I know of no reason to assume that the various branches of MWI run
concurrently.
If they do not run concurrently then the only way I see for immortality is
to be in a branch where immortality is already a possibility inherent in
that branch.
Hal Ruhl
J. Colvin wrote:
>> >why do you say that it is logically
>> >impossible for an electron to be intelligent? To show that it is
>> >*logically* impossible you would have to show that it entails a
>> >logical or mathematical contradiction, such as 2+2=5.
I will be back to this quote later on.
I did n
See please after Hal's message
John M
- Original Message -
From: "Hal Ruhl" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Sunday, April 17, 2005 10:51 AM
Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality
> I know of no reason to assume that the various branches of MWI run
> concurrently.
>
> If they do not
Russell, I hate to discuss sci-fi (the daemon), but you wrote:
"The daemon computes the future - not just predicts or guesses, but
computes it exactly. "
So in your opinion the daemon 'knows' (= applies for this exact comp) all
the unlimited details of a totally interconnected world. IMO she canno
Hal wrote:
>Consider a 2-D cellular automaton world like Conway's Life.
>Every cell is either occupied or unoccupied. It has one of
>two states. Now let us consider such a world in which one
>cell holds much more than one bit of information. Suppose it
>holds a million bits. This one cel
>> Bruno:In general worlds are not effective (computable) objects: we cannot
>> mechanically (even allowing infinite resources) generate a world.<
>
>JC: Hmmm..but then if such worlds are not effective objects, how
>can they be
>said to be "instantiated"? If we extend this to Tegmark, this
>i
JC: >>That's a good question. I can think of a chess position that is
>>a-priori illegal. But our macroscopic world is so complex it is far
>>from obvious what is allowed and what is forbidden.
>
>Jesse Mazer: So what if some chess position is illegal? They are only
>illegal according to the ru
Hal Ruhl wrote:
I know of no reason to assume that the various branches of MWI run
concurrently.
If they do not run concurrently then the only way I see for immortality is
to be in a branch where immortality is already a possibility inherent in
that branch.
I don't see why this should be so. Yo
>Hal Ruhl wrote:
>
>>I know of no reason to assume that the various branches of MWI run
>>concurrently.
>>
>>If they do not run concurrently then the only way I see for
>immortality
>>is to be in a branch where immortality is already a possibility
>>inherent in that branch.
>
>Stathis: I don't
John Mikes wrote:
I did not follow this thread, because immortality is a nono for my mostly
common sense thinking: who wants to 'in eternity' wake up with arthritic
pains and struggle with failing memory? Or is immortality understood for an
earlier (perfect? when is it?) stage of life, let us say w
Jonathan Colvin wrote:
Well, I was elaborating on Bruno's statement that worlds ("maximal
consistent set of propositions") of a FS are not computable; that even
given
infinite resources (ie. infinite time) it is not possible to generate a
"complete" world. This suggests to me that it is *not* the
Has anyone on the list experienced personal elevations into
one or more of these parallel universes, I have and would like to
exchange info
mechanically (even allowing infinite resources) generate a world.<
JC: Hmmm..but then if such worlds are not effective objects, how
...snip...
that this is
Jonathan Colvin wrote:
>Hal Ruhl wrote:
>
>>I know of no reason to assume that the various branches of MWI run
>>concurrently.
>>
>>If they do not run concurrently then the only way I see for
>immortality
>>is to be in a branch where immortality is already a possibility
>>inherent in that branch.
>
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] ("Hal Finney")
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2005 15:27:25 -0700 (PDT)
Jesse Mazer writes:
> Would you apply the same logic to copying a mind within a single
universe
> that you would to the splitting of worl
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jesse Mazer writes (after quoting Stathis Papaioannou):
No doubt, common implementations of your mind will predominate over more
bizarre ones at any given point in time. It is also possible to imagine
some scenarios where you survive indefinitely with all of your frien
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