametrize the cardinality of distinct OMs to *all possible* partitionings of the tangent spaces of physical systems (spaces wherein the Lagrangians and Hamiltonians exist) then we obtain at least the cardinality of the continuum. It is only if we assume some arbitrary coarse graining that we have a countable set of OMs. I do not assume an arbitrary coarse graining, but do think that each OM must contain a finite amount of information. This implies the set of OMs is countable. [SPK] Umm, how does the finiteness of the elements of a set X induce finiteness of X? I may have missed this in my studies of set theory. That is not what I said. Firstly, I said the set of OMs are countable, which includes the lowest transfinite cardinal aleph_0. Also, there is more to it. Perhaps I wasn't explicit about the fact that I consider two OMs with the same information content to be identical. Ie, the contained information uniquely identifies the OM. In that case, the set of all OM can be mapped 1-1 to the set of finite binary strings [0,1]* (I think that's how it is written). That set is countable, so the set of all OMs must be too. I must dispute this claim because that reasoning in terms of 'two integer' encoding of rationals ignores the vast and even infinite apparatus required to decode the value of an arbitrary pair of 'specified by two integers' values. Both the human brain, and computers are capable of handling rational numbers exactly. Neither of these are infinite apparatuses. If you're using an arbitrary precision integer representation (eg the software GMP), the only limitation to storing the rational number (or decoding it, as you put it) is the amount of memory available on the computer. [SPK] True, but that misses my point. Brains and Computers are not entities existing in an otherwise empty universe; we have to consider a multiplicity of mutually observing and measuring entities and the internal interpretational and representational structures thereof. Consider a simple digital camera. The images that the camera can capture are limited by the pixel resolution of the camera, this is a constraint induced by the physical design of the camera. The camera itself, as a physical object, is not limited in the detail of its properties by those intrinsic constraints. We must take care to not assume that the limits of the observational or measurement process is not assumed to be that of the system that is making the observations/measurement. Since the observable world is defined by the observer, one can't really not take the observer into account. One can perhaps get higher order cardinalities by looking at the boundary of that which is common to all observers. For concreteness, consider the UD trace UD* in Bruno's work. UD* is isomorphic to the reals - you would have to define something like that to be your world to get uncountable things. The amount of information needed to represent any rational number is finite (although may be arbitarily large, as is the case for any integer). Only real numbers, in general, require infinite information. Such numbers are known as uncomputable numbers. [SPK] Surely Reality is not limited to the rationals! Are we to be crypto-Pythagoreans, claiming to believe that only the rationals exist, yet still using pi, e and other irrationals without question??? If Nature is computational, does it not make sense that its computations /information accessing and processing might not be limited to the rationals? No, again, I didn't say that. I think of reality as being the set of knowable things, which is necessarily countable. Various computable numbers such as e, pi etc are definitely knowable. John Eastmond was the one to bring up the rationals by means of a bijection from a set of OMs. I was pointing to flaws in his use of rational numbers (they're still countable, for instance). -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Interesting paper on consciousness, computation and MWI
On 9/22/2011 1:05 AM, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Sep 21, 2011 at 10:08:55AM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote: On 9/21/2011 6:41 AM, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Sep 19, 2011 at 01:14:04PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote: Exactly why are there not a continuum of OMs? It seems to me if we parametrize the cardinality of distinct OMs to *all possible* partitionings of the tangent spaces of physical systems (spaces wherein the Lagrangians and Hamiltonians exist) then we obtain at least the cardinality of the continuum. It is only if we assume some arbitrary coarse graining that we have a countable set of OMs. I do not assume an arbitrary coarse graining, but do think that each OM must contain a finite amount of information. This implies the set of OMs is countable. [SPK] Umm, how does the finiteness of the elements of a set X induce finiteness of X? I may have missed this in my studies of set theory. That is not what I said. Firstly, I said the set of OMs are countable, which includes the lowest transfinite cardinal aleph_0. Also, there is more to it. Perhaps I wasn't explicit about the fact that I consider two OMs with the same information content to be identical. Ie, the contained information uniquely identifies the OM. In that case, the set of all OM can be mapped 1-1 to the set of finite binary strings [0,1]* (I think that's how it is written). That set is countable, so the set of all OMs must be too. [SPK] Thank you for this explanation. There is just something about this that is still unsettling to me. I will ponder it further. I must dispute this claim because that reasoning in terms of 'two integer' encoding of rationals ignores the vast and even infinite apparatus required to decode the value of an arbitrary pair of 'specified by two integers' values. Both the human brain, and computers are capable of handling rational numbers exactly. Neither of these are infinite apparatuses. If you're using an arbitrary precision integer representation (eg the software GMP), the only limitation to storing the rational number (or decoding it, as you put it) is the amount of memory available on the computer. [SPK] True, but that misses my point. Brains and Computers are not entities existing in an otherwise empty universe; we have to consider a multiplicity of mutually observing and measuring entities and the internal interpretational and representational structures thereof. Consider a simple digital camera. The images that the camera can capture are limited by the pixel resolution of the camera, this is a constraint induced by the physical design of the camera. The camera itself, as a physical object, is not limited in the detail of its properties by those intrinsic constraints. We must take care to not assume that the limits of the observational or measurement process is not assumed to be that of the system that is making the observations/measurement. Since the observable world is defined by the observer, one can't really not take the observer into account. One can perhaps get higher order cardinalities by looking at the boundary of that which is common to all observers. For concreteness, consider the UD trace UD* in Bruno's work. UD* is isomorphic to the reals - you would have to define something like that to be your world to get uncountable things. [SPK] How do we extend this to a countable number of seperate observers and their interactions and communications with each other. It seems to me, and I may be wrong, that this generates a diagonalization. The bisimulation algebra that was developed is not closed in non-symmetric cases. ** Summary of basic properties: A = A ~ A real identity bisimulation rule B ~ C not= C ~ B non-commutativity rule; conjugate of bisimulation not equal to itself A ~ A = A ~ B ~ Alaw of real identity bisimulation (when conjugate equal to itself) Corollary: A ~ A not= A ~ B ~ C ~ A by law of real identity bisimulation A ~ A = A ~ B ~ C ~ B ~ A retractable path independence; by law of real identity bisimulation A ~ C not= A ~ B ~ C non-closure ** Am I missing something? The amount of information needed to represent any rational number is finite (although may be arbitarily large, as is the case for any integer). Only real numbers, in general, require infinite information. Such numbers are known as uncomputable numbers. [SPK] Surely Reality is not limited to the rationals! Are we to be crypto-Pythagoreans, claiming to believe that only the rationals exist, yet still using pi, e and other irrationals without question??? If Nature is computational, does it not make sense that its computations /information accessing and processing might not be limited to the rationals? No, again, I didn't say that. I think of reality as being the set of knowable things, which is necessarily countable. Various computable numbers such as e, pi etc are definitely
Re: Interesting paper on consciousness, computation and MWI
On Wed, Aug 24, 2011 at 03:12:31PM -0700, David Nyman wrote: This paper presents some intriguing ideas on consciousness, computation and the MWI, including an argument against the possibility of consciousness supervening on any single deterministic computer program (Bruno might find this interesting). Any comments on its cogency? http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0208038 David I've done a partial read of this paper, and already in section 5 I see a problem. In section 5, Eastmond attempts to derive a paradox from the assumption of an infinite number of observer moments in a lifetime (as might be the case with quantum immortality, for example). He starts with a mapping between the lifetime of OMs and the rational numbers between 0 1. Then he argues that in observing one's current observer moment, determining which half of the unit interval the OM is mapped to gives 1 bit of information. Further subdividing the interval gives, of course, more bits of information. He then concludes that an infinite number of bits of information is needed to specify the OM. The paradox is derived by using Cantor's argument to show that there are an uncountable number of infinite length bitstrings, many more than the OMs. The problem with this argument is that all rational numbers, when expressed in base2, ultimately end in a repeating tail. In decimal notation, we write dots above the digits that repeat. Once the recurring tail has been reached, no further bits of information is required to specify the rational number. Another way of looking at it is that all rational numbers can be specified as two integers - a finite amount of information. I notice this paper is an 02 arXiv paper, so rather old. It hasn't been through peer review AFAICT. There was a bit of a critique of it on Math Forum, but that degenerated pretty fast. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Interesting paper on consciousness, computation and MWI
On 9/19/2011 3:20 AM, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Aug 24, 2011 at 03:12:31PM -0700, David Nyman wrote: This paper presents some intriguing ideas on consciousness, computation and the MWI, including an argument against the possibility of consciousness supervening on any single deterministic computer program (Bruno might find this interesting). Any comments on its cogency? http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0208038 David I've done a partial read of this paper, and already in section 5 I see a problem. In section 5, Eastmond attempts to derive a paradox from the assumption of an infinite number of observer moments in a lifetime (as might be the case with quantum immortality, for example). He starts with a mapping between the lifetime of OMs and the rational numbers between 0 1. Then he argues that in observing one's current observer moment, determining which half of the unit interval the OM is mapped to gives 1 bit of information. Further subdividing the interval gives, of course, more bits of information. He then concludes that an infinite number of bits of information is needed to specify the OM. The paradox is derived by using Cantor's argument to show that there are an uncountable number of infinite length bitstrings, many more than the OMs. Exactly why are there not a continuum of OMs? It seems to me if we parametrize the cardinality of distinct OMs to *all possible* partitionings of the tangent spaces of physical systems (spaces wherein the Lagrangians and Hamiltonians exist) then we obtain at least the cardinality of the continuum. It is only if we assume some arbitrary coarse graining that we have a countable set of OMs. The problem with this argument is that all rational numbers, when expressed in base2, ultimately end in a repeating tail. In decimal notation, we write dots above the digits that repeat. Once the recurring tail has been reached, no further bits of information is required to specify the rational number. Another way of looking at it is that all rational numbers can be specified as two integers - a finite amount of information. I must dispute this claim because that reasoning in terms of 'two integer' encoding of rationals ignores the vast and even infinite apparatus required to decode the value of an arbitrary pair of 'specified by two integers' values. The same applies to the notion of digital information. Sure, we can think that the observed universe can be represented by some finite collection of finite bit strings, but this is just the result of imposing an arbitrary upper and lower bound on the resolution of the recording/describing machinery. There is no ab initio reason why that particular upper/lower bound on resolution exists in the first place. I notice this paper is an 02 arXiv paper, so rather old. It hasn't been through peer review AFAICT. There was a bit of a critique of it on Math Forum, but that degenerated pretty fast. Cheers Ideas are sometimes like vine or a single malt whiskey that must age before its bouquet is at its prime. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Interesting paper on consciousness, computation and MWI
Sophistry has a smell. Sometimes an argument smells of it, but it may be a lot harder to pin down where the specious logic is – especially when it’s all dressed up in a mathematical formalism that may be inaccessible to the non-mathematician/logician. However the problem with the arguments relating to consciousness in this paper is not so hard to pin down, and indeed Stephen King is on the right track with his objection. Eastmond argues that an infinite conscious lifetime is impossible because, in ‘finding oneself’ at a particular point in that lifetime, one would have to gain an infinite amount of knowledge, which is absurd. He concludes that such an infinite lifetime is in principle impossible. The flaw lies in the way the author glosses over the notion of “gaining information”. In examining the problem, he treats this “gaining of information” as if it occurred magically the moment one finds oneself at a certain point in a lifetime, but in fact such information has to be acquired by a concrete computation. For example, if I am to gain information about my current lifetime position, I need to examine a calendar and compare this to stored or acquired knowledge about my date of birth. In the case of an infinite lifetime, the size of the computation required is arbitrarily large (but finite) in the case of an infinite lifetime with a lower bound (a life time with a starting point), or simply uncomputable in the case of an infinite lifetime with no lower bound. This is the same as saying that one cannot calculate the age of a person who has always existed. The fact that such a person’s age is uncomputable does not however mean that such a person cannot exist. The favoured theory in modern cosmology suggests that the universe is spatially infinite. How then do we calculate the position of our planet in this universe? If astronomers had infinite access to the map of the universe, they could still never calculate our position, because the calculation would be infinite. Given that time is known to be interconvertible with space, it follows that the same logic would apply to locating an event on an infinite timeline. The situations are mathematically indistinguishable, yet this does not prove away the spatially infinite universe theory. In an infinite lifetime with no lower bound, we can never know our age, and the amount of information ‘gained’ when we find ourselves at a point of time in such a lifetime is a function of how much information we can process (concrete processing limitations) and the amount of information available to us about our position. Whichever is smaller forms the limit. There is also a flaw in the reasoning in relation to the proposed conscious computer which resets itself in order to generate repeated (and therefore infinite) conscious moments. We must remember that the information gain is made by the conscious entity and must form part of its conscious computation. Otherwise where is the supposed gain occurring? All we would have is an objective description of a perfectly mathematically conceivable situation – an infinite set of values for the set of conscious moments, or an infinitely long string to define a moment within that set. So the computer must gain the information. But it cannot do so if it continually resets. The invocation of thermodynamics does not help if the computer cannot access information about entropy. It can escape this problem with an endless incrementing loop, but then it needs an infinite memory to store this growing string. Its computational limitations inevitably force its incrementing register to 'clock over' (like Y2K) at some point, causing it to repeat itself. So unless we grant the possibility of an infinite mind/computer, an infinite lifetime necessarily entails the repeat of conscious experience (just as cosmologists grant that the spatially infinite universe with locally finite information must entail a Nietzschean infinite recurrence). Such a lifetime is perfectly imaginable. Indeed, theoretically an infinite lifetime with no repetition is possible with infinite computational resources. With these flaws the remaining argument regarding the impossibility of a deterministic and conscious computer need not even be addressed, since they are built on unsound foundations. On Aug 25, 8:12 am, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: This paper presents some intriguing ideas on consciousness, computation and the MWI, including an argument against the possibility of consciousness supervening on any single deterministic computer program (Bruno might find this interesting). Any comments on its cogency? http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0208038 David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at
Re: Interesting paper on consciousness, computation and MWI
Hi David, It looks not so bad :) At first sight it is based on the ASSA (absolute self-samplings, like in the doomsday argument; may be Russell can comment on this). He seems naïve on the identity thesis, but that could be a reduction ad absurdum. The use of classical chaos is interesting, but not completely convincing, I might think on it. Will take a deeper look later. Thanks, Bruno On 25 Aug 2011, at 00:12, David Nyman wrote: This paper presents some intriguing ideas on consciousness, computation and the MWI, including an argument against the possibility of consciousness supervening on any single deterministic computer program (Bruno might find this interesting). Any comments on its cogency? http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0208038 David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/AyiMzznp-hIJ . To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Interesting paper on consciousness, computation and MWI
Hi, I have found what I believe is a flaw in the reasoning in the paper. On pages 5-6 we find: In Section 5, I attempt to apply this reasoning to the case of an infinite lifetime. I find that, on the one hand, in discovering his current moment out of an infinite ensemble of moments, the observer should gain an infinite amount of information. But, on the other hand, I argue that such a state of affairs is not logically possible. Thus I conclude that an infinite conscious lifetime is not possible in principle. I disagree with this conclusion because the ability to 'discover' ones current moment out of an infinite ensemble of moments would require the ability to access the computational resources needed to run the computation of the search algorithm on the infinite ensemble. In this case it is required that an infinite quantity of resources be available in a finite or infinitesimal duration. The author does mention some aspects of the problem in computational terms but the issue of resources does not seem to have been noticed. I find it strange that computations can be treated as if they are not subject to the laws of physics that included prohibitions on perpetual motion machines. There is no such thing as a free computation. The content of our Observer moments is finite due to computational resource limitations not because of some universal prior measure. Onward! Stephen On 8/25/2011 5:32 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi David, It looks not so bad :) At first sight it is based on the ASSA (absolute self-samplings, like in the doomsday argument; may be Russell can comment on this). He seems naïve on the identity thesis, but that could be a reduction ad absurdum. The use of classical chaos is interesting, but not completely convincing, I might think on it. Will take a deeper look later. Thanks, Bruno On 25 Aug 2011, at 00:12, David Nyman wrote: This paper presents some intriguing ideas on consciousness, computation and the MWI, including an argument against the possibility of consciousness supervening on any single deterministic computer program (Bruno might find this interesting). Any comments on its cogency? http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0208038 David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/AyiMzznp-hIJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
