Re: COMP refutation GAME OVER
On 13 Jul 2011, at 20:21, meekerdb wrote: On 7/13/2011 3:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Jul 2011, at 10:28, Kim Jones wrote: What does the pronoun its refer to in this sentence? The UD or the universe? How can something be the result of a process going through it? It has to exist already before anything can go through it. Doesn't it? Could either Quentin or Bruno please render this thought in French, please? I will understand it better. Thanks. I cannot even think in french! Really, I have been asked to write a paper in french, for a book, and I realize that I am so used to write on this in english that I have to think a lot to find french expressions to convey the thought. The its is neither the UD, nor the universe, but the observer (you). The observable part of the universe that the observer is observing here and now is determined by the collection of computations (in the UD) going through the state of the observer here and now. It is the 3-state of the observer here and now. Just imagine that there is somewhere a DU running in the universe. Then take into account the first person indeterminacy and its invariance for huge computation delays, its invariance for the real/ virtual change, well, all the first person invariance described in the first six steps of the UD Argument. You can see, then, that, whatever experience you are doing in your present, your subjective future is determined by the infinity of computations made by that UD and which go through the computational state of your mind during the experiences. OK? Bruno OK - I think. The indeterminacy arises because among the computations that the UD is performing there are many realizations of universes in which you have the same mental state. Universes, or pieces of universes, and/or just dreams, etc. OK But the continuations of those computations are not identical since they are in different universes. OK. But it seems that this requires some way of identifying what part of a universe is you. How are you picked out? By point of view (in the general sense of local interaction)? Yes. The picking out is made by the first person point of view. There is no third person ways to make the picking out, but the observer himself will do it from his first person point of view. He will feel to be the one who has survived. This will require indeed a local interaction. If my consciousness supervenes only on the couple ME+MILKY-WAY, I will survive in the infinity many UD-emulations of the couples ME +MILKY-WAY (done at the right level or below). I will obviously not be conscious in the extensions where I do not survive. So, quasi- tautologically, I will be picked out on the domain of continuations where I do survive. Note: this introduces a first person non-cul-de-sac form of immortality, which is the reason why it is handled by the Bp Dt hypostase. The Dt assures the existence of at least one extension, as we know it exist in the UD*. It is necessary given that G, which represents the believed machine's logic of belief, does not prove Bp - Dt (but G* proves it, G* represents the true machine's logic of belief). Of course, biologists provide clues that the level is possibly high (neurons, glial cells, chemical brain product concentration), but strictly speaking we cannot prove that a level of substitution is correct. We have to trust or to distrust the doctor, and the doctor has to be honest in saying that he is just guessing, and that the operation is risky. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP refutation GAME OVER
On 11 Jul 2011, at 19:56, meekerdb wrote: On 7/10/2011 8:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You confuse perhaps with Schmidhuber's position, or some digital physicist (DP). But as I have explained many times here that this position does not work. Computationalism or digital mechanism (DM) is the idea that I am a machine, and by the first person indeterminacy, and the way the laws of physics have to emerge from computations, the physical universe (nor the fundamental reality) cannot be described entirely by a computation. On the contrary it is a sum on an infinity of computations. If the universe is a computation, then I am computable, but then it cannot be a computation (by what I say above, it is not obvious). So with comp, or without comp, the physical universe is not a computation. With comp, the laws of nature are not computable, or have strong non computable components. DM - ~DP DP - DM, So DP - ~DP, so ~DP. Bruno This confuses me. When you say the universe is not computable, you mean it is not the process of computing a function. But you think it is generated by a UD. Right? In other words, you are saying what a UD does is *not* a computation. I think you are forgetting to take into account the first person indeterminacy. Your probable next first person state in indeterminate, and the domain of indetermination is all the third person states equivalent (in the third person doctor sense) with the state of your current body (at the right level or below) generated infinitely often by the UD. The physical laws have to be retrieved from that indeterminacy on that domain, and there is no reason why your statistical experience or physical reality is computable. The UD does (an infinite) computation, but the universe results from an internal and relative statistics on all computations. It remains possible that somehow a computation wins the game, but if that is the case that has to be justify from the statistics on all the computation, and strictly speaking this is rather unplausible. Instead of the UD, take the simpler case of the iterated WM self- duplication. Let us fix the iteration to 1000. In this case, you can see easily that what you can expect is not computable at all. All 2^1000 histories will be generated, and the computable are rare. The UD makes dummy similar iteration with all states, so you can guess that physics arise from a subtle mixture of computability and randomness. I think that Bennett depth plays also a role, the self- referential constraints play a role. But it predicts that some randomness is at play in the stabilization/normalisation of the deep computational histories. You don't need step 8 to understand this. Just imagine the physical universe big enough to run a UD. In one instant your futures is determined by an infinity of computations. This shows already that physicists use implicitly an induction principle, by assuming the inexistence of other instantiations of couple you, the observed electron other that the one under their consideration. But the UD guarantied (unlike Boltzmann brain) an infinity of them. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP refutation GAME OVER
What does the pronoun its refer to in this sentence? The UD or the universe? How can something be the result of a process going through it? It has to exist already before anything can go through it. Doesn't it? Could either Quentin or Bruno please render this thought in French, please? I will understand it better. Thanks. Kim Jones On 13/07/2011, at 2:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Actually Quentin wrote: No he is saying that the univese is the result of an infinity of computation going through its current state... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP refutation GAME OVER
The universe as such does not exist. The mind of an observer can be captured by a computational state. A computational state is reached by an infinity of computations. The universe appearance (to the observer mind) is the result of this infinity of computations that interfere, because you supervene on all of them. Quentin 2011/7/13 Kim Jones kimjo...@ozemail.com.au What does the pronoun its refer to in this sentence? The UD or the universe? How can something be the result of a process going through it? It has to exist already before anything can go through it. Doesn't it? Could either Quentin or Bruno please render this thought in French, please? I will understand it better. Thanks. Kim Jones On 13/07/2011, at 2:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Actually Quentin wrote: No he is saying that the univese is the result of an infinity of computation going through its current state... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP refutation GAME OVER
On 7/13/2011 2:40 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: The universe as such does not exist. The mind of an observer can be captured by a computational state. How is a computational state defined? We're talking about a Turing machine; so does the state include the state of the machine plus what's on the tape? Brent A computational state is reached by an infinity of computations. The universe appearance (to the observer mind) is the result of this infinity of computations that interfere, because you supervene on all of them. Quentin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP refutation GAME OVER
On 7/13/2011 3:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Jul 2011, at 10:28, Kim Jones wrote: What does the pronoun its refer to in this sentence? The UD or the universe? How can something be the result of a process going through it? It has to exist already before anything can go through it. Doesn't it? Could either Quentin or Bruno please render this thought in French, please? I will understand it better. Thanks. I cannot even think in french! Really, I have been asked to write a paper in french, for a book, and I realize that I am so used to write on this in english that I have to think a lot to find french expressions to convey the thought. The its is neither the UD, nor the universe, but the observer (you). The observable part of the universe that the observer is observing here and now is determined by the collection of computations (in the UD) going through the state of the observer here and now. It is the 3-state of the observer here and now. Just imagine that there is somewhere a DU running in the universe. Then take into account the first person indeterminacy and its invariance for huge computation delays, its invariance for the real/virtual change, well, all the first person invariance described in the first six steps of the UD Argument. You can see, then, that, whatever experience you are doing in your present, your subjective future is determined by the infinity of computations made by that UD and which go through the computational state of your mind during the experiences. OK? Bruno OK - I think. The indeterminacy arises because among the computations that the UD is performing there are many realizations of universes in which you have the same mental state. But the continuations of those computations are not identical since they are in different universes. But it seems that this requires some way of identifying what part of a universe is you. How are you picked out? By point of view (in the general sense of local interaction)? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP refutation GAME OVER
On 11 Jul 2011, at 20:08, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2011/7/11 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net On 7/10/2011 8:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You confuse perhaps with Schmidhuber's position, or some digital physicist (DP). But as I have explained many times here that this position does not work. Computationalism or digital mechanism (DM) is the idea that I am a machine, and by the first person indeterminacy, and the way the laws of physics have to emerge from computations, the physical universe (nor the fundamental reality) cannot be described entirely by a computation. On the contrary it is a sum on an infinity of computations. If the universe is a computation, then I am computable, but then it cannot be a computation (by what I say above, it is not obvious). So with comp, or without comp, the physical universe is not a computation. With comp, the laws of nature are not computable, or have strong non computable components. DM - ~DP DP - DM, So DP - ~DP, so ~DP. Bruno This confuses me. When you say the universe is not computable, you mean it is not the process of computing a function. But you think it is generated by a UD. Right? In other words, you are saying what a UD does is *not* a computation. Brent No he is saying that the univese is the result of an infinity of computation going through its current state... an infinity of computation is *not computable*, hence digital physics is false. The UD of course runs all programs and is computable, but the UD generates and runs *all* programs, it's not a program that computes the universe. Yes indeed. I think Brent forgot the first person indeterminacy. The universe is not something computed by the UD. The universe is how the UD is seen from the views of those who are computed by the UD. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP refutation GAME OVER
On 11 Jul 2011, at 02:55, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: I'm sorry Bruno, but you are so intractably mired in your own presuppositions that you'll never get this. Rhetoric. Clearly you have never been roughly and uncompromisingly educated by the natural world, as I have as an engineer. Rhetoric. Consider the statement I am machine. This is totally loaded with presupposition. Like agreeing on the meaning of the word machine has any bearing on the problem at hand. No amount of playing about with any words like 'machine' or 'computation' has any relevance to the problem. I am machine is not loaded with presupposition. It *is* the presupposition that I study the consequences of. It is also ambiguous, and that is why I make it clearer: by Church thesis + the existence of a level such that yes doctor. I choose to have nothing to do with any of it. I choose to presuppose nothing. This is an empirical matter. So you presuppose a empirical world. Me too. But you suppose that it is basic or primitive. That is Aristotle theology, and I have explained this in contradiction with the comp. hyp. But then you criticize the comp. hyp., and that makes you coherent, except that you are using it at some other level. In the entire history of technology development, the artificial instantiation of a natural phenomenon, the actual natural phenomenon was retained. FIRE, WHEEL/TERRESTRIAL TRANSPORT, FLIGHT etc etc etc Except once ...In the artificial instantiation of COGNITION, the 100% chosen technique is to throw the physics away...replacing it with the physics (atoms) of a computer, yet the natural phenomenon is still expected. No amount of discussion about abstract meanings of words like machine and the logical conclusions reached in unproven, irrelevant presupposed domains of abstractions of physics changes that. Read the papers, and ask question. Here you just witness your prejudices, and your absence of study. Where it once may have been plausible that 'information' manipulation might be a useful abstraction in AGI, this is now gone. ? Empirically. This is because the EM fields are no longer epiphenomenal. They have an active role. EM are Turing emulable. You just make the level lower. So, unless you make precise that you believe in - a non Turing emulable component in the EM - different from the what is already make non Turing emulable by comp, you are just begging the question. Eliminate/replace them with noise like a computer and you eliminate cognition like computed flame is not flame. Right. But irrelevant. Anastassiou, C. A., Perin, R., Markram, H., Koch, C. (2011). Ephaptic coupling of cortical neurons. Nature Neuroscience, 14(2), 217-223. Frohlich, F., McCormick, D. A. (2010). Endogenous Electric Fields May Guide Neocortical Network Activity. NEURON, 67(1), 129-143. The physics of cognition itself is a little less obvious than the physics of flames and flight. This does not entail that it is any more negligible in artificial cognition than flight physics was to artificial flying. This new reality does not mean that an AGI cannot be computational! What it means is that you will never prove what can be replaced by computation without artificially building the physics of cognition and then seeing what can be computed without eliminating/degrading the cognition. Your use of the term physics is like the use of God in gap explanation. A theory of combustion resulted from playing with combustion. Not the other way around. A theory of flight resulted from flying. Not the other way around. A theory of cognition and general intelligence will result from building artificial general intelligence, not the other way around. We now know what is going on in a brain to the point of being able to replicate it. How could we know? Semiconductor chip feature sizes approach those of the brain's feature sizes (insofar as they are cognition-relevant). The game has changed because of empirical outcomes. The relative importance of the contributors to cognition have changed. In the last year. Such changes happen from time to time. I for one am really enthused. Nice. But unless you believe in non Turing emulable mind, the comp's consequence continue to follow. The UD reasoning does not depend on the level of substitution, so none of the papers you mention change the fact that the physical science/ reality is a consequence of arithmetic, once comp is assumed. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP refutation GAME OVER
On 7/10/2011 8:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You confuse perhaps with Schmidhuber's position, or some digital physicist (DP). But as I have explained many times here that this position does not work. Computationalism or digital mechanism (DM) is the idea that I am a machine, and by the first person indeterminacy, and the way the laws of physics have to emerge from computations, the physical universe (nor the fundamental reality) cannot be described entirely by a computation. On the contrary it is a sum on an infinity of computations. If the universe is a computation, then I am computable, but then it cannot be a computation (by what I say above, it is not obvious). So with comp, or without comp, the physical universe is not a computation. With comp, the laws of nature are not computable, or have strong non computable components. DM - ~DP DP - DM, So DP - ~DP, so ~DP. Bruno This confuses me. When you say the universe is not computable, you mean it is not the process of computing a function. But you think it is generated by a UD. Right? In other words, you are saying what a UD does is *not* a computation. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP refutation GAME OVER
2011/7/11 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net On 7/10/2011 8:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You confuse perhaps with Schmidhuber's position, or some digital physicist (DP). But as I have explained many times here that this position does not work. Computationalism or digital mechanism (DM) is the idea that I am a machine, and by the first person indeterminacy, and the way the laws of physics have to emerge from computations, the physical universe (nor the fundamental reality) cannot be described entirely by a computation. On the contrary it is a sum on an infinity of computations. If the universe is a computation, then I am computable, but then it cannot be a computation (by what I say above, it is not obvious). So with comp, or without comp, the physical universe is not a computation. With comp, the laws of nature are not computable, or have strong non computable components. DM - ~DP DP - DM, So DP - ~DP, so ~DP. Bruno This confuses me. When you say the universe is not computable, you mean it is not the process of computing a function. But you think it is generated by a UD. Right? In other words, you are saying what a UD does is *not* a computation. Brent No he is saying that the univese is the result of an infinity of computation going through its current state... an infinity of computation is *not computable*, hence digital physics is false. The UD of course runs all programs and is computable, but the UD generates and runs *all* programs, it's not a program that computes the universe. Quentin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.**comeverything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@ **googlegroups.com everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** group/everything-list?hl=enhttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP refutation GAME OVER
On 10 Jul 2011, at 09:37, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: Hi Bruno et.al. Once again we have come to grief on the old conflation. (A) You speak of a universe _AS_ computation (described _as if_ on some abstract mega-turing machine) You confuse perhaps with Schmidhuber's position, or some digital physicist (DP). But as I have explained many times here that this position does not work. Computationalism or digital mechanism (DM) is the idea that I am a machine, and by the first person indeterminacy, and the way the laws of physics have to emerge from computations, the physical universe (nor the fundamental reality) cannot be described entirely by a computation. On the contrary it is a sum on an infinity of computations. If the universe is a computation, then I am computable, but then it cannot be a computation (by what I say above, it is not obvious). So with comp, or without comp, the physical universe is not a computation. With comp, the laws of nature are not computable, or have strong non computable components. DM - ~DP DP - DM, So DP - ~DP, so ~DP. Bruno (B) I speak of computation _OF_ laws of nature, by a computer made of natural material, where the laws of nature are those describing how it appears to an observer within. Descriptions of (A) are not the same as (B). Only if you conflate (A) and (B) can you be confused about this. Until you can see the difference you will continually find my position difficult. My proof relates to the real world of computing (B). Your position (A) can be 100% right, very interesting and 100% irrelevant to the task at hand. Whatever difficulties you and others have with this, they can be sorted out by understanding the difference between (A) and (B). Laws of nature in (A) are laws of structure. Laws in (B) are laws of appearances (to an observer). Like F = MA. This issue I have proved is EMPIRICALLY PROVEN in domain (B). The argument is OVER. You can't have it both ways. Either (1) (B)-style computing of laws of appearances of the cognition is LITERALLY cognitionIn which case (B)-style computing of laws of appearance of combustion must also be LITERALLY combustion. OR (2) B)-style computing of laws of appearances of the ANYTHING is NOT LITERALLY ANYTHING, ANYWHERE and NEVER WAS. This is because computing combustion doesn't produce flames. I could encode representation in flames. SO WHAT! It's the same bunch of atoms dancing about... (table of elements). They don't know what representing is going on! What magic changes things merely because representing happens? At the same time, I would also say that the kind of computing referred to by (A) _IS_ flame. But that's not a model of flame. It's the flame. You can 'act as if' the flame is running some kind of non existent computer, but that does NOT become (B). Expectation (1) is the universal position of all AGI workers. Now that presupposition is FALSE. When neuroscience finds this out (I have a paper in already), the entire AGI community is going to be told they are not investing in AGI. They are only doing complex AI with predictable limits. Real AGI will be done by replicating the physics of cognition. I give it a year or so. Colin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . winmail.dat http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
RE: COMP refutation GAME OVER
-Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal Sent: Monday, 11 July 2011 1:16 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: COMP refutation GAME OVER On 10 Jul 2011, at 09:37, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: Hi Bruno et.al. Once again we have come to grief on the old conflation. (A) You speak of a universe _AS_ computation (described _as if_ on some abstract mega-turing machine) You confuse perhaps with Schmidhuber's position, or some digital physicist (DP). But as I have explained many times here that this position does not work. Computationalism or digital mechanism (DM) is the idea that I am a machine, and by the first person indeterminacy, and the way the laws of physics have to emerge from computations, the physical universe (nor the fundamental reality) cannot be described entirely by a computation. On the contrary it is a sum on an infinity of computations. If the universe is a computation, then I am computable, but then it cannot be a computation (by what I say above, it is not obvious). So with comp, or without comp, the physical universe is not a computation. With comp, the laws of nature are not computable, or have strong non computable components. DM - ~DP DP - DM, So DP - ~DP, so ~DP. Bruno == I'm sorry Bruno, but you are so intractably mired in your own presuppositions that you'll never get this. Clearly you have never been roughly and uncompromisingly educated by the natural world, as I have as an engineer. Consider the statement I am machine. This is totally loaded with presupposition. Like agreeing on the meaning of the word machine has any bearing on the problem at hand. No amount of playing about with any words like 'machine' or 'computation' has any relevance to the problem. I choose to have nothing to do with any of it. I choose to presuppose nothing. This is an empirical matter. In the entire history of technology development, the artificial instantiation of a natural phenomenon, the actual natural phenomenon was retained. FIRE, WHEEL/TERRESTRIAL TRANSPORT, FLIGHT etc etc etc Except once ...In the artificial instantiation of COGNITION, the 100% chosen technique is to throw the physics away...replacing it with the physics (atoms) of a computer, yet the natural phenomenon is still expected. No amount of discussion about abstract meanings of words like machine and the logical conclusions reached in unproven, irrelevant presupposed domains of abstractions of physics changes that. Where it once may have been plausible that 'information' manipulation might be a useful abstraction in AGI, this is now gone. Empirically. This is because the EM fields are no longer epiphenomenal. They have an active role. Eliminate/replace them with noise like a computer and you eliminate cognition like computed flame is not flame. Anastassiou, C. A., Perin, R., Markram, H., Koch, C. (2011). Ephaptic coupling of cortical neurons. Nature Neuroscience, 14(2), 217-223. Frohlich, F., McCormick, D. A. (2010). Endogenous Electric Fields May Guide Neocortical Network Activity. NEURON, 67(1), 129-143. The physics of cognition itself is a little less obvious than the physics of flames and flight. This does not entail that it is any more negligible in artificial cognition than flight physics was to artificial flying. This new reality does not mean that an AGI cannot be computational! What it means is that you will never prove what can be replaced by computation without artificially building the physics of cognition and then seeing what can be computed without eliminating/degrading the cognition. A theory of combustion resulted from playing with combustion. Not the other way around. A theory of flight resulted from flying. Not the other way around. A theory of cognition and general intelligence will result from building artificial general intelligence, not the other way around. We now know what is going on in a brain to the point of being able to replicate it. Semiconductor chip feature sizes approach those of the brain's feature sizes (insofar as they are cognition-relevant). The game has changed because of empirical outcomes. The relative importance of the contributors to cognition have changed. In the last year. Such changes happen from time to time. I for one am really enthused. Colin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
