Re: Bruno's Brussels Thesis English Version Chap 1 (trial translation)
On 11 Feb 2009, at 00:48, Günther Greindl wrote: > > Kim, > >>> Günther recommends recently the book "Eveything Must Go" by Ladyman >>> et al. This looks like heavy going but seems like a good and a >>> relevant tome to get into, possibly circling around the mechanist >>> idea. Do you also recommend it? > > The book does not concern the mechanist thesis, there is only one > reference to Church. > > Everett is given a whole section, but Ladyman et al. are agnostic as > to > it's application to the macroscopic world (that is, if there are > macroscopic many worlds). But they are not hostile to the > interpretation. > > The book is good for getting a very informed overview of what current > physics has to say for _metaphysics_ and philosophy of science. The > authors sketch their variant of structural realism - it's good to read > it if you still cling to the concept of "matter". Indeed, that is the point. And yes there is section on Everett (but his name is not in the index). The authors seems to be unaware that mechanism implies Everett (at least) or "worst" (so that mechanism is testable). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's Brussels Thesis English Version Chap 1 (trial translation)
Kim, >> Günther recommends recently the book "Eveything Must Go" by Ladyman >> et al. This looks like heavy going but seems like a good and a >> relevant tome to get into, possibly circling around the mechanist >> idea. Do you also recommend it? The book does not concern the mechanist thesis, there is only one reference to Church. Everett is given a whole section, but Ladyman et al. are agnostic as to it's application to the macroscopic world (that is, if there are macroscopic many worlds). But they are not hostile to the interpretation. The book is good for getting a very informed overview of what current physics has to say for _metaphysics_ and philosophy of science. The authors sketch their variant of structural realism - it's good to read it if you still cling to the concept of "matter". Cheers, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's Brussels Thesis English Version Chap 1 (trial translation)
Kim, > Thanks for the corrections - not only did I improve my understanding > of the thesis in closely translating the language, but had enormous > fun! I am up to the diagrammatic part and will stop here for the > time being, to catch my breath and also to try and understand the > Jaques Mallah thread as best I can. No problem. Happy that you take fun in the translation. > Günther recommends recently the book "Eveything Must Go" by Ladyman > et al. This looks like heavy going but seems like a good and a > relevant tome to get into, possibly circling around the mechanist > idea. Do you also recommend it? I met Ladyman in Dubrovnic. Very nice guy. But from the Amazon "Look inside" I have not found reference on Everett, or Church or anything indicating he circled around the mechanist idea. Judge by yourself by reading the introduction on the Amazon Look Inside, if you are interested go for it, but be careful not running on too many horses. > Available from Amazon at a hefty price but might be worth it. > > Looking forward to the creative maths assignments - but take your > time; we only live once but we live forever > I will. Best Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's Brussels Thesis English Version Chap 1 (trial translation)
Bruno Thanks for the corrections - not only did I improve my understanding of the thesis in closely translating the language, but had enormous fun! I am up to the diagrammatic part and will stop here for the time being, to catch my breath and also to try and understand the Jaques Mallah thread as best I can. Günther recommends recently the book "Eveything Must Go" by Ladyman et al. This looks like heavy going but seems like a good and a relevant tome to get into, possibly circling around the mechanist idea. Do you also recommend it? Available from Amazon at a hefty price but might be worth it. Looking forward to the creative maths assignments - but take your time; we only live once but we live forever Best Kim On 10/02/2009, at 2:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 07 Feb 2009, at 04:47, Kim Jones wrote: > > >> (see Broukère 1982), > > It is (see de Brouckère 1982) Note the "c", and the "de". > >> >> Phenomena of genetic regulation with regard to mechanism are >> eloquent [elegant?=poss. error:] Kim) > > > It is "eloquent" (indeed). Perhaps it would be clearer to say: > "Phenomena of genetic regulation are eloquent with regard to > Mechanism". > Mechanism is "Mechanist Philosophy" and so a capital M is better > suited (I am afraid that you are not just translating my 1994 > thesis, but you are correcting it ! Well, don't worry, this can be > done at a second pass. > > I have no other remark. Excellent job. I guess that now I have not > escape but to seriously introduce you to math for respecting the > deal. Good move Kim :) > > This will be done asap, through little posts. The plan is: Numbers > ==> functions ===> computable functions ===> computations ===> the > seventh step (of the UDA). > > Best, > > Bruno > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's Brussels Thesis English Version Chap 1 (trial translation)
On 07 Feb 2009, at 04:47, Kim Jones wrote:
> (see Broukère 1982),
It is (see de Brouckère 1982) Note the "c", and the "de".
>
> Phenomena of genetic regulation with regard to mechanism are
> eloquent [elegant?=poss. error:] Kim)
It is "eloquent" (indeed). Perhaps it would be clearer to say:
"Phenomena of genetic regulation are eloquent with regard to Mechanism".
Mechanism is "Mechanist Philosophy" and so a capital M is better
suited (I am afraid that you are not just translating my 1994 thesis,
but you are correcting it ! Well, don't worry, this can be done at a
second pass.
I have no other remark. Excellent job. I guess that now I have not
escape but to seriously introduce you to math for respecting the deal.
Good move Kim :)
This will be done asap, through little posts. The plan is: Numbers
==> functions ===> computable functions ===> computations ===> the
seventh step (of the UDA).
Best,
Bruno
> (Jacob and Monod 1961, Thomas 1978, Thomas and van Ham 1974).
>
> Here again is what Diderot said in his conversation with d'Alembert,
> in confronting Cartesian mechanism and the development of the embryo:
>
> "Do you see this egg? With this, one can upend every school of
> theology and every temple on Earth. What is this egg? Before the
> germ (of life) is introduced, no more than an insensate mass; and
> after it's introduction, what is it then? An insensate mass, since
> the germ itself is but an inert and coarse fluid. How might this
> mass progress to another form of organisation, toward the sensation
> of feeling, toward life itself? By warmth. What produces this
> warmth? Movement. What will be the successive effects of movements?
> Instead of my response, sit here and together we will follow these
> movements from moment to moment. Starting with a point that
> oscillates, a thread that extends and gathers colour, to the flesh
> which forms; a beak, tiny wing-ends, eyes, feet appear; a yellow-
> tinged matter that divides and which produces intestines; behold an
> animal. An animal that moves, becomes agitated, sounds its voice; I
> hear its squawking through the shell; it grows its downy coat; it
> sees. The weight of its head, which bobs back and forth, unceasingly
> brings its beak against the inner rampart of its prison; this now
> breaks; it leaves, it walks, it flies, it registers irritation, it
> flees, it returns, it complains, it suffers, it loves, it desires,
> it experiences joy; it possesses each of your affects; all of your
> actions, it can perform them all. Can you claim, with Descartes that
> it is no more than a purely imitative machine? In that case, tiny
> children laugh at you with derision and the philosophers' rejoinder
> is that if such is a machine, then you are but another." {footnote 6}
>
> (Footnote 6: We note here the essentially modernist mindset of
> Diderot who places the animal on the same rung as the human, thus
> rejecting Descartes' distinction. In general, with the notable
> exception of La Mettrie, mechanism will face a poor reception. This
> brings to mind Pascal's argument. This genre of "argument" is not
> all that far from what Turing called "head in the sand objection"
> qualifying more as "consolation" than refutation. (Turing 1950)
>
> The contemporary biologist may surmise that - relative to the laws
> of chemistry - the problem of biological reproduction is solved. The
> discovery by biochemists and molecular geneticists of the plan or
> description of the cell and the fashion by which this map is
> chemically represented, decoded and executed within the organism
> constitutes cause for the application of the Principle of Unique
> Reassembly, the Determining Principle and the Limiting Hierachical
> Principle (this last appearing already with classical genetics, see
> Cuny 1969). In the same way, the older discovery of the importance
> of particle exchanges with the surrounding environment or between
> organisms - as happens during breathing, during digestion, during
> conception, favours the application of the Locality Principle (Van
> Helmont, Mendel, Lavoisier, Vesale - to cite the more well known
> ones; see de Broukère 1982, Ambroselli et al 1987, Vesale 1543).
>
> 1.1.5 Doubts Arising from Chemistry
>
> Watson has said "the cell obeys the laws of chemistry", and the
> preceding incentives perhaps justify a belief in indexical mechanism
> relative to those laws. If these laws prove themselves to be non-
> mechanisable, mechanism will thereby find itself weakened, perhaps
> even refuted but certainly relativised.
>
> This suggestion is all the more well-founded in that the laws of
> chemistry are captured by quantum mechanics. Despite its name
> ("mechanics" is here used in the Newtonian sense), philosophers and
> theologians are attracted to QM and see in the factual descriptions
> (up to here confirmed) of this theory an
Re: Bruno's Brussels Thesis English Version Chap 1 (trial translation)
Not yet. But if you exercise moderate patience I can translate the
whole thing within the next two weeks (minus diagrams)
Thanks for the accolade
K
On 05/02/2009, at 5:37 PM, Hector Zenil wrote:
>
> This is pretty good. Is there any online source with a complete
> version available?
>
> Thanks.
>
>
> On Thu, Feb 5, 2009 at 7:32 AM, Kim Jones
> wrote:
>> Trans. Kim Jones (extract only)
>>
>> 1.1 Mechanist Philosophies
>> 1.1.1 Different types of Mechanism
>> I distinguish the following mechanist hypotheses:
>> BEHAVIOURIST MECHANISM
>> Some machines can behave as thinking beings (living, conscious etc.)
>> (BEH-MEC)
>> STRONG MECHANISM
>> Some machines can think (living beings, conscious beings, have a
>> private
>> life etc.) (STR-MEC)
>> INDEXICAL MECHANISM
>> I am a machine (or - you are a machine, or again - human beings are
>> machines) (IND-MEC)
>> By replacing "machine" by "digital machine" one obtains the
>> corresponding
>> digital theses.
>> The behaviourist digital mechanism BEH-DIG-MEC corresponds largely
>> to that
>> of Turing in his 1950 article. In the same way, the strong digital
>> mechanism
>> STR-DIG-MEC corresponds to what is called in the literature the
>> strong
>> artificial intelligence thesis (strong AI).
>> In this work I am exclusively interested in indexical and digital
>> mechanism
>> (IND-DIG-MEC or just IDM). "Digitality" necessitates Church's
>> Thesis, which
>> is why the digital aspect is explained in its turn in the second
>> part.
>> There, I will show how a procedure, due essentially to Goedel,
>> permits an
>> indexical treatment of machines in general.
>> Proposition:
>> IND-MEC => STR-MEC => BEH-MEC, and
>> BEH-MEC ≠> STR-MEC ≠> IND-MEC.
>> (with or without the hypothesis of digitality)
>>
>> Reasoning: One admits that humans know how to think (conscious
>> beings,
>> having private lives etc.) In this case IND-MEC entails STR-MEC and
>> STR-MEC
>> entails BEH-MEC. That BEH-MEC does not entail STR-MEC is supported by
>> Weizenbaum (1976) (see also Gunderson {footnote 1} 1971). STR-MEC
>> does not
>> entail IND-MEC, since the fact that machines are able to think does
>> not
>> entail that they alone are able to think. It is conceivable that
>> machines
>> are able to think without we ourselves being machines. Wang (1974)
>> presents
>> a similar reasoning. Nevertheless, numerous philosophers make
>> implicit use
>> of an opposing opinion: STR-MEC => IND-MEC, see for example Arsac
>> 1987.
>> {Footnote 1: Gunderson 1971 criticises the Turing Test. The Turing
>> Test is a
>> test for BEH-MEC. Simply put, a machine (hidden) passes the test if
>> it is
>> able to pass itself off as a human being during a "conversation" by
>> means of
>> a computer keyboard terminal.}
>> 1.1.2 Mechanist Philosophy: Historical Summary
>> Contemporary digital mechanist philosophy is due in large measure to
>> Descartes and Hobbes {footnote 2} (see Rogow 1986, Bernhardt 1989).
>> Descartes wanted to distinguish Man from the animals. He argues
>> that the
>> animal, as much as Man's body (including the brain), is a machine. He
>> understood by this a finite assembly of of material components
>> that unequivocally determine the behaviour of the whole. Descartes
>> surmises
>> that the soul is not mechanical. In separating the soul from the
>> body in
>> this way, and thus the mind from matter, he is the originator of
>> the dualist
>> position, widely encompassed by the philosophy of mind. One speaks of
>> Cartesian Dualism.
>> There follows three arguments that Descartes presented in favour of
>> his
>> distinction of man from the animal-as-machine (We note that this
>> distinction
>> entails the negation of IND-MEC.)
>> {footnote 2: One can detect some mechanist affirmations or questions
>> among (pre and post-Socratic, though not necessarily
>> materialist) philosophers, from Greek antiquity (cf Timaeus and
>> Plato, see
>> also Odifreddi 1989). Among Chinese philosophers, for example Lao-
>> Tzu, a
>> certain monk is admired for having passed off his "automated"
>> servants as
>> flesh and blood beings. Among Hindu philosophers for example, in the
>> "Questions to the King Milinda", the human body is compared to the
>> chariot,
>> and the human mind is compared to the different parts of the chariot,
>> similar to Hume's (1739) manner of tackling the problem of identity
>> with his
>> boat. The temptation to set up artefacts in the image of Man is
>> also a
>> component of several myths, (for ex. the Golem in Jewish culture,
>> see for
>> ex. Breton 1990). It is no exaggeration to maintain that the very
>> idea of
>> mechanism appears wherever and whenever machines themselves are
>> developed.}
>> 1) Animals are not endowed with reason and cannot engage in
>> linguistic
>> communication
>> This argument is losing credibility since language and reason seem
>> more
>> accessible to today's machines than for
Re: Bruno's Brussels Thesis English Version Chap 1 (trial translation)
This is pretty good. Is there any online source with a complete
version available?
Thanks.
On Thu, Feb 5, 2009 at 7:32 AM, Kim Jones wrote:
> Trans. Kim Jones (extract only)
>
> 1.1 Mechanist Philosophies
> 1.1.1 Different types of Mechanism
> I distinguish the following mechanist hypotheses:
> BEHAVIOURIST MECHANISM
> Some machines can behave as thinking beings (living, conscious etc.)
> (BEH-MEC)
> STRONG MECHANISM
> Some machines can think (living beings, conscious beings, have a private
> life etc.) (STR-MEC)
> INDEXICAL MECHANISM
> I am a machine (or - you are a machine, or again - human beings are
> machines) (IND-MEC)
> By replacing "machine" by "digital machine" one obtains the corresponding
> digital theses.
> The behaviourist digital mechanism BEH-DIG-MEC corresponds largely to that
> of Turing in his 1950 article. In the same way, the strong digital mechanism
> STR-DIG-MEC corresponds to what is called in the literature the strong
> artificial intelligence thesis (strong AI).
> In this work I am exclusively interested in indexical and digital mechanism
> (IND-DIG-MEC or just IDM). "Digitality" necessitates Church's Thesis, which
> is why the digital aspect is explained in its turn in the second part.
> There, I will show how a procedure, due essentially to Goedel, permits an
> indexical treatment of machines in general.
> Proposition:
> IND-MEC => STR-MEC => BEH-MEC, and
> BEH-MEC ≠> STR-MEC ≠> IND-MEC.
> (with or without the hypothesis of digitality)
>
> Reasoning: One admits that humans know how to think (conscious beings,
> having private lives etc.) In this case IND-MEC entails STR-MEC and STR-MEC
> entails BEH-MEC. That BEH-MEC does not entail STR-MEC is supported by
> Weizenbaum (1976) (see also Gunderson {footnote 1} 1971). STR-MEC does not
> entail IND-MEC, since the fact that machines are able to think does not
> entail that they alone are able to think. It is conceivable that machines
> are able to think without we ourselves being machines. Wang (1974) presents
> a similar reasoning. Nevertheless, numerous philosophers make implicit use
> of an opposing opinion: STR-MEC => IND-MEC, see for example Arsac 1987.
> {Footnote 1: Gunderson 1971 criticises the Turing Test. The Turing Test is a
> test for BEH-MEC. Simply put, a machine (hidden) passes the test if it is
> able to pass itself off as a human being during a "conversation" by means of
> a computer keyboard terminal.}
> 1.1.2 Mechanist Philosophy: Historical Summary
> Contemporary digital mechanist philosophy is due in large measure to
> Descartes and Hobbes {footnote 2} (see Rogow 1986, Bernhardt 1989).
> Descartes wanted to distinguish Man from the animals. He argues that the
> animal, as much as Man's body (including the brain), is a machine. He
> understood by this a finite assembly of of material components
> that unequivocally determine the behaviour of the whole. Descartes surmises
> that the soul is not mechanical. In separating the soul from the body in
> this way, and thus the mind from matter, he is the originator of the dualist
> position, widely encompassed by the philosophy of mind. One speaks of
> Cartesian Dualism.
> There follows three arguments that Descartes presented in favour of his
> distinction of man from the animal-as-machine (We note that this distinction
> entails the negation of IND-MEC.)
> {footnote 2: One can detect some mechanist affirmations or questions
> among (pre and post-Socratic, though not necessarily
> materialist) philosophers, from Greek antiquity (cf Timaeus and Plato, see
> also Odifreddi 1989). Among Chinese philosophers, for example Lao-Tzu, a
> certain monk is admired for having passed off his "automated" servants as
> flesh and blood beings. Among Hindu philosophers for example, in the
> "Questions to the King Milinda", the human body is compared to the chariot,
> and the human mind is compared to the different parts of the chariot,
> similar to Hume's (1739) manner of tackling the problem of identity with his
> boat. The temptation to set up artefacts in the image of Man is also a
> component of several myths, (for ex. the Golem in Jewish culture, see for
> ex. Breton 1990). It is no exaggeration to maintain that the very idea of
> mechanism appears wherever and whenever machines themselves are developed.}
> 1) Animals are not endowed with reason and cannot engage in linguistic
> communication
> This argument is losing credibility since language and reason seem more
> accessible to today's machines than for example, emotion which is communally
> allowed in the case of certain animals (see for ex. Lévy 1987). Here
> Descartes takes Aristotle's position which asserts that Man is a "reasoning
> animal".
> 2) Machines are finite beings. A finite being cannot conceive of the
> infinite. Now, I am able (said Descartes) to conceive of the infinite. Thus
> I am not a machine.
> This argument against IND-MEC brings into relief two fundamental questions:
> a) Can man conceive of infinity
