SP: 'So given months or years, you really are like a car in which every
single component has been replaced, the only remaining property of the
original car being the design'
MP: Yes, indeed. For the word design here, I prefer to use 'structure',
with the proviso that the structure/s we are
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Although you have clearly stated that the two ideas - consciousness
supervening on all physical processes and consciousness supervening on
no physical process - are completely different I think they are related
1Z wrote:
Mark Peaty wrote:
SP: 'using the term comp as short for computationalism as something
picked up from Bruno. On the face of it, computationalism seems quite
sensible: the best theory of consciousness and the most promising
candidate for producing artificial
Le 03-janv.-07, à 16:36, Stathis Papaioannou wrote (in more than one
posts) :
Maudlin starts off with the assumption that a recording being
conscious is obviously absurd, hence the need for the conscious
machine to handle counterfactuals. If it were not for this assumption
then there
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Although you have clearly stated that the two ideas - consciousness
supervening on all physical processes and consciousness supervening on
no physical process - are completely
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 03-janv.-07, à 16:36, Stathis Papaioannou wrote (in more than one
posts) :
Maudlin starts off with the assumption that a recording being
conscious is obviously absurd, hence the need for the conscious
machine to handle counterfactuals. If it were not for this
Brent: 'Remember that Bruno is a logician.'
MP: :-) Yes, this much is easy to infer. The full scope of what this
might MEAN however, is little short of terrifying ... ;-)
MP: Infinity, infinite, infinitely big or small; these are challenging
concepts at the best of times and made very
Mark Peaty wrote:
Brent: 'Remember that Bruno is a logician.'
MP: :-) Yes, this much is easy to infer. The full scope of what this
might MEAN however, is little short of terrifying ... ;-)
MP: Infinity, infinite, infinitely big or small; these are challenging
concepts at the best of times
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Although you have clearly stated that the two ideas - consciousness
supervening on all physical processes and consciousness supervening on
no
--- James N Rose [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 03-janv.-07, à 16:36, Stathis Papaioannou wrote
(in more than one
posts) :
Maudlin starts off with the assumption that a
recording being
conscious is obviously absurd, hence the need
for the conscious
machine to
I am not sure what Hans Moravec's physical mechanism would be for the
'teddy bear' example of panpsychism? I have read Mind Children and Robot
thoroughly, am cluless, regarding why Moravec should agree with Spinoza.
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 03-janv.-07, à 16:36, Stathis Papaioannou wrote (in more than one
posts) :
Maudlin starts off with the assumption that a recording being
conscious is obviously absurd, hence the need for the conscious
machine to handle counterfactuals. If it were not for
Le 02-janv.-07, à 13:59, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Mark Peaty writes:
SP: ' In the end, what is right is an irreducible personal belief,
which you can try to change by appeal to emotions or by example, but
not by appeal to logic or empirical facts. And in fact I feel much
safer that
Le 03-janv.-07, à 03:46, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno Marchal writes:
It gets cumbersome to qualify everything with given the appearance
of a physical world. As I have said before, I am not entirely
convinced that comp is true,
Nor am I. (Remind that no machine can, from its
Le 03-janv.-07, à 04:00, Mark Peaty a écrit :
SP: 'using the term comp as short for computationalism as
something picked up from Bruno. On the face of it, computationalism
seems quite sensible: the best theory of consciousness and the most
promising candidate for producing artificial
Le 03-janv.-07, à 05:24, Brent Meeker wrote (to Mark Peaty)
Remember that Bruno is a logician. When he writes infinite he
really means infinite - not really, really big as physicists do.
Almost all numbers are bigger than 10^120, which is the biggest number
that appears in physics (and
Bruno Marchal writes:
which invokes an argument discovered by Bruno and Tim Maudlin
demonstrating that there is a problem with the theory that the mental
supervenes on the physical. It seems that to be consistent you have to
allow either that any computation, including the supposedly
Le 03-janv.-07, à 06:39, Mark Peaty a écrit :
BM: ' (= Bruno Marchal, not Brent Meeker)
OK, except I don't see what you mean by on a number basis. We know
that number have a lot of quantitative interesting relationships, but
after Godel, Solovay etc.. we do know that numbers have
SP: 'Recall that ordinary life does not involve anything like perfect
copying of your brain from moment to moment. Thousands of neurons are
dying all the time and you don't even notice, and it is possible to
infarct a substantial proportion of your brain and finish up with just a
bit of a
Mark Peaty wrote:
SP: 'using the term comp as short for computationalism as something
picked up from Bruno. On the face of it, computationalism seems quite
sensible: the best theory of consciousness and the most promising
candidate for producing artificial intelligence/consciousness'
What
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Although you have clearly stated that the two ideas - consciousness
supervening on all physical processes and consciousness supervening on
no physical process - are completely different I think they are related in
that in both cases matter is irrelevant to
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 03-janv.-07, à 05:24, Brent Meeker wrote (to Mark Peaty)
Remember that Bruno is a logician. When he writes infinite he
really means infinite - not really, really big as physicists do.
Almost all numbers are bigger than 10^120, which is the biggest number
that
Mark Peaty wrote:
SP: 'You don't actually have to emulate the entire universe, just enough
to fool its inhabitants. For example, you don't need to emulate the
appearance of a snowflake in the Andromeda galaxy except in the unlikely
event that someone went to have a look at it.'
MP: I think
Peter Jones writes:
SP: 'using the term comp as short for computationalism as something
picked up from Bruno. On the face of it, computationalism seems quite
sensible: the best theory of consciousness and the most promising
candidate for producing artificial intelligence/consciousness'
For my benefit, could you flesh that out in plain English please?
Regards
Mark Peaty CDES
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/
1Z wrote:
Mark Peaty wrote:
SP: 'using the term comp as short for computationalism as something
picked up from Bruno. On the face of it,
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Although you have clearly stated that the two ideas - consciousness
supervening on all physical processes and consciousness supervening on
no physical process - are completely different I think they are related in
that in both cases matter
Le 02-janv.-07, à 08:14, Mark Peaty a écrit :
SP: ' In the end, what is right is an irreducible personal belief,
which you can try to change by appeal to emotions or by example, but
not by appeal to logic or empirical facts. And in fact I feel much
safer that way: if someone honestly
Mark Peaty writes:
SP: ' In the end, what is right is an irreducible personal belief, which you can try to
change by appeal to emotions or by example, but not by appeal to logic or empirical facts. And in
fact I feel much safer that way: if someone honestly believed that he knew what was
Le 02-janv.-07, à 04:20, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 31-déc.-06, à 04:59, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit (to Tom Caylor):
Of course: questions of personal meaning are not scientific
questions. Physics may show you how to build a nuclear bomb, but it
won't tell
Bruno Marchal writes:
It gets cumbersome to qualify everything with given the appearance of
a physical world. As I have said before, I am not entirely convinced
that comp is true,
Nor am I. (Remind that no machine can, from its first person point of
view, be entirely convinced that
SP: 'using the term comp as short for computationalism as something
picked up from Bruno. On the face of it, computationalism seems quite
sensible: the best theory of consciousness and the most promising
candidate for producing artificial intelligence/consciousness'
That is what I thought
Mark Peaty wrote:
SP: 'using the term comp as short for computationalism as something
picked up from Bruno. On the face of it, computationalism seems quite
sensible: the best theory of consciousness and the most promising
candidate for producing artificial intelligence/consciousness'
That
Mark Peaty writes:
SP: 'using the term comp as short for computationalism as something picked
up from Bruno. On the face of it, computationalism seems quite sensible: the best theory of
consciousness and the most promising candidate for producing artificial intelligence/consciousness'
That
is also an excellent reason
for dying). I therefore conclude that the meaning of life is the most
urgent of questions.
There is an analogy between meaning of life for entity X, and
consistency of machine/theory X.
There is a sense in which the consistency of X is both the most
important fact
Hi John:
One example of what I am saying would be the way we drill holes in
the earth and pump out oil and oxidize it and the resulting energy
flux soon dissipates, can do little more useful work, and radiates
into space. If the oil was left in place it could be many millions
of years
Le 31-déc.-06, à 04:59, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit (to Tom Caylor):
Of course: questions of personal meaning are not scientific questions.
Physics may show you how to build a nuclear bomb, but it won't tell
you whether you should use it.
But Physics, per se, is not supposed to answer
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 31-déc.-06, à 04:59, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit (to Tom Caylor):
Of course: questions of personal meaning are not scientific questions.
Physics may show you how to build a nuclear bomb, but it won't tell
you whether you should use it.
But Physics, per se, is
SP: ' In the end, what is right is an irreducible personal belief,
which you can try to change by appeal to emotions or by example, but not
by appeal to logic or empirical facts. And in fact I feel much safer
that way: if someone honestly believed that he knew what was right as
surely as he
'inanimate').
John M
- Original Message -
From: Stathis Papaioannou
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2006 10:59 PM
Subject: RE: The Meaning of Life
Tom Caylor writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Tom Caylor writes (quoting Bruno Marchal
One way to look at life is from the point of view of energy hang-up
barriers - those various facts about the structure of our universe
that slow the dissipation of useful energy concentrations.
Life drills holes in these barriers and thus is on the fastest
system path to maximum entropy.
Subject: Re: The Meaning of Life
One way to look at life is from the point of view of energy hang-up
barriers - those various facts about the structure of our universe
that slow the dissipation of useful energy concentrations.
Life drills holes in these barriers and thus
into a
deep depression, does that have any bearing on whether or not it is true?
Stathis Papaioannou
It's interesting that in my observations quite a lot of people have an
eye-opening experience around the age of 12 regarding the meaning of
life. Perhaps it has to do with entering puberty and forming our
regarding the meaning of
life. Perhaps it has to do with entering puberty and forming our own
sense of purpose. I guess you might know something about this from
your background, Stathis. For me it was when I was eleven, I think
triggered by starting to go to a boarding school and living away from
my
been, and threw
me into a
deep depression, does that have any bearing on whether or not it is true?
Stathis Papaioannou
It's interesting that in my observations quite a lot of people have an
eye-opening experience around the age of 12 regarding the meaning of
life. Perhaps it has to do
been, and threw
me into a
deep depression, does that have any bearing on whether or not it is true?
Stathis Papaioannou
It's interesting that in my observations quite a lot of people have an
eye-opening experience around the age of 12 regarding the meaning of
life. Perhaps it has to do
. But even if it hadn't been, and threw me
into a
deep depression, does that have any bearing on whether or not it is true?
Stathis Papaioannou
It's interesting that in my observations quite a lot of people have an
eye-opening experience around the age of 12 regarding the meaning of
life. Perhaps
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