On Fri, Oct 31, 2008 at 12:16:57PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> Le 31-oct.-08, à 06:39, Russell Standish a écrit :
>
> >
> > On Wed, Oct 29, 2008 at 05:48:11PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>
> >> ...
> >>
> >> Physical supervenience is the conjunction of the following
> >> assumptions:
Le 31-oct.-08, à 06:39, Russell Standish a écrit :
>
> On Wed, Oct 29, 2008 at 05:48:11PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> ...
>>
>> Physical supervenience is the conjunction of the following
>> assumptions:
>>
>> -There is a physical universe
>> -I am conscious (consciousness exists)
>> -(My)
On Wed, Oct 29, 2008 at 05:48:11PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 29 Oct 2008, at 06:09, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> >
> > On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 09:04:15AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>
> >> Ah! See my papers for a proof that indeed consciousness does not
> >> emerge from brain funct
2008/10/30 Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> The seven first steps of the UD Argument show this already indeed, if
> you accept some Occam Razor. The movie graph is a much subtle argument
> showing you don't need occam razor: not only a machine cannot
> distinguish real from virtual, but canno
On 29 Oct 2008, at 06:09, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 09:04:15AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> Ah! See my papers for a proof that indeed consciousness does not
>> emerge from brain function. See the paper by Maudlin for an
>> independent and later argument (which hand
On Tue, Oct 28, 2008 at 09:04:15AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Ah! See my papers for a proof that indeed consciousness does not
> emerge from brain function. See the paper by Maudlin for an
> independent and later argument (which handles also the "counterfactual
> objection"). You have
> That's exactly what I was referring to above about 'superposition of
> emotional states' - neither positive nor negative; but SPECIFIC in
> some wordless way nonetheless
>
> Once again, I would be more inclined to call this a 'feeling state' as
> opposed to an 'emotional state'. There's a much h
On 24/10/2008, at 8:44 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
> And then there's the big white elephant in the room: consciousness. I
> don't know what it is ...
I am sure you know what it is. I guess you just cannot defined it, nor
prove that it applies to you (it's different).
> and I don't believ
On 24/10/2008, at 8:44 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>> Wonder is more of a feeling though - don't need wonder as a survival
>> mechanism
>
> I can imagine wonder having survival value for highly evolved
> organisms like the homo sapiens. It is the driving force behind great
> scientists and engine
On 25/10/2008, at 8:10 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
>> OK - I don't 'know' that except in the sense of having the feeling
>> that I read it somewhere - usually New Scientist...
>> I'm sure that I could dig up the appropriate reference for you but I
>> think you should maybe trust my 'feelings' on
On 24/10/2008, at 9:14 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> I'm suggesting that emotions are tethered to survival need and
>> protection of values etc.
>>
>> There is radical brain-chemistry change of state under emotions
>>
>> They have a physical effect on the organism having them that can be
Absolutely, I don't think anyone could question this. Sensations are so
filtered and processed that the sensorium we experience is pretty much just
an elaborate fabrication of the brain... and no perception,
memory-association or thought comes naked into our qualia - they all have
some emotional dr
Kim Jones wrote:
>
> On 24/10/2008, at 5:47 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>>> There is radical brain-chemistry change of state under emotions
>>>
>>> They have a physical effect on the organism having them that can be
>>> spotted easily by a 3rd party
>>>
>>> Feelings are mildly intellectual sensati
2008/10/24 Kim Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>
> On 24/10/2008, at 4:14 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>> I'm not sure what distinction you're making. As far as I'm concerned
>> feelings=emotions.
>
> Brent which of the following portray 'feelings' and which portray
> 'emotions':
>
>
> I have a ( ) my
> Wonder is more of a feeling though - don't need wonder as a survival
> mechanism
I can imagine wonder having survival value for highly evolved
organisms like the homo sapiens. It is the driving force behind great
scientists and engineers. It's an emotion that drive us to want to
decode reality.
On 24/10/2008, at 6:33 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
> I believe emotions are very basic things. Just strong, overriding,
> biological responses. I'm sure animals have them too.
Without doubt
animals are all 'on the make' - without emotions you cannot have any
'leverage' over your kind
> How e
> Why do we have emotions? Aren't simple, value-conferring feelings good
> enough or something?
Through adaption to the environment (non evolutionary), the human
brain grows to become a much more complex systems than what could be
encoded in the genotype. Lets just say that the Kolomogorv complex
On 24/10/2008, at 5:47 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
>> There is radical brain-chemistry change of state under emotions
>>
>> They have a physical effect on the organism having them that can be
>> spotted easily by a 3rd party
>>
>> Feelings are mildly intellectual sensations of value that we have
Kim Jones wrote:
>
> On 24/10/2008, at 4:14 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>> I'm not sure what distinction you're making. As far as I'm concerned
>> feelings=emotions.
>
> Brent which of the following portray 'feelings' and which portray
> 'emotions':
>
>
> I have a ( ) my uranium shares might
On 24/10/2008, at 4:14 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
> I'm not sure what distinction you're making. As far as I'm concerned
> feelings=emotions.
Brent which of the following portray 'feelings' and which portray
'emotions':
I have a ( ) my uranium shares might go up soon
I have a ( ) it might r
Kim Jones wrote:
> Admittedly a bit off-topic but hey - there are some great minds on this
> list and it could give birth to something relevant. There! ;-D
>
>
>
> Why do we have emotions? Aren't simple, value-conferring feelings good
> enough or something? Emotions cause a host of extraordin
On 24/10/2008, at 2:43 PM, A. Wolf wrote:
>> acting in a sense contrary to how you feel. Takes a bit of practice
>> but anybody can act.
>
> This is true, but this is mostly frontal lobe territory...suppressing
> dominant responses with an interest in long-term benefit. It's good
> that we
>
> Yes, but don't forget in saying this you have recognised that this is
> also our chief weapon against each other.
> Is it not rather ironic that we can call 'sociopath' someone who
> cannot 'fake it' emotionally to get his own way?
Ironically, most sociopaths are actually excellent at faking em
On 24/10/2008, at 1:56 PM, A. Wolf wrote:
>
> On Thu, Oct 23, 2008 at 10:33 PM, Kim Jones
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Admittedly a bit off-topic but hey - there are some great minds on
>> this list
>> and it could give birth to something relevant. There! ;-D
>
> I was going to intro myse
On Thu, Oct 23, 2008 at 10:33 PM, Kim Jones <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Admittedly a bit off-topic but hey - there are some great minds on this list
> and it could give birth to something relevant. There! ;-D
I was going to intro myself eventually but because this is interesting
to me, I wanted
> At this stage you should try to be specific about the reasons why an
> hardware independent isomorphism cannot exist, or perhaps you are
> just saying that "first person feeling" would not be genuine if they
> were not related to some 'physical reality' in which case I could
> agree
I feel we'r
Le 29-juil.-06, à 18:23, David Nyman a écrit :
> "No doctor!" Or rather, it depends what you mean by 'what really
> describes me'. What I have argued is that, at the 'physical' level of
> description, running a hardware-independent computation could never
> 'really describe me' in one of the m
Le 28-juil.-06, à 22:15, David Nyman a écrit :
> In your comments above you refer to Platonism. It seems clear that if
> we are to regard mathematics or comp as having the kind of 'efficacy'
> (sorry, but what word would you prefer?), then we must indeed grant
> them some sort of Platonic ind
Le 27-juil.-06, à 03:21, David Nyman a écrit :
>> Mmmmhh This sounds a little bit too much idealist for me. Numbers
>> exist with some logic-mathematical priority, and then self-intimacy
>> should emerge from many complex relations among numbers. Also, the
>> many
>> universes (both with co
Le 24-juil.-06, à 04:23, David Nyman a écrit :
>> Bruno: And this is perhaps the very root of a possible disagreement.
>> I would
>> not compare "mathematical" with "tautological", nor with
>> "conventional". This should be clear after the Godelian fall of
>> logicism. We know today that even
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Then if you take your theory seriously enough you will be lead to
> Chalmers or Penrose sort of theory which needs actual non Turing
> emulable stuff to make singular your experience or even "local nature".
I don't see why.
The idea that computation can't lead to what you
Then if you take your theory seriously enough you will be lead to
Chalmers or Penrose sort of theory which needs actual non Turing
emulable stuff to make singular your experience or even "local nature".
Why not? I find this a bit speculative, and I am interested more in the
consequence of the
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