Re: Re: Where's the agent ? Who or what does stuff and is aware of stuff ?
Hi meekerdb Excellent point. My only answer is that the self or agent has to be a monad. because only monads can perceive (although indirectly). Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: meekerdb Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-11, 18:22:55 Subject: Re: Where's the agent ? Who or what does stuff and is aware of stuff ? On 8/11/2012 6:00 AM, Roger wrote: Hi meekerdb No, the agent is not part of the material world, it is nonmaterial. It has no extension and so is outside of spacetime. Mind itself is such (as Descartes observed). Maybe. But wherever 'the agent' is, it is a non-explanation of agency. If you're going to explain something you have to explain it in terms of something else that is better understood. So to 'explain' mind as being an immaterial agent is vacuous. Brent Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/11/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: meekerdb Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-10, 15:16:55 Subject: Re: Where's the agent ? Who or what does stuff and is aware of stuff ? On 8/10/2012 5:53 AM, Roger wrote: Hi Russell Standish But Dennet has no agent to react to all of those signals. To perceive. To judge. To cause action. If he had an agent he would have failed to explain anything - he would have just pushed the problem off into the agent. To do those, an agent has to be unified and singular -- a point of focus-- and there's no propect for such in current neuroscience/neurophilosophy. But that's Dennett's point. Humans aren't that way. They may do something because of X and yet think they did it because of Y. This is blatant in split brain experiments where the subjects brain on one side makes a reasonable decision based on the information available to it; while the other side, which doesn't have that information, confabulates a completely different story about the decision. This is most obvious in split brain patients, but it happens to the rest of us too. There is only one action because a physical body can't do two different things at the same time; but that doesn't mean the person is not of two minds. Brent Hence I follow Leibniz, even though he's difficult and some say contradictory. That agent or soul or self you have is your monad, the only (alhough indirectly) perceiving/acting/feeling agent in all of us, but currently missing in neuroscience and neurophilosophy. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Where's the agent ? Who or what does stuff and is aware of stuff ?
Oh. Monads. Well I'm glad we didn't leave the explanation in terms of something poorly understood like 'agency'. Brent On 8/14/2012 10:34 AM, Roger wrote: Hi meekerdb Excellent point. My only answer is that the self or agent has to be a monad. because only monads can perceive (although indirectly). Roger , rclo...@verizon.net mailto:rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - *From:* meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net *Receiver:* everything-list mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com *Time:* 2012-08-11, 18:22:55 *Subject:* Re: Where's the agent ? Who or what does stuff and is aware of stuff ? On 8/11/2012 6:00 AM, Roger wrote: Hi meekerdb No, the agent is not part of the material world, it is nonmaterial. It has no extension and so is outside of spacetime. Mind itself is such (as Descartes observed). Maybe. But wherever 'the agent' is, it is a non-explanation of agency. If you're going to explain something you have to explain it in terms of something else that is better understood. So to 'explain' mind as being an immaterial agent is vacuous. Brent Roger , rclo...@verizon.net mailto:rclo...@verizon.net 8/11/2012 - Receiving the following content - *From:* meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net *Receiver:* everything-list mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com *Time:* 2012-08-10, 15:16:55 *Subject:* Re: Where's the agent ? Who or what does stuff and is aware of stuff ? On 8/10/2012 5:53 AM, Roger wrote: Hi Russell Standish But Dennet has no agent to react to all of those signals. To perceive. To judge. To cause action. If he had an agent he would have failed to explain anything - he would have just pushed the problem off into the agent. To do those, an agent has to be unified and singular -- a point of focus-- and there's no propect for such in current neuroscience/neurophilosophy. But that's Dennett's point. Humans aren't that way. They may do something because of X and yet think they did it because of Y. This is blatant in split brain experiments where the subjects brain on one side makes a reasonable decision based on the information available to it; while the other side, which doesn't have that information, confabulates a completely different story about the decision. This is most obvious in split brain patients, but it happens to the rest of us too. There is only one action because a physical body can't do two different things at the same time; but that doesn't mean the person is not of two minds. Brent Hence I follow Leibniz, even though he's difficult and some say contradictory. That agent or soul or self you have is your monad, the only (alhough indirectly) perceiving/acting/feeling agent in all of us, but currently missing in neuroscience and neurophilosophy. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Where's the agent ? Who or what does stuff and is aware of stuff ?
On 10 Aug 2012, at 14:53, Roger wrote: Hi Russell Standish But Dennet has no agent to react to all of those signals. To perceive. To judge. To cause action. To do those, an agent has to be unified and singular -- a point of focus-- and there's no propect for such in current neuroscience/ neurophilosophy. I insist. The self is what computer science handles the best. I agree with you that it is immaterial, and beyond space and time, which are construct of souls Hence I follow Leibniz, even though he's difficult and some say contradictory. It is factually contradictory. Leibniz is coherent as he seems to recognize changing his mind on that issue. Different theories are not necessarily contradictory, when they are not mixed together. On the contrary Leibniz is rather very coherent in each of its different approach, but some followers mix them. That agent or soul or self you have is your monad, the only (alhough indirectly) perceiving/acting/feeling agent in all of us, but currently missing in neuroscience and neurophilosophy. But not in computer science, which is indeed not very well known by neuroscientists. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/10/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Russell Standish Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-10, 08:04:44 Subject: Re: Libet's experimental result re-evaluated! On Fri, Aug 10, 2012 at 12:10:43PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Aug 2012, at 00:23, Russell Standish wrote: It is plain to me that thoughts can be either conscious or unconscious, and the conscious component is a strict minority of the total. This is not obvious for me, and I have to say that it is a point which is put in doubt by the salvia divinorum reports (including mine). When you dissociate the brain in parts, perhaps many parts, you realise that they might all be conscious. In fact the very idea of non-consciousness might be a construct of consciousness, and be realized by partial amnesia. I dunno. For the same reason I have stopped to believe that we can be unconscious during sleep. I think that we can only be amnesic-of-'previous-consciousness'. With due respect to your salvia experiences, which I dare not follow, I'm still more presuaded by the likes of Daniel Dennett, and his pandemonia theory of the mind. In that idea, many subconscious process, working disparately, solve different aspects of the problems at hand, or provide different courses of action. The purpose of consciousness is to select from among the course of action presented by the pandemonium of subconscious processes - admittedly consciousness per se may not be necessary for this role - any unifying (aka reductive) process may be sufficient. The reason I like this, is that it echoes an essentially Darwinian process of random variation that is selected upon. Dawinian evolution is the key to any form of creative process. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Where's the agent ? Who or what does stuff and is aware of stuff ?
Hi meekerdb No, the agent is not part of the material world, it is nonmaterial. It has no extension and so is outside of spacetime. Mind itself is such (as Descartes observed). Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/11/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: meekerdb Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-10, 15:16:55 Subject: Re: Where's the agent ? Who or what does stuff and is aware of stuff ? On 8/10/2012 5:53 AM, Roger wrote: Hi Russell Standish But Dennet has no agent to react to all of those signals. To perceive. To judge. To cause action. If he had an agent he would have failed to explain anything - he would have just pushed the problem off into the agent. To do those, an agent has to be unified and singular -- a point of focus-- and there's no propect for such in current neuroscience/neurophilosophy. But that's Dennett's point. Humans aren't that way. They may do something because of X and yet think they did it because of Y. This is blatant in split brain experiments where the subjects brain on one side makes a reasonable decision based on the information available to it; while the other side, which doesn't have that information, confabulates a completely different story about the decision. This is most obvious in split brain patients, but it happens to the rest of us too. There is only one action because a physical body can't do two different things at the same time; but that doesn't mean the person is not of two minds. Brent Hence I follow Leibniz, even though he's difficult and some say contradictory. That agent or soul or self you have is your monad, the only (alhough indirectly) perceiving/acting/feeling agent in all of us, but currently missing in neuroscience and neurophilosophy. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Where's the agent ? Who or what does stuff and is aware of stuff ?
On 8/11/2012 6:00 AM, Roger wrote: Hi meekerdb No, the agent is not part of the material world, it is nonmaterial. It has no extension and so is outside of spacetime. Mind itself is such (as Descartes observed). Maybe. But wherever 'the agent' is, it is a non-explanation of agency. If you're going to explain something you have to explain it in terms of something else that is better understood. So to 'explain' mind as being an immaterial agent is vacuous. Brent Roger , rclo...@verizon.net mailto:rclo...@verizon.net 8/11/2012 - Receiving the following content - *From:* meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net *Receiver:* everything-list mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com *Time:* 2012-08-10, 15:16:55 *Subject:* Re: Where's the agent ? Who or what does stuff and is aware of stuff ? On 8/10/2012 5:53 AM, Roger wrote: Hi Russell Standish But Dennet has no agent to react to all of those signals. To perceive. To judge. To cause action. If he had an agent he would have failed to explain anything - he would have just pushed the problem off into the agent. To do those, an agent has to be unified and singular -- a point of focus-- and there's no propect for such in current neuroscience/neurophilosophy. But that's Dennett's point. Humans aren't that way. They may do something because of X and yet think they did it because of Y. This is blatant in split brain experiments where the subjects brain on one side makes a reasonable decision based on the information available to it; while the other side, which doesn't have that information, confabulates a completely different story about the decision. This is most obvious in split brain patients, but it happens to the rest of us too. There is only one action because a physical body can't do two different things at the same time; but that doesn't mean the person is not of two minds. Brent Hence I follow Leibniz, even though he's difficult and some say contradictory. That agent or soul or self you have is your monad, the only (alhough indirectly) perceiving/acting/feeling agent in all of us, but currently missing in neuroscience and neurophilosophy. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Where's the agent ? Who or what does stuff and is aware of stuff ?
Hi Russell Standish But Dennet has no agent to react to all of those signals. To perceive. To judge. To cause action. To do those, an agent has to be unified and singular -- a point of focus-- and there's no propect for such in current neuroscience/neurophilosophy. Hence I follow Leibniz, even though he's difficult and some say contradictory. That agent or soul or self you have is your monad, the only (alhough indirectly) perceiving/acting/feeling agent in all of us, but currently missing in neuroscience and neurophilosophy. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/10/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Russell Standish Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-10, 08:04:44 Subject: Re: Libet's experimental result re-evaluated! On Fri, Aug 10, 2012 at 12:10:43PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Aug 2012, at 00:23, Russell Standish wrote: It is plain to me that thoughts can be either conscious or unconscious, and the conscious component is a strict minority of the total. This is not obvious for me, and I have to say that it is a point which is put in doubt by the salvia divinorum reports (including mine). When you dissociate the brain in parts, perhaps many parts, you realise that they might all be conscious. In fact the very idea of non-consciousness might be a construct of consciousness, and be realized by partial amnesia. I dunno. For the same reason I have stopped to believe that we can be unconscious during sleep. I think that we can only be amnesic-of-'previous-consciousness'. With due respect to your salvia experiences, which I dare not follow, I'm still more presuaded by the likes of Daniel Dennett, and his pandemonia theory of the mind. In that idea, many subconscious process, working disparately, solve different aspects of the problems at hand, or provide different courses of action. The purpose of consciousness is to select from among the course of action presented by the pandemonium of subconscious processes - admittedly consciousness per se may not be necessary for this role - any unifying (aka reductive) process may be sufficient. The reason I like this, is that it echoes an essentially Darwinian process of random variation that is selected upon. Dawinian evolution is the key to any form of creative process. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Where's the agent ? Who or what does stuff and is aware of stuff ?
On 8/10/2012 5:53 AM, Roger wrote: Hi Russell Standish But Dennet has no agent to react to all of those signals. To perceive. To judge. To cause action. If he had an agent he would have failed to explain anything - he would have just pushed the problem off into the agent. To do those, an agent has to be unified and singular -- a point of focus-- and there's no propect for such in current neuroscience/neurophilosophy. But that's Dennett's point. Humans aren't that way. They may do something because of X and yet think they did it because of Y. This is blatant in split brain experiments where the subjects brain on one side makes a reasonable decision based on the information available to it; while the other side, which doesn't have that information, confabulates a completely different story about the decision. This is most obvious in split brain patients, but it happens to the rest of us too. There is only one action because a physical body can't do two different things at the same time; but that doesn't mean the person is not of two minds. Brent Hence I follow Leibniz, even though he's difficult and some say contradictory. That agent or soul or self you have is your monad, the only (alhough indirectly) perceiving/acting/feeling agent in all of us, but currently missing in neuroscience and neurophilosophy. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Where's the agent ? Who or what does stuff and is aware of stuff ?
Hi Roger, I have noticed and read your posts. Might you write some remarks about Leibniz' concept of pre-established harmony? On 8/10/2012 8:53 AM, Roger wrote: Hence I follow Leibniz, even though he's difficult and some say contradictory. That agent or soul or self you have is your monad, the only (alhough indirectly) perceiving/acting/feeling agent in all of us, but currently missing in neuroscience and neurophilosophy. -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
