Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? Computer Science
(This and a few other everything-list messages were sent to my email box, and I noticed that I hadn't seen them on the Google Groups website. Sure enough, they're not visible there. I searched for them, and they show up in the search list, but if I click on them, Google Groups crashes. Any idea what's up?) On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 9:02 PM, Colin Geoffrey Hales cgha...@unimelb.edu.au wrote: http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25377 *Neil Gershenfeld* http://www.edge.org/memberbio/neil_gershenfeld *Physicist, Director, MIT's Center for Bits and Atoms; Author, FAB* Totally agree: He blames Turing and von Neumann So do I. We stopped doing real empirical work on the inorganic brain 60 years ago. We failed for 60 years to make an inorganic brain. Computer “Science” was never and never will be an empirical science at all. It is 100% the experimental exploration of theoretical models and has been generationally systemically confused with empirical science. Party’s over. Cheers Colin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe. To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? Computer Science
Dear Gage, Are you attempting to view the Google group from a Google+ or Gmail environment? On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 5:39 PM, Gabe Bodeen gabebod...@gmail.com wrote: (This and a few other everything-list messages were sent to my email box, and I noticed that I hadn't seen them on the Google Groups website. Sure enough, they're not visible there. I searched for them, and they show up in the search list, but if I click on them, Google Groups crashes. Any idea what's up?) On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 9:02 PM, Colin Geoffrey Hales cgha...@unimelb.edu.au wrote: http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25377 *Neil Gershenfeld* http://www.edge.org/memberbio/neil_gershenfeld *Physicist, Director, MIT's Center for Bits and Atoms; Author, FAB* Totally agree: He blames Turing and von Neumann So do I. We stopped doing real empirical work on the inorganic brain 60 years ago. We failed for 60 years to make an inorganic brain. Computer “Science” was never and never will be an empirical science at all. It is 100% the experimental exploration of theoretical models and has been generationally systemically confused with empirical science. Party’s over. Cheers Colin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe . To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe. To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? Computer Science
Hi Stephen, I'm viewing these emails from Gmail. They don't show up on the list at https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/everything-list whether I am logged out or logged in. However, I can search for them on that webpage. If I click the search results, a fresh installation of Chrome fails to load it (but fortunately does not crash). If it were just a privacy settings issue, then presumably the posts shouldn't show up in my email. :) -Gabe On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 4:42 PM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com wrote: Dear Gage, Are you attempting to view the Google group from a Google+ or Gmail environment? On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 5:39 PM, Gabe Bodeen gabebod...@gmail.com wrote: (This and a few other everything-list messages were sent to my email box, and I noticed that I hadn't seen them on the Google Groups website. Sure enough, they're not visible there. I searched for them, and they show up in the search list, but if I click on them, Google Groups crashes. Any idea what's up?) On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 9:02 PM, Colin Geoffrey Hales cgha...@unimelb.edu.au wrote: http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25377 *Neil Gershenfeld* http://www.edge.org/memberbio/neil_gershenfeld *Physicist, Director, MIT's Center for Bits and Atoms; Author, FAB* Totally agree: He blames Turing and von Neumann So do I. We stopped doing real empirical work on the inorganic brain 60 years ago. We failed for 60 years to make an inorganic brain. Computer “Science” was never and never will be an empirical science at all. It is 100% the experimental exploration of theoretical models and has been generationally systemically confused with empirical science. Party’s over. Cheers Colin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe . To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe . To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe. To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? Computer Science
Dear Gabe, You may need to purge your browser's cache. Google Groups tend to turn the browser into a resource hog. On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 5:47 PM, Gabe Bodeen gabebod...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Stephen, I'm viewing these emails from Gmail. They don't show up on the list at https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/everything-list whether I am logged out or logged in. However, I can search for them on that webpage. If I click the search results, a fresh installation of Chrome fails to load it (but fortunately does not crash). If it were just a privacy settings issue, then presumably the posts shouldn't show up in my email. :) -Gabe On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 4:42 PM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com wrote: Dear Gage, Are you attempting to view the Google group from a Google+ or Gmail environment? On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 5:39 PM, Gabe Bodeen gabebod...@gmail.comwrote: (This and a few other everything-list messages were sent to my email box, and I noticed that I hadn't seen them on the Google Groups website. Sure enough, they're not visible there. I searched for them, and they show up in the search list, but if I click on them, Google Groups crashes. Any idea what's up?) On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 9:02 PM, Colin Geoffrey Hales cgha...@unimelb.edu.au wrote: http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25377 *Neil Gershenfeld* http://www.edge.org/memberbio/neil_gershenfeld *Physicist, Director, MIT's Center for Bits and Atoms; Author, FAB* Totally agree: He blames Turing and von Neumann So do I. We stopped doing real empirical work on the inorganic brain 60 years ago. We failed for 60 years to make an inorganic brain. Computer “Science” was never and never will be an empirical science at all. It is 100% the experimental exploration of theoretical models and has been generationally systemically confused with empirical science. Party’s over. Cheers Colin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe . To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe . To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe . To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe. To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? Computer Science
On 17 Jan 2014, at 19:24, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Bruno, I was not clear. Let me try again. On Fri, Jan 17, 2014 at 4:24 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 16 Jan 2014, at 15:18, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Bruno, Let me first say that I share your opinion of physicalism! My point is that it is the only opinion available to any self- referentially correct machines (believing in rationality and some amount of occam (the amount needed to disbelieve in fairy tales). As to the empirical evidence of inorganic minds. What behavior should we look for? By comp, the behavior (indeed even the subjective experience) is the same for organic and inorganic mind. I am inviting you to speculate here. I agree that the behavior will be the same for organic and inorganic system; all that matters is that the necessary functionality exist for the computations to supervene or run on the hardware. My question is about the particularities of the functions that would be required for a mind. From my study so far, based on your remarks and reasoning (thank you!) and those of Lou Kauffman, it seems that a recursively expressible reflexivity function is necessary. Define this. careful, in that domain reflexivity means []p - p, or GÖdel or Löb, and that is incompatible. What functions does the Löb's theorem require? I think that Lou's eigenforms are a starting point for recursively expressible reflexivity, but I am still not able to see the full expression of in the eigenforms as the P is not parametrized by the recursion depth. (His eigenforms are very similar to the Dx = xx formula except that they are parameterizable in time/recursion depth. I appreciate very much Kaufmann, especially on knots. His eigen form is the bred of the logicians since Gödel. Your correction on Dx = xx is of the type 1004 fallacy. As I use that expression to refer to any form of the second recursion theorem of Kleene. I ask this with all seriousness, as I have been researching methods to detect AGI (another way to denote inorganic minds) and have found that there are, IMHO, very good arguments (particularly by Goetzel) that have been made that show that we should not expect AGI to interact via natural languages and will not have models of the world that can be mapped via simple bijections to our models of the world. Basically, their physics are expected to be very different. That does not make sense to me. The AGI might have different qualia, but if it does get the right comp quanta, then the AGI will conclude that he/it/she is not a machine, which is absurd, or that comp is wrong, and then it is a zombie! No, I am asking about the forms of expression that the AGI may have to communicate with each other. It can have any form, as long as being able to send and receive signals. I don't see the relevance with the preceding paragraph. Keep in mind that I am not a philosopher. I explain a result in the (comp) theology of machines, which is a branch of arithmetic (by the UDA: that is not obvious at all).. Bruno Bruno On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 6:56 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 16 Jan 2014, at 04:02, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25377 Neil Gershenfeld Physicist, Director, MIT's Center for Bits and Atoms; Author, FAB Totally agree: He blames Turing and von Neumann So do I. He assumes both comp and weak materialism. In fact some digital physics. This has been shown many time here to not work at all. I can repeat the argument, but it is very easy from the UDA. Physicalism is ready for retirement, if comp is true. We stopped doing real empirical work on the inorganic brain 60 years ago. We failed for 60 years to make an inorganic brain. Computer “Science” was never and never will be an empirical science at all. It is 100% the experimental exploration of theoretical models and has been generationally systemically confused with empirical science. I think on the contrary that computer science gives a precise criteria how to use the empirical experimentation to refute precise theory of the mind. You assume that an inorganic brain might one day function, but that would mean that comp, or string AI, is possible, and then I don't see how you could avoid the consequences. Party’s over. You talk here a bit like Edgar or other knower of the Truth. We are just searching, using theories (= hypothesis), as only them put light on how to interpret the experimental data. Bruno Cheers Colin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . Visit this group at
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? Computer Science
On 16 Jan 2014, at 15:18, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Bruno, Let me first say that I share your opinion of physicalism! My point is that it is the only opinion available to any self- referentially correct machines (believing in rationality and some amount of occam (the amount needed to disbelieve in fairy tales). As to the empirical evidence of inorganic minds. What behavior should we look for? By comp, the behavior (indeed even the subjective experience) is the same for organic and inorganic mind. I ask this with all seriousness, as I have been researching methods to detect AGI (another way to denote inorganic minds) and have found that there are, IMHO, very good arguments (particularly by Goetzel) that have been made that show that we should not expect AGI to interact via natural languages and will not have models of the world that can be mapped via simple bijections to our models of the world. Basically, their physics are expected to be very different. That does not make sense to me. The AGI might have different qualia, but if it does get the right comp quanta, then the AGI will conclude that he/it/she is not a machine, which is absurd, or that comp is wrong, and then it is a zombie! Bruno On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 6:56 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 16 Jan 2014, at 04:02, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25377 Neil Gershenfeld Physicist, Director, MIT's Center for Bits and Atoms; Author, FAB Totally agree: He blames Turing and von Neumann So do I. He assumes both comp and weak materialism. In fact some digital physics. This has been shown many time here to not work at all. I can repeat the argument, but it is very easy from the UDA. Physicalism is ready for retirement, if comp is true. We stopped doing real empirical work on the inorganic brain 60 years ago. We failed for 60 years to make an inorganic brain. Computer “Science” was never and never will be an empirical science at all. It is 100% the experimental exploration of theoretical models and has been generationally systemically confused with empirical science. I think on the contrary that computer science gives a precise criteria how to use the empirical experimentation to refute precise theory of the mind. You assume that an inorganic brain might one day function, but that would mean that comp, or string AI, is possible, and then I don't see how you could avoid the consequences. Party’s over. You talk here a bit like Edgar or other knower of the Truth. We are just searching, using theories (= hypothesis), as only them put light on how to interpret the experimental data. Bruno Cheers Colin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe . To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? Computer Science
Dear Bruno, I was not clear. Let me try again. On Fri, Jan 17, 2014 at 4:24 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 16 Jan 2014, at 15:18, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Bruno, Let me first say that I share your opinion of physicalism! My point is that it is the only opinion available to any self-referentially correct machines (believing in rationality and some amount of occam (the amount needed to disbelieve in fairy tales). As to the empirical evidence of inorganic minds. What behavior should we look for? By comp, the behavior (indeed even the subjective experience) is the same for organic and inorganic mind. I am inviting you to speculate here. I agree that the behavior will be the same for organic and inorganic system; all that matters is that the necessary functionality exist for the computations to supervene or run on the hardware. My question is about the particularities of the functions that would be required for a mind. From my study so far, based on your remarks and reasoning (thank you!) and those of Lou Kauffman, it seems that a recursively expressible reflexivity function is necessary. What functions does the Löb's theorem require? I think that Lou's eigenforms are a starting point for recursively expressible reflexivity, but I am still not able to see the full expression of [image: \Box(\Box P\rightarrow P)\rightarrow \Box P,] in the eigenforms as the P is not parametrized by the recursion depth. (His eigenforms are very similar to the Dx = xx formula except that they are parameterizable in time/recursion depth. I ask this with all seriousness, as I have been researching methods to detect AGI (another way to denote inorganic minds) and have found that there are, IMHO, very good arguments (particularly by Goetzelhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TI5naBq7lYc) that have been made that show that we should not expect AGI to interact via natural languages and will not have models of the world that can be mapped via simple bijections to our models of the world. Basically, their physics are expected to be very different. That does not make sense to me. The AGI might have different qualia, but if it does get the right comp quanta, then the AGI will conclude that he/it/she is not a machine, which is absurd, or that comp is wrong, and then it is a zombie! No, I am asking about the forms of expression that the AGI may have to communicate with each other. Bruno On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 6:56 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 16 Jan 2014, at 04:02, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25377 *Neil Gershenfeld* http://www.edge.org/memberbio/neil_gershenfeld *Physicist, Director, MIT's Center for Bits and Atoms; Author, FAB* Totally agree: He blames Turing and von Neumann So do I. He assumes both comp and weak materialism. In fact some digital physics. This has been shown many time here to not work at all. I can repeat the argument, but it is very easy from the UDA. Physicalism is ready for retirement, if comp is true. We stopped doing real empirical work on the inorganic brain 60 years ago. We failed for 60 years to make an inorganic brain. Computer “Science” was never and never will be an empirical science at all. It is 100% the experimental exploration of theoretical models and has been generationally systemically confused with empirical science. I think on the contrary that computer science gives a precise criteria how to use the empirical experimentation to refute precise theory of the mind. You assume that an inorganic brain might one day function, but that would mean that comp, or string AI, is possible, and then I don't see how you could avoid the consequences. Party’s over. You talk here a bit like Edgar or other knower of the Truth. We are just searching, using theories (= hypothesis), as only them put light on how to interpret the experimental data. Bruno Cheers Colin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe . To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? Computer Science
On 16 Jan 2014, at 04:02, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25377 Neil Gershenfeld Physicist, Director, MIT's Center for Bits and Atoms; Author, FAB Totally agree: He blames Turing and von Neumann So do I. He assumes both comp and weak materialism. In fact some digital physics. This has been shown many time here to not work at all. I can repeat the argument, but it is very easy from the UDA. Physicalism is ready for retirement, if comp is true. We stopped doing real empirical work on the inorganic brain 60 years ago. We failed for 60 years to make an inorganic brain. Computer “Science” was never and never will be an empirical science at all. It is 100% the experimental exploration of theoretical models and has been generationally systemically confused with empirical science. I think on the contrary that computer science gives a precise criteria how to use the empirical experimentation to refute precise theory of the mind. You assume that an inorganic brain might one day function, but that would mean that comp, or string AI, is possible, and then I don't see how you could avoid the consequences. Party’s over. You talk here a bit like Edgar or other knower of the Truth. We are just searching, using theories (= hypothesis), as only them put light on how to interpret the experimental data. Bruno Cheers Colin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? Computer Science
Dear Bruno, Let me first say that I share your opinion of physicalism! As to the empirical evidence of inorganic minds. What behavior should we look for? I ask this with all seriousness, as I have been researching methods to detect AGI (another way to denote inorganic minds) and have found that there are, IMHO, very good arguments (particularly by Goetzelhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TI5naBq7lYc) that have been made that show that we should not expect AGI to interact via natural languages and will not have models of the world that can be mapped via simple bijections to our models of the world. Basically, their physics are expected to be very different. On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 6:56 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 16 Jan 2014, at 04:02, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25377 *Neil Gershenfeld* http://www.edge.org/memberbio/neil_gershenfeld *Physicist, Director, MIT's Center for Bits and Atoms; Author, FAB* Totally agree: He blames Turing and von Neumann So do I. He assumes both comp and weak materialism. In fact some digital physics. This has been shown many time here to not work at all. I can repeat the argument, but it is very easy from the UDA. Physicalism is ready for retirement, if comp is true. We stopped doing real empirical work on the inorganic brain 60 years ago. We failed for 60 years to make an inorganic brain. Computer “Science” was never and never will be an empirical science at all. It is 100% the experimental exploration of theoretical models and has been generationally systemically confused with empirical science. I think on the contrary that computer science gives a precise criteria how to use the empirical experimentation to refute precise theory of the mind. You assume that an inorganic brain might one day function, but that would mean that comp, or string AI, is possible, and then I don't see how you could avoid the consequences. Party’s over. You talk here a bit like Edgar or other knower of the Truth. We are just searching, using theories (= hypothesis), as only them put light on how to interpret the experimental data. Bruno Cheers Colin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe. To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? Computer Science
http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25377 Neil Gershenfeldhttp://www.edge.org/memberbio/neil_gershenfeld Physicist, Director, MIT's Center for Bits and Atoms; Author, FAB Totally agree: He blames Turing and von Neumann So do I. We stopped doing real empirical work on the inorganic brain 60 years ago. We failed for 60 years to make an inorganic brain. Computer Science was never and never will be an empirical science at all. It is 100% the experimental exploration of theoretical models and has been generationally systemically confused with empirical science. Party's over. Cheers Colin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? Computer Science
Hi Colin, I like that article, especially the part: Turing and von Neumann understood the limits of their models; late in life they both studied computing in spatial structures, pattern formation for Turing and self-replication for von Neumann. But their legacy lives on in the instruction pointer in most any processor, the modern descendant of Turing's head reading a tape. All of the other instructions not pointed to consume information processing resources, but don't process information. I am actually working on research for a spatial structure based computational system. :-) I do agree more or less with your criticism of most of computer science, it has very little to do with Bacon's vision of science. The confusion between empirical science and exploration of theoretical models has infected large portions of academia, it happens that way for some reason. Do you have any speculations as to why? Maybe empirical science is very expensive in comparison with model exploration. On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 10:02 PM, Colin Geoffrey Hales cgha...@unimelb.edu.au wrote: http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25377 *Neil Gershenfeld* http://www.edge.org/memberbio/neil_gershenfeld *Physicist, Director, MIT's Center for Bits and Atoms; Author, FAB* Totally agree: He blames Turing and von Neumann So do I. We stopped doing real empirical work on the inorganic brain 60 years ago. We failed for 60 years to make an inorganic brain. Computer “Science” was never and never will be an empirical science at all. It is 100% the experimental exploration of theoretical models and has been generationally systemically confused with empirical science. Party’s over. Cheers Colin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe. To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? Computer Science
On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 9:02 PM, Colin Geoffrey Hales cgha...@unimelb.edu.au wrote: http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25377 *Neil Gershenfeld* http://www.edge.org/memberbio/neil_gershenfeld *Physicist, Director, MIT's Center for Bits and Atoms; Author, FAB* Totally agree: He blames Turing and von Neumann So do I. We stopped doing real empirical work on the inorganic brain 60 years ago. We failed for 60 years to make an inorganic brain. Computer “Science” was never and never will be an empirical science at all. It is 100% the experimental exploration of theoretical models and has been generationally systemically confused with empirical science. Party’s over. Cheers Colin That guy makes the mistake of believing computer science is about computers, which is the same error as believing astronomy is about telescopes. (Borrowed from a possible quote from Edsger Dijkstra) Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
