Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
>
> John M writes:
>
>
>>When did you last learn that the tenets of ongoing
>>physics are only "provisionally" accepted as 'real'?
>>(I just wanted to tease members of this list.
>>Of course on THIS list 'thinking' people gathered and
>>such thoughts are no
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> > > I don't know if block universe theories are true or not, but the
> > > subjective
> > > passage of time is not an argument against them. If mind is computation,
> > > do
> > > you believe that a consciou
Le 10-août-06, à 19:35, David Nyman a écrit :
> Colin Hales wrote:
>
>> Perhaps the 3rd person is best called 'virtual'. It's role is one for
>> 'as-if' it existed.
>
> Yes, that's a reasonable suggestion. Then 3rd person might be reserved
> for the type of observation in George's examples. The
Le 10-août-06, à 22:44, 1Z a écrit :
>>
>
> With the materialist hypothesis there is also no dualism.
This is defensible but necessitates a solution of the mind-body
problem, to explain the relation between sensations and "matter".
The traditional implicit or explicit solution of the materiali
Le 10-août-06, à 22:59, 1Z a écrit :
>> So we should understand that you would criticize any notion, sometimes
>> brought by physicists, of "block-universe".
>
>
> Yes, I certainly would! It is unable to explain the subjective
> passage of time. Dismissing the subjective sensation of the passge
Le 11-août-06, à 18:50, David Nyman a écrit :
> I had an interesting exchange with Julian Barbour about this a while
> back. Originally I was convinced he was wrong that a time capsule was
> sufficient to produce the subjective experience of the passage of time.
> I called it a 'sleight of intui
Le 12-août-06, à 03:00, David Nyman a écrit :
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> If grandmother asks for recalling the main difference between Plato
>> and
>> Aristotle's theories of matter, I would just say that in Plato, the
>> visible (observable, measurable) realm is taken as appearances or
>> s
Le 12-août-06, à 09:56, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit :
>
> BTW Plato followed Heraclitus, who was already onto this.
I put Heraclitus in the "first person or time central" people. I am not
sure it makes sense to say follows Heraclitus (although he deliver some
nice text defending that views
Le 12-août-06, à 16:36, David Nyman a écrit (to Colin Hales):
> My belief has been that restoring 1st person to some sort of centrality
> would be part of the antidote, and I haven't yet (quite) lost hope on
> this score. I look forward to the fruits of your own efforts in this
> regard.
Comp c
Brent,
That's an interesting explanation of a zero-information
universe, which you suggest is implicit in the MWI of QM - yet (like me) you
don't necessarily buy MWI. In your view, are there other explanations
for quantum mysteries that are more credible?
Norman Samish
~~
Le 12-août-06, à 18:27, 1Z a écrit :
> Comp could be true in a material universe, so comp does not
> imply the non-existence of matter.
For some observer O, in some putative "material" universe, comp can be
true for "a nanosecond".
To remain stably longer in a material universe is as probable
Le 12-août-06, à 18:30, 1Z a écrit :
> Matter is a bare substrate with no properties of its own.
But how could something having no properties of its own (unlike
numbers) be arranged to give something having some property of its own?
> The question
> may well be asked at this point: what rol
Le 13-août-06, à 12:57, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
>
>
>
>
> Bruno Marchal writes:
>
I know it looks counterintuitive, but an AI can know which computer
is
running and how many they are. It is a consequence of comp, and the
UDA
shows why. The answer is:
the co
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> It just means that I (Bruno) believes that Bruno (I) is not so
> important in the sense that if I die, a perfect number will still
> either exist or not exist. I do interpret Penrose's mathematical
> platonism in that way, and I agree with him (on that), like I think
> davi
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Le 12-août-06, à 03:00, David Nyman a écrit :
>
>
>>Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>>>If grandmother asks for recalling the main difference between Plato
>>>and
>>>Aristotle's theories of matter, I would just say that in Plato, the
>>>visible (observable, measurable) realm
Norman Samish wrote:
> Brent,
>
> That's an interesting explanation of a zero-information universe, which
> you suggest is implicit in the MWI of QM - yet (like me) you don't
> necessarily buy MWI. In your view, are there other explanations for
> quantum mysteries that are more credible?
>
To Stathis, Brent, and List:
- Original Message -
From: "Brent Meeker" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> (not really!)
To:
Sent: Monday, August 14, 2006 3:22 AM
Subject: Re: Can we ever know truth?
>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > John M writes:
> >
> >
> >>When did you last learn t
The laughed at Bozo the Clown too.
Brent Meeker
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> To Stathis, Brent, and List:
> - Original Message -
> From: "Brent Meeker" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> (not really!)
> To:
> Sent: Monday, August 14, 2006 3:22 AM
> Subject: Re: Can we ever know truth?
>
>
>
>>Stathi
Peter Jones writes:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Peter Jones writes:
> >
> > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > >
> > > > I don't know if block universe theories are true or not, but the
> > > > subjective
> > > > passage of time is not an argument against them. If mind is
> > > > computation,
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