Dear Bruno, I was not clear. Let me try again.
On Fri, Jan 17, 2014 at 4:24 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 16 Jan 2014, at 15:18, Stephen Paul King wrote: > > Dear Bruno, > > Let me first say that I share your opinion of physicalism! > > > My point is that it is the only opinion available to any > self-referentially correct machines (believing in rationality and some > amount of occam (the amount needed to disbelieve in fairy tales). > > > > As to the empirical evidence of inorganic minds. What behavior should we > look for? > > > By comp, the behavior (indeed even the subjective experience) is the same > for organic and inorganic mind. > I am inviting you to speculate here. I agree that the behavior will be the same for organic and inorganic system; all that matters is that the necessary functionality exist for the computations to supervene or "run" on the hardware. My question is about the particularities of the functions that would be required for a mind. From my study so far, based on your remarks and reasoning (thank you!) and those of Lou Kauffman, it seems that a recursively expressible reflexivity function is necessary. What functions does the Löb's theorem require? I think that Lou's eigenforms are a starting point for recursively expressible reflexivity, but I am still not able to see the full expression of [image: \Box(\Box P\rightarrow P)\rightarrow \Box P,] in the eigenforms as the P is not parametrized by the recursion depth. (His eigenforms are very similar to the Dx = xx formula except that they are parameterizable in time/recursion depth. > > > > I ask this with all seriousness, as I have been researching methods to > detect AGI (another way to denote inorganic minds) and have found that > there are, IMHO, very good arguments (particularly by > Goetzel<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TI5naBq7lYc>) > that have been made that show that we should not expect AGI to interact via > "natural languages" and will not have models of the world that can be > mapped via simple bijections to our models of the world. Basically, their > "physics" are expected to be very different. > > > That does not make sense to me. The AGI might have different qualia, but > if it does get the right comp quanta, then the AGI will conclude that > he/it/she is not a machine, which is absurd, or that comp is wrong, and > then it is a zombie! > No, I am asking about the forms of expression that the AGI may have to "communicate" with each other. > > Bruno > > > > > > > > On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 6:56 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> >> On 16 Jan 2014, at 04:02, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: >> >> http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25377 >> >> *Neil Gershenfeld* <http://www.edge.org/memberbio/neil_gershenfeld> >> *Physicist, Director, MIT's Center for Bits and Atoms; Author, FAB* >> >> Totally agree: He blames Turing and von Neumann >> >> So do I. >> >> >> He assumes both comp and weak materialism. In fact some digital physics. >> This has been shown many time here to not work at all. I can repeat the >> argument, but it is very easy from the UDA. >> Physicalism is ready for retirement, if comp is true. >> >> >> >> We stopped doing real empirical work on the inorganic brain 60 years ago. >> We failed for 60 years to make an inorganic brain. >> >> Computer “Science” was never and never will be an empirical science at >> all. It is 100% the experimental exploration of theoretical models .... and >> has been generationally systemically confused with empirical science. >> >> >> >> I think on the contrary that computer science gives a precise criteria >> how to use the empirical experimentation to refute precise theory of the >> mind. >> >> You assume that an inorganic brain might one day function, but that would >> mean that comp, or string AI, is possible, and then I don't see how you >> could avoid the consequences. >> >> >> Party’s over. >> >> >> You talk here a bit like Edgar or other "knower of the Truth". >> >> We are just searching, using theories (= hypothesis), as only them put >> light on how to interpret the experimental data. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> Cheers >> Colin >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the >> Google Groups "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this topic, visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe >> . >> To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > > > -- > > Kindest Regards, > > Stephen Paul King > > Senior Researcher > > Mobile: (864) 567-3099 > > stephe...@provensecure.com > > http://www.provensecure.us/ > > > “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of > the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain > information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and > exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as > attorney work product. 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