Re: Hello all - My Theory of Everything
Le 11-janv.-07, à 15:15, Russell Standish a écrit : I would further hypothesise that all intelligences must arise evolutionarily. I do believe this too, but once an intelligence is there it can be copied in short time. Dishonest people do that with ideas, publishers do that with writtings, Nature does this with DNA, and fanatics can do this with nuclear bombs. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Hello all - My Theory of Everything
On Wed, Dec 13, 2006 at 03:41:31PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 13-déc.-06, à 02:45, Russell Standish a écrit : Essentially that is the Occam razor theorem. Simpler universes have higher probability. In the ASSA(*) realm I can give sense to this. I think Hal Finney and Wei Dai have defended something like this. But in the comp RSSA(**) realm, strictly speaking even the notion of one universe (even considered among other universes or in a multiverse à-la Deutsch) does not make sense unless the comp substitution level is *very* low. Stable appearances of local worlds emerge from *all* computations making all apparent (and thus sufficiently complex) world not turing emulable. Recall that I am a machine entails the apparent universe cannot be a machine (= cannot be turing-emulable (cf UDA(***)). Bruno I appreciate your result, that I am machine implies that my input is not algorithmic. However, Occam's razor is actually a property of observation, under at least certain reasonable models of observation. Feed a human being a random string (eg a Rorschach plot), and he/she will interpret it as something simpler than a random string (that cloud looks like a rabbit). I would hypthesise that this property necessarily arises in any evolutionary derived intelligence. I would further hypothesise that all intelligences must arise evolutionarily. Gell-Mann has something about Effective Complexity in his book Quark and Jaguar. What I've been writing about (in various of my papers) is a somewhat more formal version of this, though no doubt not so formal by your standards :). Cheers A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Hello all - My Theory of Everything
Russell Standish schreef: On Mon, Dec 11, 2006 at 03:26:59PM -0800, William wrote: If the universe is computationallu simulable, then any universal Turing machine will do for a higher hand. In which case, the information needed is simply the shortest possible program for simulating the universe, the length of which by definition is the information content of the universe. What I meant to compare is 2 situations (I've taken an SAS doing the simulations for now although i do not think it is required): 1) just our universe A consisting of minimal information 2) An interested SAS in another universe wants to simulate some universes; amongst which is also universe A, ours. Now we live in universe A; but the question we can ask ourselves is if we live in 1) or 2). (Although one can argue there is no actual difference). Nevertheless, my proposition is that we live in 1; since 2 does exist but is less probable than 1. information in 1 = inf(A) information in 2 = inf(simulation_A) + inf(SAS) + inf(possible other stuff) = inf(A) + inf(SAS) + inf(possible other stuff) inf(A) You're still missing the point. If you sum over all SASes and other computing devices capable of simulating universe A, the probability of being in a simulation of A is identical to simply being in universe A. This is actually a theorem of information theory, believe it or not! I think I'm following your reasoning here, this theorem could also be used to prove that any probability distribution for universes, which gives a lower or equal probability to a system with fewer information; must be wrong. Right ? But in this case, could one not argue that there is only a small number (out of the total) of higher universes containing an SAS, and then rephrase the statement to we are not being simulated by another SAS ? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Hello all - My Theory of Everything
On Wed, Dec 13, 2006 at 09:14:36AM -, William wrote: I think I'm following your reasoning here, this theorem could also be used to prove that any probability distribution for universes, which gives a lower or equal probability to a system with fewer information; must be wrong. Right ? Essentially that is the Occam razor theorem. Simpler universes have higher probability. But in this case, could one not argue that there is only a small number (out of the total) of higher universes containing an SAS, and then rephrase the statement to we are not being simulated by another SAS ? By higher I gather you mean more complex. But I think you are implicitly assuming that a more complex universe is needed to simulate this one, which I think is wrong. All that is needed is Turing completeness, which even very simple universes have (for instance Conway's Game of Life). Cheers PS - I'm off tomorrow for the annual family pilgrimage, so I'll be rather quiet on this list for the next month. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Hello all - My Theory of Everything
Le 13-déc.-06, à 02:45, Russell Standish a écrit : Essentially that is the Occam razor theorem. Simpler universes have higher probability. In the ASSA(*) realm I can give sense to this. I think Hal Finney and Wei Dai have defended something like this. But in the comp RSSA(**) realm, strictly speaking even the notion of one universe (even considered among other universes or in a multiverse à-la Deutsch) does not make sense unless the comp substitution level is *very* low. Stable appearances of local worlds emerge from *all* computations making all apparent (and thus sufficiently complex) world not turing emulable. Recall that I am a machine entails the apparent universe cannot be a machine (= cannot be turing-emulable (cf UDA(***)). Bruno For the new people I recall the acronym: (*) ASSA = absolute self-sampling assumption (**) RSSA = relative self-sampling assumption The SSA idea is in the ASSA realm comes from Nick Bostrom, if I remember correctly. (***) UDA: see for example http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Hello all - My Theory of Everything
On Mon, Dec 11, 2006 at 03:26:59PM -0800, William wrote: If the universe is computationallu simulable, then any universal Turing machine will do for a higher hand. In which case, the information needed is simply the shortest possible program for simulating the universe, the length of which by definition is the information content of the universe. What I meant to compare is 2 situations (I've taken an SAS doing the simulations for now although i do not think it is required): 1) just our universe A consisting of minimal information 2) An interested SAS in another universe wants to simulate some universes; amongst which is also universe A, ours. Now we live in universe A; but the question we can ask ourselves is if we live in 1) or 2). (Although one can argue there is no actual difference). Nevertheless, my proposition is that we live in 1; since 2 does exist but is less probable than 1. information in 1 = inf(A) information in 2 = inf(simulation_A) + inf(SAS) + inf(possible other stuff) = inf(A) + inf(SAS) + inf(possible other stuff) inf(A) You're still missing the point. If you sum over all SASes and other computing devices capable of simulating universe A, the probability of being in a simulation of A is identical to simply being in universe A. This is actually a theorem of information theory, believe it or not! A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Hello all - My Theory of Everything
Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Dec 11, 2006 at 03:26:59PM -0800, William wrote: If the universe is computationallu simulable, then any universal Turing machine will do for a higher hand. In which case, the information needed is simply the shortest possible program for simulating the universe, the length of which by definition is the information content of the universe. What I meant to compare is 2 situations (I've taken an SAS doing the simulations for now although i do not think it is required): 1) just our universe A consisting of minimal information 2) An interested SAS in another universe wants to simulate some universes; amongst which is also universe A, ours. Now we live in universe A; but the question we can ask ourselves is if we live in 1) or 2). (Although one can argue there is no actual difference). Nevertheless, my proposition is that we live in 1; since 2 does exist but is less probable than 1. information in 1 = inf(A) information in 2 = inf(simulation_A) + inf(SAS) + inf(possible other stuff) = inf(A) + inf(SAS) + inf(possible other stuff) inf(A) You're still missing the point. If you sum over all SASes and other computing devices capable of simulating universe A, the probability of being in a simulation of A is identical to simply being in universe A. This is actually a theorem of information theory, believe it or not! I wasn't aware that there was any accepted way of assigning a probability to being in a universe A. Can you point to a source for the proof of this theorem? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Hello all - My Theory of Everything
On Tue, Dec 12, 2006 at 08:54:51AM -0800, Brent Meeker wrote: You're still missing the point. If you sum over all SASes and other computing devices capable of simulating universe A, the probability of being in a simulation of A is identical to simply being in universe A. This is actually a theorem of information theory, believe it or not! I wasn't aware that there was any accepted way of assigning a probability to being in a universe A. Can you point to a source for the proof of this theorem? Brent Meeker See theorem 4.3.3 aka Coding Theorem in Li and Vitanyi. Being in a simulation corresponds to adding a fixed length prefix corresponding to the interpreter to the original string, although there will also be other programs that will be shorter in the new interpreter. After summing over all possible machines, and all possible programs simulating our universe on those machines, you will end with a quantity identical to the Q_U(x) in that theorem, aka universal a priori probability. Note that in performing this sum, I am not changing the reference machine U (potential source of confusion). Of course this point is moot if the universe is not simulable! Cheers A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Hello all - My Theory of Everything
Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Dec 12, 2006 at 08:54:51AM -0800, Brent Meeker wrote: You're still missing the point. If you sum over all SASes and other computing devices capable of simulating universe A, the probability of being in a simulation of A is identical to simply being in universe A. This is actually a theorem of information theory, believe it or not! I wasn't aware that there was any accepted way of assigning a probability to being in a universe A. Can you point to a source for the proof of this theorem? Brent Meeker See theorem 4.3.3 aka Coding Theorem in Li and Vitanyi. Being in a simulation corresponds to adding a fixed length prefix corresponding to the interpreter to the original string, although there will also be other programs that will be shorter in the new interpreter. After summing over all possible machines, and all possible programs simulating our universe on those machines, you will end with a quantity identical to the Q_U(x) in that theorem, aka universal a priori probability. Note that in performing this sum, I am not changing the reference machine U (potential source of confusion). Of course this point is moot if the universe is not simulable! Or if the length of the code has nothing to do with it's probability. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Hello all - My Theory of Everything
On Tue, Dec 12, 2006 at 02:07:28PM -0800, Brent Meeker wrote: Of course this point is moot if the universe is not simulable! Or if the length of the code has nothing to do with it's probability. Brent Meeker No, because that assumption (Solomonoff-Levin style probability and its relationship with algorithmic information was assumed by the respondent - whose name has become buried in the everything list archive. I seriously doubt any other probability distribution would make sense, but that's another point altogether. Cheers A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Hello all - My Theory of Everything
On Sun, Dec 10, 2006 at 01:57:40AM -0800, William wrote: It takes precisely the same amount of information to simulate something as the thing has in the first place. This is the definition of information as used in algorithmic information theory. So I don't think this latter argument works at all. I am referring to a perfect simulation by higher hand. The universe where this simulation is taking place would both have all the information of our universe (same amount of information) + the information to describe the simulators (higher hand); which would be more than the information in our universe (and describing these higher hands probably isn't going to work without adding an infinite amount of information). If the universe is computationallu simulable, then any universal Turing machine will do for a higher hand. In which case, the information needed is simply the shortest possible program for simulating the universe, the length of which by definition is the information content of the universe. If, on the other hand, the universe is not simulable by a Turing machine, then I really don't know what you mean by simulating it by a higher hand. You would need to give more details. Cheers A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Hello all - My Theory of Everything
In a message dated 12/11/2006 3:35:36 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: [EMAIL PROTECTED] --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Hello all - My Theory of Everything
In a message dated 12/11/2006 3:17:42 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: [EMAIL PROTECTED] --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Hello all - My Theory of Everything
If the universe is computationallu simulable, then any universal Turing machine will do for a higher hand. In which case, the information needed is simply the shortest possible program for simulating the universe, the length of which by definition is the information content of the universe. What I meant to compare is 2 situations (I've taken an SAS doing the simulations for now although i do not think it is required): 1) just our universe A consisting of minimal information 2) An interested SAS in another universe wants to simulate some universes; amongst which is also universe A, ours. Now we live in universe A; but the question we can ask ourselves is if we live in 1) or 2). (Although one can argue there is no actual difference). Nevertheless, my proposition is that we live in 1; since 2 does exist but is less probable than 1. information in 1 = inf(A) information in 2 = inf(simulation_A) + inf(SAS) + inf(possible other stuff) = inf(A) + inf(SAS) + inf(possible other stuff) inf(A) --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
