Le 15-sept.-06, à 13:53, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Yes, that's just what I would say. The only purpose served by the rock
is to provide the real world
dynamism part of the computation, even if it does this simply by
mapping lines of code to the otherwise
idle passage of time. The
Le 19-sept.-06, à 08:02, Colin Hales a écrit :
x-tad-biggerHi,/x-tad-bigger
x-tad-biggerI/x-tad-biggerx-tad-bigger’/x-tad-biggerx-tad-biggerm overrun with stuff at uni, but I have this one issue /x-tad-biggerx-tad-bigger–/x-tad-biggerx-tad-bigger solipsism- which is hot and we seem to be
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
So I think integrated patches of Knowledge-Information (logical-depth
complexity) are the 'islands' in the 'sea' of raw Information (Shannon
or statistical type complexity). And I think there's a third kind of
information associated with Qualia which isn't
Le 19-sept.-06, à 11:50, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Interesting what you said about modal and category theory. I don't
know much about category theory and I'd be interested to know how you
would define it. So: what is category theory? As far as I can make
out it's a highly advanced
Colin Hales wrote:
Hi,
I'm overrun with stuff at uni, but I have this one issue - solipsism- which
is hot and we seem to be touching on, so I thought you may help me collect
my thoughts before I run off. gotta leave all those threads hanging
there.and I left them in an awfully under
Bruno Marchal wrote:
It would be a problem if the actual infinities or infinitesimals were
thrid person describable *and* playing some role in the process of
individuating consciousness. In that case comp is false.
About solipsism I am not sure why you introduce the subject. It seems
to
Le 20-sept.-06, à 14:08, 1Z a écrit :
This isn't the only way COMP couldbe false. For instance, if
matter exists, consciousness could be dependent on it. Thus,
while the existence of matter might disprove the Bruno version of comp,
it doesn't prove the existence of actual infintities.
If
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 20-sept.-06, à 14:08, 1Z a écrit :
This isn't the only way COMP couldbe false. For instance, if
matter exists, consciousness could be dependent on it. Thus,
while the existence of matter might disprove the Bruno version of comp,
it doesn't prove the existence of
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
1Z wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
It would be a problem if the actual infinities or infinitesimals were
thrid person describable *and* playing some role in the process of
individuating consciousness. In that case comp is false.
About solipsism I am not sure why
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 20-sept.-06, à 14:08, 1Z a écrit :
This isn't the only way COMP couldbe false. For instance, if
matter exists, consciousness could be dependent on it. Thus,
while the existence of matter might disprove the Bruno version of comp,
it doesn't prove the existence of
Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 20-sept.-06, à 14:08, 1Z a écrit :
This isn't the only way COMP couldbe false. For instance, if
matter exists, consciousness could be dependent on it. Thus,
while the existence of matter might disprove the Bruno version of comp,
it doesn't
I had in mind (from very 'old' studies/readings) a somewhat different
version of the hard' solipsism and this one - sort of - eliminates the
validity of the questions. I will interject.
My take was Russell's remark I mark with *** in the post.
John M
- Original Message -
From: Russell
Bruno Marchal writes:
About solipsism I am not sure why you introduce the subject. It seems
to me nobody defend it in the list.
Is anyone out there really a solipsist? Has anyone ever met or talked to a
real solipsist?
Stathis Papaioannou
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Bruno Marchal writes:
About solipsism I am not sure why you introduce the subject. It seems
to me nobody defend it in the list.
Is anyone out there really a solipsist? Has anyone ever met or talked to a
real solipsist?
Stathis Papaioannou
Will all those
Colin Hales wrote:
-Original Message-
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-
[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Brent Meeker
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2006 9:31 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test
-Original Message-
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-
[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Brent Meeker
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2006 9:52 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test
Colin Hales
This is an extract from the full work on solipsism. It is one special
section written in the first person, for what else could a solipsist
scientist do? I'd be interested in any comments... it paints a rather
bizarre picture of science.
-
I,
The scientist could prove that he is not alone by invoking the
principle of sufficient reason: nothing is arbitrary and exist with no
reason. If something exists in a particular arbitrary way (himself)
with no reason for him to be in that particular way, then all
other alternatives of him must
George Levy:
The scientist could prove that he is not alone by
invoking the principle of sufficient reason: nothing is arbitrary and exist
with no reason. If something exists in a particular arbitrary way (himself)
with no reason for him to be in that particular way, then all other
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