Bruno Marchal writes (quoting Tom Caylor):
> > In my view, your motivation is not large enough. I am also motivated
> > by a problem: the problem of evil. I don't think the real problem of
> > evil is solved or even really addressed with comp. This is because
> > comp cannot define evil corre
On Mon, Dec 11, 2006 at 03:26:59PM -0800, William wrote:
>
> > If the universe is computationallu simulable, then any universal
> > Turing machine will do for a "higher hand". In which case, the
> > information needed is simply the shortest possible program for
> > simulating the universe, the le
Le 12-déc.-06, à 03:58, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
> 1Z wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> I agree that the problem of evil (and thus the equivalent problem of
>>> Good) is interesting. Of course it is not well addressed by the two
>>> current theories of everything: Loop gravity and String theory.
>>
Bruno Marchal writes:
>
> Le 12-déc.-06, à 03:58, 1Z a écrit :
>
> >
> >
> > 1Z wrote:
> >> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>
> >>> I agree that the problem of evil (and thus the equivalent problem of
> >>> Good) is interesting. Of course it is not well addressed by the two
> >>> current theories of e
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 12-déc.-06, à 03:58, 1Z a écrit :
>
> >
> >
> > 1Z wrote:
> >> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>
> >>> I agree that the problem of evil (and thus the equivalent problem of
> >>> Good) is interesting. Of course it is not well addressed by the two
> >>> current theories of everyth
Le 12-déc.-06, à 11:16, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
>
> Bruno Marchal writes (quoting Tom Caylor):
>
>>> In my view, your motivation is not large enough. I am also motivated
>>> by a problem: the problem of evil. I don't think the real problem of
>>> evil is solved or even really addressed
Le 12-déc.-06, à 13:02, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
>
> Bruno Marchal writes:
>
>>
>> Le 12-déc.-06, à 03:58, 1Z a écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 1Z wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> I agree that the problem of evil (and thus the equivalent problem
> of
> Good) is interesting. Of
Russell Standish wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 11, 2006 at 03:26:59PM -0800, William wrote:
>>> If the universe is computationallu simulable, then any universal
>>> Turing machine will do for a "higher hand". In which case, the
>>> information needed is simply the shortest possible program for
>>> simulati
On Tue, Dec 12, 2006 at 08:54:51AM -0800, Brent Meeker wrote:
> >
> > You're still missing the point. If you sum over all SASes and other
> > computing devices capable of simulating universe A, the probability of
> > being in a simulation of A is identical to simply being in universe A.
> >
> >
Russell Standish wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 12, 2006 at 08:54:51AM -0800, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>> You're still missing the point. If you sum over all SASes and other
>>> computing devices capable of simulating universe A, the probability of
>>> being in a simulation of A is identical to simply being in
On Tue, Dec 12, 2006 at 02:07:28PM -0800, Brent Meeker wrote:
> >
> > Of course this point is moot if the universe is not simulable!
>
> Or if the length of the code has nothing to do with it's probability.
>
> Brent Meeker
>
No, because that assumption (Solomonoff-Levin style probability and
Bruno Marchal writes:
>
> Le 12-déc.-06, à 11:16, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
> >
> >
> > Bruno Marchal writes (quoting Tom Caylor):
> >
> >>> In my view, your motivation is not large enough. I am also motivated
> >>> by a problem: the problem of evil. I don't think the real problem of
>
Bruno Marchal writes:
> > I don't see how it's such a big problem. Consciousness exists,
> > therefore feelings exist,
> > and some of these feelings are unpleasant ones. Explaining
> > consciousness is difficult,
> > but once granted, you don't need an extra theory for every different
> > ty
No responses yet to this question. It seems to me a straightforward
consequence of computationalism that we should be able to write a program
which, when run, will experience pain, and I suspect that this would be a
substantially simpler program than one demonstrating general intelligence. It
Stathis,
The reason for lack of responses is that your idea
goes directly to illuminating why AI systems - as
promoulgated under current designs of software
running in hardware matrices - CANNOT emulate living
systems. It an issue that AI advocates intuitively
and scrupulously AVOID.
"Pain" in
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