Le 24-juin-05, à 22:43, Pete Carlton a écrit :
(Sorry for the delay; I like to spend several hours writing here but I
have had meetings to attend etc..)
On Jun 22, 2005, at 4:19 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno wrote
There are two *physical* issues here.
1) The simplest one is that if you
Le 22-juin-05, à 13:19, Brent Meeker a écrit :
-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, June 22, 2005 8:16 AM
To: Pete Carlton
Cc: EverythingList
Subject: Re: Dualism and the DA
Le 21-juin-05, à 21:21, Pete Carlton a écrit :
snip
Now
Le 22-juin-05, à 21:26, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
x-tad-biggerActually, it occurred to me lately that saying everything happens may be the same as the paradox of the set of all sets.
/x-tad-bigger
That is indeed close to may critics of Tegmark. But as you know logician have made progress in
(Sorry for the delay; I like to spend several hours writing here but I have had meetings to attend etc..)On Jun 22, 2005, at 4:19 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:There are two *physical* issues here.1) The simplest one is that if you agree with the comp indeterminacy(or similar) you get an explanation of
Le 21-juin-05, à 21:21, Pete Carlton a écrit :
I think the practical differences are large, as you say, but I
disagree that it points to a fundamental metaphysical difference. I
think what appears to be a metaphysical difference is just the
breakdown of our folk concept of I. Imagine a
-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, June 22, 2005 8:16 AM
To: Pete Carlton
Cc: EverythingList
Subject: Re: Dualism and the DA
Le 21-juin-05, à 21:21, Pete Carlton a écrit :
I think the practical differences are large, as you say, but I
Brent Meeker:
The fact that all these metaphysical problems and bizarre results are predictedby assuming *everything happens* implies to me that *everything happens* islikely false. I'm not sure what the best alternative is, but I like RolandOmnes view point that QM is a probabilistic theory and
On Jun 20, 2005, at 10:44 AM, Hal Finney wrote:Pete Carlton writes: snip-- we don't need to posit any kind of dualism to paper over it, we just have to revise our concept of "I". Hal Finney wrote:Copies seem a little more problematic. We're pretty cavalier aboutcreating and destroying them in
On Mon, Jun 20, 2005 at 12:01:48AM -0700, Jonathan Colvin wrote:
Russell Standish wrote:
(JC) If you want to insist that What would it be like to be a bat is
equivalent to the question What would the universe be like
if I had
been a bat rather than me?, it is very hard to see what
Le 19-juin-05, à 02:39, Jonathan Colvin a écrit :
I'm sure the one in Moscow will also answer that he feels really to be the
one in Moscow.
OK.
But what you haven't answered is in what way the universe is
any different under circumstance (A) than (B). This is because there is
surely *no*
Jonathan Colvin writes:
This is, I think, the crux of the reference class issue with the DA. My (and
your) reference class can not be merely conscious observers or all
humans, but must be something much closer to someone (or thing) discussing
or aware of the DA). I note that this reference
On Jun 17, 2005, at 10:17 PM, Russell Standish wrote:snipI still find it hard to understand this argument. The question "Whatis it like to be a bat?" still has meaning, but is probablyunanswerable (although Dennett, I notice considers it answerable,contra Nagel!)Dennett considers it answerable,
Pete Carlton writes:
I think the second question, where will I be in the next
duplication, is also meaningless. I think that if you know all the
3rd-person facts before you step into the duplicator - that there
will be two doubles made of you in two different places, and both
doubles
Russell Standish wrote:
(JC) If you want to insist that What would it be like
to be a bat
is equivalent to the question What would the universe be like
if I had
been a bat rather than me?, it is very hard to see what the
answer could be. Suppose you
*had* been a bat
- Original Message -
From: Jonathan Colvin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: 'Russell Standish' [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: 'EverythingList' everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Monday, June 20, 2005 09:52 PM
Subject: Reference class (was dualism and the DA)
Russell Standish wrote:
(JC) If you want
I have just waved my magic wand, and lo! Jonathan Colvin has been changed
body and mind into Russell Standish and placed in Sydney, while Russell
Standish has been changed into Jonathan Colvin and placed somewhere on the
coastal US. If anyone else covets a particular person's wealth or
-
From: Jonathan Colvin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: 'Hal Finney' [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Friday, June 17, 2005 4:34 PM
Subject: RE: Dualism and the DA
Hal Finney wrote:
It's an interesting question as to how far we can comfortably
or meaningfully take counterfactuals
Le 17-juin-05, 19:44, Jonathan Colvin a crit :
Bruno wrote:
Note that the question why am I me and not my brother is
strictly equivalent with why am I the one in Washington and
not the one in Moscow after a WM duplication. It is strictly
unanswerable. Even a God could not give an adequate
Russell Standish wrote:
On What would it be like to have been born someone else, how
does this differ from What is it like to be a bat?
Presumably Jonathon Colvin would argue that this latter
question is meaningless, unless immaterial souls existed.
I still find it hard to understand this
Bruno wrote:
Note that the question why am I me and not my brother is strictly
equivalent with why am I the one in Washington and not the one in
Moscow after a WM duplication. It is strictly unanswerable. Even a
God could not give an adequate explanation (assuming c.).
(JC) Ok, does
Le Dimanche 19 Juin 2005 02:39, Jonathan Colvin a crit:
the dualism comes from reifying the 3rd
person independent universe, and if we accept only the 1st person as
real, there is no dualism. It is quite a metaphysical leap, though, to
discard the 3rd person universe. I'd like to know how to
Russell Standish wrote:
Well, actually I'd say the fist *is* identical to the hand.
At least,
my fist seems to be identical to my hand.
Even when the hand is open
Define fist. You don't seem to be talking about a thing,
but some
sort of Platonic form. That's an expressly
Jonathan Colvin writes:
In the process of writing this email, I did some googling, and it seems my
objection has been independantly discovered (some time ago). See
http://hanson.gmu.edu/nodoom.html
In particular, I note the following section, which seems to mirror my
argument rather
Note that the question why am I me and not my brother is strictly
equivalent with why am I the one in Washington and not the one in
Moscow after a WM duplication. It is strictly unanswerable. Even a God
could not give an adequate explanation (assuming c.).
Bruno
Le 16-juin-05, 23:02,
Ok, does that not imply that it is a meaningless question? If you want to
insist that this question is meaningful, I don't see how this is possible
without assuming a dualism of some sort (exactly which sort I'm trying to
figure out).
If the material universe is identical under situation (A) (I
Hal Finney wrote:
It's an interesting question as to how far we can comfortably
or meaningfully take counterfactuals. At some level it is
completely mundane to say things like, if I had taken a
different route to work today, I wouldn't have gotten caught
in that traffic jam. We aren't thrown
Hal Finney wrote:
Jonathan Colvin writes:
In the process of writing this email, I did some googling, and it
seems my objection has been independantly discovered (some
time ago).
See http://hanson.gmu.edu/nodoom.html
In particular, I note the following section, which seems to
mirror my
On Jun 17, 2005, at 10:24 AM, Hal Finney wrote:
Does it make sense for Jobs to say, who would I have been if that had
happened?
Yes, it makes sense, but only because we know that the phrase Who
would I have been, uttered by Steve Jobs, is just a convenient way
for expressing a
On What would it be like to have been born someone else, how does
this differ from What is it like to be a bat?
Presumably Jonathon Colvin would argue that this latter question is
meaningless, unless immaterial souls existed.
I still find it hard to understand this argument. The question What
is
On Wed, Jun 15, 2005 at 10:30:11PM -0700, Jonathan Colvin wrote:
Nope, I'm thinking of dualism as the mind (or consciousness) is separate
from the body. Ie. The mind is not identical to the body.
These two statements are not equivalent. You cannot say that the fist
is separate from the
Russell Standish wrote:
Nope, I'm thinking of dualism as the mind (or consciousness) is
separate from the body. Ie. The mind is not identical to the body.
These two statements are not equivalent. You cannot say that
the fist is separate from the hand. Yet the fist is not
identical to the
On Thu, Jun 16, 2005 at 01:02:11AM -0700, Jonathan Colvin wrote:
Russell Standish wrote:
Nope, I'm thinking of dualism as the mind (or consciousness) is
separate from the body. Ie. The mind is not identical to the body.
These two statements are not equivalent. You cannot say that
the
Russell Standish wrote:
Nope, I'm thinking of dualism as the mind (or consciousness) is
separate from the body. Ie. The mind is not identical to
the body.
These two statements are not equivalent. You cannot say
that the fist
is separate from the hand. Yet the fist is not identical
Le Jeudi 16 Juin 2005 10:02, Jonathan Colvin a crit:
Switch the question. Why aren't you me (Jonathan Colvin)? I'm conscious
(feels like I am, anyway).
Hi Jonathan,
I think you do not see the real question, which can be formulated (using your
analogy) by :
Why (me as) Russell Standish is
Quentin wrote:
Switch the question. Why aren't you me (Jonathan Colvin)? I'm
conscious (feels like I am, anyway).
I think you do not see the real question, which can be
formulated (using your
analogy) by :
Why (me as) Russell Standish is Russell Standish rather
Jonathan Colvin ? I (as RS)
to be a sort of dualism (randomly emplaced souls etc).
Nooo! - the DA does not imply dualism. The souls do not need to exist
anywhere else before being randomly emplaced.
Cheers
--
*PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry
PROTECTED]
Cc: 'Hal Finney' [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Wednesday, June 15, 2005 9:28 PM
Subject: Dualism and the DA
On Wed, Jun 15, 2005 at 06:05:16PM -0700, Jonathan Colvin wrote:
Since it is coming from Nick B., over-exhaustive :)
I don't think anybody, Nick included, has
etc).
Nooo! - the DA does not imply dualism. The souls do not need
to exist anywhere else before being randomly emplaced.
Ambiguous response. Are you saying that the DA requires that souls must be
randomly emplaced, but that this does not require dualism, or that the DA
does not require souls
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Pardon the intrusion, but in your opinion does every form
of dualism require that one side of the duality has properties
and behaviors that are not constrained by the other side of
the duality, as examplified by the idea of randomly emplaced souls?
The idea that
Russel Standish wrote:
It seems to me that to believe we are randomly emplaced
souls, whether
or not they existed elsewhere beforehand, is to perforce embrace a
species of dualism.
Exactly what species of dualism? Dualism usually means that
minds and brains are distinct orthogonal things,
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