Hi meekerdb 

Excellent point. My only answer is that the self or agent has to be a monad.

because only monads can perceive (although indirectly).


Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/14/2012 
----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: meekerdb 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-08-11, 18:22:55
Subject: Re: Where's the agent ? Who or what does stuff and is aware of stuff ?


On 8/11/2012 6:00 AM, Roger wrote: 
Hi meekerdb 


No, the agent is not part of the material world, it is nonmaterial.
It has no extension and so is outside of spacetime. 
Mind itself is such (as Descartes observed).

Maybe.  But wherever 'the agent' is, it is a non-explanation of agency.  If 
you're going to explain something you have to explain it in terms of something 
else that is better understood.  So to 'explain' mind as being an immaterial 
agent is vacuous.

Brent




Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/11/2012 
----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: meekerdb 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-08-10, 15:16:55
Subject: Re: Where's the agent ? Who or what does stuff and is aware of stuff ?


On 8/10/2012 5:53 AM, Roger wrote: 
Hi Russell Standish 

But Dennet has no agent to react to all of those signals.
To perceive. To judge. To cause action.

If he had an agent he would have failed to explain anything -  he would have 
just pushed the problem off into the "agent".



To do those, an agent has to be unified and singular -- a point of focus--
and there's no propect for such in current neuroscience/neurophilosophy.

But that's Dennett's point.  Humans aren't that way.  They may do something 
because of X and yet think they did it because of Y.  This is blatant in split 
brain experiments where the subjects brain on one side makes a reasonable 
decision based on the information available to it; while the other side, which 
doesn't have that information, confabulates a completely different story about 
the decision.  This is most obvious in split brain patients, but it happens to 
the rest of us too.  There is only one action because a physical body can't do 
two different things at the same time; but that doesn't mean the person is not 
of two minds.

Brent



Hence I follow Leibniz, even though he's difficult and some say
contradictory. That agent or soul or self you have is your
monad, the only (alhough indirectly) perceiving/acting/feeling
agent in all of us, but currently missing in neuroscience and
neurophilosophy.



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