I have before stated my long-held opinions on this,
namely that it's best to regard one's duplicates
as self. As a corollary, the "you" that ends up
in one place is "100% you" and so is the other.
Consider this alternative experiment: we reveal to
you that every minute of the last two years you h
I'll offer my thoughts on first-person indeterminacy. This is based
on Wei Dai's framework which I have called UD+ASSA. I am working on
some web pages to summarize the various conclusions I have drawn from
this framework. (Actually, here I am going to in effect use the SSA
rather than the ASSA,
Tom Caylor writes:
> Without really getting into your thought experiment, I want to ask a> question. What does it mean to "experience a minute of continuous> consciousness"? OK, we have a biological clock that gives us a rough> sense of relative passing of time. But I don't think you maintai
Le 19-juin-06, à 15:31, Russell Standish a écrit :
> I'm not so sure. At heart, I suspect he is a computationalist, however
> what he assumes in his papers is that the universe (that we see) is a
> single
> specific computation selected from the dovetailer algorithm. With COMP
> (and
> with fu
Lee Corbin writes:
> I have before stated my long-held opinions on this,> namely that it's best to regard one's duplicates> as self. As a corollary, the "you" that ends up> in one place is "100% you" and so is the other.> > Consider this alternative experiment: we reveal to> you that every minu
Le 20-juin-06, à 04:04, Norman Samish a écrit :
I've endured this thread long enough! Let's get back to something I can understand!
"Why?" you'll ask.
I'll reply, "Because your audience is shrinking! I've plotted the Audience vs. Topic, and find that, in 12.63 months, there is a 91% probab
Hal,
Are you suggesting that the teleportation B->W,M could actually take place, from a third person perspective, but it is possible that the subject entering the teleporter at B from his point of view might actually die - not come out either at W or M? I know there are many people who would sa
On Tue, Jun 20, 2006 at 11:43:08AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> Le 19-juin-06, à 15:31, Russell Standish a écrit :
>
> > I'm not so sure. At heart, I suspect he is a computationalist, however
> > what he assumes in his papers is that the universe (that we see) is a
> > single
> > specific
Le 20-juin-06, à 09:43, Lee Corbin a écrit :
>
> I have before stated my long-held opinions on this,
> namely that it's best to regard one's duplicates
> as self. As a corollary, the "you" that ends up
> in one place is "100% you" and so is the other.
If you meant by self "my third person self
Hal,
It seems to me that you are introducing a notion of physical universe,
and then use it to reintroduce a notion of first person death, so that
you can bet you will be the one "annihilated" in Brussels.
You agree that this is just equivalent of negating the comp hypothesis.
You would not u
Bruno writes:
> Hal,
>
> It seems to me that you are introducing a notion of physical universe,=20
> and then use it to reintroduce a notion of first person death, so that=20
> you can bet you will be the one "annihilated" in Brussels.
I should first mention that I did not anticipate the conclusi
On Tue, Jun 20, 2006 at 09:35:12AM -0700, "Hal Finney" wrote:
>
> The starting point was the framework I have described previously, which
> can be stated very simply as that the measure of an information pattern
> comes from the universal distribution of Kolmogorov. I then applied this
> analysi
I don't understand why you consider the measures of the programs that do the
simulations. The ''real'' measure should be derived from the algorithmic
complexity of the laws of physics that describe how the computers/brains
work. If you know for certain that a computation will be performed in this
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Tom Caylor writes:
>
> > Without really getting into your thought experiment, I want to ask a
> > question. What does it mean to "experience a minute of continuous
> > consciousness"? OK, we have a biological clock that gives us a rough
> > sense of relative pa
Hal Finney wrote:
> I'll offer my thoughts on first-person indeterminacy. This is based
> on Wei Dai's framework which I have called UD+ASSA. I am working on
> some web pages to summarize the various conclusions I have drawn from
> this framework. (Actually, here I am going to in effect use the
Stathis writes
> > No important difference exists between one person
> > to whom this is happening, and his neighbor to
> > whom it is not. They both feel similarly, and
> > by hypothesis lead very similar lives.
> If we had evolved in a world where multiple copies of
> people exist at the same
Bruno writes
> > [In the case of thousands of copies being made
> > each second, and all but one annihilated after
> > whatever... a microsecond will do]
> > No important difference exists between one person
> > to whom this is happening, and his neighbor to
> > whom it is not. They both feel sim
Brent Meeker writes:
> I wonder if our sense of identiy is more dependent on the world than we suppose. I recall reading> somewhere, in the 1960's when sensory deprivation experiments were "the new thing", that people who> stayed in the sensory deprivation tanks more than an hour or so found t
Lee Corbin writes:
> Well, people here are prepared to accept that at each> moment the universe splits into innumerable copies,> that physics is governed by equations that Feynman> (erroneously IMO) says nobody can understand, and> our lives are not as they appear, but are composed> of ensemble
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