Le 09-mai-07, à 18:50, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> Le 09-mai-07, à 09:08, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
>>
>>> Of course reality doesn't change. The question of map versus
>>> territory is *not* an all or nothing
>>> question. *sometimes* the map equals the territory.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Le 09-mai-07, à 09:08, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
>
>> Of course reality doesn't change. The question of map versus
>> territory is *not* an all or nothing
>> question. *sometimes* the map equals the territory. Most of the time
>> it does not.
>
>
> This is an impo
Le 09-mai-07, à 09:08, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
> Of course reality doesn't change. The question of map versus
> territory is *not* an all or nothing
> question. *sometimes* the map equals the territory. Most of the time
> it does not.
This is an important point where I agree with Marc.
Le 09-mai-07, à 06:16, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
> It's true that consistency/precise alone doesn't imply
> existence, but they are factors that one can take into account.
>
OK. But consistency of a mathematical theory having sufficiently rich
models so that they support self-observing ent
On May 9, 5:55 pm, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> But what is mathematics? It's three things I think: Categories,
> Relations and Propositions. Of these, Relations and Propositions
> refer to discrete (finite) knowledge. But Categories includes the
> other two, since categories can also deal w
On May 9, 6:46 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> But according to your "map=territory" philosophy all these incompatible
> theories exist physically. What does that mean? All but one of them must
> describe some other universe and we just don't know which ones? Or do you
> m
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>
> On May 9, 5:57 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>> How can Everett's "every possibility is realized" be logically compatible
>> with Bohm's "there's only one, deterministic outcome", we just don't know
>> which one" and G
On May 9, 6:46 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> > On May 9, 5:57 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> >> How can Everett's "every possibility is realized" be logically compatible
> >> with Bohm's "there's only on
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>
> On May 9, 3:22 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>>> Infinite sets and infinitesimals are a lot more than 'mathematical
>>> conveniences'. There are precise logical theories for these things
>>> (As I mentioned before - Can
On May 9, 5:57 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> How can Everett's "every possibility is realized" be logically compatible
> with Bohm's "there's only one, deterministic outcome", we just don't know
> which one" and Griffith's "it's a probabilistic the
On May 9, 2:37 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Le 08-mai-07, à 04:27, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
>
> > 'The Laws of Physics' don't refer to human notions (they certainly
> > are not regarded that way by scientists - the whole notion of an
> > objective reality would have be thr
On May 9, 3:22 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> > Infinite sets and infinitesimals are a lot more than 'mathematical
> > conveniences'. There are precise logical theories for these things
> > (As I mentioned before - Cantor worked out the theory of inf
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>
> On May 9, 6:08 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>>
>>> On May 8, 4:22 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> I have now given three clear-cut exmaples of a failure of
> reductioni
On May 9, 6:08 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> > On May 8, 4:22 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> >>> I have now given three clear-cut exmaples of a failure of
> >>> reductionism.
> >>> (1) Infinite Sets
>
On May 9, 5:59 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> >So in the case of useful concepts there has to be a partial
> > match between the information content of the concepts and the
> > information content of reality. This means we can infer properties
> > ab
On May 9, 2:37 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Le 08-mai-07, à 04:27, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
>
> > Say what!! this is not a valid analogy since the laws of physics are
> > absolutely the fundamental level of reality, where as dsecriptions of
> > chimpanzee behaviour are not.
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>
> On May 8, 6:03 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>> Yes, but the theory is our idea of that "partial match" and is a human
>> construct. As a human idea, the theory is something separate. But the
>> objective reality of nature (whatever it is)
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>
> On May 8, 4:22 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>>
>>> I have now given three clear-cut exmaples of a failure of
>>> reductionism.
>>> (1) Infinite Sets
>> But there is no infinite set of anything.
>
> Says who? The p
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>
> On May 8, 3:56 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>>> 'The Laws of Physics' don't refer to human notions (they certainly
>>> are not regarded that way by scientists
>> They are by the scientists I know.
>
> The *knowledge*
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>
> On May 8, 4:06 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> On 08/05/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>> Silly spelling error in my last post - I meant 'electrons' of course.
>>> Let avoid talk of 'electrons' then, and talk abou
Le 08-mai-07, à 04:27, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
> Say what!! this is not a valid analogy since the laws of physics are
> absolutely the fundamental level of reality, where as dsecriptions of
> chimpanzee behaviour are not.
What makes you so sure. This is a physicalist assumption, and it h
On May 8, 6:03 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Yes, but the theory is our idea of that "partial match" and is a human
> construct. As a human idea, the theory is something separate. But the
> objective reality of nature (whatever it is) is not something separate to
> th
On May 8, 4:22 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>
> > I have now given three clear-cut exmaples of a failure of
> > reductionism.
> > (1) Infinite Sets
>
> But there is no infinite set of anything.
Says who? The point is that infinite sets appear to
On 08/05/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Well of course I agree with you in this case. 'Election' is a human
> construct. That's why it was a horrifyingly unfortunate typo on my
> point. The point is that if you try to apply the same reasoning to
> everything, you'll end up say
On May 8, 3:56 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> > 'The Laws of Physics' don't refer to human notions (they certainly
> > are not regarded that way by scientists
>
> They are by the scientists I know.
The *knowledge* we have of the laws of physics are
On May 8, 4:06 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 08/05/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
>
> > Silly spelling error in my last post - I meant 'electrons' of course.
> > Let avoid talk of 'electrons' then, and talk about 'Quantum Wave
> > Functions' the
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Silly spelling error in my last post - I meant 'electrons' of course.
> Let avoid talk of 'electrons' then, and talk about 'Quantum Wave
> Functions' then, since surely even Russell must agree that QM fields
> are fundamental (at least as far as we know). You can't say
On 08/05/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> Silly spelling error in my last post - I meant 'electrons' of course.
> Let avoid talk of 'electrons' then, and talk about 'Quantum Wave
> Functions' then, since surely even Russell must agree that QM fields
> are fundamental (at leas
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>
> On May 7, 4:06 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> On 07/05/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>>> We have here a clear example of an indispensible *physical* concept
>>> which *cannot* be broken down or reduced to any finite lo
Silly spelling error in my last post - I meant 'electrons' of course.
Let avoid talk of 'electrons' then, and talk about 'Quantum Wave
Functions' then, since surely even Russell must agree that QM fields
are fundamental (at least as far as we know). You can't say that QM
fields are just human in
On May 7, 4:06 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 07/05/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > We have here a clear example of an indispensible *physical* concept
> > which *cannot* be broken down or reduced to any finite lower level
> > descriptions. Thi
On Mon, May 07, 2007 at 07:50:21PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On 05/05/07, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Reductionism eliminates emergence. Reductionism is the philosophy that
> > all relevant properties of something can be explained in terms of the
> > properties of it
On 05/05/07, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Reductionism eliminates emergence. Reductionism is the philosophy that
> all relevant properties of something can be explained in terms of the
> properties of its components.
>
> A weaker property is supervenience. Something A supervenes on
Reductionism eliminates emergence. Reductionism is the philosophy that
all relevant properties of something can be explained in terms of the
properties of its components.
A weaker property is supervenience. Something A supervenes on the
physics of its component parts U if two different states of
On 05/05/07, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Similarly, chimpanzees are names given to a certain collection of
> chemicals that happens to behave in a particular way. The rules of
> chimpanzee behaviour are fully emergent from the rules of chemistry.
>
In your book you say that "reduc
On Mon, May 07, 2007 at 02:06:36PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> I'm not sure that it is necessary to consider the laws of physics a separate
> ontological category. A zoologist might study the behaviour of chimpanzees,
> take notes, and summarise these notes in a paper for others to read
On 07/05/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>Still, I don't think this has any bearing on reductionism. The scientific
> method is
> > about how we are to go about discovering scientific truths, just as the
> > adversarial method in a court of law is about how to decide guilt or
> >
On May 6, 10:51 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 06/05/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Non-reductive materialism *doesn't* say that a person's person state
>
> > could be different even though his physical state is unchanged. If it
> > did, you are
On 06/05/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Non-reductive materialism *doesn't* say that a person's person state
> could be different even though his physical state is unchanged. If it
> did, you are right, it wouldn't be materialism. In all forms of
> materialism, the person's men
On May 5, 6:21 am, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> I agree that "coarse graining" is of supreme importance to cognition,
> and this was bourne out in a conversation I had with a cognitive
> science researcher from the Centre for the Mind the other day.
That's good news. Glad w
On May 6, 12:03 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 04/05/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> It seems to me that 'coarse graining' could provide a means for time
>
> > to 'stratify' into different levels. Now let me elaborate a little.
> > Coarse graining
On Fri, May 04, 2007 at 03:07:54AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Been thinking about Bruno's often talked 1st person/3rd Person
> division. Had a series of insights that seem to connect up to some
> ideas of my own.
>
> Essentially my idea resolves around 'coarse graining' and the
> possi
MG:
"> Well, again, this is a functional description of *some*
aspects of
> consciousness with which we are familiar. I would say that
> consciousness in general does not require does not require a self
> model. Reflection on the motivation system generates self-awareness I
> think, but other t
On 04/05/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
It seems to me that 'coarse graining' could provide a means for time
> to 'stratify' into different levels. Now let me elaborate a little.
> Coarse graining is the 'level of detail' at which we observe reality.
> If we observe reality 'wit
On May 5, 10:05 pm, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> MG:
> 'There is no doubt that the nature of consciousness is closely
>
> > associated with time in some way - but exactly how? The relationship
> > between time (time flow and also causality) may be far closer than
> > many realize. C
MG:
'There is no doubt that the nature of consciousness is closely
> associated with time in some way - but exactly how? The relationship
> between time (time flow and also causality) may be far closer than
> many realize. Could consciousness in fact be *identical* to time in
> some peculiar sen
On May 5, 1:59 am, "Danny Mayes " <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I think of time from the third person perspective as being simply a higher
> spatial dimension above 3 dimensional volume in the same way that 3
> dimensional volume exists above 2 dimensional area. In other words it's
> really the
List
Subject: An idea to resolve the 1st Person/3rd person division mystery -
Coarse graining is the answer!?
Been thinking about Bruno's often talked 1st person/3rd Person
division. Had a series of insights that seem to connect up to some
ideas of my own.
Essentially my idea res
Been thinking about Bruno's often talked 1st person/3rd Person
division. Had a series of insights that seem to connect up to some
ideas of my own.
Essentially my idea resolves around 'coarse graining' and the
possibility that there is more than one valid way to define
causality. On this and oth
49 matches
Mail list logo
