Re: Attempt toward a systematic description
Le 27-juil.-07, à 23:01, John Mikes a écrit : > Bruno, I will "Wiki" the Church thesis - now it is too hot around here. > Besides: your "slip" is showing (if you know this US-expression): > "...the most universal physics capable of being conceived." > Physix is a human figment, as we try to exokain (and conceive?) > certain partially observed phenomena with the little epistemy wi so > far got. If comp is true, my point is actually that physics is a figment of any self-refrentially correct machine. > And: "conceive" is the way we (humans) try to get close to 'reality'. > Whatever you CAN say is said by YOU (a human) I am also a colony of bacteria and viruses ... > and we really have access only to marginal (and misunderstood?) > paraphernalia. That is true, and that's why we reason about that marginal and indirect paraphernalia. > I was hit on the head in J.Cohen-J.Stewart's "Collapse of Chaos" by > the "Zarathustrans" how those two witty authors attempted to produce > "not-so-human" logic (interpreted still to humans). (If you missed so > far (this and their "Figment of Reality") rush to read it in your > leisure time. > Iti s more entertaining than Harry Potter or Star trek.) > This is why I find it a universe-restricted attempt to send out into > space some math formulations as introducing our 'intelligent' status. > Quite other systems (universes?) may not follow it and have different > 'logical' bases. By definition, the field of logic study the possible logical bases. > Would be tricky to find such different systems in THIS universe as > well. > I would accept every word you say with the proviso: "In our human view" I'm just a humble messenger of the lobian machine. Actually even just the UDA is addressed to any entity willing to accept some digital body. I don't use the human hypothesis, which is a bit self-defeating: our qualitative "human" is itself a human invention. My work is supposed to described the lobian view. I was saying that the lobian physics could be the most non trivial part of physics that can be conceived ... by sound and enough introspective machines (not necessarily humans). Best, Bruno > John > > > On 7/27/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> Le 27-juil.-07, à 02:59, John Mikes a écrit : >> >> > Bruno, >> > thanks for your detailed reply to my 6-09-07 post which I read only >> > 7-26-09 for stupid reasons: I fell into a list with 100+ posts a >> day - >> > many political and very informative - and it took my time and mental >> > capacity. Also 2 other lists fleured up in topics I was involved >> > strongly so when I cut loose from the war-religion-Iraq and info >> about >> > the whole world etc. - political haranguing I merged into mind/life >> > economy discussions. >> > I just could not discipline myself to read 'everything'. I read >> > 'everything else'. >> > >> > Besides my response is wasting your time and activity, since I >> cannot >> > 'think' in terms of true Goedel-Church or Everett etc. terms. A >> 'wave >> > colapse' is meaningless to me and I discard Schrodinger's cat's >> > multiple posibilities as "ignorantia mascarading as science". I do >> not >> > speculate on numbers. What do I speculate on? good question. >> > Maybe on the ways how to speculate. >> > Your remarks are vey helpful, I wish I can use them for myself. >> > >> > I represented for a long time the epistemic paradox what you >> expressed >> > as: >> > "The more a universal machine knows, the more she will >> be*relatively* >> > ignorant." >> > To know about more and more what we don't know. >> > >> > And I saved your definition: >> > "To be a real scientist means to have the >> > courage to be enough clear so that you can be shown wrong .." >> > Which is the reason why I call my 'worldview' a "narrative", not a >> > theory. >> > >> > Substrate? physical reality? figments at a level (=conventional >> > science) of our mental journey. And I still wonder whether 'number' >> > and 'comp' also belong into the formulations of the (present) human >> > mind accessible logical level. I find 'nature' not subject to such, >> - >> > this is my (science) agnosticism. >> >> >> If Church thesis is true, then there is something quite general, that >> is not specifically human, in the computer science. Physics and nature >> could be more human-oriented, although the lobian physics could as >> well >> be the most universal physics capable of being conceived. In the next >> posts I will have opportunity to (re)explain better (I hope) the >> tremendous impact of Church thesis for the sciences (including >> theology) in general, >> >> Best, >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> > >> > John >> > >> > On 6/10/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> >> Le 09-juin-07, à 22:38, John Mikes a écrit : >> >> >> >> >> >> > Bruno; >> >> > >> >> > how about adding to Tom's reality survey the anti Aeistotelian: >> >> > Reality is what we don't see? >> >> >> >> >> >> >>
Re: Attempt toward a systematic description
Bruno, I will "Wiki" the Church thesis - now it is too hot around here. Besides: your "slip" is showing (if you know this US-expression): "...the most universal physics capable of being conceived." Physix is a human figment, as we try to exokain (and conceive?) certain partially observed phenomena with the little epistemy wi so far got. And: "conceive" is the way we (humans) try to get close to 'reality'. Whatever you CAN say is said by YOU (a human) and we really have access only to marginal (and misunderstood?) paraphernalia. I was hit on the head in J.Cohen-J.Stewart's "Collapse of Chaos" by the "Zarathustrans" how those two witty authors attempted to produce "not-so-human" logic (interpreted still to humans). (If you missed so far (this and their "Figment of Reality") rush to read it in your leisure time. Iti s more entertaining than Harry Potter or Star trek.) This is why I find it a universe-restricted attempt to send out into space some math formulations as introducing our 'intelligent' status. Quite other systems (universes?) may not follow it and have different 'logical' bases. Would be tricky to find such different systems in THIS universe as well. I would accept every word you say with the proviso: "In our human view" John On 7/27/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Thanks for your gentle remarks. I will comment your last remark. > Le 27-juil.-07, à 02:59, John Mikes a écrit : > > > Bruno, > > thanks for your detailed reply to my 6-09-07 post which I read only > > 7-26-09 for stupid reasons: I fell into a list with 100+ posts a day - > > many political and very informative - and it took my time and mental > > capacity. Also 2 other lists fleured up in topics I was involved > > strongly so when I cut loose from the war-religion-Iraq and info about > > the whole world etc. - political haranguing I merged into mind/life > > economy discussions. > > I just could not discipline myself to read 'everything'. I read > > 'everything else'. > > > > Besides my response is wasting your time and activity, since I cannot > > 'think' in terms of true Goedel-Church or Everett etc. terms. A 'wave > > colapse' is meaningless to me and I discard Schrodinger's cat's > > multiple posibilities as "ignorantia mascarading as science". I do not > > speculate on numbers. What do I speculate on? good question. > > Maybe on the ways how to speculate. > > Your remarks are vey helpful, I wish I can use them for myself. > > > > I represented for a long time the epistemic paradox what you expressed > > as: > > "The more a universal machine knows, the more she will be*relatively* > > ignorant." > > To know about more and more what we don't know. > > > > And I saved your definition: > > "To be a real scientist means to have the > > courage to be enough clear so that you can be shown wrong .." > > Which is the reason why I call my 'worldview' a "narrative", not a > > theory. > > > > Substrate? physical reality? figments at a level (=conventional > > science) of our mental journey. And I still wonder whether 'number' > > and 'comp' also belong into the formulations of the (present) human > > mind accessible logical level. I find 'nature' not subject to such, - > > this is my (science) agnosticism. > > > If Church thesis is true, then there is something quite general, that > is not specifically human, in the computer science. Physics and nature > could be more human-oriented, although the lobian physics could as well > be the most universal physics capable of being conceived. In the next > posts I will have opportunity to (re)explain better (I hope) the > tremendous impact of Church thesis for the sciences (including > theology) in general, > > Best, > > Bruno > > > > > > > > John > > > > On 6/10/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >> Le 09-juin-07, à 22:38, John Mikes a écrit : > >> > >> > >> > Bruno; > >> > > >> > how about adding to Tom's reality survey the anti Aeistotelian: > >> > Reality is what we don't see? > >> > >> > >> > >> OK. That is how we could sum up Platonism. > >> > >> > >> > >> > We "get" a partial impact of the 'total' and interpret it 1st person > >> > as our 'reality', as it was said some time ago here (Brent?) > >> > "perceived reality" what I really liked . Then came Colin with his > >> > "reduced" (or what was his term?) solipsism: paraphrasing the > >> > perceived reality into "OUR" world what we compoase of whatever we > >> > got. > >> > >> > >> OK. The difficulty is to keep track of the difference between first > >> person singular (my pain, my joy, ...) and first person plural like > >> the > >> apparent wave collapse in Everett, if not the apparent schroedinger > >> wave in Comp. > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > >> > I know that you ask your oimniscient Loebian machine, > >> > >> > >> Aaah... come on. It is hard to imagine something less omniscient and > >> more modest than the simple lobian machine I interview, like PA whose > >> knowledge is quite a tiny subset of yours.
Re: Attempt toward a systematic description
Thanks for your gentle remarks. I will comment your last remark. Le 27-juil.-07, à 02:59, John Mikes a écrit : > Bruno, > thanks for your detailed reply to my 6-09-07 post which I read only > 7-26-09 for stupid reasons: I fell into a list with 100+ posts a day - > many political and very informative - and it took my time and mental > capacity. Also 2 other lists fleured up in topics I was involved > strongly so when I cut loose from the war-religion-Iraq and info about > the whole world etc. - political haranguing I merged into mind/life > economy discussions. > I just could not discipline myself to read 'everything'. I read > 'everything else'. > > Besides my response is wasting your time and activity, since I cannot > 'think' in terms of true Goedel-Church or Everett etc. terms. A 'wave > colapse' is meaningless to me and I discard Schrodinger's cat's > multiple posibilities as "ignorantia mascarading as science". I do not > speculate on numbers. What do I speculate on? good question. > Maybe on the ways how to speculate. > Your remarks are vey helpful, I wish I can use them for myself. > > I represented for a long time the epistemic paradox what you expressed > as: > "The more a universal machine knows, the more she will be*relatively* > ignorant." > To know about more and more what we don't know. > > And I saved your definition: > "To be a real scientist means to have the > courage to be enough clear so that you can be shown wrong .." > Which is the reason why I call my 'worldview' a "narrative", not a > theory. > > Substrate? physical reality? figments at a level (=conventional > science) of our mental journey. And I still wonder whether 'number' > and 'comp' also belong into the formulations of the (present) human > mind accessible logical level. I find 'nature' not subject to such, - > this is my (science) agnosticism. If Church thesis is true, then there is something quite general, that is not specifically human, in the computer science. Physics and nature could be more human-oriented, although the lobian physics could as well be the most universal physics capable of being conceived. In the next posts I will have opportunity to (re)explain better (I hope) the tremendous impact of Church thesis for the sciences (including theology) in general, Best, Bruno > > John > > On 6/10/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> Le 09-juin-07, à 22:38, John Mikes a écrit : >> >> >> > Bruno; >> > >> > how about adding to Tom's reality survey the anti Aeistotelian: >> > Reality is what we don't see? >> >> >> >> OK. That is how we could sum up Platonism. >> >> >> >> > We "get" a partial impact of the 'total' and interpret it 1st person >> > as our 'reality', as it was said some time ago here (Brent?) >> > "perceived reality" what I really liked . Then came Colin with his >> > "reduced" (or what was his term?) solipsism: paraphrasing the >> > perceived reality into "OUR" world what we compoase of whatever we >> > got. >> >> >> OK. The difficulty is to keep track of the difference between first >> person singular (my pain, my joy, ...) and first person plural like >> the >> apparent wave collapse in Everett, if not the apparent schroedinger >> wave in Comp. >> >> >> >> >> > >> > I know that you ask your oimniscient Loebian machine, >> >> >> Aaah... come on. It is hard to imagine something less omniscient and >> more modest than the simple lobian machine I interview, like PA whose >> knowledge is quite a tiny subset of yours. >> You are still talking like a *pregodelian* mechanist. Machine can no >> more be conceived as omniscient, just the complete contrary. >> And adding knowledge makes this worse. You can see consciousness >> evolution as a trip from G to G*, but that trip makes the gap between >> G >> and G* bigger. The more a universal machine knows, the more she will >> be >> *relatively* ignorant. >> With comp, knowledge is like a light in the dark, which makes you >> aware >> of the bigness of the explorable reality, and beyond. >> >> >> >> > but we, quotidien mortals, >> >> >> Even the disembodied PA has to believe-intuit its (relative) possible >> mortality or breakdown, and this forever (wrongly or correctly if it >> does well the difference between the "hypostases-person-views"). >> When a universal machine knows that she is universal, then she has to >> be aware of its limitations soon or later. >> To be immortal, with comp, means to be able to die, forever ... >> >> >> >> > rely on our own stupidity about the world. >> >> ALL Universal Machine have to do that. This has been proved. Without >> stupidity: no intelligence. To be a real scientist means to have the >> courage to be enough clear so that you can be shown wrong ... >> >> >> >> > And in this department "perceived reality" is what we have and it is >> > close to Colin's personalized mini solipsism. >> >> >> Physical reality, probably the border of the "lobian mind" is a first >> person *plural* sum
Re: Attempt toward a systematic description
Le 26-juil.-07, à 00:16, Tom Caylor a écrit : > > Bruno Marchal wrote: >> Le 08-juin-07, à 20:17, Tom Caylor a écrit : >> >> >>> I should respond to your response. I'm in a busy pensive state >>> lately, reading Theaetetus (as you suggested on the Incompleteness >>> thread) along with Protagoras and some Aristotle (along with the >>> dozen >>> other books I'm always reading...) in the little time I have. >> >> >> Take your time I will be extremely busy the next two weeks (exams >> and then Siena Cie 2007). >> > > I know you are busy until August, so no pressure, for sure. Thanks, > > In your Siena paper on an arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus, in > the last sentence you say: > > "An absence of justification of some universal quantum machine, from > the lobian self-observing machine, or a mathematical proof that there > are none, or any empirical difference between this arithmetical > physics and the empirical physics, would refute, not Plotinus, but the > present arithmetical interpretation." > > What do you mean by "or a mathematical proof that there are none"? A proof that the comp-physics does not allow quantum computation. For example the "intelligible matter" or the "sensible matter" could have given formally modal systems collapsing into classical logic, in which it is known (as Stephen has said many times) we can not embed quantum logic. Imagine just that the material modalities give Newtonian Mechanics. It can be proved that newtonian (relativistic or not) mechanics cannot justify real (relative) time quantum computations. > > By the way, I've finished reading Plato's Theaetetus, Protogoras, > Parmenides, and Sophist and I am working on Aristotle's Metaphysics. > So then perhaps I will be ready for Plotinus! (?) Don't forget the intriguing Timaeus! ;) (I think Plotinus will help you for those older text; but don't take his *illustration* too seriously ... , just look at the validity of his reasoning). You can also read the little book on Plotinus by O'Meara (very good); ref in my theses. Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Attempt toward a systematic description
Bruno, thanks for your detailed reply to my 6-09-07 post which I read only 7-26-09 for stupid reasons: I fell into a list with 100+ posts a day - many political and very informative - and it took my time and mental capacity. Also 2 other lists fleured up in topics I was involved strongly so when I cut loose from the war-religion-Iraq and info about the whole world etc. - political haranguing I merged into mind/life economy discussions. I just could not discipline myself to read 'everything'. I read 'everything else'. Besides my response is wasting your time and activity, since I cannot 'think' in terms of true Goedel-Church or Everett etc. terms. A 'wave colapse' is meaningless to me and I discard Schrodinger's cat's multiple posibilities as "ignorantia mascarading as science". I do not speculate on numbers. What do I speculate on? good question. Maybe on the ways how to speculate. Your remarks are vey helpful, I wish I can use them for myself. I represented for a long time the epistemic paradox what you expressed as: "The more a universal machine knows, the more she will be*relatively* ignorant." To know about more and more what we don't know. And I saved your definition: "To be a real scientist means to have the courage to be enough clear so that you can be shown wrong .." Which is the reason why I call my 'worldview' a "narrative", not a theory. Substrate? physical reality? figments at a level (=conventional science) of our mental journey. And I still wonder whether 'number' and 'comp' also belong into the formulations of the (present) human mind accessible logical level. I find 'nature' not subject to such, - this is my (science) agnosticism. John On 6/10/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > Le 09-juin-07, à 22:38, John Mikes a écrit : > > > > Bruno; > > > > how about adding to Tom's reality survey the anti Aeistotelian: > > Reality is what we don't see? > > > > OK. That is how we could sum up Platonism. > > > > > We "get" a partial impact of the 'total' and interpret it 1st person > > as our 'reality', as it was said some time ago here (Brent?) > > "perceived reality" what I really liked . Then came Colin with his > > "reduced" (or what was his term?) solipsism: paraphrasing the > > perceived reality into "OUR" world what we compoase of whatever we > > got. > > > OK. The difficulty is to keep track of the difference between first > person singular (my pain, my joy, ...) and first person plural like the > apparent wave collapse in Everett, if not the apparent schroedinger > wave in Comp. > > > > > > > > I know that you ask your oimniscient Loebian machine, > > > Aaah... come on. It is hard to imagine something less omniscient and > more modest than the simple lobian machine I interview, like PA whose > knowledge is quite a tiny subset of yours. > You are still talking like a *pregodelian* mechanist. Machine can no > more be conceived as omniscient, just the complete contrary. > And adding knowledge makes this worse. You can see consciousness > evolution as a trip from G to G*, but that trip makes the gap between G > and G* bigger. The more a universal machine knows, the more she will be > *relatively* ignorant. > With comp, knowledge is like a light in the dark, which makes you aware > of the bigness of the explorable reality, and beyond. > > > > > but we, quotidien mortals, > > > Even the disembodied PA has to believe-intuit its (relative) possible > mortality or breakdown, and this forever (wrongly or correctly if it > does well the difference between the "hypostases-person-views"). > When a universal machine knows that she is universal, then she has to > be aware of its limitations soon or later. > To be immortal, with comp, means to be able to die, forever ... > > > > > rely on our own stupidity about the world. > > ALL Universal Machine have to do that. This has been proved. Without > stupidity: no intelligence. To be a real scientist means to have the > courage to be enough clear so that you can be shown wrong ... > > > > > And in this department "perceived reality" is what we have and it is > > close to Colin's personalized mini solipsism. > > > Physical reality, probably the border of the "lobian mind" is a first > person *plural* sum of all lobian dreams. There is no ultimate > substrate. By being "plural" it should better not been called solipsism > imo. (I'm assuming comp of course). > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Attempt toward a systematic description
Bruno Marchal wrote: > Le 08-juin-07, à 20:17, Tom Caylor a écrit : > > > > I should respond to your response. I'm in a busy pensive state > > lately, reading Theaetetus (as you suggested on the Incompleteness > > thread) along with Protagoras and some Aristotle (along with the dozen > > other books I'm always reading...) in the little time I have. > > > Take your time I will be extremely busy the next two weeks (exams > and then Siena Cie 2007). > I know you are busy until August, so no pressure, for sure. In your Siena paper on an arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus, in the last sentence you say: "An absence of justification of some universal quantum machine, from the lobian self-observing machine, or a mathematical proof that there are none, or any empirical difference between this arithmetical physics and the empirical physics, would refute, not Plotinus, but the present arithmetical interpretation." What do you mean by "or a mathematical proof that there are none"? By the way, I've finished reading Plato's Theaetetus, Protogoras, Parmenides, and Sophist and I am working on Aristotle's Metaphysics. So then perhaps I will be ready for Plotinus! (?) Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Attempt toward a systematic description
Le 09-juin-07, à 22:38, John Mikes a écrit : > Bruno; > > how about adding to Tom's reality survey the anti Aeistotelian: > Reality is what we don't see? OK. That is how we could sum up Platonism. > We "get" a partial impact of the 'total' and interpret it 1st person > as our 'reality', as it was said some time ago here (Brent?) > "perceived reality" what I really liked . Then came Colin with his > "reduced" (or what was his term?) solipsism: paraphrasing the > perceived reality into "OUR" world what we compoase of whatever we > got. OK. The difficulty is to keep track of the difference between first person singular (my pain, my joy, ...) and first person plural like the apparent wave collapse in Everett, if not the apparent schroedinger wave in Comp. > > I know that you ask your oimniscient Loebian machine, Aaah... come on. It is hard to imagine something less omniscient and more modest than the simple lobian machine I interview, like PA whose knowledge is quite a tiny subset of yours. You are still talking like a *pregodelian* mechanist. Machine can no more be conceived as omniscient, just the complete contrary. And adding knowledge makes this worse. You can see consciousness evolution as a trip from G to G*, but that trip makes the gap between G and G* bigger. The more a universal machine knows, the more she will be *relatively* ignorant. With comp, knowledge is like a light in the dark, which makes you aware of the bigness of the explorable reality, and beyond. > but we, quotidien mortals, Even the disembodied PA has to believe-intuit its (relative) possible mortality or breakdown, and this forever (wrongly or correctly if it does well the difference between the "hypostases-person-views"). When a universal machine knows that she is universal, then she has to be aware of its limitations soon or later. To be immortal, with comp, means to be able to die, forever ... > rely on our own stupidity about the world. ALL Universal Machine have to do that. This has been proved. Without stupidity: no intelligence. To be a real scientist means to have the courage to be enough clear so that you can be shown wrong ... > And in this department "perceived reality" is what we have and it is > close to Colin's personalized mini solipsism. Physical reality, probably the border of the "lobian mind" is a first person *plural* sum of all lobian dreams. There is no ultimate substrate. By being "plural" it should better not been called solipsism imo. (I'm assuming comp of course). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Attempt toward a systematic description
Bruno; how about adding to Tom's reality survey the anti Aeistotelian: Reality is what we don't see? We "get" a partial impact of the 'total' and interpret it 1st person as our 'reality', as it was said some time ago here (Brent?) "perceived reality" what I really liked . Then came Colin with his "reduced" (or what was his term?) solipsism: paraphrasing the perceived reality into "OUR" world what we compoase of whatever we got. I know that you ask your oimniscient Loebian machine, but we, quotidien mortals, rely on our own stupidity about the world. And in this department "perceived reality" is what we have and it is close to Colin's personalized mini solipsism. John On 6/9/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > Le 08-juin-07, à 20:17, Tom Caylor a écrit : > > > > I should respond to your response. I'm in a busy pensive state > > lately, reading Theaetetus (as you suggested on the Incompleteness > > thread) along with Protagoras and some Aristotle (along with the dozen > > other books I'm always reading...) in the little time I have. > > > Take your time I will be extremely busy the next two weeks (exams > and then Siena Cie 2007). > > > > > > But you do make assumptions as part of the comp hypothesis, including > > assumptions about numbers. > > > I just assume the validity of the excluded middle principle on purely > arithmetical question. If you prefer I just assume that if you run a > machine then either that machine will stop or it will run forever. > I don't know anyone not believing in this, but I have to make it as an > assumption because I can not prove it from less, and I use it in the > proofs. > In the same spirit I assume 0 is not the successor of a positive > integer, etc. (I reason axiomatically). > Some technics can make this hypothesis weaker though. > > > > > > LRA looks to be about the particulars of arithmetic. PA, with > > induction, is trying to generalize to come up with some universal > > truths about arithmetic. > > > About numbers, ok. > > > > But LRA has access to only one particular truth at a time, with no > > awareness of generalities/universals. > > > Just few of them. OK. > > > > > > > > >> LRA is, like PA, under the godelian limitation joug. Only, PA knows > >> it! > >> Lobian machine, like PA or ZF, are godel-limited, but they are aware > >> of > >> their limitation. OK? > >> > > > > So PA has this "awareness", by *definition*. > > > > Not by definition at all! Showing this is the "difficult part" of > Godel's second incompleteness theorem. It is done for the first time in > some ugly way by Ackerman and Hilbert in their *Grundlagen*. It is the > work of Lob which has made possible to do it in a beautiful way, and > this has been a key step to the discovery of the modal logics G and G*, > which formalizes completely the propositional logic of self-reference. > > > > > > It is a useful *tool* in > > mathematics, but you are assuming it is a part of reality at the > > deepest level. This is part your Arithmetic Realism part of the comp > > hyp, is it not? > > > No. I consider PA as a clever being, a sort of *baby God* like any of > us could hope to be (with comp). PA is just a universal machine knowing > that she is universal (in a weak and precise sense). That is, PA is > what I call a lobian machine. > In some sense, PA "is" a turing machine having already the cognitive > abilities to begin being anxious about the length of its available > tape. > > > > > > > > >> > >>> This is because even > >>> the statement 1+2=2+1 is a Plato-like statement. The Aristotle > >>> verification would be to take 1 object and then take 2 more objects > >>> and count the group as a whole. Then take 2 objects and then 1 > >>> object > >>> and count the group as a whole. But, first of all, there are at > >>> least > >>> conceptually a (at least potentially) infinite number of objects you > >>> could use for this experiment, and you could do the experiment as an > >>> observer from an infinite number of angles/perspectives. Plus, a > >>> difference in perspective could make it so that you are taking the > >>> objects in a different order and so invalidate the experiment. I > >>> don't know what the implication is here other than there are very > >>> fundamental philosophical assumptions to deal with here. This is > >>> even > >>> without bringing multiplication into the picture. It seems, if you > >>> are going to base your reality on math, that these kinds of questions > >>> aren't unimportant because they remind me of the fundamental problems > >>> at the base of the quantum versus relativity. > >> > >> I cannot comment because it is a bit vague for me. Normally I can not > >> address physical question before getting the comp-physics. > >> > >> Bruno > >> > > > > The above does not require physical reality, but only concepts that we > > can think about looking inward (eyes closed view). But even though it > > is "only" conceptual, my point is that we ar
Re: Attempt toward a systematic description
Le 08-juin-07, à 20:17, Tom Caylor a écrit : > I should respond to your response. I'm in a busy pensive state > lately, reading Theaetetus (as you suggested on the Incompleteness > thread) along with Protagoras and some Aristotle (along with the dozen > other books I'm always reading...) in the little time I have. Take your time I will be extremely busy the next two weeks (exams and then Siena Cie 2007). > > But you do make assumptions as part of the comp hypothesis, including > assumptions about numbers. I just assume the validity of the excluded middle principle on purely arithmetical question. If you prefer I just assume that if you run a machine then either that machine will stop or it will run forever. I don't know anyone not believing in this, but I have to make it as an assumption because I can not prove it from less, and I use it in the proofs. In the same spirit I assume 0 is not the successor of a positive integer, etc. (I reason axiomatically). Some technics can make this hypothesis weaker though. > LRA looks to be about the particulars of arithmetic. PA, with > induction, is trying to generalize to come up with some universal > truths about arithmetic. About numbers, ok. > But LRA has access to only one particular truth at a time, with no > awareness of generalities/universals. Just few of them. OK. > > >> LRA is, like PA, under the godelian limitation joug. Only, PA knows >> it! >> Lobian machine, like PA or ZF, are godel-limited, but they are aware >> of >> their limitation. OK? >> > > So PA has this "awareness", by *definition*. Not by definition at all! Showing this is the "difficult part" of Godel's second incompleteness theorem. It is done for the first time in some ugly way by Ackerman and Hilbert in their *Grundlagen*. It is the work of Lob which has made possible to do it in a beautiful way, and this has been a key step to the discovery of the modal logics G and G*, which formalizes completely the propositional logic of self-reference. > It is a useful *tool* in > mathematics, but you are assuming it is a part of reality at the > deepest level. This is part your Arithmetic Realism part of the comp > hyp, is it not? No. I consider PA as a clever being, a sort of *baby God* like any of us could hope to be (with comp). PA is just a universal machine knowing that she is universal (in a weak and precise sense). That is, PA is what I call a lobian machine. In some sense, PA "is" a turing machine having already the cognitive abilities to begin being anxious about the length of its available tape. > >> >>> This is because even >>> the statement 1+2=2+1 is a Plato-like statement. The Aristotle >>> verification would be to take 1 object and then take 2 more objects >>> and count the group as a whole. Then take 2 objects and then 1 >>> object >>> and count the group as a whole. But, first of all, there are at >>> least >>> conceptually a (at least potentially) infinite number of objects you >>> could use for this experiment, and you could do the experiment as an >>> observer from an infinite number of angles/perspectives. Plus, a >>> difference in perspective could make it so that you are taking the >>> objects in a different order and so invalidate the experiment. I >>> don't know what the implication is here other than there are very >>> fundamental philosophical assumptions to deal with here. This is >>> even >>> without bringing multiplication into the picture. It seems, if you >>> are going to base your reality on math, that these kinds of questions >>> aren't unimportant because they remind me of the fundamental problems >>> at the base of the quantum versus relativity. >> >> I cannot comment because it is a bit vague for me. Normally I can not >> address physical question before getting the comp-physics. >> >> Bruno >> > > The above does not require physical reality, but only concepts that we > can think about looking inward (eyes closed view). But even though it > is "only" conceptual, my point is that we are taking a "leap of faith" > even when we talk about 1+1=2, classifying an infinite number of cases > into one equivalence class. Not at all. This could appears in engineering when you apply a theory, not when you do math. "1+1 = 2" means what you have learn in high school where the mathematical structure written (N, 0, +, x) by algebraic minded people has been introduced to you. "1+1 = 2" can be false in many mathematical striucture. But then they admit other and different axiomatics. Thanks to the *completeness theorem of Godel" what can be proved by PA is true in ALL mathematical structure which verifies the axioms of PA. But there is no machine which can prove all what is true in the standard model (N, 0, +, x), which escapes all machine and all theories. > > Perhaps at the core of this issue is whether things like "+" are > prescriptive or descriptive. Is it possible that there are universes >
Re: Attempt toward a systematic description
Tom Caylor wrote:
...
> The above does not require physical reality, but only concepts that we
> can think about looking inward (eyes closed view). But even though it
> is "only" conceptual, my point is that we are taking a "leap of faith"
> even when we talk about 1+1=2, classifying an infinite number of cases
> into one equivalence class.
>
> Perhaps at the core of this issue is whether things like "+" are
> prescriptive or descriptive. Is it possible that there are universes
> with mathematical "white rabbits" such that when you take 1 thing and
> 1 other thing ("physical" or not) and associate them in any way,
> including just thinking about them, then you don't necessarily get 2
> things (e.g. sometime you get 1 or 3 or 0)?
>
> Tom
Good point. I think of 1+1=2 as a model. Sometimes, as in putting two apples
in a bag, it fits. Other times, as in putting two drops of water in a cup, it
can be reinterpreted to fit (in terms of volumes). Or, as in a gathering of
the high school basketball team with 12 members in a room with the high school
tennis team with 10 members, you may find that 10+12=15. So applying the model
requires judgment about what counts and what "+" means.
Brent Meeker
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Attempt toward a systematic description
On May 25, 6:55 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Le 25-mai-07, à 02:39, Tom Caylor a écrit : > > On May 16, 8:17 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > ... > >> 0) historical background > > >> ARISTOTLE: reality = what you see > >> PLATO: what you see = shadows of shadows of shadows of shadows of > >> > >> what perhaps could be. > >> And would that be? nobody can say, but everybody can > >> get > >> glimpses by looking inward, even (universal) machines. > > >> Twentieth century: two creative bombs: > > >> - The Universal Machine (talks bits): UM (Babbage, Post, > >> Turing, > >> Church, Suze, von Neumann, ...) > >> - The other universal machine (talks qubit): QUM (Feynman, > >> Deutsch, Kitaev, Freedman, ...) > > > Could you please expand on how these 20th century ideas extended > > Aristotle and Plato? > > Aristotle is (partially?) responsible to the come back to the naive > idea that matter exist primitively, and this leads quickly to the idea > that science = mainly empirical science. > Plato's intuition is that the empirical world is but one aspect of a > bigger reality, and that intuition comes from self-introspection. > I should respond to your response. I'm in a busy pensive state lately, reading Theaetetus (as you suggested on the Incompleteness thread) along with Protagoras and some Aristotle (along with the dozen other books I'm always reading...) in the little time I have. > The Universal Machine can illustrate that indeed when she introspects > herself, she can discover her own limitation (Godel and Lob theorem are > provable by the machines on themselves: a point frequently missed by > those who try to use Godel against Mechanism). > > > Of course the quantum part is an extension, but > > what about the universal part? > > As you may suspect, I am questioning as usual the even-more- > > fundamental assumptions which might be underneath this. Sorry I don't > > really have any time lately either, so I understand if you just want > > to get on with your description based on your assumptions. > > OK. Never forget I have never defend the comp hyp. I have (less > modestly) prove that it is impossible to believe in both the comp hyp, > and the weak materialist thesis (the thesis that there exist primary > matter having a relation with the physical knowledge). With comp matter > emerges from mind which emerges from numbers. > But you do make assumptions as part of the comp hypothesis, including assumptions about numbers. > ... > >>*** > >> 1) The ontic theory of everything: LRA (Little Robinson Arithmetic), > > >> CLASSICAL LOGIC (first order predicate logic axioms and > >> inference > >> rules) > >> AXIOMS OF SUCCESSION > >> AXIOMS OF ADDITION > >> AXIOMS OF MULTIPLICATION > > >> That's all. It is the "Schroedinger" equation of the comp-everything! > >> The reason is that LRA is already as powerful as a universal machine. > >> LRA proves all verifiable sentences with the shape ExP(x), with P(x) > >> decidable. It is equivalent with the universal dovetailer. > > >> Now we have to do with LRA what Everett has done with QM. Embed the > >> observer in the ontic reality. > >> For this we have to "modelize" the observer/knower/thinker. > > >>*** > > >> 2) The epistemic theory, or the generic observer theory: PA (the > >> lobian > >> machine I will interview). > > >> CLASSICAL LOGIC (first order predicate logic axioms and > >> inference > >> rules) > >> AXIOMS OF SUCCESSION > >> AXIOMS OF ADDITION > >> AXIOMS OF MULTIPLICATION > >> AXIOMS OF INDUCTION > > >> Note: the observer extends the ontic reality! It extends it by its > >> beliefs in the induction axioms. They are as many as they are formula > >> F(x), and they have the shape: > > >> [F(0) & Ax(F(x) -> F(x+1))] -> AxF(x) > > >>*** > > > OK. Would you say that LRA plays the part of Arisotle and PA the part > > of Plato here? > > No, why? LRA is a version of the universal dovetailer (the ontic > reality) in the form of a subset of the beliefs of the lobian machine > like Peano Arithmetic. > LRA looks to be about the particulars of arithmetic. PA, with induction, is trying to generalize to come up with some universal truths about arithmetic. > I recall often the difference between Aristotle and Plato, because it > corresponds to two diametrically different conception of reality. With > Aristotle, roughly speaking, there is mainly a physical world, and > explanations are supposed to be of a naturallistic type. With Plato, > and the mystics (those who search the truth by looking inward) the > physical world is the interface (to borrow Rossler's vocabulary) > between us and something else: there is a deeper reality, a priori not > of a naturalistic type. > > > >> OBVIOUS IMPORTANT QUESTION: How to inte
Re: Attempt toward a systematic description
Le 25-mai-07, à 02:39, Tom Caylor a écrit : > > On May 16, 8:17 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> Hi, >> >> I take the opportunity that the list is calm to send a first >> approximation of a possibly extendable post which addresses the >> beginning of the background needed for the interview of the universal >> machine on the physical laws. >> It also addresses some point relevant for discussing the link "formal >> system" <==> "Computation" as in Tegmark diagram page 18 of his >> paper "the mathematical universe" (cf a post by Mark Geddes). >> >> Although schematic, it could already help me if you can list the >> points >> for which you would like examples or more technical details, or just >> explanations. You can also ask for *less* technical details like an >> explanation in (pure) english, perhaps. >> >> I am building again from Robinson Arithmetic, but I could have use the >> combinators or any logical description of what a universal machine (a >> computer) can do. The adavantage of using Robinson Arithmetic (or its >> "little" variant) is that provability in Robinson Arithmetic >> corresponds to universal computability, but not of universal >> provability (which does not exist). >> >> I am perhaps on the verge of not being able to explain the sequel in >> informal term, but I keep hope that non expert, but computer-open >> minded people, can learn and help me to be clearer or more >> pedagogical, >> without having us to study thoroughly mathematical logic. >> Tell me perhaps if you don't understand what I call "Searle's error" >> in >> the comp setting below. >> >>*** >> >> 0) historical background >> >> ARISTOTLE: reality = what you see >> PLATO: what you see = shadows of shadows of shadows of shadows of >> >> what perhaps could be. >> And would that be? nobody can say, but everybody can >> get >> glimpses by looking inward, even (universal) machines. >> >> Twentieth century: two creative bombs: >> >> - The Universal Machine (talks bits): UM (Babbage, Post, >> Turing, >> Church, Suze, von Neumann, ...) >> - The other universal machine (talks qubit): QUM (Feynman, >> Deutsch, Kitaev, Freedman, ...) >> > > Could you please expand on how these 20th century ideas extended > Aristotle and Plato? Aristotle is (partially?) responsible to the come back to the naive idea that matter exist primitively, and this leads quickly to the idea that science = mainly empirical science. Plato's intuition is that the empirical world is but one aspect of a bigger reality, and that intuition comes from self-introspection. The Universal Machine can illustrate that indeed when she introspects herself, she can discover her own limitation (Godel and Lob theorem are provable by the machines on themselves: a point frequently missed by those who try to use Godel against Mechanism). > Of course the quantum part is an extension, but > what about the universal part? > As you may suspect, I am questioning as usual the even-more- > fundamental assumptions which might be underneath this. Sorry I don't > really have any time lately either, so I understand if you just want > to get on with your description based on your assumptions. OK. Never forget I have never defend the comp hyp. I have (less modestly) prove that it is impossible to believe in both the comp hyp, and the weak materialist thesis (the thesis that there exist primary matter having a relation with the physical knowledge). With comp matter emerges from mind which emerges from numbers. > >> Comp = Milinda-Descartes Mechanism in a digital version. = (also) "YES >> DOCTOR" + CHURCH'S THESIS. (I suppress the arithmetical realism, >> because it is implicit in CHURCH'S THESIS). >> >> UDA: a reasoning which shows that if comp is correct then the physical >> laws have to be derived by a measure on states (the measure being made >> up through their computational histories). >> >> Subgoal: extract QUM from UM's self-observation. >> >> Link with everything-list: search for the "observer moments" and the >> relevant structure operating on them (not yet solved). >> >>*** >> >> 1) The ontic theory of everything: LRA (Little Robinson Arithmetic), >> >> CLASSICAL LOGIC (first order predicate logic axioms and >> inference >> rules) >> AXIOMS OF SUCCESSION >> AXIOMS OF ADDITION >> AXIOMS OF MULTIPLICATION >> >> That's all. It is the "Schroedinger" equation of the comp-everything! >> The reason is that LRA is already as powerful as a universal machine. >> LRA proves all verifiable sentences with the shape ExP(x), with P(x) >> decidable. It is equivalent with the universal dovetailer. >> >> Now we have to do with LRA what Everett has done with QM. Embed the >> observer in the ontic reality. >> For this we have to "modelize" the observer/knower/thinker. >> >>
Re: Attempt toward a systematic description
Le 24-mai-07, à 19:48, Mohsen Ravanbakhsh a écrit : > Hi Bruno, > > Thank you for the information. I understand these parts for the others > it seems I need to search in archives of the > list for some keywords that I do not understand. I'm not an old > member. No problem. You can always ask. A mailing list is done for that. In the worst case where you ask for some explanation which I have already given ten thousand times, I will either provide links, or ... ask you to wait for the ten thousand and one explanation. > I just wanted to say, most of links in > your page lead to nowhere!(Error), It would be nice if you fix them. I should have updated it since a long time. My old software doesn't work since macOS-10, and I'm tired to buy always the same soft. Also I have to remind my password. I was hoping to change my web-page before' goinf to Siena, but June is the exam period and I am not sure I will be able to do that. Sorry. Bruno > > Mohsen Ravanbakhsh > > On 5/23/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> Hi Mohsen, >> >> Le 22-mai-07, à 12:20, Mohsen Ravanbakhsh a écrit : >> >> >> > Hi Bruno, >> > >> > My sixth sens says you're talking about something important :) but I >> > don't get it. >> >> >> Note that it could help me if you could be a little more specific. OK >> I >> see another post of you. >> >> >> >> >> > It could have been of much more interest, if you could elaborate, or >> > provide us with some references for each part of your >> >> >> So you are able to make sense of the fact that >> [LOGIC+ADDITION+MULTIPLICATION] gives already a Universal Turing >> Machine. This is no more astosnishing than the fact that the K and S >> combinators provides already turing-universality, or that the Conway >> Game of Life is already turing universal. >> The advantage of [LOGIC+ADDITION+MULTIPLICATION] is that (universal) >> computability is seen as a particular case of provability. >> >> What is more long to explain in details is that >> [LOGIC+ADDITION+MULTIPLICATION + INDUCTION] is already lobian. But I >> will first look to your other post which title refer to >> incompleteness. >> >> >> >> > argument.(Beginning from the 'OBVIOUS IMPORTANT QUESTION' it >> > becomesvague for me) >> >> >> The key point consists in understanding the difference between >> computability/simulability and provability. I will come back on this, >> but the idea is that, assuming comp, I can simulate Einstein's brain >> exactly, and still not share his beliefs. Similarly the very non >> powerful Little-Robinson-arithmetic can simulate rich theories like >> PEANO or ZF, but cannot prove the theorem of PA or ZF. >> >> For example PA can prove that ZF can prove the consistency of PA, yet, >> PA cannot prove the consistency of PA. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> > > > > -- > > Mohsen Ravanbakhsh, > Sharif University of Technology, > Tehran. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Attempt toward a systematic description
Bruno, I have a criticism to your argument for teleportation. in the third step, Before the teleportation to cities A and B, you're assuming an uncertainty of first person in appearing in one of those cities. Suppose it to be A. *Where does this asymmetry come from?* I as the first person have been asymmetrically transported to A and not to B. Why? parallel universes again? I thing it wont be creditable, because we have (as far as we know) no quantum collapse. A mere information transfer does not need branching :) ! Does it mean comp is wrong? -- Mohsen Ravanbakhsh, --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Attempt toward a systematic description
On May 16, 8:17 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Hi, > > I take the opportunity that the list is calm to send a first > approximation of a possibly extendable post which addresses the > beginning of the background needed for the interview of the universal > machine on the physical laws. > It also addresses some point relevant for discussing the link "formal > system" <==> "Computation" as in Tegmark diagram page 18 of his > paper "the mathematical universe" (cf a post by Mark Geddes). > > Although schematic, it could already help me if you can list the points > for which you would like examples or more technical details, or just > explanations. You can also ask for *less* technical details like an > explanation in (pure) english, perhaps. > > I am building again from Robinson Arithmetic, but I could have use the > combinators or any logical description of what a universal machine (a > computer) can do. The adavantage of using Robinson Arithmetic (or its > "little" variant) is that provability in Robinson Arithmetic > corresponds to universal computability, but not of universal > provability (which does not exist). > > I am perhaps on the verge of not being able to explain the sequel in > informal term, but I keep hope that non expert, but computer-open > minded people, can learn and help me to be clearer or more pedagogical, > without having us to study thoroughly mathematical logic. > Tell me perhaps if you don't understand what I call "Searle's error" in > the comp setting below. > >*** > > 0) historical background > > ARISTOTLE: reality = what you see > PLATO: what you see = shadows of shadows of shadows of shadows of > what perhaps could be. > And would that be? nobody can say, but everybody can get > glimpses by looking inward, even (universal) machines. > > Twentieth century: two creative bombs: > > - The Universal Machine (talks bits): UM (Babbage, Post, Turing, > Church, Suze, von Neumann, ...) > - The other universal machine (talks qubit): QUM (Feynman, > Deutsch, Kitaev, Freedman, ...) > Could you please expand on how these 20th century ideas extended Aristotle and Plato? Of course the quantum part is an extension, but what about the universal part? As you may suspect, I am questioning as usual the even-more- fundamental assumptions which might be underneath this. Sorry I don't really have any time lately either, so I understand if you just want to get on with your description based on your assumptions. > Comp = Milinda-Descartes Mechanism in a digital version. = (also) "YES > DOCTOR" + CHURCH'S THESIS. (I suppress the arithmetical realism, > because it is implicit in CHURCH'S THESIS). > > UDA: a reasoning which shows that if comp is correct then the physical > laws have to be derived by a measure on states (the measure being made > up through their computational histories). > > Subgoal: extract QUM from UM's self-observation. > > Link with everything-list: search for the "observer moments" and the > relevant structure operating on them (not yet solved). > >*** > > 1) The ontic theory of everything: LRA (Little Robinson Arithmetic), > > CLASSICAL LOGIC (first order predicate logic axioms and inference > rules) > AXIOMS OF SUCCESSION > AXIOMS OF ADDITION > AXIOMS OF MULTIPLICATION > > That's all. It is the "Schroedinger" equation of the comp-everything! > The reason is that LRA is already as powerful as a universal machine. > LRA proves all verifiable sentences with the shape ExP(x), with P(x) > decidable. It is equivalent with the universal dovetailer. > > Now we have to do with LRA what Everett has done with QM. Embed the > observer in the ontic reality. > For this we have to "modelize" the observer/knower/thinker. > >*** > > 2) The epistemic theory, or the generic observer theory: PA (the lobian > machine I will interview). > > CLASSICAL LOGIC (first order predicate logic axioms and inference > rules) > AXIOMS OF SUCCESSION > AXIOMS OF ADDITION > AXIOMS OF MULTIPLICATION > AXIOMS OF INDUCTION > > Note: the observer extends the ontic reality! It extends it by its > beliefs in the induction axioms. They are as many as they are formula > F(x), and they have the shape: > > [F(0) & Ax(F(x) -> F(x+1))] -> AxF(x) > >*** OK. Would you say that LRA plays the part of Arisotle and PA the part of Plato here? > > OBVIOUS IMPORTANT QUESTION: How to interview PA when we dispose > ontologically only of LRA? > > NOT OBVIOUS SOLUTION: just try to obviate the fundamental SEARLE ERROR > (cf Mind's I, Hofstadter -Dennett describe it well) in front of the LRA > theorems. > > I explain: Searle's goal consisted in arguing against mechanism, that > is arguing we are not machine, and in particular that a simulator is > not the
Re: Attempt toward a systematic description
Hi Bruno, Thank you for the information. I understand these parts for the others it seems I need to search in archives of the list for some keywords that I do not understand. I'm not an old member. I just wanted to say, most of links in your page lead to nowhere!(Error), It would be nice if you fix them. Mohsen Ravanbakhsh On 5/23/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > Hi Mohsen, > > Le 22-mai-07, à 12:20, Mohsen Ravanbakhsh a écrit : > > > > Hi Bruno, > > > > My sixth sens says you're talking about something important :) but I > > don't get it. > > > Note that it could help me if you could be a little more specific. OK I > see another post of you. > > > > > > It could have been of much more interest, if you could elaborate, or > > provide us with some references for each part of your > > > So you are able to make sense of the fact that > [LOGIC+ADDITION+MULTIPLICATION] gives already a Universal Turing > Machine. This is no more astosnishing than the fact that the K and S > combinators provides already turing-universality, or that the Conway > Game of Life is already turing universal. > The advantage of [LOGIC+ADDITION+MULTIPLICATION] is that (universal) > computability is seen as a particular case of provability. > > What is more long to explain in details is that > [LOGIC+ADDITION+MULTIPLICATION + INDUCTION] is already lobian. But I > will first look to your other post which title refer to incompleteness. > > > > > argument.(Beginning from the 'OBVIOUS IMPORTANT QUESTION' it > > becomesvague for me) > > > The key point consists in understanding the difference between > computability/simulability and provability. I will come back on this, > but the idea is that, assuming comp, I can simulate Einstein's brain > exactly, and still not share his beliefs. Similarly the very non > powerful Little-Robinson-arithmetic can simulate rich theories like > PEANO or ZF, but cannot prove the theorem of PA or ZF. > > For example PA can prove that ZF can prove the consistency of PA, yet, > PA cannot prove the consistency of PA. > > Bruno > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- Mohsen Ravanbakhsh, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Attempt toward a systematic description
Hi Mohsen, Le 22-mai-07, à 12:20, Mohsen Ravanbakhsh a écrit : > Hi Bruno, > > My sixth sens says you're talking about something important :) but I > don't get it. Note that it could help me if you could be a little more specific. OK I see another post of you. > It could have been of much more interest, if you could elaborate, or > provide us with some references for each part of your So you are able to make sense of the fact that [LOGIC+ADDITION+MULTIPLICATION] gives already a Universal Turing Machine. This is no more astosnishing than the fact that the K and S combinators provides already turing-universality, or that the Conway Game of Life is already turing universal. The advantage of [LOGIC+ADDITION+MULTIPLICATION] is that (universal) computability is seen as a particular case of provability. What is more long to explain in details is that [LOGIC+ADDITION+MULTIPLICATION + INDUCTION] is already lobian. But I will first look to your other post which title refer to incompleteness. > argument.(Beginning from the 'OBVIOUS IMPORTANT QUESTION' it > becomes vague for me) The key point consists in understanding the difference between computability/simulability and provability. I will come back on this, but the idea is that, assuming comp, I can simulate Einstein's brain exactly, and still not share his beliefs. Similarly the very non powerful Little-Robinson-arithmetic can simulate rich theories like PEANO or ZF, but cannot prove the theorem of PA or ZF. For example PA can prove that ZF can prove the consistency of PA, yet, PA cannot prove the consistency of PA. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Attempt toward a systematic description
Hi Bruno, My sixth sens says you're talking about something important :) but I don't get it. It could have been of much more interest, if you could elaborate, or provide us with some references for each part of your argument.(Beginning from the 'OBVIOUS IMPORTANT QUESTION' it becomes vague for me) On 5/16/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > Hi, > > I take the opportunity that the list is calm to send a first > approximation of a possibly extendable post which addresses the > beginning of the background needed for the interview of the universal > machine on the physical laws. > It also addresses some point relevant for discussing the link "formal > system" <==> "Computation" as in Tegmark diagram page 18 of his > paper "the mathematical universe" (cf a post by Mark Geddes). > > Although schematic, it could already help me if you can list the points > for which you would like examples or more technical details, or just > explanations. You can also ask for *less* technical details like an > explanation in (pure) english, perhaps. > > I am building again from Robinson Arithmetic, but I could have use the > combinators or any logical description of what a universal machine (a > computer) can do. The adavantage of using Robinson Arithmetic (or its > "little" variant) is that provability in Robinson Arithmetic > corresponds to universal computability, but not of universal > provability (which does not exist). > > > I am perhaps on the verge of not being able to explain the sequel in > informal term, but I keep hope that non expert, but computer-open > minded people, can learn and help me to be clearer or more pedagogical, > without having us to study thoroughly mathematical logic. > Tell me perhaps if you don't understand what I call "Searle's error" in > the comp setting below. > > > *** > > > 0) historical background > > ARISTOTLE: reality = what you see > PLATO: what you see = shadows of shadows of shadows of shadows of > what perhaps could be. >And would that be? nobody can say, but everybody can get > glimpses by looking inward, even (universal) machines. > > Twentieth century: two creative bombs: > >- The Universal Machine (talks bits): UM (Babbage, Post, Turing, > Church, Suze, von Neumann, ...) >- The other universal machine (talks qubit): QUM (Feynman, > Deutsch, Kitaev, Freedman, ...) > > Comp = Milinda-Descartes Mechanism in a digital version. = (also) "YES > DOCTOR" + CHURCH'S THESIS. (I suppress the arithmetical realism, > because it is implicit in CHURCH'S THESIS). > > > UDA: a reasoning which shows that if comp is correct then the physical > laws have to be derived by a measure on states (the measure being made > up through their computational histories). > > Subgoal: extract QUM from UM's self-observation. > > Link with everything-list: search for the "observer moments" and the > relevant structure operating on them (not yet solved). > > > *** > > > 1) The ontic theory of everything: LRA (Little Robinson Arithmetic), > > CLASSICAL LOGIC (first order predicate logic axioms and inference > rules) > AXIOMS OF SUCCESSION > AXIOMS OF ADDITION > AXIOMS OF MULTIPLICATION > > > That's all. It is the "Schroedinger" equation of the comp-everything! > The reason is that LRA is already as powerful as a universal machine. > LRA proves all verifiable sentences with the shape ExP(x), with P(x) > decidable. It is equivalent with the universal dovetailer. > > Now we have to do with LRA what Everett has done with QM. Embed the > observer in the ontic reality. > For this we have to "modelize" the observer/knower/thinker. > > > > > *** > > > > 2) The epistemic theory, or the generic observer theory: PA (the lobian > machine I will interview). > > CLASSICAL LOGIC (first order predicate logic axioms and inference > rules) > AXIOMS OF SUCCESSION > AXIOMS OF ADDITION > AXIOMS OF MULTIPLICATION > AXIOMS OF INDUCTION > > Note: the observer extends the ontic reality! It extends it by its > beliefs in the induction axioms. They are as many as they are formula > F(x), and they have the shape: > > [F(0) & Ax(F(x) -> F(x+1))] -> AxF(x) > > > > > *** > > > > > > OBVIOUS IMPORTANT QUESTION: How to interview PA when we dispose > ontologically only of LRA? > > NOT OBVIOUS SOLUTION: just try to obviate the fundamental SEARLE ERROR > (cf Mind's I, Hofstadter -Dennett describe it well) in front of the LRA > theorems. > > > I explain: Searle's goal consisted in arguing against mechanism, that > is arguing we are not machine, and in particular that a simulator is > not the real thing. He accepts the idea that in principle a program can > simulate a chinese speaker. Knowing the program, Searles accepts he can > simulate it, and this without understanding chinese. He
Attempt toward a systematic description
Hi, I take the opportunity that the list is calm to send a first approximation of a possibly extendable post which addresses the beginning of the background needed for the interview of the universal machine on the physical laws. It also addresses some point relevant for discussing the link "formal system" <==> "Computation" as in Tegmark diagram page 18 of his paper "the mathematical universe" (cf a post by Mark Geddes). Although schematic, it could already help me if you can list the points for which you would like examples or more technical details, or just explanations. You can also ask for *less* technical details like an explanation in (pure) english, perhaps. I am building again from Robinson Arithmetic, but I could have use the combinators or any logical description of what a universal machine (a computer) can do. The adavantage of using Robinson Arithmetic (or its "little" variant) is that provability in Robinson Arithmetic corresponds to universal computability, but not of universal provability (which does not exist). I am perhaps on the verge of not being able to explain the sequel in informal term, but I keep hope that non expert, but computer-open minded people, can learn and help me to be clearer or more pedagogical, without having us to study thoroughly mathematical logic. Tell me perhaps if you don't understand what I call "Searle's error" in the comp setting below. *** 0) historical background ARISTOTLE: reality = what you see PLATO: what you see = shadows of shadows of shadows of shadows of what perhaps could be. And would that be? nobody can say, but everybody can get glimpses by looking inward, even (universal) machines. Twentieth century: two creative bombs: - The Universal Machine (talks bits): UM (Babbage, Post, Turing, Church, Suze, von Neumann, ...) - The other universal machine (talks qubit): QUM (Feynman, Deutsch, Kitaev, Freedman, ...) Comp = Milinda-Descartes Mechanism in a digital version. = (also) "YES DOCTOR" + CHURCH'S THESIS. (I suppress the arithmetical realism, because it is implicit in CHURCH'S THESIS). UDA: a reasoning which shows that if comp is correct then the physical laws have to be derived by a measure on states (the measure being made up through their computational histories). Subgoal: extract QUM from UM's self-observation. Link with everything-list: search for the "observer moments" and the relevant structure operating on them (not yet solved). *** 1) The ontic theory of everything: LRA (Little Robinson Arithmetic), CLASSICAL LOGIC (first order predicate logic axioms and inference rules) AXIOMS OF SUCCESSION AXIOMS OF ADDITION AXIOMS OF MULTIPLICATION That's all. It is the "Schroedinger" equation of the comp-everything! The reason is that LRA is already as powerful as a universal machine. LRA proves all verifiable sentences with the shape ExP(x), with P(x) decidable. It is equivalent with the universal dovetailer. Now we have to do with LRA what Everett has done with QM. Embed the observer in the ontic reality. For this we have to "modelize" the observer/knower/thinker. *** 2) The epistemic theory, or the generic observer theory: PA (the lobian machine I will interview). CLASSICAL LOGIC (first order predicate logic axioms and inference rules) AXIOMS OF SUCCESSION AXIOMS OF ADDITION AXIOMS OF MULTIPLICATION AXIOMS OF INDUCTION Note: the observer extends the ontic reality! It extends it by its beliefs in the induction axioms. They are as many as they are formula F(x), and they have the shape: [F(0) & Ax(F(x) -> F(x+1))] -> AxF(x) *** OBVIOUS IMPORTANT QUESTION: How to interview PA when we dispose ontologically only of LRA? NOT OBVIOUS SOLUTION: just try to obviate the fundamental SEARLE ERROR (cf Mind's I, Hofstadter -Dennett describe it well) in front of the LRA theorems. I explain: Searle's goal consisted in arguing against mechanism, that is arguing we are not machine, and in particular that a simulator is not the real thing. He accepts the idea that in principle a program can simulate a chinese speaker. Knowing the program, Searles accepts he can simulate it, and this without understanding chinese. He concludes that we have to distinguish between speaking chinese and simulating speaking chinese. True! but with comp you have to distinguish between the simulated chinese speaker and the simulator of the chinese speaker! By being able to simulate the chinese speaker, Searle can have a conversation with the chinese speaker (well assuming that the chinese speaker can talk english, or that Searle knows chinese). This is particularly important in our setting. LRA has the power of a universal turing machi
