subject:"Re\: Probability in Everettian QM"

On Fri, Sep 11, 2020 at 3:06 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

*>You’re not giving an example of what people might say when the walk into
> or out of duplication machines.*


How can I answer that? There are a lot of things such a person might say in
that situation, they might say it looks like rain, or they might say the John
Clark of yesterday is not dead because at least one being today remembers
being John Clark yesterday, and there could be many more.

John K Clark

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-11 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Fri, 11 Sep 2020 at 23:04, John Clark  wrote:

> On Fri, Sep 11, 2020 at 5:33 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> 
>
>>
>>>
>>> >> when
>>>
>>> something that would now take paragraphs to explain becomes intuitively
>>> obvious to everybody on a gut level people will say things in a language
>>> whose grammar is totally different from anything spoken by anybody
>>>
>>> living
>>>
>>> today. Early 21st-century speech will seem very archaic and naïve to
>>> them.
>>>
>>
>> > *There would be social and legal changes,*
>>
>
> That is the understatement of the millennium, of the last several hundred
> millennia actually.
>
>
>> > *but people's psychology, developed over at least hundreds of
>> thousands of years, would remain the same.*
>>
>
> If any being wishes to function and also to communicate after self
> duplication becomes commonplace then language would have to change
> RADICALLY because circumstances have changed to something different from
> anything they were even remotely like in the last few hundred thousand
> years since humans evolved. For an organism to remain viable radical
> changes in the environment require radical changes in behavior. If you're
> right and humans are hardwired in such a way that they are incapable of
> changing then the only alternative is to cease communicating, or cease
> functioning, or use genetic engineering to change the hardwiring.
>

You’re not giving an example of what people might say when the walk into or
out of duplication machines.

> --
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Fri, Sep 11, 2020 at 5:31 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> *>>>I gave you the answer for year, but it asks for distinguishing the 1p
>> and the 3p*
>>
> >> And that is absolutely positively 100% impossible because in a world
>> where self duplication is common place there is no such thing as *THE*
>> first person.
>
>

> *>That is equivalent to saying that when we undergo a self-duplication,
> and thus even just a brain transplant, we die.*
>

No, that would be equivalent to saying "there is no such thing as *A* first
person", and saying such a thing would be absurd. I know for a fact that I
am conscious therefore I know for a fact that* A* first person exists; I am
almost certain that I am not the only conscious being in the universe
therefore I am almost certain *THE* first person does not exist.

> >>> For both copies, “the first person” is the one in the mirror they see
>>> themselves in the city they feel to be in.
>>
>>
> >> Then I guess you don't think the Helsinki man of yesterday survived
>> because today there is nobody in Helsinki and the mirror there is blank.
>
>
>
> *> I don’t see how that follows. It would be like saying that John Clark
> is dead right now in all places he is absent. *
>

You are absolutely correct, saying that would be exactly like saying John
Clark is dead right now in all places he is absent; but then I'm not the
one who said "*For both copies, “the first person” is the one in the mirror
they see themselves in the city they feel to be in*".

*> You are also predicting that if you look at the schroedinger cat, you
> die.*
>

Somebody did indeed predict that but that somebody was certainly NOT John
Clark, because John Clark was NOT the one who said "*the first person” is
the one in the mirror they see themselves in the city they feel to be in*".

> *> OK. But none get the feeling of his doppelgänger in any direct way.
> They have become two persons, with distinct and unique first person
> experience, and both are the H-man. Personal identity is not transitive. *
>

At last I agree with you about something!

John K Clark

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Fri, Sep 11, 2020 at 5:11 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> When self duplication becomes commonplace I think the English language
>> will need to change so much that what people will say would be
>> incomprehensible to an English speaker in the early 21st century when self
>> duplication was anything but commonplace.
>
>
> *> Then this should have happened since long, as you and me are already
> differentiate results from the first amoeba…*
>

Amoebas don't have a language and probably aren't conscious, my fellow
human beings certainly do have a language and probably are conscious.

 John K Clark

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Fri, Sep 11, 2020 at 5:33 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> >> when something that would now take paragraphs to explain becomes
>> intuitively obvious to everybody on a gut level people will say things in a
>> language whose grammar is totally different from anything spoken by anybody 
>> living
>> today. Early 21st-century speech will seem very archaic and naïve to
>> them.
>>
>
> > *There would be social and legal changes,*
>

That is the understatement of the millennium, of the last several hundred
millennia actually.

> > *but people's psychology, developed over at least hundreds of thousands
> of years, would remain the same.*
>

If any being wishes to function and also to communicate after self
duplication becomes commonplace then language would have to change
RADICALLY because circumstances have changed to something different from
anything they were even remotely like in the last few hundred thousand
years since humans evolved. For an organism to remain viable radical
changes in the environment require radical changes in behavior. If you're
right and humans are hardwired in such a way that they are incapable of
changing then the only alternative is to cease communicating, or cease
functioning, or use genetic engineering to change the hardwiring.

John K Clark

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM


> On 10 Sep 2020, at 21:41, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 3:25 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
> wrote:
> 
> > When self duplication becomes commonplace I don't think the word "you" will 
> > exist anymore.
>  
> > Why not?  It still works where there are identical twins. 
> 
>  Now Brent be honest, do you really think that question deserves an answer?
>  
> > And duplicates of a person will differentiate almost instantly and diverge 
> > further with time.
> 
> Yes, and it is exactly precisely for that reason the personal pronoun "you" 
> will become ambiguous to the point of meaninglessness in a world that has 
> "you" duplicating machines.

If Brent’s biological duplication (the twin) does not open your eyes, note that 
we are already multiplied in arithmetic, so the word “you” should never 
appeared in your theory.

(And if you believe that a universal machine can distinguish a physical reality 
from the arithmetical reality without observation (by their experience only), 
then you believe in some magic incompatible with the the Indexical Digital 
Mechanist hypothesis.

Bruno



> 
> John K Clark
> 
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Re: Probability in Everettian QM


> On 10 Sep 2020, at 20:29, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 9/10/2020 3:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> My own feeling is like Nozick's, which is best expressed by the old 
>>> American statement: "Close enough for government work.”
>> 
>> OK. But that is utilitarianism. You cannot be serious on this, or you are 
>> mixing religion/moral/ethics with politics and the state, which should not 
>> be done (in a democracy). Justice needs truth (or the honest research of the 
>> truth), but truth cannot be declared to be juste at will, that would be 
>> wishful thinking.
> 
> It's not mixing religion/moral/ethics with politics and the state.  The 
> phrase means "It will serve.  Get on with things."  similar to "Perfection is 
> the enemy of the good.”

"Perfection is the enemy of the good.” Is true in the human practical affairs, 
but that is not relevant in metaphysics, where we reason from precise 
hypotheses to get testable predictions and refute theories. The closest 
continuer theory is wrong when we assume Digital Mechanism. If you bet Moscow 
because it is far closer to Helsinki than Washington, you will be in trouble, 
and also, you will prevent finding the Born Rule or the Mechanist corresponding 
one, at the start.

Bruno



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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-11 Thread Stathis Papaioannou




On Fri, 11 Sep 2020 at 04:25, John Clark  wrote:

> On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 12:51 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
> *>>> this is how people will talk. “I went through duplication, and I woke
 up in a little room.*

>>>
>>> >> I don't think so. When self duplication becomes commonplace I think
>>> the English language will need to change so much that what people will say
>>> would be incomprehensible to an English speaker in the early 21st century
>>> when self duplication was anything but commonplace.
>>>
>>
>> *> People will tell those who have not yet had the experience: “you will*
>> [,,,]
>>
>
> I don't think so. When self duplication becomes commonplace I don't think
> the word "you" will exist anymore.
>
> *> What do you think they will say?*
>>
>
> "I" think that when something that would now take paragraphs to explain
> becomes intuitively obvious to everybody on a gut level people will say
> things in a language whose grammar is totally different from anything
> spoken by anybody living today. Early 21st-century speech will seem very
> archaic and naïve to them.
>

There would be social and legal changes, but people's psychology, developed
over at least hundreds of thousands of years, would remain the same. I am
quite sure that people would say things like: "I walked into the
duplication room, fell asleep, then woke up in a different room. I was told
I would end up in New York or London, and I ended up in London. I then
talked to a copy of me who was in New York, and knew everything about me
until the point I walked into the duplicator." If you think they would say
something different, try to give an example.

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

> On 10 Sep 2020, at 15:07, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 5:36 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> >>> It has a perfectly clear referent,
>  
> >> If it were perfectly clear then why doesn't Bruno Marchal use the referent 
> >> in Bruno Marchal's thought experiments rather than a personal pronoun? 
> >> John Clark has been asking Bruno Marchal to do that for years but Bruno 
> >> Marchal absolutely refuses. 
> 
> >That is incorrect. I gave you the answer for year, but it asks for 
> >distinguishing the 1p and the 3p
> 
> And that is absolutely positively 100% impossible because in a world where 
> self duplication is common place there is no such thing as THE first person.

That is equivalent to saying that when we undergo a self-duplication, and thus 
even just a brain transplant, we die. Because we all  know *the* first person* 
we are, even after the WM duplication, the guy in W and the guy in M know 
perfectly who hey are, and know perfectly that they could not have predict in 
advance who they are feeling now. In Helsinki, reason prevents to predict that 
we will FEEL being two persons at once: indeed, in Helsinki you can predict 
with certainty that you (anyone doing the experience) will feel to be unique, 
and “the” refers to that unique person that we can only feel to be. The other 
copies are respectively doppelgänger to each other.

>  
> >> And as John Clark has been saying for years, if "you" is duplicated then 
> >> there is no longer such a thing as "THE first person" there is only "A 
> >> first person”.
> 
> > Exactly, and that is the reason why in Helsinki, the guy cannot have any 
> > certainty other that “W v M”, 
> 
> It's not just Helsinki, if self duplication is commonplace then the guy can't 
> be certain in Moscow or Washington or anywhere or at anytime about anything 
> as long as you keep talking gibberish like THE first person.

Just push a little bit that line of thought, and you will eliminate 
consciousness, first person, etc. 

You are also predicting that if you look at the schroedinger cat, you die.

> 
> > For both copies, “the first person” is the one in the mirror they see 
> > themselves in the city they feel to be in.
> 
> Then I guess you don't think the Helsinki man of yesterday survived because 
> today there is nobody in Helsinki and the mirror there is blank.

I don’t see how that follows. It would be like saying that John Clark is dead 
right now in all places he is absent. 

> I however think that Helsinki man has survived because today there are not 
> one but two people who remember being him yesterday.

OK. But none get the feeling of his doppelgänger in any direct way. They have 
become two persons, with distinct and unique first person experience, and both 
are the H-man. 

Personal identity is not transitive. The HM and the HW are both the H person, 
but the HM and the HW are different person.

> If I were the Helsinki man I'd say that's great, two is better than one.

That is why we reproduce biologically already. We are some billions, or more if 
you remember that we are mammals.

But the question is about predicting first person experience, independently of 
deciding who or what we really are, as long as we accept the “yes doctor” 
hypothesis.

It is a simple fact that after reiterating the duplication a great number of 
times, the vast majority of personal memories will be algorthmically 
incompressible, and that the copies (who does not “feel the split”) will admit 
they can’t predict their immediate future (the first personal future which 
subsist given that we have admitted that we don’t die).

>  
> > There are indeed two first person but each of them feel to be the first 
> > person
> 
> Then I guess you've changed your mind after all these years and now believe 
> the first person Helsinki man will see both cities because this is all about 
> the Helsinki man, so the fact that the Washington man will not see Moscow is 
> irrelevant. The Helsinki man is the Washington man and the Washington man is 
> the Helsinki man, but the Washington man is not the Moscow man.

That’s correct, and that is the reason why the Helsinki Man can predict with 
certainty that he will get a coffee cup in only once city, but without knowing 
in advance which one.

You see, no ambiguity, just first person indeterminacy. You confuse 1-p, 3-1-p, 
1-1-p, 3-3-p, etc. 

Bruno

> 
>  John K Clark
> 
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>

Re: Probability in Everettian QM


> On 10 Sep 2020, at 14:16, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 4:57 PM Stathis Papaioannou  > wrote:
> 
> > this is how people will talk. “I went through duplication, and I woke up in 
> > a little room.
> 
> I don't think so. When self duplication becomes commonplace I think the 
> English language will need to change so much that what people will say would 
> be incomprehensible to an English speaker in the early 21st century when self 
> duplication was anything but commonplace.


Then this should have happened since long, as you and me are already 
differentiate results from the first amoeba…

Nature has used self-duplication since long. The sexual reproduction is a 
variant of it, and is defined in theoretical computer science by a double 
recursion.

Bruno


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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-10 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Fri, Sep 11, 2020 at 4:42 AM spudboy100 via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> Now by this assessment, are some continuers closer than other? Is a
> 99.9555 % continuer of say, Bruce, although not as perfect as the 100%
> Bruce of the 21st century?? "Sorry about that freckles on the back on your
> testicles, gone missing, Mr. K, but all in, how well would you rate our
> service? By the way, Professor Bruno, still feels that the Identity of
> Discernibles, even after arguing it with Doctor  Leibniz (one of our
> satisfied customers!), regarding  the Closest Continuer, and I hear that
> they have agreed to move on to other topics."
>
> Remember this axiom from the US: Good enough for government work.
>

An excellent maxim; one that I use all the time!

If there is any doubt about closeness, declare a tie and move on.

Brucce

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-10 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 9/10/2020 12:41 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 3:25 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
> wrote:

> When self duplication becomes commonplaceI don't think the
word "you" will exist anymore.

/> Why not? It still works where there are identical twins. /

Now Brent be honest, do you really think that question deserves an answer?

> And duplicates of a person will differentiate almost instantly and
diverge further with time.

Yes, and it is exactly precisely for that reason the personal pronoun
"you" will become ambiguous to the point of meaninglessness in a world
that has "you" duplicating machines.

It only becomes ambiguous when used prospectively since you-now has an
indeterminate relation to your future copies. But I don't think
duplication will be frequent. It will be like "Why don't you come over
for dinner and drinks" has different referent before and after you're
married.

Brent

John K Clark
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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 3:25 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> When self duplication becomes commonplace I don't think the word "you"
>> will exist anymore.
>
>

* > Why not?  It still works where there are identical twins. *

 Now Brent be honest, do you really think that question deserves an answer?

> > And duplicates of a person will differentiate almost instantly and
> diverge further with time.
>

Yes, and it is exactly precisely for that reason the personal pronoun "you"
will become ambiguous to the point of meaninglessness in a world that has
"you" duplicating machines.

John K Clark

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 2:59 PM spudboy100 via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> * > I did mean Sean Carroll and it was he who argues against (2017) that a
> clone, even a perfect one, is never you,*
>

I had thought I had read all of Sean Carroll's books but perhaps I missed
one, where did Sean Carroll say that?

> > *because of no physical continuity.*
>

And if there is no physical continuity between you and a perfect clone of
you then where in the world did the information to make that perfect clone
come from?

> *>On Orange Man, he his the best we can do because his opposition takes
> direct and indirect payments from Chairman Xi*
>

15 times Trump praised China as coronavirus was spreading across the globe

Trump says he fell in love with North Korea's murderous dictator

> *Obnoxious but tough,*

Obnoxious certainly, but tough?? The man is a wimp, "unfair" is Trump's
favorite word, this son of a billionaire is full of self-pity, has severe
daddy issues, and is constantly whining about how the world is being very
unfair to him.

John K Clark

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-10 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 9/10/2020 11:24 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 12:51 PM Stathis Papaioannou
mailto:stath...@gmail.com>> wrote:

/>>> this is how people will talk. “I went through
duplication, and I woke up in a little room./

>> I don't think so. When self duplication becomes commonplace I
think the English language will need to change so much that
what people will say would be incomprehensible to an English
speaker in the early 21st century when self duplication was
anything but commonplace.

/> People will tell those who have not yet had the experience:
“you will/[,,,]

I don't think so. When self duplication becomes commonplaceI don't
think the word "you" will exist anymore.

Why not? It still works where there are identical twins. And
duplicates of a person will differentiate almost instantly and diverge
further with time.

Brent

/> What do you think they will say?/

"I" think that when something that would now take paragraphs to
explain becomes intuitively obvious to everybody on a gut level people
will say things in a language whose grammar is totally different from
anything spoken by anybody living today.Early 21st-century speech will
seem very archaic and naïve to them.

John K Clark
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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-10 Thread spudboy100 via Everything List

No, I did mean Sean Carroll and it was he who argues against (2017) that a 
clone, even a perfect one, is never you, because of no physical continuity. My 
mantra that you have identified correctly as utilitarian is fine with me, but 
you are really asking if a clone is an absolutely perfect copy-memory stream, 
and all fun stuff? On Orange Man, he his the best we can do because his 
opposition takes direct and indirect payments from Chairman Xi (I could list 
the politician$!), and his haters (over in the US) are quite chummy with global 
jihadists. He was also rather excellent domestically on unemployment, which the 
last guy never cared about. Neither did his voters. However, yes, he often has 
the 'presence,' of a carnival barker, a used car salesman, the bad kind, a New 
Yorker-which he most definitely is. Obnoxious but tough, in a world where the 
middle class is under constant pressure from Globalist oligarch$ who would 
rather do without the middle classes. (Sorry JC! I just needed to respond to 
Bruno). 

-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal 
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thu, Sep 10, 2020 6:14 am
Subject: Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On 10 Sep 2020, at 03:58, spudboy100 via Everything List 
 wrote:
Apply this to your own very active philosophy. Let us say that "you" are 
resurrected from the cold in the late 22nd century? The technicians of this 
later age, state upon your awakening: "Mr. Clark, the way science advanced over 
the years since your demise, demonstrated that to get you back to life, the 
easiest track to achieve was to scan the cold preserved brain of one, John 
Clark, and though the entire cortical data map of his life was available, the 
way we do things, the only way currently, is to build him a separate body, 
based on a very young clone of him, and transferred all data, memories, etc.
Now, JC, is that clone, you??!! For me, it seems like it's Robert Nozick's, 
Closest Continuer. 

But what if the clone is duplicated?

Physicist Sean Carroll would say that person wasn't you. 

I guess you mean David Albert. Sean Carroll defends Everett, which use 
implicitly the first person mechanist indeterminacy. This is how he explains 
the appearance of the collapse, without collapse. (Then Everett still use 
physicalism, but that cannot work with mechanism where the wave itself must be 
recovered from the statistic on all computations, not just the quantum one).

My own feeling is like Nozick's, which is best expressed by the old American 
statement: "Close enough for government work.”

OK. But that is utilitarianism. You cannot be serious on this, or you are 
mixing religion/moral/ethics with politics and the state, which should not be 
done (in a democracy). Justice needs truth (or the honest research of the 
truth), but truth cannot be declared to be juste at will, that would be wishful 
thinking.

Now I simply must add this part in. "Mister Clark, we know that you have ever 
been a loyal liberal, and pursuant to this knowledge, we must warn you that the 
Earth is now the polity of Donald the Golden, recently, resurrected from the 
infrared of the past light cone about earth's orbit. We have provided a very 
nice residence on Mars Terrarium, Magnus Tharsis, where you will be welcomed.  
Unless, of course you choose to remain here, where you will have the 
opportunity to kiss The Donald's ring!..  Armipotens dudum celebrari praeter in 
Socialās ex timore! :-D

That is the main problem with Trump. His disdain for facts and for the search 
of truth. We can suppose he has some good reason to behave like this, and I 
guess they are not very pretty.
Bruno

-Original Message-
From: John Clark 
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wed, Sep 9, 2020 7:01 am
Subject: Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 4:40 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> It has a perfectly clear referent,

If it were perfectly clear then why doesn't Bruno Marchal use the referent in 
Bruno Marchal's thought experiments rather than a personal pronoun? John Clark 
has been asking Bruno Marchal to do that for years but Bruno Marchal absolutely 
refuses. 

 > if you make precise if you talk about he first person “you” or about some 
 > third person view.

And as John Clark has been saying for years, if "you" is duplicated then there 
is no longer such a thing as "THE first person" there is only "A first person". 
John K Clark

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-10 Thread spudboy100 via Everything List

Now by this assessment, are some continuers closer than other? Is a 99.9555 % 
continuer of say, Bruce, although not as perfect as the 100% Bruce of the 21st 
century?? "Sorry about that freckles on the back on your testicles, gone 
missing, Mr. K, but all in, how well would you rate our service? By the way, 
Professor Bruno, still feels that the Identity of Discernibles, even after 
arguing it with Doctor  Leibniz (one of our satisfied customers!), regarding  
the Closest Continuer, and I hear that they have agreed to move on to other 
topics."
Remember this axiom from the US: Good enough for government work.

-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal 
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thu, Sep 10, 2020 5:29 am
Subject: Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On 9 Sep 2020, at 12:45, John Clark  wrote:

On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 10:35 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

>Not on the closest continuer theory. If there is a tie, there is no unique 
>closest continuer. If there is only one continuer, he is necessarily the 
>closest.

Closest continuer theory Is a remarkably silly theory even for philosophers, 
and that's saying something!

It is indeed inconsistent with Indexical Digital Mechanism (YD + CT, if you 
remember). We can’t believe in both Darwin, and the closest continuer theory.
But it might be consistent with non-mechanism, to be sure.
Bruno

John K Clark

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-10 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 9/10/2020 3:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
My own feeling is like Nozick's, which is best expressed by the old 
American statement: "Close enough for government work.”


OK. But that is utilitarianism. You cannot be serious on this, or you 
are mixing religion/moral/ethics with politics and the state, which 
should not be done (in a democracy). Justice needs truth (or the 
honest research of the truth), but truth cannot be declared to be 
juste at will, that would be wishful thinking.


It's not mixing religion/moral/ethics with politics and the state. The 
phrase means "It will serve.  Get on with things."  similar to 
"Perfection is the enemy of the good."


Brent

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 12:51 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

*>>> this is how people will talk. “I went through duplication, and I woke
>>> up in a little room.*
>>>
>>
>> >> I don't think so. When self duplication becomes commonplace I think
>> the English language will need to change so much that what people will say
>> would be incomprehensible to an English speaker in the early 21st century
>> when self duplication was anything but commonplace.
>>
>
> *> People will tell those who have not yet had the experience: “you will*
> [,,,]
>

I don't think so. When self duplication becomes commonplace I don't think
the word "you" will exist anymore.

*> What do you think they will say?*
>

"I" think that when something that would now take paragraphs to explain
becomes intuitively obvious to everybody on a gut level people will say
things in a language whose grammar is totally different from anything
spoken by anybody living today. Early 21st-century speech will seem very
archaic and naïve to them.

 John K Clark

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-10 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Thu, 10 Sep 2020 at 22:17, John Clark  wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 4:57 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
> *> this is how people will talk. “I went through duplication, and I woke
>> up in a little room.*
>>
>
> I don't think so. When self duplication becomes commonplace I think the
> English language will need to change so much that what people will say
> would be incomprehensible to an English speaker in the early 21st century
> when self duplication was anything but commonplace.
>

People will tell those who have not yet had the experience: “you will go
into room and then a moment later walk out from a different room, and see
all these other people who look just like you and know everything about
you”. What do you think they will say?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 5:36 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>>> *It has a perfectly clear referent,*
>>
>>

>> If it were perfectly clear then why doesn't Bruno Marchal use the refere
>> nt in Bruno Marchal's thought experiments rather than a personal pronoun?
>> John Clark has been asking Bruno Marchal to do that for years but Bruno
>> Marchal absolutely refuses.
>
>
> >*That is incorrect. I gave you the answer for year, but it asks for
> distinguishing the 1p and the 3p*
>

And that is absolutely positively 100% impossible because in a world where
self duplication is common place there is no such thing as *THE* first
person.

> >> And as John Clark has been saying for years, if "you" is duplicated
>> then there is no longer such a thing as "*THE* first person" there is
>> only "*A* first person”.
>
>
> *> Exactly, and that is the reason why in Helsinki, the guy cannot have
> any certainty other that “W v M”, *
>

It's not just Helsinki, if self duplication is commonplace then the guy
can't be certain in Moscow or Washington or anywhere or at anytime about
anything as long as you keep talking gibberish like *THE* first person.

*> For both copies, “the first person” is the one in the mirror they see
> themselves in the city they feel to be in.*
>

Then I guess you don't think the Helsinki man of yesterday survived because
today there is nobody in Helsinki and the mirror there is blank. I however
think that Helsinki man has survived because today there are not one but
two people who remember being him yesterday. If I were the Helsinki man I'd
say that's great, two is better than one.

> > *There are indeed two first person but each of them feel to be the
> first person *
>

Then I guess you've changed your mind after all these years and now believe
the first person Helsinki man will see both cities because this is all
about the Helsinki man, so the fact that the Washington man will not see
Moscow is irrelevant. The Helsinki man is the Washington man and the
Washington man is the Helsinki man, but the Washington man is not the
Moscow man.

 John K Clark

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 4:57 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

*> this is how people will talk. “I went through duplication, and I woke up
> in a little room.*
>

I don't think so. When self duplication becomes commonplace I think the
English language will need to change so much that what people will say
would be incomprehensible to an English speaker in the early 21st century
when self duplication was anything but commonplace.

John K Clark

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM


> On 10 Sep 2020, at 03:58, spudboy100 via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> Apply this to your own very active philosophy. Let us say that "you" are 
> resurrected from the cold in the late 22nd century? The technicians of this 
> later age, state upon your awakening: "Mr. Clark, the way science advanced 
> over the years since your demise, demonstrated that to get you back to life, 
> the easiest track to achieve was to scan the cold preserved brain of one, 
> John Clark, and though the entire cortical data map of his life was 
> available, the way we do things, the only way currently, is to build him a 
> separate body, based on a very young clone of him, and transferred all data, 
> memories, etc.
> 
> Now, JC, is that clone, you??!! For me, it seems like it's Robert Nozick's, 
> Closest Continuer.

But what if the clone is duplicated?




> Physicist Sean Carroll would say that person wasn't you.


I guess you mean David Albert. Sean Carroll defends Everett, which use 
implicitly the first person mechanist indeterminacy. This is how he explains 
the appearance of the collapse, without collapse. (Then Everett still use 
physicalism, but that cannot work with mechanism where the wave itself must be 
recovered from the statistic on all computations, not just the quantum one).



> My own feeling is like Nozick's, which is best expressed by the old American 
> statement: "Close enough for government work.”

OK. But that is utilitarianism. You cannot be serious on this, or you are 
mixing religion/moral/ethics with politics and the state, which should not be 
done (in a democracy). Justice needs truth (or the honest research of the 
truth), but truth cannot be declared to be juste at will, that would be wishful 
thinking.



> 
> Now I simply must add this part in. "Mister Clark, we know that you have ever 
> been a loyal liberal, and pursuant to this knowledge, we must warn you that 
> the Earth is now the polity of Donald the Golden, recently, resurrected from 
> the infrared of the past light cone about earth's orbit. We have provided a 
> very nice residence on Mars Terrarium, Magnus Tharsis, where you will be 
> welcomed.  Unless, of course you choose to remain here, where you will have 
> the opportunity to kiss The Donald's ring!..  Armipotens dudum celebrari 
> praeter in Socialās ex timore! :-D

That is the main problem with Trump. His disdain for facts and for the search 
of truth. We can suppose he has some good reason to behave like this, and I 
guess they are not very pretty.

Bruno




>  
> 
> -Original Message-
> From: John Clark 
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Sent: Wed, Sep 9, 2020 7:01 am
> Subject: Re: Probability in Everettian QM
> 
> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 4:40 AM Bruno Marchal  <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> 
> > It has a perfectly clear referent,
> 
> If it were perfectly clear then why doesn't Bruno Marchal use the referent in 
> Bruno Marchal's thought experiments rather than a personal pronoun? John 
> Clark has been asking Bruno Marchal to do that for years but Bruno Marchal 
> absolutely refuses. 
> 
> > if you make precise if you talk about he first person “you” or about some 
> > third person view.
> 
> And as John Clark has been saying for years, if "you" is duplicated then 
> there is no longer such a thing as "THE first person" there is only "A first 
> person".
> 
> John K Clark
> 
> 
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Re: Probability in Everettian QM


> On 9 Sep 2020, at 16:29, PGC  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, September 9, 2020 at 11:38:32 AM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 9 Sep 2020, at 07:51, Stathis Papaioannou > > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 14:56, Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 2:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou > > wrote:
>> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 12:35, Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 12:32 PM Stathis Papaioannou > > wrote:
>> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 11:53, Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 11:39 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>> > wrote:
>> On 9/8/2020 6:14 PM, smitra wrote:
>> > On 09-09-2020 02:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>> 
>> >> I don't find that answer convincing, because of the implicit dualist
>> >> assumption. A perfectly reasonable answer to the question asked the
>> >> night before duplication is: "I won't be in a room tomorrow morning,
>> >> because when I am duplicated with 100 continuers, I cease to exist and
>> >> each of the continuers becomes a new, separate person. This is because
>> >> there is a tie among the continuers, with no closest continuer. In
>> >> that situation, the original ceases, and the continuers are separate
>> >> persons."
>> >>
>> >> Now you might not like this answer, but it is perfectly coherent and
>> >> rational. It has the great advantage that it avoids the stench of
>> >> dualism that hangs over your theory.
>> >>
>> >> Bruce
>> >>
>> >
>> > The tie will be broken by small random fluctuations in the physical 
>> > states of the copies.
>> 
>> Dualism would imply that one and only one of the duplicates has your 
>> soul and is "you".  I see no problem is just saying they are Bruce 
>> Kellet-1, Bruce Kellet-2,... Bruce Kellet-100.  They all remember the 
>> bet, and assuming their stake is duplicated too, they each either get 
>> $100 or lose $25.  The existence of more than one Bruce Kellet certainly 
>> creates problems in law and language.  But law and language are invented 
>> to deal with reality, not define it.
>> 
>> 
>> You are right about what dualism implies. So if you ask the question of the 
>> person the night before duplication, it has no answer unless you assume 
>> dualism. I think you are right about multiple BKs: BK1, BK2,... and so on. 
>> These are different persons who share some memories with the BK of the night 
>> before. Closest continuer theory works well in these duplication scenarios, 
>> despite the fact that people on this list seem averse to that theory for 
>> some undefined reason.
>> 
>> You could say that any suggestion that one of the BK's is a continuation of 
>> the original, even when there is only one BK extant at any time, implies 
>> dualism.
>> 
>> 
>> Not on the closest continuer theory. If there is a tie, there is no unique 
>> closest continuer. If there is only one continuer, he is necessarily the 
>> closest. Dualism is not required.
>> 
>> But why should the closest continuer be a continuation of the person rather 
>> than the next-closest continuer, unless the soul has a preference for it?
>> 
>> Be a dualist if you want to. But the closest continuer theory is a 
>> convention designed to resolve questions of personal identity in cases of 
>> personal duplication, absent a "soul". Arbitrary random selections are not 
>> as satisfactory.
>> 
>> I'm not a dualist. I think there is no metaphysical basis for continuity of 
>> identity, it is just a psychological construct. 
> 
> 
> That is a bit dangerous, and on the verge of reductionism. I understand why 
> you say this in this context, but the psychological constructs must be taken 
> seriously. The physical reality itself will become a first person plural 
> psychological construct too.
> 
> I am not sure if you have understood that we need some arithmetical realism 
> just to define precisely what is a digital machine, and o enunciate the 
> Church-Turing thesis, but then we need to take into account the fact that all 
> computations are emulated by that minimal amount of arithmetic that we have 
> supposed.
> 
> I know that Parfit called “mechanism” “reductionism”, but Mechanism is in 
> reality a powerful vaccine against reductionism, beginning by the 
> reductionist conception of machine and number.
> 
> With Mechanism, we do have an ontological reductionism: only numbers exist, 
> with only two simple laws: addition and multiplication. Then the physical 
> reality emerges as a first person plural persistent sharable interfering web 
> of histories, which is confirmed by quantum mechanics without collapse, up to 
> now.
> 
> It is the believer in a “physical reality out there” to explain how it manage 
> to make some computations more real than other. It is up to them to show some 
> evidence for that belief.
> 
> That's easy. For millennia, by the rules of your discourse, every 
> person/number killing another with some weapon essentially states: "This 
> computation is more real. This one." 
> 
> There's been too much

Re: Probability in Everettian QM

> On 9 Sep 2020, at 13:01, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 4:40 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> > It has a perfectly clear referent,
> 
> If it were perfectly clear then why doesn't Bruno Marchal use the referent in 
> Bruno Marchal's thought experiments rather than a personal pronoun? John 
> Clark has been asking Bruno Marchal to do that for years but Bruno Marchal 
> absolutely refuses. 

That is incorrect. I gave you the answer for year, but it asks for 
distinguishing the 1p and the 3p discourses, to which you refute with insults 
and expression like “peepee”, which have failed to change my mind on this...

> 
> > if you make precise if you talk about he first person “you” or about some 
> > third person view.
> 
> And as John Clark has been saying for years, if "you" is duplicated then 
> there is no longer such a thing as "THE first person" there is only "A first 
> person”.

Exactly, and that is the reason why in Helsinki, the guy cannot have any 
certainty other that “W v M”, despite he is 100% certain (modulo his belief in 
Mechanism) that he will survive. Like you said to Bruce, the fact that there is 
a doppelgänger does not make you disappearing. For both copies, “the first 
person” is the one in the mirror they see themselves in the city they feel to 
be in. There are indeed two first person but each of them feel to be the first 
person they have become to be, and they could not have predicted it in 
Helsinki, without forcing one of the copy to assess that the prediction was 
wrong.

Bruno

> 
> John K Clark
> 
> 
> 
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>  
> .

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM


> On 9 Sep 2020, at 12:45, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 10:35 PM Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> 
> >Not on the closest continuer theory. If there is a tie, there is no unique 
> >closest continuer. If there is only one continuer, he is necessarily the 
> >closest.
> 
> Closest continuer theory Is a remarkably silly theory even for philosophers, 
> and that's saying something!

It is indeed inconsistent with Indexical Digital Mechanism (YD + CT, if you 
remember). We can’t believe in both Darwin, and the closest continuer theory.

But it might be consistent with non-mechanism, to be sure.

Bruno




> 
> John K Clark
> 
> 
>  
> 
> 
> 
> 
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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-09 Thread spudboy100 via Everything List

Apply this to your own very active philosophy. Let us say that "you" are 
resurrected from the cold in the late 22nd century? The technicians of this 
later age, state upon your awakening: "Mr. Clark, the way science advanced over 
the years since your demise, demonstrated that to get you back to life, the 
easiest track to achieve was to scan the cold preserved brain of one, John 
Clark, and though the entire cortical data map of his life was available, the 
way we do things, the only way currently, is to build him a separate body, 
based on a very young clone of him, and transferred all data, memories, etc.
Now, JC, is that clone, you??!! For me, it seems like it's Robert Nozick's, 
Closest Continuer. Physicist Sean Carroll would say that person wasn't you. My 
own feeling is like Nozick's, which is best expressed by the old American 
statement: "Close enough for government work."
Now I simply must add this part in. "Mister Clark, we know that you have ever 
been a loyal liberal, and pursuant to this knowledge, we must warn you that the 
Earth is now the polity of Donald the Golden, recently, resurrected from the 
infrared of the past light cone about earth's orbit. We have provided a very 
nice residence on Mars Terrarium, Magnus Tharsis, where you will be welcomed.  
Unless, of course you choose to remain here, where you will have the 
opportunity to kiss The Donald's ring!..  Armipotens dudum celebrari praeter in 
Socialās ex timore! :-D

-Original Message-
From: John Clark 
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wed, Sep 9, 2020 7:01 am
Subject: Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 4:40 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> It has a perfectly clear referent,

If it were perfectly clear then why doesn't Bruno Marchal use the referent in 
Bruno Marchal's thought experiments rather than a personal pronoun? John Clark 
has been asking Bruno Marchal to do that for years but Bruno Marchal absolutely 
refuses. 

 > if you make precise if you talk about he first person “you” or about some 
 > third person view.

And as John Clark has been saying for years, if "you" is duplicated then there 
is no longer such a thing as "THE first person" there is only "A first person". 
John K Clark

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-09 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 9/9/2020 1:57 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Thu, 10 Sep 2020 at 00:38, John Clark > wrote:

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 6:18 AM Stathis Papaioannou
mailto:stath...@gmail.com>> wrote:

/> You could say the “you” is at best ambiguous and at worst
meaningless in this case./

Yes, and that means a thought experiment that uses that personal
pronoun and is supposed to clear up confusion regarding personal
identity is an utter failure.

/> But if duplication were commonplace, people would use “you”. /

If duplication were commonplace then the English language would
need to undergo a RADICAL revision, especially in the way it users
personal pronouns.

> /Most who go through duplication would advise their friends,
“don’t bet on a prime number, because going on my experience,
you are unlikely to get it”./

Who is unlikely to get it?

That is the point: this is how people will talk. “I went through
duplication, and I woke up in a little room. I was asked to guess if
it was a prime numbered room. Like a fool, I guessed yes. Don’t make
the same mistake if you are duplicated! Guess no!”

In fact, don't make the same mistake even if you aren't duplicated (how
would you know?). There a lot more numbers than there are prime numbers.

Brent

Someone will say that the pronouns do not have the same meaning any
more, but so what, you can’t argue with thousands of people, even
previous pronoun sceptics, telling the same story.

John K Clark

> The “you” cannot refer to a magical soul, because
such a thing never existed in the first place.

I agree with that but I don't think "you" refers to
anything or anyone. Of course all this confusion could be
avoided if people would simply stop using personal
pronouns in thought experiments that are supposed to make
Abstract ideas about personal identity clearer.

John K Clark

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Thu, 10 Sep 2020 at 00:38, John Clark  wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 6:18 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>
>> *> You could say the “you” is at best ambiguous and at worst meaningless
>> in this case.*
>>
>
> Yes, and that means a thought experiment that uses that personal pronoun
> and is supposed to clear up confusion regarding personal identity is an
> utter failure.
>
>
>> * > But if duplication were commonplace, people would use “you”. *
>>
>
> If duplication were commonplace then the English language would need to
> undergo a RADICAL revision, especially in the way it users personal
> pronouns.
>
> > *Most who go through duplication would advise their friends, “don’t bet
>> on a prime number, because going on my experience, you are unlikely to get
>> it”.*
>>
>
> Who is unlikely to get it?
>

That is the point: this is how people will talk. “I went through
duplication, and I woke up in a little room. I was asked to guess if it was
a prime numbered room. Like a fool, I guessed yes. Don’t make the same
mistake if you are duplicated! Guess no!” Someone will say that the
pronouns do not have the same meaning any more, but so what, you can’t
argue with thousands of people, even previous pronoun sceptics, telling the
same story.

John K Clark
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>> > The “you” cannot refer to a magical soul, because such a thing never
 existed in the first place.
>>>
>>>
>>> I agree with that but I don't think "you" refers to anything or anyone.
>>> Of course all this confusion could be avoided if people would simply stop
>>> using personal pronouns in thought experiments that are supposed to make 
>>> Abstract
>>> ideas about personal identity clearer.
>>>
>>> John K Clark
>>>
>>>
>>>



>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>> 
>>> .
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>> Stathis Papaioannou
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>> .
>>
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>>
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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 2:09 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>> None of the identical copies becomes separate people until one of them
>> sees something the others do not, because after that they are no longer
>> identical
>
>
> * > That's an exaggeration.  There are many things that will differentiate
> the copies other than what they see. *
>

Many things other than the external environment? Many things? Random
quantum variations is the only thing I can think of.


> > *The interesting question is whether things that are subconscious
> count...something he felt but only remembered feeling much later?*
>

If it was felt by one and not the other then they are no longer identical.


> > *a flea bite he didn't notice?*
>

If it was not noticed then they remain identical

*> but only remembered feeling much later?*


If it is remembered by one but not the other then they can no longer be
identical.


> >
> * I don't think consciousness is the unitary thing that is implicitly
> assumed on this forum. *
>

I don't' think survival is a all or nothing matter either.

 John K Clark






>
>

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-09 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 9/9/2020 3:32 AM, John Clark wrote:
None of the identical copies becomes separate people until one of them 
sees something the others do not, because after that they are no 
longer identical 


That's an exaggeration.  There are many things that will differentiate 
the copies other than what they see.  The interesting question is 
whether things that are subconscious count...something he felt but only 
remembered feeling much later? ...a flea bite he didn't notice? ...ex 
hypothesi there are a lot of physical differences at the molecular 
level.  I don't think consciousness is the unitary thing that is 
implicitly assumed on this forum.


Brent

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-09 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 9/9/2020 12:29 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Le mer. 9 sept. 2020 à 09:14, Bruce Kellett > a écrit :

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 4:50 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:

On 9/8/2020 10:51 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 14:56, Bruce Kellett
mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:

Be a dualist if you want to. But the closest continuer
theory is a convention designed to resolve questions of
personal identity in cases of personal
duplication, absent a "soul". Arbitrary random selections
are not as satisfactory.

I'm not a dualist. I think there is no metaphysical basis for
continuity of identity, it is just a psychological construct.

Realistically (sort of) in the duplication of Bruce there will
be millions of errors in each copy. There would be no point in
trying to make them any more accurate. That would certainly
be good enough to fool his closest friends and family. So at
the molecular level there will certainly be a unique closest
continuer. But I can't see that it makes any difference.
That's just as arbitrary as denominating the first one to open
his door the REAL Bruce.

The importance of copying errors depends on the metric used to
assess closeness of continuation. If and when actual duplication
becomes possible, we can worry about the fine details of this. But
if you think in terms of AI, duplication might involve no more
than running the same program on multiple computers. Duplication
errors are then eliminated.

I think the point of taking more into account in terms of personal
identity than just psychological continuity is that psychological
continuity makes little sense when you are asleep, under
anaesthesia, or otherwise unconscious. Do you cease to be a person
when unconscious? The same person? Does your family recognize you
then or not? Since we do not doubt continuity of personal
existence even though our bodies change continuously at the
molecular level, copying errors at that level are not relevant for
bodily continuity. Our memories and emotions change every bit as
much, if not more, on these time scales. So the metric to
determine continuity of personal identity is not clear cut. It is
the sort of thing that can be sorted out if and when we can
actually duplicate persons and their bodies.

The only thing for a person to take into account if she is the same
person as yesterday, one second ago, one year ago.. is feeling she is
and is the only true thing,

But she can be mistaken about that. Suppose she feels she's the Queen
of England, but she doesn't know where the Queen was yesterday or who
the Queen spoke to a minute ago or the name of the Queen's assistant.
And suppose there's another person, who is and has been physically
distinct from her and is the Queen of England and does know all those
things. Are we to suppose her feeling trumps all that. And what
exactly is this "feeling" if it does not depend on memories?

Brent

what you're talking about could have meaning in a law court but
nowhere else... it has nothing to do with personal identity.

Quentin

Bruce
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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-09 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 9/9/2020 12:14 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 4:50 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
> wrote:

On 9/8/2020 10:51 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 14:56, Bruce Kellett mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:

Be a dualist if you want to. But the closest continuer theory
is a convention designed to resolve questions of personal
identity in cases of personal duplication, absent a "soul".
Arbitrary random selections are not as satisfactory.

I'm not a dualist. I think there is no metaphysical basis for
continuity of identity, it is just a psychological construct.

Realistically (sort of) in the duplication of Bruce there will be
millions of errors in each copy. There would be no point in
trying to make them any more accurate. That would certainly be
good enough to fool his closest friends and family. So at the
molecular level there will certainly be a unique closest
continuer. But I can't see that it makes any difference. That's
just as arbitrary as denominating the first one to open his door
the REAL Bruce.

The importance of copying errors depends on the metric used to assess
closeness of continuation. If and when actual duplication becomes
possible, we can worry about the fine details of this. But if you
think in terms of AI, duplication might involve no more than running
the same program on multiple computers. Duplication errors are then
eliminated.

I don't think those are determinative. When you awake you have the same
memories and personality as when you went to sleep. So you might say
the anesthetized Bruce is a different person, but the continuity is
still between awake Bruce before and awake Bruce after. In common
parlance someone suffering a brain injury, a stroke or tumor or trauma,
is often described a "being a different person". But that's not usually
said of a person who becomes a paraplegic or loses a limb.

Brent

Do you cease to be a person when unconscious? The same person? Does
your family recognize you then or not? Since we do not doubt
continuity of personal existence even though our bodies change
continuously at the molecular level, copying errors at that level are
not relevant for bodily continuity. Our memories and emotions change
every bit as much, if not more, on these time scales. So the metric to
determine continuity of personal identity is not clear cut. It is the
sort of thing that can be sorted out if and when we can actually
duplicate persons and their bodies.

Bruce

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 6:18 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:


> *> You could say the “you” is at best ambiguous and at worst meaningless
> in this case.*
>

Yes, and that means a thought experiment that uses that personal pronoun
and is supposed to clear up confusion regarding personal identity is an
utter failure.


> * > But if duplication were commonplace, people would use “you”. *
>

If duplication were commonplace then the English language would need to
undergo a RADICAL revision, especially in the way it users personal
pronouns.

> *Most who go through duplication would advise their friends, “don’t bet
> on a prime number, because going on my experience, you are unlikely to get
> it”.*
>

Who is unlikely to get it?

John K Clark





>
> > The “you” cannot refer to a magical soul, because such a thing never
>>> existed in the first place.
>>
>>
>> I agree with that but I don't think "you" refers to anything or anyone.
>> Of course all this confusion could be avoided if people would simply stop
>> using personal pronouns in thought experiments that are supposed to make 
>> Abstract
>> ideas about personal identity clearer.
>>
>> John K Clark
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>>
>>
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>> 
>> .
>>
>>
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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-09 Thread PGC



On Wednesday, September 9, 2020 at 11:38:32 AM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 9 Sep 2020, at 07:51, Stathis Papaioannou  > wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 14:56, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 2:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou > > wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 12:35, Bruce Kellett >> > wrote:
>>>
 On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 12:32 PM Stathis Papaioannou >>> > wrote:

> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 11:53, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 11:39 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everyth...@googlegroups.com > wrote:
>>
>>> On 9/8/2020 6:14 PM, smitra wrote:
>>> > On 09-09-2020 02:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>>
>>> >> I don't find that answer convincing, because of the implicit 
>>> dualist
>>> >> assumption. A perfectly reasonable answer to the question asked 
>>> the
>>> >> night before duplication is: "I won't be in a room tomorrow 
>>> morning,
>>> >> because when I am duplicated with 100 continuers, I cease to 
>>> exist and
>>> >> each of the continuers becomes a new, separate person. This is 
>>> because
>>> >> there is a tie among the continuers, with no closest continuer. In
>>> >> that situation, the original ceases, and the continuers are 
>>> separate
>>> >> persons."
>>> >>
>>> >> Now you might not like this answer, but it is perfectly coherent 
>>> and
>>> >> rational. It has the great advantage that it avoids the stench of
>>> >> dualism that hangs over your theory.
>>> >>
>>> >> Bruce
>>> >>
>>> >
>>> > The tie will be broken by small random fluctuations in the 
>>> physical 
>>> > states of the copies.
>>>
>>> Dualism would imply that one and only one of the duplicates has your 
>>> soul and is "you".  I see no problem is just saying they are Bruce 
>>> Kellet-1, Bruce Kellet-2,... Bruce Kellet-100.  They all remember 
>>> the 
>>> bet, and assuming their stake is duplicated too, they each either 
>>> get 
>>> $100 or lose $25.  The existence of more than one Bruce Kellet 
>>> certainly 
>>> creates problems in law and language.  But law and language are 
>>> invented 
>>> to deal with reality, not define it.
>>>
>>
>>
>> You are right about what dualism implies. So if you ask the question 
>> of the person the night before duplication, it has no answer unless you 
>> assume dualism. I think you are right about multiple BKs: BK1, BK2,... 
>> and 
>> so on. These are different persons who share some memories with the BK 
>> of 
>> the night before. Closest continuer theory works well in these 
>> duplication 
>> scenarios, despite the fact that people on this list seem averse to that 
>> theory for some undefined reason.
>>
>
> You could say that any suggestion that one of the BK's is a 
> continuation of the original, even when there is only one BK extant at 
> any 
> time, implies dualism.
>


 Not on the closest continuer theory. If there is a tie, there is no 
 unique closest continuer. If there is only one continuer, he is 
 necessarily 
 the closest. Dualism is not required.

>>>
>>> But why should the closest continuer be a continuation of the person 
>>> rather than the next-closest continuer, unless the soul has a preference 
>>> for it?
>>>
>>
>> Be a dualist if you want to. But the closest continuer theory is a 
>> convention designed to resolve questions of personal identity in cases of 
>> personal duplication, absent a "soul". Arbitrary random selections are not 
>> as satisfactory.
>>
>
> I'm not a dualist. I think there is no metaphysical basis for continuity 
> of identity, it is just a psychological construct. 
>
>
>
> That is a bit dangerous, and on the verge of reductionism. I understand 
> why you say this in this context, but the psychological constructs must be 
> taken seriously. The physical reality itself will become a first person 
> plural psychological construct too.
>
> I am not sure if you have understood that we need some arithmetical 
> realism just to define precisely what is a digital machine, and o enunciate 
> the Church-Turing thesis, but then we need to take into account the fact 
> that all computations are emulated by that minimal amount of arithmetic 
> that we have supposed.
>
> I know that Parfit called “mechanism” “reductionism”, but Mechanism is in 
> reality a powerful vaccine against reductionism, beginning by the 
> reductionist conception of machine and number.
>
> With Mechanism, we do have an ontological reductionism: only numbers 
> exist, with only two simple laws: addition and multiplication. Then the 
> physical reality emerges as a first person plural persistent sharable 
> interfering web of histories, which is confirmed by quantum mechanics 
> without collapse, up to now.
>
> It is the

Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On 9 Sep 2020, 20:41 +1000, John Clark , wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 9:05 PM Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
>
> > > so the person who wakes up in your bed tomorrow is not you, but just 
> > >someone who thinks he is you.
>
> How would things be different if that were not true and the person who wakes 
> up in your bed tomorrow who thinks he's you really is you? Things wouldn't be 
> different at all as far as I can tell. If it makes no difference if X is true 
> or not then X can't be very important.

Things could only be different if there were some non-apparent property such as 
a magical soul that was missing.

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 4:40 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> *It has a perfectly clear referent,*
>

If it were perfectly clear then why doesn't Bruno Marchal use the referent
in Bruno Marchal's thought experiments rather than a personal pronoun? John
Clark has been asking Bruno Marchal to do that for years but Bruno
Marchal absolutely
refuses.

> *if you make precise if you talk about he first person “you” or about
> some third person view.*
>

And as John Clark has been saying for years, if "you" is duplicated then
there is no longer such a thing as "*THE* first person" there is only "*A*
first person".

John K Clark

>

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 10:35 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

*>Not on the closest continuer theory. If there is a tie, there is no
> unique closest continuer. If there is only one continuer, he is necessarily
> the closest.*


Closest continuer theory Is a remarkably silly theory even for
philosophers, and that's saying something!

John K Clark






>

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 9:05 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> *so the person who wakes up in your bed tomorrow is not you, but just
> someone who thinks he is you.*

How would things be different if that were not true and the person who
wakes up in your bed tomorrow who thinks he's you really is you? Things
wouldn't be different at all as far as I can tell. If it makes no
difference if X is true or not then X can't be very important.

John K Clark

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 8:16 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> *A perfectly reasonable answer to the question asked the night before
> duplication is: "I won't be in a room tomorrow morning, because when I am
> duplicated with 100 continuers, I cease to exist *

Suppose There were no duplication would you also cease to exist?  I think
the Bruce Kellett of yesterday still exists because somebody today
remembers being him, if there is more than 1 all the better.

> *and each of the continuers becomes a new, separate person.*

None of the identical copies becomes separate people until one of them sees
something the others do not, because after that they are no longer identical

> This is because there is a tie among the continuers, with no closest
> continuer. In that situation, the original ceases, and the continuers are
> separate persons."

Nobody remembers every little thing they did, said or saw the day before, I
hate to tell you this but I secretly made a copy of the Bruce Kellett of
yesterday that has a little bit better memory than you do so he is the
"closest continuer" not you, so I guess that means you don't exist. So
Bruce, how does it feel not to exist? Has nonexistence caused you any
problems?

*> Now you might not like this answer, *

I don't.

> but it is perfectly coherent and rational.

I don't think so.

John K Clark

>

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 19:33, John Clark  wrote:

>
>
> On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 6:14 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
> > If there are 100 John Clarks tomorrow then John Clark has survived,
>
>
> Yes.
>
>  > because all it takes is one
>
>
> Yes, so there is a 100% chance John Clark will see a prime number on his
> room number and a 100% chance John Clark will not see a prime number on his
> room number.
>
> > *and there is a 25/100 probability that a randomly chosen John Clark
>> will see a prime number.*
>
>
> OK.
>
>  > *This is the non-delusional interpretation of the question “what is
>> the probability that you will see a prime number?”. *
>
>
> Then the referent to the personal pronoun "you" is not John Clark It is a
> subset of randomly selected John Clarks made after 100 duplications that
> were shown numbers between one and 100. But the question  "what will *you*
> see?" was asked before the duplications and so there was nobody in that
> subset at the time, So who was the question directed at and who was
> expected to answer?
>

You could say the “you” is at best ambiguous and at worst meaningless in
this case. But if duplication were commonplace, people would use “you”.
Most who go through duplication would advise their friends, “don’t bet on a
prime number, because going on my experience, you are unlikely to get it”.

> The “you” cannot refer to a magical soul, because such a thing never
>> existed in the first place.
>
>
> I agree with that but I don't think "you" refers to anything or anyone.
> Of course all this confusion could be avoided if people would simply stop
> using personal pronouns in thought experiments that are supposed to make 
> Abstract
> ideas about personal identity clearer.
>
> John K Clark
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --
>
>
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> "Everything List" group.
>
>
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>
>
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> 
> .
>
>
> --
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

> On 9 Sep 2020, at 07:51, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 14:56, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 2:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou  > wrote:
> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 12:35, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 12:32 PM Stathis Papaioannou  > wrote:
> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 11:53, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 11:39 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
> wrote:
> On 9/8/2020 6:14 PM, smitra wrote:
> > On 09-09-2020 02:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> 
> >> I don't find that answer convincing, because of the implicit dualist
> >> assumption. A perfectly reasonable answer to the question asked the
> >> night before duplication is: "I won't be in a room tomorrow morning,
> >> because when I am duplicated with 100 continuers, I cease to exist and
> >> each of the continuers becomes a new, separate person. This is because
> >> there is a tie among the continuers, with no closest continuer. In
> >> that situation, the original ceases, and the continuers are separate
> >> persons."
> >>
> >> Now you might not like this answer, but it is perfectly coherent and
> >> rational. It has the great advantage that it avoids the stench of
> >> dualism that hangs over your theory.
> >>
> >> Bruce
> >>
> >
> > The tie will be broken by small random fluctuations in the physical 
> > states of the copies.
> 
> Dualism would imply that one and only one of the duplicates has your 
> soul and is "you".  I see no problem is just saying they are Bruce 
> Kellet-1, Bruce Kellet-2,... Bruce Kellet-100.  They all remember the 
> bet, and assuming their stake is duplicated too, they each either get 
> $100 or lose $25.  The existence of more than one Bruce Kellet certainly 
> creates problems in law and language.  But law and language are invented 
> to deal with reality, not define it.
> 
> 
> You are right about what dualism implies. So if you ask the question of the 
> person the night before duplication, it has no answer unless you assume 
> dualism. I think you are right about multiple BKs: BK1, BK2,... and so on. 
> These are different persons who share some memories with the BK of the night 
> before. Closest continuer theory works well in these duplication scenarios, 
> despite the fact that people on this list seem averse to that theory for some 
> undefined reason.
> 
> You could say that any suggestion that one of the BK's is a continuation of 
> the original, even when there is only one BK extant at any time, implies 
> dualism.
> 
> 
> Not on the closest continuer theory. If there is a tie, there is no unique 
> closest continuer. If there is only one continuer, he is necessarily the 
> closest. Dualism is not required.
> 
> But why should the closest continuer be a continuation of the person rather 
> than the next-closest continuer, unless the soul has a preference for it?
> 
> Be a dualist if you want to. But the closest continuer theory is a convention 
> designed to resolve questions of personal identity in cases of personal 
> duplication, absent a "soul". Arbitrary random selections are not as 
> satisfactory.
> 
> I'm not a dualist. I think there is no metaphysical basis for continuity of 
> identity, it is just a psychological construct. 

That is a bit dangerous, and on the verge of reductionism. I understand why you 
say this in this context, but the psychological constructs must be taken 
seriously. The physical reality itself will become a first person plural 
psychological construct too.

I am not sure if you have understood that we need some arithmetical realism 
just to define precisely what is a digital machine, and o enunciate the 
Church-Turing thesis, but then we need to take into account the fact that all 
computations are emulated by that minimal amount of arithmetic that we have 
supposed.

I know that Parfit called “mechanism” “reductionism”, but Mechanism is in 
reality a powerful vaccine against reductionism, beginning by the reductionist 
conception of machine and number.

With Mechanism, we do have an ontological reductionism: only numbers exist, 
with only two simple laws: addition and multiplication. Then the physical 
reality emerges as a first person plural persistent sharable interfering web of 
histories, which is confirmed by quantum mechanics without collapse, up to now.

It is the believer in a “physical reality out there” to explain how it manage 
to make some computations more real than other. It is up to them to show some 
evidence for that belief. This requires to abandon digital mechanism eventually.

If you or anyone have still a problem with this, I can explain more. This is 
known since the 1930s, but ignored by many.

Bruno

PS I will certainly say more on this, but now I have hundred of exam copies to 
note...

> 
> -- 
>

Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 6:14 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> If there are 100 John Clarks tomorrow then John Clark has survived,

Yes.

 > because all it takes is one

Yes, so there is a 100% chance John Clark will see a prime number on his
room number and a 100% chance John Clark will not see a prime number on his
room number.

> *and there is a 25/100 probability that a randomly chosen John Clark will
> see a prime number.*

OK.

 > *This is the non-delusional interpretation of the question “what is the
> probability that you will see a prime number?”. *

Then the referent to the personal pronoun "you" is not John Clark It is a
subset of randomly selected John Clarks made after 100 duplications that
were shown numbers between one and 100. But the question  "what will *you*
see?" was asked before the duplications and so there was nobody in that
subset at the time, So who was the question directed at and who was
expected to answer?

> The “you” cannot refer to a magical soul, because such a thing never
> existed in the first place.

I agree with that but I don't think "you" refers to anything or anyone. Of
course all this confusion could be avoided if people would simply stop
using personal pronouns in thought experiments that are supposed to
make Abstract
ideas about personal identity clearer.

John K Clark

>

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM


> On 9 Sep 2020, at 06:56, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 2:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou  > wrote:
> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 12:35, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 12:32 PM Stathis Papaioannou  > wrote:
> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 11:53, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 11:39 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
> wrote:
> On 9/8/2020 6:14 PM, smitra wrote:
> > On 09-09-2020 02:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> 
> >> I don't find that answer convincing, because of the implicit dualist
> >> assumption. A perfectly reasonable answer to the question asked the
> >> night before duplication is: "I won't be in a room tomorrow morning,
> >> because when I am duplicated with 100 continuers, I cease to exist and
> >> each of the continuers becomes a new, separate person. This is because
> >> there is a tie among the continuers, with no closest continuer. In
> >> that situation, the original ceases, and the continuers are separate
> >> persons."
> >>
> >> Now you might not like this answer, but it is perfectly coherent and
> >> rational. It has the great advantage that it avoids the stench of
> >> dualism that hangs over your theory.
> >>
> >> Bruce
> >>
> >
> > The tie will be broken by small random fluctuations in the physical 
> > states of the copies.
> 
> Dualism would imply that one and only one of the duplicates has your 
> soul and is "you".  I see no problem is just saying they are Bruce 
> Kellet-1, Bruce Kellet-2,... Bruce Kellet-100.  They all remember the 
> bet, and assuming their stake is duplicated too, they each either get 
> $100 or lose $25.  The existence of more than one Bruce Kellet certainly 
> creates problems in law and language.  But law and language are invented 
> to deal with reality, not define it.
> 
> 
> You are right about what dualism implies. So if you ask the question of the 
> person the night before duplication, it has no answer unless you assume 
> dualism. I think you are right about multiple BKs: BK1, BK2,... and so on. 
> These are different persons who share some memories with the BK of the night 
> before. Closest continuer theory works well in these duplication scenarios, 
> despite the fact that people on this list seem averse to that theory for some 
> undefined reason.
> 
> You could say that any suggestion that one of the BK's is a continuation of 
> the original, even when there is only one BK extant at any time, implies 
> dualism.
> 
> 
> Not on the closest continuer theory. If there is a tie, there is no unique 
> closest continuer. If there is only one continuer, he is necessarily the 
> closest. Dualism is not required.
> 
> But why should the closest continuer be a continuation of the person rather 
> than the next-closest continuer, unless the soul has a preference for it?
> 
> Be a dualist if you want to. But the closest continuer theory is a convention 
> designed to resolve questions of personal identity in cases of personal 
> duplication, absent a "soul". Arbitrary random selections are not as 
> satisfactory.

To negate the soul is the same as to negate consciousness. That is the 
materialist eliminativism. I see it as the nth attempt by materialist to negate 
the existence of the subjective experience. 

Bruno



> 
> Bruce
> 
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>  
> .

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM


> On 9 Sep 2020, at 02:16, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 10:06 AM Stathis Papaioannou  > wrote:
> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 09:00, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 8:14 AM Stathis Papaioannou  > wrote:
> On Tue, 8 Sep 2020 at 22:10, John Clark  > wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 6:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou  > wrote:
> 
> > The probability of interest is that one particular John Clark will see a 
> > prime number, not that some John Clark will see a prime number. A gambler 
> > who buys a lottery ticket is interested in the probability that one 
> > particular gambler will buy the winning ticket, not the probability that 
> > some gambler will buy the winning ticket
>  
> BEFORE the duplication "one particular John Clark" and "some John Clark" are 
> exactly the same person, that is Bruno's Mr.You, that is the person Bruno 
> makes his bet with. Thus AFTER the duplication the identity of Mr.You becomes 
> completely ambiguous, there is now no way to tell who he made the bet with, 
> or how to determine the outcome and figure out who won and who lost. And 
> that's why Bruno loves personal pronouns so much and refuses to stop using 
> them, they can be used to sweep logical contradictions and absurdities under 
> the rug, and that can be very useful if the towering logical edifice of your 
> theory is built on a foundation of sand. The only way Bruno can stop using 
> personal pronouns is by means of Bruno's patented peepee terminology and 
> start talking about THE First Person Perspective, when of course after the 
> duplication there is no such thing as THE First Person Perspective, there is 
> only A First Person Perspective.
> 
> > Nothing singles him out, one is picked at random out of the 100,
> 
> But this entire thought experiment Is about what "you" can predict BEFORE the 
> duplication, Back then nobody can single anybody out because there is only 
> one John Clark. And this thought experiment is about what "you" can expect to 
> see, so the gambler must be Mr.You, so the gambler is also duplicated 100 
> times. 
> 
> > and the question is asked, what is the probability that this particular one 
> > will see a prime number? 
> 
> I can predict today with 100% certainty that tomorrow AFTER the duplication 
> when the John Clark in room #11 walks out turns around and looks at the 
> number on his door he will see a prime number, but that is a very VERY long 
> way from the original ambiguous question that was asked BEFORE the 
> duplication, namely "AFTER the duplication what is the probability "you" will 
> see a prime number?".  And that has no answer because it is not a question, 
> it's gibberish.
> 
> I think what you and Bruce Kellett are perhaps objecting to is the dualist 
> idea that there is a unique John Clark soul, with the question of probability 
> with duplicates implicitly asking which one of the duplicates this soul will 
> fly into. We know that souls are delusional, and this applies to a single 
> world situation also. If you survive the night, it means that an entity 
> identifying as John Clark wakes up in your bed tomorrow morning, not that 
> your soul has persisted in the one body. If there are 100 John Clarks 
> tomorrow then John Clark has survived, because all it takes is one, and there 
> is a 25/100 probability that a randomly chosen John Clark will see a prime 
> number. This is the non-delusional interpretation of the question “what is 
> the probability that you will see a prime number?”. The “you” cannot refer to 
> a magical soul, because such a thing never existed in the first place.
> 
> 
> I am certainly objecting to the perceived dualist assumption in your response 
> to the question (asked before duplication): "What is the probability that you 
> will see a prime number on your door when you wake tomorrow?". As JC points 
> out, by tomorrow there will be 100 individuals in the frame. Who is the "You" 
> to whom you posed the question yesterday? If the question in that form has an 
> answer, then you must assume that just one of the 100 individuals next 
> morning has inherited the soul of JC, and is the person to whom you 
> originally referred. By subtly changing the question so that you refer only 
> to asking the question of some random individual the next morning, you avoid 
> this dualist implication by essentially saying that the initial "You" 
> referred to, is the random individual you selected in the morning. If the two 
> questions are to be related at all, then you must make the dualist assumption.
> 
> I have given you the non-dualist interpretation of the question: "what is the 
> probability that you will see a prime number tomorrow" is "what is the 
> probability that a randomly chosen John Clark will see a prime number". 
> Perhaps some people assume that a magical soul will

Re: Probability in Everettian QM


> On 8 Sep 2020, at 01:05, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 8:49 AM Stathis Papaioannou  > wrote:
> On Mon, 7 Sep 2020 at 04:41, John Clark  > wrote:
> On Sun, Sep 6, 2020 at 9:34 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> >> I don't know what the hell to make of a "objective probability of a 
> >> possible subjectivity”.
> 
> > I give you an example. A person is multiplied by 100 and put in 100 
> > different, but identical from inside rooms. Just the number of the room 
> > differs, like in some hostel. You seem to agree that, as long as they stay 
> > in the room, there is only one person. But the copies are asked to open the 
> > room, and the person was asked, before the experience what is the 
> > probability that when going out of the room, its number is prime.
> 
> In that thought experiment there is no objective probability because John 
> Clark is always in a prime numbered room or John Clark is not. So there is 
> only subjective probability. There is a 100% chance John Clark will walk out, 
> look at the number on the door and see a prime number, and a 100% chance he 
> will not see a prime number. And the question "What is the probability I will 
> see a prime number?" has no answer because in this hypothetical the personal 
> pronoun "I" is ambiguous. 
> 
> However if you were to ask one of the individual John Clarks in one of those 
> rooms AFTER the duplication "What is the probability you will see a prime 
> number on the door when you walk out?" then that would be a legitimate 
> unambiguous question, and the answer would be 25% because there are 25 prime 
> numbers less than 100. But that probability would just be a subjective 
> probability because he is either in a prime numbered room or he is not, So 
> that probability figure must just be a measure of that John Clark's ignorance.
> 
> The probability of interest is that one particular John Clark will see a 
> prime number,
> 
> 
> How do you avoid the clear dualist implications of this? What is it that 
> singles out the particular John Clark in whom you are interested?


We are interested in all copies, and what is common for the majority of them 
(to get the prediction right). Nothing pick up one of them, except each does 
that itself from the first person perspective.

There is no ontological dualism, only a phenomenological dualism, the same we 
need to understand the difference between seeing someone tortured and being 
tortured. To negate that phenomenological dualism is like eliminating person or 
consciousness, which will indeed be mandatory to keep Materialism + Mechanism 
coherent. But as this negates consciousness, eventually the monism will have to 
be idealistic or neutral.

Your position either negate Mechanism (and we are then out of the scope of the 
thread), or to eliminate the first person experience, which is obviously random 
from the points of view of the majority of duplicated people when we iterate 
the duplication.

Bruno



> 
> Bruce
> 
> not that some John Clark will see a prime number. A gambler who buys a 
> lottery ticket is interested in the probability that one particular gambler 
> will buy the winning ticket, not the probability that some gambler will buy 
> the winning ticket, which he knows is 1 if all the tickets are sold.
> 
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>  
> .

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM


> On 7 Sep 2020, at 16:33, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 9:29 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> >> In that thought experiment there is no objective probability because John 
> >> Clark is always in a prime numbered room or John Clark is not. So there is 
> >> only subjective probability. There is a 100% chance John Clark will walk 
> >> out, look at the number on the door and see a prime number, and a 100% 
> >> chance he will not see a prime number.
> 
> > You make the same error than Bruce (curiously enough). Because all the 
> > alternative are realised, you take as 1 the probability that you feel them.
> 
> And you make the exact same error over and over and over and over again!  If 
> I made a mistake in the above it certainly wasn't that one because I said 
> absolutely nothing about what Mr.You would or would not do or say or think, 
> and could not even if I wanted to because due to the circumstances of the 
> thought experiment the personal pronoun "you" has no referent,


It has a perfectly clear referent, if you make precise if you talk about he 
first person “you” or about some third person view.

You mock the 1p/3p distinction (the “peepee”), but the absence of reference 
comes from not taking that difference into account. It is an informal confusion 
similar to Penrose and Lucas, who confused the []p (3p), and the []p & p (1p).

The confusion is natural as G* proves them equivalent, but the whole point 
comes from the fact hat the machine cannot prove that equivalence. 

The machine cannot even define “[]p & p”, which explains the difficulty here, 
but it is both resolved intuitively and formally with the mechanist assumption 
made precise, and the understanding of the 1p/3p difference (that you have, as 
you told us many times).

Bruno



> so any "question" using that word has no answer because it is not a question, 
> it's just some words and a question mark.
> 
> >> However if you were to ask one of the individual John Clarks in one of 
> >> those rooms AFTER the duplication "What is the probability you will see a 
> >> prime number on the door when you walk out?" then that would be a 
> >> legitimate unambiguous question, and the answer would be 25% because there 
> >> are 25 prime numbers less than 100.
> 
> > In this case, there were no explicit duplication,
> 
> Exactly, and therefore the personal pronoun "you" would not be ambiguous.so a 
> question that started as "what would you" would not automatically be an 
> ambiguous question.
> 
> > Let me ask you this: do you agree that if I can predict with certainty that 
> > I will be [...]
> 
> I don't need to read another word. No I do not agree, and I don't disagree 
> either because gibberish is not the sort of thing one can agree or disagree 
> with, it's just gibberish. 
> 
> John K Clark
> 
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>  
> .

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 17:14, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 4:50 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>> On 9/8/2020 10:51 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 14:56, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Be a dualist if you want to. But the closest continuer theory is a
>>> convention designed to resolve questions of personal identity in cases of
>>> personal duplication, absent a "soul". Arbitrary random selections are not
>>> as satisfactory.
>>>
>>
>> I'm not a dualist. I think there is no metaphysical basis for continuity
>> of identity, it is just a psychological construct.
>>
>>
>> Realistically (sort of) in the duplication of Bruce there will be
>> millions of errors in each copy.  There would be no point in trying to make
>> them any more accurate.  That would certainly be good enough to fool his
>> closest friends and family.  So at the molecular level there will certainly
>> be a unique closest continuer.  But I can't see that it makes any
>> difference.  That's just as arbitrary as denominating the first one to open
>> his door the REAL Bruce.
>>
>
>
> The importance of copying errors depends on the metric used to assess
> closeness of continuation. If and when actual duplication becomes possible,
> we can worry about the fine details of this. But if you think in terms of
> AI, duplication might involve no more than running the same program on
> multiple computers. Duplication errors are then eliminated.
>
> I think the point of taking more into account in terms of personal
> identity than just psychological continuity is that psychological
> continuity makes little sense when you are asleep, under anaesthesia, or
> otherwise unconscious. Do you cease to be a person when unconscious? The
> same person? Does your family recognize you then or not? Since we do not
> doubt continuity of personal existence even though our bodies change
> continuously at the molecular level, copying errors at that level are not
> relevant for bodily continuity. Our memories and emotions change every bit
> as much, if not more, on these time scales. So the metric to determine
> continuity of personal identity is not clear cut. It is the sort of thing
> that can be sorted out if and when we can actually duplicate persons and
> their bodies.
>

The only reason you are considered to still be a person when unconscious is
that you are expected to eventually wake up. Cryonics enthusiasts sometimes
propose using alternative words for what everyone else would call a corpse,
such as a body in an "ametabolic coma", on the grounds that eventually it
might be revived.

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-09 Thread Quentin Anciaux

Le mer. 9 sept. 2020 à 09:46, Bruce Kellett  a
écrit :

> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 5:29 PM Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
>
>> Le mer. 9 sept. 2020 à 09:14, Bruce Kellett  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 4:50 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>>
 On 9/8/2020 10:51 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

 On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 14:56, Bruce Kellett 
 wrote:

>
> Be a dualist if you want to. But the closest continuer theory is a
> convention designed to resolve questions of personal identity in cases of
> personal duplication, absent a "soul". Arbitrary random selections are not
> as satisfactory.
>

 I'm not a dualist. I think there is no metaphysical basis for
 continuity of identity, it is just a psychological construct.


 Realistically (sort of) in the duplication of Bruce there will be
 millions of errors in each copy.  There would be no point in trying to make
 them any more accurate.  That would certainly be good enough to fool his
 closest friends and family.  So at the molecular level there will certainly
 be a unique closest continuer.  But I can't see that it makes any
 difference.  That's just as arbitrary as denominating the first one to open
 his door the REAL Bruce.

>>>
>>>
>>> The importance of copying errors depends on the metric used to assess
>>> closeness of continuation. If and when actual duplication becomes possible,
>>> we can worry about the fine details of this. But if you think in terms of
>>> AI, duplication might involve no more than running the same program on
>>> multiple computers. Duplication errors are then eliminated.
>>>
>>> I think the point of taking more into account in terms of personal
>>> identity than just psychological continuity is that psychological
>>> continuity makes little sense when you are asleep, under anaesthesia, or
>>> otherwise unconscious. Do you cease to be a person when unconscious? The
>>> same person? Does your family recognize you then or not? Since we do not
>>> doubt continuity of personal existence even though our bodies change
>>> continuously at the molecular level, copying errors at that level are not
>>> relevant for bodily continuity. Our memories and emotions change every bit
>>> as much, if not more, on these time scales. So the metric to determine
>>> continuity of personal identity is not clear cut. It is the sort of thing
>>> that can be sorted out if and when we can actually duplicate persons and
>>> their bodies.
>>>
>>
>> The only thing for a person to take into account if she is the same
>> person as yesterday, one second ago, one year ago.. is feeling she is and
>> is the only true thing, what you're talking about could have meaning in a
>> law court but nowhere else... it has nothing to do with personal identity.
>>
>
>
> Tell that to the parents grieving over their son who is in a coma
> following an accident.
>

This has nothing to do with *personal* identity... personal identity is a
first person concept... if you're not conscious (coma, dead, whatever) if
there is no 'I' talking into your head, it has no meaning... now for law,
inheritance and other persons acting towards you, it can have meaning, but
it's not "personal identity" and for knowing if you're alive or not, you're
the only source of truth about that... no one can tell you you're not what
you think you are.

Quentin

>
> Bruce
>
> --
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> 
> .
>


-- 
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Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-09 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 5:29 PM Quentin Anciaux  wrote:

> Le mer. 9 sept. 2020 à 09:14, Bruce Kellett  a
> écrit :
>
>> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 4:50 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On 9/8/2020 10:51 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>
>>> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 14:56, Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>

 Be a dualist if you want to. But the closest continuer theory is a
 convention designed to resolve questions of personal identity in cases of
 personal duplication, absent a "soul". Arbitrary random selections are not
 as satisfactory.

>>>
>>> I'm not a dualist. I think there is no metaphysical basis for continuity
>>> of identity, it is just a psychological construct.
>>>
>>>
>>> Realistically (sort of) in the duplication of Bruce there will be
>>> millions of errors in each copy.  There would be no point in trying to make
>>> them any more accurate.  That would certainly be good enough to fool his
>>> closest friends and family.  So at the molecular level there will certainly
>>> be a unique closest continuer.  But I can't see that it makes any
>>> difference.  That's just as arbitrary as denominating the first one to open
>>> his door the REAL Bruce.
>>>
>>
>>
>> The importance of copying errors depends on the metric used to assess
>> closeness of continuation. If and when actual duplication becomes possible,
>> we can worry about the fine details of this. But if you think in terms of
>> AI, duplication might involve no more than running the same program on
>> multiple computers. Duplication errors are then eliminated.
>>
>> I think the point of taking more into account in terms of personal
>> identity than just psychological continuity is that psychological
>> continuity makes little sense when you are asleep, under anaesthesia, or
>> otherwise unconscious. Do you cease to be a person when unconscious? The
>> same person? Does your family recognize you then or not? Since we do not
>> doubt continuity of personal existence even though our bodies change
>> continuously at the molecular level, copying errors at that level are not
>> relevant for bodily continuity. Our memories and emotions change every bit
>> as much, if not more, on these time scales. So the metric to determine
>> continuity of personal identity is not clear cut. It is the sort of thing
>> that can be sorted out if and when we can actually duplicate persons and
>> their bodies.
>>
>
> The only thing for a person to take into account if she is the same person
> as yesterday, one second ago, one year ago.. is feeling she is and is the
> only true thing, what you're talking about could have meaning in a law
> court but nowhere else... it has nothing to do with personal identity.
>


Tell that to the parents grieving over their son who is in a coma following
an accident.

Bruce

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 16:50, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On 9/8/2020 10:51 PM, Stathis
>
> Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 14:56,
>
> Bruce Kellett 
>
> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 2:49
>>
>> PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>>
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 12:35, Bruce
>>>
>>> Kellett 
>>>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>





 On Wed, Sep 9,

 2020 at 12:32 PM Stathis Papaioannou 

 wrote:









>
>
>
> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at
>
> 11:53, Bruce Kellett 
>
> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On
>>
>> Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 11:39 AM
>>
>> 'Brent Meeker' via Everything
>>
>> List 
>>
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On
>>>
>>> 9/8/2020 6:14 PM, smitra
>>>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> > On 09-09-2020 02:16,
>>>
>>> Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> >> I don't find that
>>>
>>> answer convincing, because of
>>>
>>> the implicit dualist
>>>
>>>
>>> >> assumption. A
>>>
>>> perfectly reasonable answer to
>>>
>>> the question asked the
>>>
>>>
>>> >> night before
>>>
>>> duplication is: "I won't be in
>>>
>>> a room tomorrow morning,
>>>
>>>
>>> >> because when I am
>>>
>>> duplicated with 100
>>>
>>> continuers, I cease to exist
>>>
>>> and
>>>
>>>
>>> >> each of the
>>>
>>> continuers becomes a new,
>>>
>>> separate person. This is
>>>
>>> because
>>>
>>>
>>> >> there is a tie among
>>>
>>> the continuers, with no
>>>
>>> closest continuer. In
>>>
>>>
>>> >> that situation, the
>>>
>>> original ceases, and the
>>>
>>> continuers are separate
>>>
>>>
>>> >> persons."
>>>
>>>
>>> >>
>>>
>>>
>>> >> Now you might not
>>>
>>> like this answer, but it is
>>>
>>> perfectly coherent and
>>>
>>>
>>> >> rational. It has the
>>>
>>> great advantage that it avoids
>>>
>>> the stench of
>>>
>>>
>>> >> dualism that hangs
>>>
>>> over your theory.
>>>
>>>
>>> >>
>>>
>>>
>>> >> Bruce
>>>
>>>
>>> >>
>>>
>>>
>>> >
>>>
>>>
>>> > The tie will be broken by
>>>
>>> small random fluctuations in
>>>
>>> the physical
>>>
>>>
>>> > states of the copies.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Dualism would imply that one
>>>
>>> and only one of the duplicates
>>>
>>> has your
>>>
>>>
>>> soul and is "you".  I see no
>>>
>>> problem is just saying they
>>>
>>> are Bruce
>>>
>>>
>>> Kellet-1, Bruce Kellet-2,...
>>>
>>> Bruce Kellet-100.  They all
>>>
>>> remember the
>>>
>>>
>>> bet, and assuming their stake
>>>
>>> is duplicated too, they each
>>>
>>> either get
>>>
>>>
>>> $100 or lose $25.  The
>>>
>>> existence of more than one
>>>
>>> Bruce Kellet certainly
>>>
>>>
>>> creates problems in law and
>>>
>>> language.  But law and
>>>
>>> language are invented
>>>
>>>
>>> to deal with reality, not
>>>
>>> define it.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> You
>>
>> are right about what dualism
>>
>> implies. So if you ask the
>>
>> question of the person the
>>
>> night before duplication, it
>>
>> has no answer unless you
>>
>> assume dualism. I think you
>>
>> are right about multiple BKs:
>>
>> BK1, BK2,... and so on. These
>>
>> are different persons who
>>
>> share some memories with the
>>
>> BK of the night before.
>>
>> Closest continuer theory works
>>
>> well in these duplication
>>
>> scenarios, despite the fact
>>
>> that people on this list seem
>>
>> averse to that theory for some
>>
>> undefined reason.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> You could say that any suggestion
>
> that one of the BK's is a continuation
>
> of the original, even when there is
>
> only one BK extant at any time,
>
> implies dualism.
>
>
>
>
>











 Not on the

 closest continuer theory. If there is a

 tie, there

Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-09 Thread Quentin Anciaux

Le mer. 9 sept. 2020 à 09:14, Bruce Kellett  a
écrit :

> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 4:50 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>> On 9/8/2020 10:51 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 14:56, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Be a dualist if you want to. But the closest continuer theory is a
>>> convention designed to resolve questions of personal identity in cases of
>>> personal duplication, absent a "soul". Arbitrary random selections are not
>>> as satisfactory.
>>>
>>
>> I'm not a dualist. I think there is no metaphysical basis for continuity
>> of identity, it is just a psychological construct.
>>
>>
>> Realistically (sort of) in the duplication of Bruce there will be
>> millions of errors in each copy.  There would be no point in trying to make
>> them any more accurate.  That would certainly be good enough to fool his
>> closest friends and family.  So at the molecular level there will certainly
>> be a unique closest continuer.  But I can't see that it makes any
>> difference.  That's just as arbitrary as denominating the first one to open
>> his door the REAL Bruce.
>>
>
>
> The importance of copying errors depends on the metric used to assess
> closeness of continuation. If and when actual duplication becomes possible,
> we can worry about the fine details of this. But if you think in terms of
> AI, duplication might involve no more than running the same program on
> multiple computers. Duplication errors are then eliminated.
>
> I think the point of taking more into account in terms of personal
> identity than just psychological continuity is that psychological
> continuity makes little sense when you are asleep, under anaesthesia, or
> otherwise unconscious. Do you cease to be a person when unconscious? The
> same person? Does your family recognize you then or not? Since we do not
> doubt continuity of personal existence even though our bodies change
> continuously at the molecular level, copying errors at that level are not
> relevant for bodily continuity. Our memories and emotions change every bit
> as much, if not more, on these time scales. So the metric to determine
> continuity of personal identity is not clear cut. It is the sort of thing
> that can be sorted out if and when we can actually duplicate persons and
> their bodies.
>

The only thing for a person to take into account if she is the same person
as yesterday, one second ago, one year ago.. is feeling she is and is the
only true thing, what you're talking about could have meaning in a law
court but nowhere else... it has nothing to do with personal identity.

Quentin

>
> Bruce
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
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> 
> .
>


-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-09 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 4:50 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> On 9/8/2020 10:51 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 14:56, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>>
>> Be a dualist if you want to. But the closest continuer theory is a
>> convention designed to resolve questions of personal identity in cases of
>> personal duplication, absent a "soul". Arbitrary random selections are not
>> as satisfactory.
>>
>
> I'm not a dualist. I think there is no metaphysical basis for continuity
> of identity, it is just a psychological construct.
>
>
> Realistically (sort of) in the duplication of Bruce there will be millions
> of errors in each copy.  There would be no point in trying to make them any
> more accurate.  That would certainly be good enough to fool his closest
> friends and family.  So at the molecular level there will certainly be a
> unique closest continuer.  But I can't see that it makes any difference.
> That's just as arbitrary as denominating the first one to open his door the
> REAL Bruce.
>

The importance of copying errors depends on the metric used to assess
closeness of continuation. If and when actual duplication becomes possible,
we can worry about the fine details of this. But if you think in terms of
AI, duplication might involve no more than running the same program on
multiple computers. Duplication errors are then eliminated.

I think the point of taking more into account in terms of personal identity
than just psychological continuity is that psychological continuity makes
little sense when you are asleep, under anaesthesia, or otherwise
unconscious. Do you cease to be a person when unconscious? The same person?
Does your family recognize you then or not? Since we do not doubt
continuity of personal existence even though our bodies change continuously
at the molecular level, copying errors at that level are not relevant for
bodily continuity. Our memories and emotions change every bit as much, if
not more, on these time scales. So the metric to determine continuity of
personal identity is not clear cut. It is the sort of thing that can be
sorted out if and when we can actually duplicate persons and their bodies.

Bruce

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-09 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 9/8/2020 10:51 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 14:56, Bruce Kellett > wrote:

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 2:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou
mailto:stath...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 12:35, Bruce Kellett
mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 12:32 PM Stathis Papaioannou
mailto:stath...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 11:53, Bruce Kellett
mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>>
wrote:

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 11:39 AM 'Brent Meeker' via
Everything List mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:

On 9/8/2020 6:14 PM, smitra wrote:
> On 09-09-2020 02:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:

>> I don't find that answer convincing,
because of the implicit dualist
>> assumption. A perfectly reasonable answer
to the question asked the
>> night before duplication is: "I won't be in
a room tomorrow morning,
>> because when I am duplicated with 100
continuers, I cease to exist and
>> each of the continuers becomes a new,
separate person. This is because
>> there is a tie among the continuers, with
no closest continuer. In
>> that situation, the original ceases, and
the continuers are separate
>> persons."
>>
>> Now you might not like this answer, but it
is perfectly coherent and
>> rational. It has the great advantage that
it avoids the stench of
>> dualism that hangs over your theory.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>
> The tie will be broken by small random
fluctuations in the physical
> states of the copies.

Dualism would imply that one and only one of
the duplicates has your
soul and is "you".  I see no problem is just
saying they are Bruce
Kellet-1, Bruce Kellet-2,... Bruce
Kellet-100.  They all remember the
bet, and assuming their stake is duplicated
too, they each either get
$100 or lose $25.  The existence of more than
one Bruce Kellet certainly
creates problems in law and language.  But law
and language are invented
to deal with reality, not define it.

You are right about what dualism implies. So if
you ask the question of the person the night
before duplication, it has no answer unless you
assume dualism. I think you are right about
multiple BKs: BK1, BK2,... and so on. These are
different persons who share some memories with the
BK of the night before. Closest continuer theory
works well in these duplication scenarios, despite
the fact that people on this list seem averse to
that theory for some undefined reason.

You could say that any suggestion that one of the BK's
is a continuation of the original, even when there is
only one BK extant at any time, implies dualism.

Not on the closest continuer theory. If there is a tie,
there is no unique closest continuer. If there is only one
continuer, he is necessarily the closest. Dualism is not
required.

But why should the closest continuer be a continuation of the
person rather than the next-closest continuer, unless the soul
has a preference for it?

Be a dualist if you want to. But the closest continuer theory is a
convention designed to resolve questions of personal identity in
cases of personal duplication, absent a "soul". Arbitrary random
selections are not as satisfactory.

I'm not a dualist. I think there is no metaphysical basis for 
continuity of identity, it is just a psychological construct.

Realistically (sort of) in the duplication of Bruce there will be 
millions of errors in each copy.  There would be no point in trying to 
make them any more accurate.  That would certainly be good enough to

Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-09 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 3:52 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 14:56, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>>
>> Be a dualist if you want to. But the closest continuer theory is a
>> convention designed to resolve questions of personal identity in cases of
>> personal duplication, absent a "soul". Arbitrary random selections are not
>> as satisfactory.
>>
>
> I'm not a dualist.
>

I am glad to hear it.

> I think there is no metaphysical basis for continuity of identity, it is
> just a psychological construct.
>

That may be your opinion. Others may beg to differ. Personal identity
consists in more than just psychological continuity.

Bruce

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 14:56, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 2:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 12:35, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 12:32 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 11:53, Bruce Kellett 
 wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 11:39 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>> On 9/8/2020 6:14 PM, smitra wrote:
>> > On 09-09-2020 02:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>> >> I don't find that answer convincing, because of the implicit
>> dualist
>> >> assumption. A perfectly reasonable answer to the question asked the
>> >> night before duplication is: "I won't be in a room tomorrow
>> morning,
>> >> because when I am duplicated with 100 continuers, I cease to exist
>> and
>> >> each of the continuers becomes a new, separate person. This is
>> because
>> >> there is a tie among the continuers, with no closest continuer. In
>> >> that situation, the original ceases, and the continuers are
>> separate
>> >> persons."
>> >>
>> >> Now you might not like this answer, but it is perfectly coherent
>> and
>> >> rational. It has the great advantage that it avoids the stench of
>> >> dualism that hangs over your theory.
>> >>
>> >> Bruce
>> >>
>> >
>> > The tie will be broken by small random fluctuations in the physical
>> > states of the copies.
>>
>> Dualism would imply that one and only one of the duplicates has your
>> soul and is "you".  I see no problem is just saying they are Bruce
>> Kellet-1, Bruce Kellet-2,... Bruce Kellet-100.  They all remember the
>> bet, and assuming their stake is duplicated too, they each either get
>> $100 or lose $25.  The existence of more than one Bruce Kellet
>> certainly
>> creates problems in law and language.  But law and language are
>> invented
>> to deal with reality, not define it.
>>
>
>
> You are right about what dualism implies. So if you ask the question
> of the person the night before duplication, it has no answer unless you
> assume dualism. I think you are right about multiple BKs: BK1, BK2,... and
> so on. These are different persons who share some memories with the BK of
> the night before. Closest continuer theory works well in these duplication
> scenarios, despite the fact that people on this list seem averse to that
> theory for some undefined reason.
>

 You could say that any suggestion that one of the BK's is a
 continuation of the original, even when there is only one BK extant at any
 time, implies dualism.

>>>
>>>
>>> Not on the closest continuer theory. If there is a tie, there is no
>>> unique closest continuer. If there is only one continuer, he is necessarily
>>> the closest. Dualism is not required.
>>>
>>
>> But why should the closest continuer be a continuation of the person
>> rather than the next-closest continuer, unless the soul has a preference
>> for it?
>>
>
> Be a dualist if you want to. But the closest continuer theory is a
> convention designed to resolve questions of personal identity in cases of
> personal duplication, absent a "soul". Arbitrary random selections are not
> as satisfactory.
>

I'm not a dualist. I think there is no metaphysical basis for continuity of
identity, it is just a psychological construct.

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 2:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 12:35, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 12:32 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 11:53, Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 11:39 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
 everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> On 9/8/2020 6:14 PM, smitra wrote:
> > On 09-09-2020 02:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> >> I don't find that answer convincing, because of the implicit dualist
> >> assumption. A perfectly reasonable answer to the question asked the
> >> night before duplication is: "I won't be in a room tomorrow morning,
> >> because when I am duplicated with 100 continuers, I cease to exist
> and
> >> each of the continuers becomes a new, separate person. This is
> because
> >> there is a tie among the continuers, with no closest continuer. In
> >> that situation, the original ceases, and the continuers are separate
> >> persons."
> >>
> >> Now you might not like this answer, but it is perfectly coherent and
> >> rational. It has the great advantage that it avoids the stench of
> >> dualism that hangs over your theory.
> >>
> >> Bruce
> >>
> >
> > The tie will be broken by small random fluctuations in the physical
> > states of the copies.
>
> Dualism would imply that one and only one of the duplicates has your
> soul and is "you".  I see no problem is just saying they are Bruce
> Kellet-1, Bruce Kellet-2,... Bruce Kellet-100.  They all remember the
> bet, and assuming their stake is duplicated too, they each either get
> $100 or lose $25.  The existence of more than one Bruce Kellet
> certainly
> creates problems in law and language.  But law and language are
> invented
> to deal with reality, not define it.
>


 You are right about what dualism implies. So if you ask the question of
 the person the night before duplication, it has no answer unless you assume
 dualism. I think you are right about multiple BKs: BK1, BK2,... and so on.
 These are different persons who share some memories with the BK of the
 night before. Closest continuer theory works well in these duplication
 scenarios, despite the fact that people on this list seem averse to that
 theory for some undefined reason.

>>>
>>> You could say that any suggestion that one of the BK's is a continuation
>>> of the original, even when there is only one BK extant at any time, implies
>>> dualism.
>>>
>>
>>
>> Not on the closest continuer theory. If there is a tie, there is no
>> unique closest continuer. If there is only one continuer, he is necessarily
>> the closest. Dualism is not required.
>>
>
> But why should the closest continuer be a continuation of the person
> rather than the next-closest continuer, unless the soul has a preference
> for it?
>

Be a dualist if you want to. But the closest continuer theory is a
convention designed to resolve questions of personal identity in cases of
personal duplication, absent a "soul". Arbitrary random selections are not
as satisfactory.

Bruce

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 12:35, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 12:32 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 11:53, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 11:39 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>>
 On 9/8/2020 6:14 PM, smitra wrote:
 > On 09-09-2020 02:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:

 >> I don't find that answer convincing, because of the implicit dualist
 >> assumption. A perfectly reasonable answer to the question asked the
 >> night before duplication is: "I won't be in a room tomorrow morning,
 >> because when I am duplicated with 100 continuers, I cease to exist
 and
 >> each of the continuers becomes a new, separate person. This is
 because
 >> there is a tie among the continuers, with no closest continuer. In
 >> that situation, the original ceases, and the continuers are separate
 >> persons."
 >>
 >> Now you might not like this answer, but it is perfectly coherent and
 >> rational. It has the great advantage that it avoids the stench of
 >> dualism that hangs over your theory.
 >>
 >> Bruce
 >>
 >
 > The tie will be broken by small random fluctuations in the physical
 > states of the copies.

 Dualism would imply that one and only one of the duplicates has your
 soul and is "you".  I see no problem is just saying they are Bruce
 Kellet-1, Bruce Kellet-2,... Bruce Kellet-100.  They all remember the
 bet, and assuming their stake is duplicated too, they each either get
 $100 or lose $25.  The existence of more than one Bruce Kellet
 certainly
 creates problems in law and language.  But law and language are
 invented
 to deal with reality, not define it.

>>>
>>>
>>> You are right about what dualism implies. So if you ask the question of
>>> the person the night before duplication, it has no answer unless you assume
>>> dualism. I think you are right about multiple BKs: BK1, BK2,... and so on.
>>> These are different persons who share some memories with the BK of the
>>> night before. Closest continuer theory works well in these duplication
>>> scenarios, despite the fact that people on this list seem averse to that
>>> theory for some undefined reason.
>>>
>>
>> You could say that any suggestion that one of the BK's is a continuation
>> of the original, even when there is only one BK extant at any time, implies
>> dualism.
>>
>
>
> Not on the closest continuer theory. If there is a tie, there is no unique
> closest continuer. If there is only one continuer, he is necessarily the
> closest. Dualism is not required.
>

But why should the closest continuer be a continuation of the person rather
than the next-closest continuer, unless the soul has a preference for it?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 12:32 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 11:53, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 11:39 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On 9/8/2020 6:14 PM, smitra wrote:
>>> > On 09-09-2020 02:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>>
>>> >> I don't find that answer convincing, because of the implicit dualist
>>> >> assumption. A perfectly reasonable answer to the question asked the
>>> >> night before duplication is: "I won't be in a room tomorrow morning,
>>> >> because when I am duplicated with 100 continuers, I cease to exist and
>>> >> each of the continuers becomes a new, separate person. This is because
>>> >> there is a tie among the continuers, with no closest continuer. In
>>> >> that situation, the original ceases, and the continuers are separate
>>> >> persons."
>>> >>
>>> >> Now you might not like this answer, but it is perfectly coherent and
>>> >> rational. It has the great advantage that it avoids the stench of
>>> >> dualism that hangs over your theory.
>>> >>
>>> >> Bruce
>>> >>
>>> >
>>> > The tie will be broken by small random fluctuations in the physical
>>> > states of the copies.
>>>
>>> Dualism would imply that one and only one of the duplicates has your
>>> soul and is "you".  I see no problem is just saying they are Bruce
>>> Kellet-1, Bruce Kellet-2,... Bruce Kellet-100.  They all remember the
>>> bet, and assuming their stake is duplicated too, they each either get
>>> $100 or lose $25.  The existence of more than one Bruce Kellet certainly
>>> creates problems in law and language.  But law and language are invented
>>> to deal with reality, not define it.
>>>
>>
>>
>> You are right about what dualism implies. So if you ask the question of
>> the person the night before duplication, it has no answer unless you assume
>> dualism. I think you are right about multiple BKs: BK1, BK2,... and so on.
>> These are different persons who share some memories with the BK of the
>> night before. Closest continuer theory works well in these duplication
>> scenarios, despite the fact that people on this list seem averse to that
>> theory for some undefined reason.
>>
>
> You could say that any suggestion that one of the BK's is a continuation
> of the original, even when there is only one BK extant at any time, implies
> dualism.
>


Not on the closest continuer theory. If there is a tie, there is no unique
closest continuer. If there is only one continuer, he is necessarily the
closest. Dualism is not required.

Bruce

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 11:53, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 11:39 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>> On 9/8/2020 6:14 PM, smitra wrote:
>> > On 09-09-2020 02:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>> >> I don't find that answer convincing, because of the implicit dualist
>> >> assumption. A perfectly reasonable answer to the question asked the
>> >> night before duplication is: "I won't be in a room tomorrow morning,
>> >> because when I am duplicated with 100 continuers, I cease to exist and
>> >> each of the continuers becomes a new, separate person. This is because
>> >> there is a tie among the continuers, with no closest continuer. In
>> >> that situation, the original ceases, and the continuers are separate
>> >> persons."
>> >>
>> >> Now you might not like this answer, but it is perfectly coherent and
>> >> rational. It has the great advantage that it avoids the stench of
>> >> dualism that hangs over your theory.
>> >>
>> >> Bruce
>> >>
>> >
>> > The tie will be broken by small random fluctuations in the physical
>> > states of the copies.
>>
>> Dualism would imply that one and only one of the duplicates has your
>> soul and is "you".  I see no problem is just saying they are Bruce
>> Kellet-1, Bruce Kellet-2,... Bruce Kellet-100.  They all remember the
>> bet, and assuming their stake is duplicated too, they each either get
>> $100 or lose $25.  The existence of more than one Bruce Kellet certainly
>> creates problems in law and language.  But law and language are invented
>> to deal with reality, not define it.
>>
>
>
> You are right about what dualism implies. So if you ask the question of
> the person the night before duplication, it has no answer unless you assume
> dualism. I think you are right about multiple BKs: BK1, BK2,... and so on.
> These are different persons who share some memories with the BK of the
> night before. Closest continuer theory works well in these duplication
> scenarios, despite the fact that people on this list seem averse to that
> theory for some undefined reason.
>

You could say that any suggestion that one of the BK's is a continuation of
the original, even when there is only one BK extant at any time, implies
dualism.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-08 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 9/8/2020 6:53 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 11:39 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote:

On 9/8/2020 6:14 PM, smitra wrote:
> On 09-09-2020 02:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:

>> I don't find that answer convincing, because of the implicit
dualist
>> assumption. A perfectly reasonable answer to the question asked the
>> night before duplication is: "I won't be in a room tomorrow
morning,
>> because when I am duplicated with 100 continuers, I cease to
exist and
>> each of the continuers becomes a new, separate person. This is
because
>> there is a tie among the continuers, with no closest continuer. In
>> that situation, the original ceases, and the continuers are
separate
>> persons."
>>
>> Now you might not like this answer, but it is perfectly
coherent and
>> rational. It has the great advantage that it avoids the stench of
>> dualism that hangs over your theory.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>
> The tie will be broken by small random fluctuations in the physical
> states of the copies.

Dualism would imply that one and only one of the duplicates has your
soul and is "you".  I see no problem is just saying they are Bruce
Kellet-1, Bruce Kellet-2,... Bruce Kellet-100.  They all remember the
bet, and assuming their stake is duplicated too, they each either get
$100 or lose $25.  The existence of more than one Bruce Kellet
certainly
creates problems in law and language.  But law and language are
invented
to deal with reality, not define it.

You are right about what dualism implies. So if you ask the question 
of the person the night before duplication, it has no answer unless 
you assume dualism. I think you are right about multiple BKs: BK1, 
BK2,... and so on. These are different persons who share some memories 
with the BK of the night before. Closest continuer theory works well 
in these duplication scenarios, despite the fact that people on this 
list seem averse to that theory for some undefined reason.

But ex hypothesi the Bruce Kellet's are all equally close continuers by 
most standards.  Of course the law could make some arbitrary distinction 
if that's useful, e.g. the first one to step out of his room is THE 
Bruce Kellet.

Brent

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 11:39 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> On 9/8/2020 6:14 PM, smitra wrote:
> > On 09-09-2020 02:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> >> I don't find that answer convincing, because of the implicit dualist
> >> assumption. A perfectly reasonable answer to the question asked the
> >> night before duplication is: "I won't be in a room tomorrow morning,
> >> because when I am duplicated with 100 continuers, I cease to exist and
> >> each of the continuers becomes a new, separate person. This is because
> >> there is a tie among the continuers, with no closest continuer. In
> >> that situation, the original ceases, and the continuers are separate
> >> persons."
> >>
> >> Now you might not like this answer, but it is perfectly coherent and
> >> rational. It has the great advantage that it avoids the stench of
> >> dualism that hangs over your theory.
> >>
> >> Bruce
> >>
> >
> > The tie will be broken by small random fluctuations in the physical
> > states of the copies.
>
> Dualism would imply that one and only one of the duplicates has your
> soul and is "you".  I see no problem is just saying they are Bruce
> Kellet-1, Bruce Kellet-2,... Bruce Kellet-100.  They all remember the
> bet, and assuming their stake is duplicated too, they each either get
> $100 or lose $25.  The existence of more than one Bruce Kellet certainly
> creates problems in law and language.  But law and language are invented
> to deal with reality, not define it.
>


You are right about what dualism implies. So if you ask the question of the
person the night before duplication, it has no answer unless you assume
dualism. I think you are right about multiple BKs: BK1, BK2,... and so on.
These are different persons who share some memories with the BK of the
night before. Closest continuer theory works well in these duplication
scenarios, despite the fact that people on this list seem averse to that
theory for some undefined reason.

Bruce

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-08 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List





On 9/8/2020 6:14 PM, smitra wrote:

On 09-09-2020 02:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 10:06 AM Stathis Papaioannou
 wrote:


On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 09:00, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 8:14 AM Stathis Papaioannou
 wrote:

On Tue, 8 Sep 2020 at 22:10, John Clark 
wrote:

On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 6:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou
 wrote:

_> The probability of interest is that one particular John Clark
will see a prime number, not that some John Clark will see a prime
number. A gambler who buys a lottery ticket is interested in the
probability that one particular gambler will buy the winning ticket,
not the probability that some gambler will buy the winning ticket_
BEFORE the duplication "one particular John Clark" and "some John
Clark" are exactly the same person, that is Bruno's Mr.You, that is
the person Bruno makes his bet with. Thus AFTER the duplication the
identity of Mr.You becomes completely ambiguous, there is now no way
to tell who he made the bet with, or how to determine the outcome
and figure out who won and who lost. And that's why Bruno loves
personal pronouns so much and refuses to stop using them, they can
be used to sweep logical contradictions and absurdities under the
rug, and that can be very useful if the towering logical edifice of
your theory is built on a foundation of sand. The only way Bruno can
stop using personal pronouns is by means of Bruno's patented peepee
terminology and start talking about THE First Person Perspective,
when of course after the duplication there is no such thing as THE
First Person Perspective, there is only A First Person Perspective.


___Nothing singles him out, one is picked at random out of the

100,_

But this entire thought experiment Is about what "you" can predict
BEFORE the duplication, Back then nobody can single anybody out
because there is only one John Clark. And this thought experiment is
about what "you" can expect to see, so the gambler must be Mr.You,
so the gambler is also duplicated 100 times.

_> and the question is asked, what is the probability that this
particular one will see a prime number? _

I can predict today with 100% certainty that tomorrow AFTER the
duplication when the John Clark in room #11 walks out turns around
and looks at the number on his door he will see a prime number, but
that is a very VERY long way from the original ambiguous question
that was asked BEFORE the duplication, namely "AFTER the duplication
what is the probability "you" will see a prime number?".  And that
has no answer because it is not a question, it's gibberish.


I think what you and Bruce Kellett are perhaps objecting to is the
dualist idea that there is a unique John Clark soul, with the question
of probability with duplicates implicitly asking which one of the
duplicates this soul will fly into. We know that souls are delusional,
and this applies to a single world situation also. If you survive the
night, it means that an entity identifying as John Clark wakes up in
your bed tomorrow morning, not that your soul has persisted in the one
body. If there are 100 John Clarks tomorrow then John Clark has
survived, because all it takes is one, and there is a 25/100
probability that a randomly chosen John Clark will see a prime number.
This is the non-delusional interpretation of the question “what is
the probability that you will see a prime number?”. The “you”
cannot refer to a magical soul, because such a thing never existed in
the first place.

I am certainly objecting to the perceived dualist assumption in your
response to the question (asked before duplication): "What is the
probability that you will see a prime number on your door when you
wake tomorrow?". As JC points out, by tomorrow there will be 100
individuals in the frame. Who is the "You" to whom you posed the
question yesterday? If the question in that form has an answer, then
you must assume that just one of the 100 individuals next morning has
inherited the soul of JC, and is the person to whom you originally
referred. By subtly changing the question so that you refer only to
asking the question of some random individual the next morning, you
avoid this dualist implication by essentially saying that the initial
"You" referred to, is the random individual you selected in the
morning. If the two questions are to be related at all, then you must
make the dualist assumption.

I have given you the non-dualist interpretation of the question: "what
is the probability that you will see a prime number tomorrow" is "what
is the probability that a randomly chosen John Clark will see a prime
number". Perhaps some people assume that a magical soul will fly into
one, and only one, of the John Clarks, but they are wrong, just as
they are wrong about a magical soul persisting in a single John Clark
waking up in his bed normally, ensuring that it is him and not someone
who merely believes he is him.

I don't find that answer convincing, because of the implicit dualist

Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 11:14 AM smitra  wrote:

> On 09-09-2020 02:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> > On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 10:06 AM Stathis Papaioannou
> >  wrote:
> >
> >> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 09:00, Bruce Kellett 
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 8:14 AM Stathis Papaioannou
> >>  wrote:
> >>
> >> On Tue, 8 Sep 2020 at 22:10, John Clark 
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >> On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 6:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou
> >>  wrote:
> >>
> >> _> The probability of interest is that one particular John Clark
> >> will see a prime number, not that some John Clark will see a prime
> >> number. A gambler who buys a lottery ticket is interested in the
> >> probability that one particular gambler will buy the winning ticket,
> >> not the probability that some gambler will buy the winning ticket_
> >> BEFORE the duplication "one particular John Clark" and "some John
> >> Clark" are exactly the same person, that is Bruno's Mr.You, that is
> >> the person Bruno makes his bet with. Thus AFTER the duplication the
> >> identity of Mr.You becomes completely ambiguous, there is now no way
> >> to tell who he made the bet with, or how to determine the outcome
> >> and figure out who won and who lost. And that's why Bruno loves
> >> personal pronouns so much and refuses to stop using them, they can
> >> be used to sweep logical contradictions and absurdities under the
> >> rug, and that can be very useful if the towering logical edifice of
> >> your theory is built on a foundation of sand. The only way Bruno can
> >> stop using personal pronouns is by means of Bruno's patented peepee
> >> terminology and start talking about THE First Person Perspective,
> >> when of course after the duplication there is no such thing as THE
> >> First Person Perspective, there is only A First Person Perspective.
> >>
> >>> ___Nothing singles him out, one is picked at random out of the
> >> 100,_
> >>
> >> But this entire thought experiment Is about what "you" can predict
> >> BEFORE the duplication, Back then nobody can single anybody out
> >> because there is only one John Clark. And this thought experiment is
> >> about what "you" can expect to see, so the gambler must be Mr.You,
> >> so the gambler is also duplicated 100 times.
> >>
> >> _> and the question is asked, what is the probability that this
> >> particular one will see a prime number? _
> >>
> >> I can predict today with 100% certainty that tomorrow AFTER the
> >> duplication when the John Clark in room #11 walks out turns around
> >> and looks at the number on his door he will see a prime number, but
> >> that is a very VERY long way from the original ambiguous question
> >> that was asked BEFORE the duplication, namely "AFTER the duplication
> >> what is the probability "you" will see a prime number?".  And that
> >> has no answer because it is not a question, it's gibberish.
> >
> > I think what you and Bruce Kellett are perhaps objecting to is the
> > dualist idea that there is a unique John Clark soul, with the question
> > of probability with duplicates implicitly asking which one of the
> > duplicates this soul will fly into. We know that souls are delusional,
> > and this applies to a single world situation also. If you survive the
> > night, it means that an entity identifying as John Clark wakes up in
> > your bed tomorrow morning, not that your soul has persisted in the one
> > body. If there are 100 John Clarks tomorrow then John Clark has
> > survived, because all it takes is one, and there is a 25/100
> > probability that a randomly chosen John Clark will see a prime number.
> > This is the non-delusional interpretation of the question “what is
> > the probability that you will see a prime number?”. The “you”
> > cannot refer to a magical soul, because such a thing never existed in
> > the first place.
> >
> > I am certainly objecting to the perceived dualist assumption in your
> > response to the question (asked before duplication): "What is the
> > probability that you will see a prime number on your door when you
> > wake tomorrow?". As JC points out, by tomorrow there will be 100
> > individuals in the frame. Who is the "You" to whom you posed the
> > question yesterday? If the question in that form has an answer, then
> > you must assume that just one of the 100 individuals next morning has
> > inherited the soul of JC, and is the person to whom you originally
> > referred. By subtly changing the question so that you refer only to
> > asking the question of some random individual the next morning, you
> > avoid this dualist implication by essentially saying that the initial
> > "You" referred to, is the random individual you selected in the
> > morning. If the two questions are to be related at all, then you must
> > make the dualist assumption.
> >
> > I have given you the non-dualist interpretation of the question: "what
> > is the probability that you will see a prime number tomorrow" is "what
> > is the probability that a randomly chosen John Clark will

Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-08 Thread smitra


On 09-09-2020 02:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 10:06 AM Stathis Papaioannou
 wrote:


On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 09:00, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 8:14 AM Stathis Papaioannou
 wrote:

On Tue, 8 Sep 2020 at 22:10, John Clark 
wrote:

On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 6:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou
 wrote:

_> The probability of interest is that one particular John Clark
will see a prime number, not that some John Clark will see a prime
number. A gambler who buys a lottery ticket is interested in the
probability that one particular gambler will buy the winning ticket,
not the probability that some gambler will buy the winning ticket_
BEFORE the duplication "one particular John Clark" and "some John
Clark" are exactly the same person, that is Bruno's Mr.You, that is
the person Bruno makes his bet with. Thus AFTER the duplication the
identity of Mr.You becomes completely ambiguous, there is now no way
to tell who he made the bet with, or how to determine the outcome
and figure out who won and who lost. And that's why Bruno loves
personal pronouns so much and refuses to stop using them, they can
be used to sweep logical contradictions and absurdities under the
rug, and that can be very useful if the towering logical edifice of
your theory is built on a foundation of sand. The only way Bruno can
stop using personal pronouns is by means of Bruno's patented peepee
terminology and start talking about THE First Person Perspective,
when of course after the duplication there is no such thing as THE
First Person Perspective, there is only A First Person Perspective.


___Nothing singles him out, one is picked at random out of the

100,_

But this entire thought experiment Is about what "you" can predict
BEFORE the duplication, Back then nobody can single anybody out
because there is only one John Clark. And this thought experiment is
about what "you" can expect to see, so the gambler must be Mr.You,
so the gambler is also duplicated 100 times.

_> and the question is asked, what is the probability that this
particular one will see a prime number? _

I can predict today with 100% certainty that tomorrow AFTER the
duplication when the John Clark in room #11 walks out turns around
and looks at the number on his door he will see a prime number, but
that is a very VERY long way from the original ambiguous question
that was asked BEFORE the duplication, namely "AFTER the duplication
what is the probability "you" will see a prime number?".  And that
has no answer because it is not a question, it's gibberish.


I think what you and Bruce Kellett are perhaps objecting to is the
dualist idea that there is a unique John Clark soul, with the question
of probability with duplicates implicitly asking which one of the
duplicates this soul will fly into. We know that souls are delusional,
and this applies to a single world situation also. If you survive the
night, it means that an entity identifying as John Clark wakes up in
your bed tomorrow morning, not that your soul has persisted in the one
body. If there are 100 John Clarks tomorrow then John Clark has
survived, because all it takes is one, and there is a 25/100
probability that a randomly chosen John Clark will see a prime number.
This is the non-delusional interpretation of the question “what is
the probability that you will see a prime number?”. The “you”
cannot refer to a magical soul, because such a thing never existed in
the first place.

I am certainly objecting to the perceived dualist assumption in your
response to the question (asked before duplication): "What is the
probability that you will see a prime number on your door when you
wake tomorrow?". As JC points out, by tomorrow there will be 100
individuals in the frame. Who is the "You" to whom you posed the
question yesterday? If the question in that form has an answer, then
you must assume that just one of the 100 individuals next morning has
inherited the soul of JC, and is the person to whom you originally
referred. By subtly changing the question so that you refer only to
asking the question of some random individual the next morning, you
avoid this dualist implication by essentially saying that the initial
"You" referred to, is the random individual you selected in the
morning. If the two questions are to be related at all, then you must
make the dualist assumption.

I have given you the non-dualist interpretation of the question: "what
is the probability that you will see a prime number tomorrow" is "what
is the probability that a randomly chosen John Clark will see a prime
number". Perhaps some people assume that a magical soul will fly into
one, and only one, of the John Clarks, but they are wrong, just as
they are wrong about a magical soul persisting in a single John Clark
waking up in his bed normally, ensuring that it is him and not someone
who merely believes he is him.

I don't find that answer convincing, because of the implicit dualist
assumption. A perfectly reasonable answer to

Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 10:16, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 10:06 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 09:00, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 8:14 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Tue, 8 Sep 2020 at 22:10, John Clark  wrote:

> On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 6:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
> *> The probability of interest is that one particular John Clark will
>> see a prime number, not that some John Clark will see a prime number. A
>> gambler who buys a lottery ticket is interested in the probability that 
>> one
>> particular gambler will buy the winning ticket, not the probability that
>> some gambler will buy the winning ticket*
>>
>
> BEFORE the duplication "one particular John Clark" and "some John
> Clark" are exactly the same person, that is Bruno's Mr.You, that is the
> person Bruno makes his bet with. Thus AFTER the duplication the identity 
> of
> Mr.You becomes completely ambiguous, there is now no way to tell who he
> made the bet with, or how to determine the outcome and figure out who won
> and who lost. And that's why Bruno loves personal pronouns so much and
> refuses to stop using them, they can be used to sweep logical
> contradictions and absurdities under the rug, and that can be very useful
> if the towering logical edifice of your theory is built on a foundation of
> sand. The only way Bruno can stop using personal pronouns is by means of
> Bruno's patented peepee terminology and start talking about *THE*
> First Person Perspective, when of course after the duplication there is no
> such thing as *THE* First Person Perspective, there is only *A* First
> Person Perspective.
>
> > *Nothing singles him out, one is picked at random out of the 100,*
>
>
> But this entire thought experiment Is about what "you" can predict
> BEFORE the duplication, Back then nobody can single anybody out because
> there is only one John Clark. And this thought experiment is
> about what "you" can expect to see, so the gambler must be Mr.You, so
> the gambler is also duplicated 100 times.
>
> *> and the question is asked, what is the probability that this
>> particular one will see a prime number? *
>
>
> I can predict today with 100% certainty that tomorrow AFTER the
> duplication when the John Clark in room #11 walks out turns around
> and looks at the number on his door he will see a prime number, but
> that is a very VERY long way from the original ambiguous question that was
> asked BEFORE the duplication, namely "AFTER the duplication what is the
> probability "you" will see a prime number?".  And that has no answer
> because it is not a question, it's gibberish.
>

 I think what you and Bruce Kellett are perhaps objecting to is the
 dualist idea that there is a unique John Clark soul, with the question of
 probability with duplicates implicitly asking which one of the duplicates
 this soul will fly into. We know that souls are delusional, and this
 applies to a single world situation also. If you survive the night, it
 means that an entity identifying as John Clark wakes up in your bed
 tomorrow morning, not that your soul has persisted in the one body. If
 there are 100 John Clarks tomorrow then John Clark has survived, because
 all it takes is one, and there is a 25/100 probability that a randomly
 chosen John Clark will see a prime number. This is the non-delusional
 interpretation of the question “what is the probability that you will see a
 prime number?”. The “you” cannot refer to a magical soul, because such a
 thing never existed in the first place.

>>>
>>>
>>> I am certainly objecting to the perceived dualist assumption in your
>>> response to the question (asked before duplication): "What is the
>>> probability that you will see a prime number on your door when you wake
>>> tomorrow?". As JC points out, by tomorrow there will be 100 individuals in
>>> the frame. Who is the "You" to whom you posed the question yesterday? If
>>> the question in that form has an answer, then you must assume that just one
>>> of the 100 individuals next morning has inherited the soul of JC, and is
>>> the person to whom you originally referred. By subtly changing the question
>>> so that you refer only to asking the question of some random individual the
>>> next morning, you avoid this dualist implication by essentially saying that
>>> the initial "You" referred to, is the random individual you selected in the
>>> morning. If the two questions are to be related at all, then you must make
>>> the dualist assumption.
>>>
>>
>> I have given you the non-dualist interpretation of the question: "what is
>> the probability that you will see a prime number tomorrow" is "what is the
>>

Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 10:06 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 09:00, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 8:14 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, 8 Sep 2020 at 22:10, John Clark  wrote:
>>>
 On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 6:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
 wrote:

 *> The probability of interest is that one particular John Clark will
> see a prime number, not that some John Clark will see a prime number. A
> gambler who buys a lottery ticket is interested in the probability that 
> one
> particular gambler will buy the winning ticket, not the probability that
> some gambler will buy the winning ticket*
>

 BEFORE the duplication "one particular John Clark" and "some John
 Clark" are exactly the same person, that is Bruno's Mr.You, that is the
 person Bruno makes his bet with. Thus AFTER the duplication the identity of
 Mr.You becomes completely ambiguous, there is now no way to tell who he
 made the bet with, or how to determine the outcome and figure out who won
 and who lost. And that's why Bruno loves personal pronouns so much and
 refuses to stop using them, they can be used to sweep logical
 contradictions and absurdities under the rug, and that can be very useful
 if the towering logical edifice of your theory is built on a foundation of
 sand. The only way Bruno can stop using personal pronouns is by means of
 Bruno's patented peepee terminology and start talking about *THE*
 First Person Perspective, when of course after the duplication there is no
 such thing as *THE* First Person Perspective, there is only *A* First
 Person Perspective.

 > *Nothing singles him out, one is picked at random out of the 100,*

 But this entire thought experiment Is about what "you" can predict
 BEFORE the duplication, Back then nobody can single anybody out because
 there is only one John Clark. And this thought experiment is
 about what "you" can expect to see, so the gambler must be Mr.You, so
 the gambler is also duplicated 100 times.

 *> and the question is asked, what is the probability that this
> particular one will see a prime number? *

 I can predict today with 100% certainty that tomorrow AFTER the
 duplication when the John Clark in room #11 walks out turns around and
 looks at the number on his door he will see a prime number, but that
 is a very VERY long way from the original ambiguous question that was asked
 BEFORE the duplication, namely "AFTER the duplication what is the
 probability "you" will see a prime number?".  And that has no answer
 because it is not a question, it's gibberish.

>>>
>>> I think what you and Bruce Kellett are perhaps objecting to is the
>>> dualist idea that there is a unique John Clark soul, with the question of
>>> probability with duplicates implicitly asking which one of the duplicates
>>> this soul will fly into. We know that souls are delusional, and this
>>> applies to a single world situation also. If you survive the night, it
>>> means that an entity identifying as John Clark wakes up in your bed
>>> tomorrow morning, not that your soul has persisted in the one body. If
>>> there are 100 John Clarks tomorrow then John Clark has survived, because
>>> all it takes is one, and there is a 25/100 probability that a randomly
>>> chosen John Clark will see a prime number. This is the non-delusional
>>> interpretation of the question “what is the probability that you will see a
>>> prime number?”. The “you” cannot refer to a magical soul, because such a
>>> thing never existed in the first place.
>>>
>>
>>
>> I am certainly objecting to the perceived dualist assumption in your
>> response to the question (asked before duplication): "What is the
>> probability that you will see a prime number on your door when you wake
>> tomorrow?". As JC points out, by tomorrow there will be 100 individuals in
>> the frame. Who is the "You" to whom you posed the question yesterday? If
>> the question in that form has an answer, then you must assume that just one
>> of the 100 individuals next morning has inherited the soul of JC, and is
>> the person to whom you originally referred. By subtly changing the question
>> so that you refer only to asking the question of some random individual the
>> next morning, you avoid this dualist implication by essentially saying that
>> the initial "You" referred to, is the random individual you selected in the
>> morning. If the two questions are to be related at all, then you must make
>> the dualist assumption.
>>
>
> I have given you the non-dualist interpretation of the question: "what is
> the probability that you will see a prime number tomorrow" is "what is the
> probability that a randomly chosen John Clark will see a prime number".
> Perhaps some people assume that a magical soul will fly into one, and only
> one, of

Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 09:00, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 8:14 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 8 Sep 2020 at 22:10, John Clark  wrote:
>>
>>> On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 6:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> *> The probability of interest is that one particular John Clark will
 see a prime number, not that some John Clark will see a prime number. A
 gambler who buys a lottery ticket is interested in the probability that one
 particular gambler will buy the winning ticket, not the probability that
 some gambler will buy the winning ticket*

>>>
>>> BEFORE the duplication "one particular John Clark" and "some John Clark"
>>> are exactly the same person, that is Bruno's Mr.You, that is the person
>>> Bruno makes his bet with. Thus AFTER the duplication the identity of Mr.You
>>> becomes completely ambiguous, there is now no way to tell who he made the
>>> bet with, or how to determine the outcome and figure out who won and who
>>> lost. And that's why Bruno loves personal pronouns so much and refuses to
>>> stop using them, they can be used to sweep logical contradictions and
>>> absurdities under the rug, and that can be very useful if the towering
>>> logical edifice of your theory is built on a foundation of sand. The only
>>> way Bruno can stop using personal pronouns is by means of Bruno's patented
>>> peepee terminology and start talking about *THE* First Person
>>> Perspective, when of course after the duplication there is no such thing as
>>> *THE* First Person Perspective, there is only *A* First Person
>>> Perspective.
>>>
>>> > *Nothing singles him out, one is picked at random out of the 100,*
>>>
>>>
>>> But this entire thought experiment Is about what "you" can predict
>>> BEFORE the duplication, Back then nobody can single anybody out because
>>> there is only one John Clark. And this thought experiment is about what
>>> "you" can expect to see, so the gambler must be Mr.You, so the
>>> gambler is also duplicated 100 times.
>>>
>>> *> and the question is asked, what is the probability that this
 particular one will see a prime number? *
>>>
>>>
>>> I can predict today with 100% certainty that tomorrow AFTER the
>>> duplication when the John Clark in room #11 walks out turns around and
>>> looks at the number on his door he will see a prime number, but that is
>>> a very VERY long way from the original ambiguous question that was asked
>>> BEFORE the duplication, namely "AFTER the duplication what is the
>>> probability "you" will see a prime number?".  And that has no answer
>>> because it is not a question, it's gibberish.
>>>
>>
>> I think what you and Bruce Kellett are perhaps objecting to is the
>> dualist idea that there is a unique John Clark soul, with the question of
>> probability with duplicates implicitly asking which one of the duplicates
>> this soul will fly into. We know that souls are delusional, and this
>> applies to a single world situation also. If you survive the night, it
>> means that an entity identifying as John Clark wakes up in your bed
>> tomorrow morning, not that your soul has persisted in the one body. If
>> there are 100 John Clarks tomorrow then John Clark has survived, because
>> all it takes is one, and there is a 25/100 probability that a randomly
>> chosen John Clark will see a prime number. This is the non-delusional
>> interpretation of the question “what is the probability that you will see a
>> prime number?”. The “you” cannot refer to a magical soul, because such a
>> thing never existed in the first place.
>>
>
>
> I am certainly objecting to the perceived dualist assumption in your
> response to the question (asked before duplication): "What is the
> probability that you will see a prime number on your door when you wake
> tomorrow?". As JC points out, by tomorrow there will be 100 individuals in
> the frame. Who is the "You" to whom you posed the question yesterday? If
> the question in that form has an answer, then you must assume that just one
> of the 100 individuals next morning has inherited the soul of JC, and is
> the person to whom you originally referred. By subtly changing the question
> so that you refer only to asking the question of some random individual the
> next morning, you avoid this dualist implication by essentially saying that
> the initial "You" referred to, is the random individual you selected in the
> morning. If the two questions are to be related at all, then you must make
> the dualist assumption.
>

I have given you the non-dualist interpretation of the question: "what is
the probability that you will see a prime number tomorrow" is "what is the
probability that a randomly chosen John Clark will see a prime number".
Perhaps some people assume that a magical soul will fly into one, and only
one, of the John Clarks, but they are wrong, just as they are wrong about a
magical soul persisting in a single John Clark waking up in his bed
normally, ensuring that it is

Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 8:14 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Tue, 8 Sep 2020 at 22:10, John Clark  wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 6:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>> wrote:
>>
>> *> The probability of interest is that one particular John Clark will see
>>> a prime number, not that some John Clark will see a prime number. A gambler
>>> who buys a lottery ticket is interested in the probability that one
>>> particular gambler will buy the winning ticket, not the probability that
>>> some gambler will buy the winning ticket*
>>>
>>
>> BEFORE the duplication "one particular John Clark" and "some John Clark"
>> are exactly the same person, that is Bruno's Mr.You, that is the person
>> Bruno makes his bet with. Thus AFTER the duplication the identity of Mr.You
>> becomes completely ambiguous, there is now no way to tell who he made the
>> bet with, or how to determine the outcome and figure out who won and who
>> lost. And that's why Bruno loves personal pronouns so much and refuses to
>> stop using them, they can be used to sweep logical contradictions and
>> absurdities under the rug, and that can be very useful if the towering
>> logical edifice of your theory is built on a foundation of sand. The only
>> way Bruno can stop using personal pronouns is by means of Bruno's patented
>> peepee terminology and start talking about *THE* First Person
>> Perspective, when of course after the duplication there is no such thing as
>> *THE* First Person Perspective, there is only *A* First Person
>> Perspective.
>>
>> > *Nothing singles him out, one is picked at random out of the 100,*
>>
>>
>> But this entire thought experiment Is about what "you" can predict
>> BEFORE the duplication, Back then nobody can single anybody out because
>> there is only one John Clark. And this thought experiment is about what
>> "you" can expect to see, so the gambler must be Mr.You, so the
>> gambler is also duplicated 100 times.
>>
>> *> and the question is asked, what is the probability that this
>>> particular one will see a prime number? *
>>
>>
>> I can predict today with 100% certainty that tomorrow AFTER the
>> duplication when the John Clark in room #11 walks out turns around and
>> looks at the number on his door he will see a prime number, but that is
>> a very VERY long way from the original ambiguous question that was asked
>> BEFORE the duplication, namely "AFTER the duplication what is the
>> probability "you" will see a prime number?".  And that has no answer
>> because it is not a question, it's gibberish.
>>
>
> I think what you and Bruce Kellett are perhaps objecting to is the dualist
> idea that there is a unique John Clark soul, with the question of
> probability with duplicates implicitly asking which one of the duplicates
> this soul will fly into. We know that souls are delusional, and this
> applies to a single world situation also. If you survive the night, it
> means that an entity identifying as John Clark wakes up in your bed
> tomorrow morning, not that your soul has persisted in the one body. If
> there are 100 John Clarks tomorrow then John Clark has survived, because
> all it takes is one, and there is a 25/100 probability that a randomly
> chosen John Clark will see a prime number. This is the non-delusional
> interpretation of the question “what is the probability that you will see a
> prime number?”. The “you” cannot refer to a magical soul, because such a
> thing never existed in the first place.
>


I am certainly objecting to the perceived dualist assumption in your
response to the question (asked before duplication): "What is the
probability that you will see a prime number on your door when you wake
tomorrow?". As JC points out, by tomorrow there will be 100 individuals in
the frame. Who is the "You" to whom you posed the question yesterday? If
the question in that form has an answer, then you must assume that just one
of the 100 individuals next morning has inherited the soul of JC, and is
the person to whom you originally referred. By subtly changing the question
so that you refer only to asking the question of some random individual the
next morning, you avoid this dualist implication by essentially saying that
the initial "You" referred to, is the random individual you selected in the
morning. If the two questions are to be related at all, then you must make
the dualist assumption.

I agree with you that such dualist assumptions are unacceptable, so I
conclude that your initial question has no answer. When you ask JC on the
night before duplication: "What is the probability that you will see a
prime number in the morning?" that question has no answer, because there is
no unique referent of "You" tomorrow morning after duplication.

Bruce

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Tue, 8 Sep 2020 at 22:10, John Clark  wrote:

> On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 6:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
> *> The probability of interest is that one particular John Clark will see
>> a prime number, not that some John Clark will see a prime number. A gambler
>> who buys a lottery ticket is interested in the probability that one
>> particular gambler will buy the winning ticket, not the probability that
>> some gambler will buy the winning ticket*
>>
>
> BEFORE the duplication "one particular John Clark" and "some John Clark"
> are exactly the same person, that is Bruno's Mr.You, that is the person
> Bruno makes his bet with. Thus AFTER the duplication the identity of Mr.You
> becomes completely ambiguous, there is now no way to tell who he made the
> bet with, or how to determine the outcome and figure out who won and who
> lost. And that's why Bruno loves personal pronouns so much and refuses to
> stop using them, they can be used to sweep logical contradictions and
> absurdities under the rug, and that can be very useful if the towering
> logical edifice of your theory is built on a foundation of sand. The only
> way Bruno can stop using personal pronouns is by means of Bruno's patented
> peepee terminology and start talking about *THE* First Person
> Perspective, when of course after the duplication there is no such thing as
> *THE* First Person Perspective, there is only *A* First Person
> Perspective.
>
> > *Nothing singles him out, one is picked at random out of the 100,*
>
>
> But this entire thought experiment Is about what "you" can predict BEFORE
> the duplication, Back then nobody can single anybody out because there is
> only one John Clark. And this thought experiment is about what "you" can
> expect to see, so the gambler must be Mr.You, so the gambler is also
> duplicated 100 times.
>
> *> and the question is asked, what is the probability that this particular
>> one will see a prime number? *
>
>
> I can predict today with 100% certainty that tomorrow AFTER the
> duplication when the John Clark in room #11 walks out turns around and
> looks at the number on his door he will see a prime number, but that is a
> very VERY long way from the original ambiguous question that was asked
> BEFORE the duplication, namely "AFTER the duplication what is the
> probability "you" will see a prime number?".  And that has no answer
> because it is not a question, it's gibberish.
>

I think what you and Bruce Kellett are perhaps objecting to is the dualist
idea that there is a unique John Clark soul, with the question of
probability with duplicates implicitly asking which one of the duplicates
this soul will fly into. We know that souls are delusional, and this
applies to a single world situation also. If you survive the night, it
means that an entity identifying as John Clark wakes up in your bed
tomorrow morning, not that your soul has persisted in the one body. If
there are 100 John Clarks tomorrow then John Clark has survived, because
all it takes is one, and there is a 25/100 probability that a randomly
chosen John Clark will see a prime number. This is the non-delusional
interpretation of the question “what is the probability that you will see a
prime number?”. The “you” cannot refer to a magical soul, because such a
thing never existed in the first place.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-08 Thread John Clark

On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 6:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

*> The probability of interest is that one particular John Clark will see a
> prime number, not that some John Clark will see a prime number. A gambler
> who buys a lottery ticket is interested in the probability that one
> particular gambler will buy the winning ticket, not the probability that
> some gambler will buy the winning ticket*
>

BEFORE the duplication "one particular John Clark" and "some John Clark"
are exactly the same person, that is Bruno's Mr.You, that is the person
Bruno makes his bet with. Thus AFTER the duplication the identity of Mr.You
becomes completely ambiguous, there is now no way to tell who he made the
bet with, or how to determine the outcome and figure out who won and who
lost. And that's why Bruno loves personal pronouns so much and refuses to
stop using them, they can be used to sweep logical contradictions and
absurdities under the rug, and that can be very useful if the towering
logical edifice of your theory is built on a foundation of sand. The only
way Bruno can stop using personal pronouns is by means of Bruno's patented
peepee terminology and start talking about *THE* First Person Perspective,
when of course after the duplication there is no such thing as *THE* First
Person Perspective, there is only *A* First Person Perspective.

> *Nothing singles him out, one is picked at random out of the 100,*

But this entire thought experiment Is about what "you" can predict BEFORE
the duplication, Back then nobody can single anybody out because there is
only one John Clark. And this thought experiment is about what "you" can
expect to see, so the gambler must be Mr.You, so the gambler is also
duplicated 100 times.

*> and the question is asked, what is the probability that this particular
> one will see a prime number? *

I can predict today with 100% certainty that tomorrow AFTER the
duplication when
the John Clark in room #11 walks out turns around and looks at the number
on his door he will see a prime number, but that is a very VERY long way
from the original ambiguous question that was asked BEFORE the duplication,
namely "AFTER the duplication what is the probability "you" will see a
prime number?".  And that has no answer because it is not a question, it's
gibberish.

 John K Clark

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Tue, 8 Sep 2020 at 4:13 pm, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 3:44 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 8 Sep 2020 at 09:06, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 8:49 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Mon, 7 Sep 2020 at 04:41, John Clark  wrote:

> On Sun, Sep 6, 2020 at 9:34 AM Bruno Marchal 
> wrote:
>
> >> I don't know what the hell to make of a "objective probability of
>>> a possible subjectivity”.
>>
>>
>> *> I give you an example. A person is multiplied by 100 and put in
>> 100 different, but identical from inside rooms. Just the number of the 
>> room
>> differs, like in some hostel. You seem to agree that, as long as they 
>> stay
>> in the room, there is only one person. But the copies are asked to open 
>> the
>> room, and the person was asked, before the experience what is the
>> probability that when going out of the room, its number is prime.*
>>
>
> In that thought experiment there is no objective probability because
> John Clark is always in a prime numbered room or John Clark is not.
> So there is only subjective probability. There is a 100% chance John Clark
> will walk out, look at the number on the door and see a prime number, and 
> a
> 100% chance he will not see a prime number. And the question "What is
> the probability I will see a prime number?" has no answer because in
> this hypothetical the personal pronoun "I" is ambiguous.
>
> However if you were to ask one of the individual John Clarks in one of
> those rooms AFTER the duplication "What is the probability you will see a
> prime number on the door when you walk out?" then that would be a
> legitimate unambiguous question, and the answer would be 25% because there
> are 25 prime numbers less than 100. But that probability would just be a
> subjective probability because he is either in a prime numbered room or he
> is not, So that probability figure must just be a measure of that John
> Clark's ignorance.
>

 The probability of interest is that one particular John Clark will see
 a prime number,

>>>
>>>
>>> How do you avoid the clear dualist implications of this? What is it that
>>> singles out the particular John Clark in whom you are interested?
>>>
>>
>> Nothing singles him out, one is picked at random out of the 100, and the
>> question is asked, what is the probability that this particular one will
>> see a prime number? This is a different question to what is the probability
>> that some John Clark will see a prime number. You are saying that the first
>> question is - what? - boring, invalid, incomprehensible?
>>
>
>
> The question of dualism arises more acutely from the 1p perspective: "if I
> am duplicated in the 100 rooms, what is the probability that I will see a
> prime number?" Take a random selection from the 100: will that one be me?
> If, for any possible selection, the answer is "yes, that will be me" (all
> the copies are "me"), then the probability that "I" will see a prime is
> one, since 25 of the "mes" will see primes. If only one selection will give
> me, then you have dualism, and a 25% chance that I will see a prime. In
> your account above, the selection is equivalent to just asking "if I select
> a room at random, what is the probability that the door will have a prime
> number?" The fact that there is a copy of JC in the room becomes irrelevant
> to the probability, which is simply determined by the ratio of the number
> of primes to the number of doors.
>

Dualism is the idea that there is a spirit separate from the body. If I am
duplicated, there will be many versions of me. If I ask, “am I a version
that sees a prime number?” that does not entail that I am a spirit separate
from the body. If I ask “what is the probability that after duplication I
will be a version that sees a prime number?” that also does not entail that
I am a spirit separate from the body. As you say, the fact that there is a
person who identifies as being me in the room does not make any difference
to the calculation, and that is the probability I am interested in. I may
be interested in this number, for example, if I am going to bet on whether
I will see a prime number after duplication. If I have the opportunity to
bet $20 for a $100 reward if I see a prime number I will accept the bet,
whereas if I have to bet $30 for a $100 reward I will not.

> --
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 3:44 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Tue, 8 Sep 2020 at 09:06, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 8:49 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Mon, 7 Sep 2020 at 04:41, John Clark  wrote:
>>>
 On Sun, Sep 6, 2020 at 9:34 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

 >> I don't know what the hell to make of a "objective probability of a
>> possible subjectivity”.
>
>
> *> I give you an example. A person is multiplied by 100 and put in 100
> different, but identical from inside rooms. Just the number of the room
> differs, like in some hostel. You seem to agree that, as long as they stay
> in the room, there is only one person. But the copies are asked to open 
> the
> room, and the person was asked, before the experience what is the
> probability that when going out of the room, its number is prime.*
>

 In that thought experiment there is no objective probability because
 John Clark is always in a prime numbered room or John Clark is not. So
 there is only subjective probability. There is a 100% chance John Clark
 will walk out, look at the number on the door and see a prime number, and a
 100% chance he will not see a prime number. And the question "What is
 the probability I will see a prime number?" has no answer because in
 this hypothetical the personal pronoun "I" is ambiguous.

 However if you were to ask one of the individual John Clarks in one of
 those rooms AFTER the duplication "What is the probability you will see a
 prime number on the door when you walk out?" then that would be a
 legitimate unambiguous question, and the answer would be 25% because there
 are 25 prime numbers less than 100. But that probability would just be a
 subjective probability because he is either in a prime numbered room or he
 is not, So that probability figure must just be a measure of that John
 Clark's ignorance.

>>>
>>> The probability of interest is that one particular John Clark will see a
>>> prime number,
>>>
>>
>>
>> How do you avoid the clear dualist implications of this? What is it that
>> singles out the particular John Clark in whom you are interested?
>>
>
> Nothing singles him out, one is picked at random out of the 100, and the
> question is asked, what is the probability that this particular one will
> see a prime number? This is a different question to what is the probability
> that some John Clark will see a prime number. You are saying that the first
> question is - what? - boring, invalid, incomprehensible?
>

The question of dualism arises more acutely from the 1p perspective: "if I
am duplicated in the 100 rooms, what is the probability that I will see a
prime number?" Take a random selection from the 100: will that one be me?
If, for any possible selection, the answer is "yes, that will be me" (all
the copies are "me"), then the probability that "I" will see a prime is
one, since 25 of the "mes" will see primes. If only one selection will give
me, then you have dualism, and a 25% chance that I will see a prime. In
your account above, the selection is equivalent to just asking "if I select
a room at random, what is the probability that the door will have a prime
number?" The fact that there is a copy of JC in the room becomes irrelevant
to the probability, which is simply determined by the ratio of the number
of primes to the number of doors.

Bruce

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-07 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Tue, 8 Sep 2020 at 09:06, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 8:49 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>> On Mon, 7 Sep 2020 at 04:41, John Clark  wrote:
>>
>>> On Sun, Sep 6, 2020 at 9:34 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>>
>>> >> I don't know what the hell to make of a "objective probability of a
> possible subjectivity”.


 *> I give you an example. A person is multiplied by 100 and put in 100
 different, but identical from inside rooms. Just the number of the room
 differs, like in some hostel. You seem to agree that, as long as they stay
 in the room, there is only one person. But the copies are asked to open the
 room, and the person was asked, before the experience what is the
 probability that when going out of the room, its number is prime.*

>>>
>>> In that thought experiment there is no objective probability because
>>> John Clark is always in a prime numbered room or John Clark is not. So
>>> there is only subjective probability. There is a 100% chance John Clark
>>> will walk out, look at the number on the door and see a prime number, and a
>>> 100% chance he will not see a prime number. And the question "What is
>>> the probability I will see a prime number?" has no answer because in
>>> this hypothetical the personal pronoun "I" is ambiguous.
>>>
>>> However if you were to ask one of the individual John Clarks in one of
>>> those rooms AFTER the duplication "What is the probability you will see a
>>> prime number on the door when you walk out?" then that would be a
>>> legitimate unambiguous question, and the answer would be 25% because there
>>> are 25 prime numbers less than 100. But that probability would just be a
>>> subjective probability because he is either in a prime numbered room or he
>>> is not, So that probability figure must just be a measure of that John
>>> Clark's ignorance.
>>>
>>
>> The probability of interest is that one particular John Clark will see a
>> prime number,
>>
>
>
> How do you avoid the clear dualist implications of this? What is it that
> singles out the particular John Clark in whom you are interested?
>

Nothing singles him out, one is picked at random out of the 100, and the
question is asked, what is the probability that this particular one will
see a prime number? This is a different question to what is the probability
that some John Clark will see a prime number. You are saying that the first
question is - what? - boring, invalid, incomprehensible?

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-07 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 8:49 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Mon, 7 Sep 2020 at 04:41, John Clark  wrote:
>
>> On Sun, Sep 6, 2020 at 9:34 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>
>> >> I don't know what the hell to make of a "objective probability of a
 possible subjectivity”.
>>>
>>>
>>> *> I give you an example. A person is multiplied by 100 and put in 100
>>> different, but identical from inside rooms. Just the number of the room
>>> differs, like in some hostel. You seem to agree that, as long as they stay
>>> in the room, there is only one person. But the copies are asked to open the
>>> room, and the person was asked, before the experience what is the
>>> probability that when going out of the room, its number is prime.*
>>>
>>
>> In that thought experiment there is no objective probability because
>> John Clark is always in a prime numbered room or John Clark is not. So
>> there is only subjective probability. There is a 100% chance John Clark
>> will walk out, look at the number on the door and see a prime number, and a
>> 100% chance he will not see a prime number. And the question "What is
>> the probability I will see a prime number?" has no answer because in
>> this hypothetical the personal pronoun "I" is ambiguous.
>>
>> However if you were to ask one of the individual John Clarks in one of
>> those rooms AFTER the duplication "What is the probability you will see a
>> prime number on the door when you walk out?" then that would be a
>> legitimate unambiguous question, and the answer would be 25% because there
>> are 25 prime numbers less than 100. But that probability would just be a
>> subjective probability because he is either in a prime numbered room or he
>> is not, So that probability figure must just be a measure of that John
>> Clark's ignorance.
>>
>
> The probability of interest is that one particular John Clark will see a
> prime number,
>


How do you avoid the clear dualist implications of this? What is it that
singles out the particular John Clark in whom you are interested?

Bruce

not that some John Clark will see a prime number. A gambler who buys a
> lottery ticket is interested in the probability that one particular gambler
> will buy the winning ticket, not the probability that some gambler will buy
> the winning ticket, which he knows is 1 if all the tickets are sold.
>

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-07 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Mon, 7 Sep 2020 at 04:41, John Clark  wrote:

> On Sun, Sep 6, 2020 at 9:34 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> >> I don't know what the hell to make of a "objective probability of a
>>> possible subjectivity”.
>>
>>
>> *> I give you an example. A person is multiplied by 100 and put in 100
>> different, but identical from inside rooms. Just the number of the room
>> differs, like in some hostel. You seem to agree that, as long as they stay
>> in the room, there is only one person. But the copies are asked to open the
>> room, and the person was asked, before the experience what is the
>> probability that when going out of the room, its number is prime.*
>>
>
> In that thought experiment there is no objective probability because John
> Clark is always in a prime numbered room or John Clark is not. So there
> is only subjective probability. There is a 100% chance John Clark will walk
> out, look at the number on the door and see a prime number, and a 100%
> chance he will not see a prime number. And the question "What is the
> probability I will see a prime number?" has no answer because in this
> hypothetical the personal pronoun "I" is ambiguous.
>
> However if you were to ask one of the individual John Clarks in one of
> those rooms AFTER the duplication "What is the probability you will see a
> prime number on the door when you walk out?" then that would be a
> legitimate unambiguous question, and the answer would be 25% because there
> are 25 prime numbers less than 100. But that probability would just be a
> subjective probability because he is either in a prime numbered room or he
> is not, So that probability figure must just be a measure of that John
> Clark's ignorance.
>

The probability of interest is that one particular John Clark will see a
prime number, not that some John Clark will see a prime number. A gambler
who buys a lottery ticket is interested in the probability that one
particular gambler will buy the winning ticket, not the probability that
some gambler will buy the winning ticket, which he knows is 1 if all the
tickets are sold.

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-07 Thread John Clark

On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 9:29 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> In that thought experiment there is no objective probability because
>> John Clark is always in a prime numbered room or John Clark is not. So
>> there is only subjective probability. There is a 100% chance John Clark
>> will walk out, look at the number on the door and see a prime number, and a
>> 100% chance he will not see a prime number.
>
>
> *> You make the same error than Bruce (curiously enough). Because all the
> alternative are realised, you take as 1 the probability that you feel them.*
>

And you make the exact same error over and over and over and over again!
If I made a mistake in the above it certainly wasn't that one because I
said absolutely nothing about what Mr.You would or would not do or say or
think, and could not even if I wanted to because due to the circumstances
of the thought experiment the personal pronoun "you" has no referent, so
any "question" using that word has no answer because it is not a question, i
t's just some words and a question mark.

>> However if you were to ask one of the individual John Clarks in one of
>> those rooms AFTER the duplication "What is the probability you will see a
>> prime number on the door when you walk out?" then that would be a
>> legitimate unambiguous question, and the answer would be 25% because there
>> are 25 prime numbers less than 100.
>
>
> *> In this case, there were no explicit duplication,*
>

Exactly, and therefore the personal pronoun "you" would not be ambiguous.so
a question that started as "*what would you*" would not automatically be an
ambiguous question.

*> Let me ask you this: do you agree that if I can predict with certainty
> that I will be* [...]
>

I don't need to read another word. No I do not agree, and I don't disagree
either because gibberish is not the sort of thing one can agree or disagree
with, it's just gibberish.

John K Clark

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM


> On 7 Sep 2020, at 13:06, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Sun, Sep 6, 2020 at 6:50 PM Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> 
> >> Bruce takes the Born probability as the probability that some sequence 
> >> exists (i.e. 1) instead of the probability it is the observed sequence, ( 
> >> |a|^2 ).
> 
> > That is the source of the disagreement. There are two possible questions: 
> > 1) In the N repeats of the binary outcome experiment, what is the 
> > probability that the sequence containing all ones will occur?
> 
> If all possible outcomes of N coin flips exist, as in the case in the set up 
> to your question, then obviously the probability that one of those coin flips 
> is all ones is 100%. It's the same answer as the answer to the question "If X 
> exists then what is the probability that X exists?”.





Except that when you look at the outcome, you are yourself multiplied, and so, 
in the 3p description, you experience all sequences. Yet, you will never 
experience all sequences, but only one of them, from your personal subjective 
pov, so, once you understand that the question is about those pov, the 
objective probability, on the subjective experience, is logically unavoidable.
> 
> > and 2) what is the probability in this scenario that I will experience the 
> > sequence of all ones?
> 
> And that question has the same answer as "How long is a piece of string?".  
> It takes more than just the ASCII symbol "?" to make a question.

Only because you mix the 1p description (about which we are asking), and the 3p 
global description, in which indeed there is no probabilities at all.

Bruno



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> 
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Re: Probability in Everettian QM


> On 7 Sep 2020, at 00:49, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 3:34 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
> wrote:
> 
> It's because Bruce takes the Born probability as the probability that some 
> sequence exists (i.e. 1) instead of the probability it is the observed 
> sequence, ( |a|^2 ).
> 
> 
> That is the source of the disagreement. There are two possible questions: 1) 
> In the N repeats of the binary outcome experiment, what is the probability 
> that the sequence containing all ones will occur?; and 2) what is the 
> probability in this scenario that I will experience the sequence of all ones?
> 
> If we are using the theory to calculate probabilities, the first question is 
> the relevant one,

?


> and the theory gives two different answers , so the theory is inconsistent.

No, the theory is inconsistent here, only if you negate the distinction between 
3p and 1p. 



> If our concern is only about ourselves, and not about what the theory says, 
> then the second question is the appropriate one. Then there is no 
> inconsistency, because we know that we will only see one sequence —

Good!



> which one we do see can only be determined post hoc, and that is not a 
> probabilistic matter. The 1p/3p confusion here is all yours, not mine. What 
> gives you the right to maintain that the Born rule is only about what you 
> will experience? And not about objective probabilities?

Define “objective probabilities”. It is clearly in a stronger sense than the 
one I have given and used  in this thread, and I am not sure what you are 
talking about. I am not sure your “objective probability” makes sense. I would 
say that the Boin rules, and their constant verification, is what makes those 
probabilities objective, because, like with Mechanism, no machine can know 
which fine-grained histories she is living, among an infinity (realised in 
arithmetic, notably).

Bruno



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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

> On 6 Sep 2020, at 20:40, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Sun, Sep 6, 2020 at 9:34 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> >> I don't know what the hell to make of a "objective probability of a 
> >> possible subjectivity”.
> 
> > I give you an example. A person is multiplied by 100 and put in 100 
> > different, but identical from inside rooms. Just the number of the room 
> > differs, like in some hostel. You seem to agree that, as long as they stay 
> > in the room, there is only one person. But the copies are asked to open the 
> > room, and the person was asked, before the experience what is the 
> > probability that when going out of the room, its number is prime.
> 
> In that thought experiment there is no objective probability because John 
> Clark is always in a prime numbered room or John Clark is not. So there is 
> only subjective probability. There is a 100% chance John Clark will walk out, 
> look at the number on the door and see a prime number, and a 100% chance he 
> will not see a prime number.

You make the same error than Bruce (curiously enough). Because all the 
alternative are realised, you take as 1 the probability that you feel them. But 
if we do the experience, those who see that the number is prime, or that it is 
not prime, can understand that the prediction asked, (which is a prediction on 
possible subjective experiences, and not on body localisation) cannot be 100% 
for prime. Indeed the John Clark of room 1, 4, 6, 8, 9, … admits that their 
prediction (on their subjective experiences) are wrong, and that is what makes 
those probabilities on subjective experiences objective. That are personally 
refutable, and unless you negate the conscious experience, they make sense.

> And the question "What is the probability I will see a prime number?" has no 
> answer because in this hypothetical the personal pronoun "I" is ambiguous. 

It is not ambiguous, or it is ambiguous in Everett too. The point is that it is 
the same “ambiguity”, i.e. indeterminacy of personal outcomes.

> 
> However if you were to ask one of the individual John Clarks in one of those 
> rooms AFTER the duplication "What is the probability you will see a prime 
> number on the door when you walk out?" then that would be a legitimate 
> unambiguous question, and the answer would be 25% because there are 25 prime 
> numbers less than 100.

In this case, there were no explicit duplication, as in the start they are all 
identical brain in the rooms, and you have agree that there is only one, non 
ambiguous person/consciousness.

Let me ask you this: do you agree that if I can predict with certainty that I 
will be indeterminate about what I will see after opening the door of the 
reconstitution box, then, I am unambiguously already indeterminate on that 
outcome? If yes, you can no mire say that there is a unique person, when two 
brains run identically. If not, you get the point.

> But that probability would just be a subjective probability because he is 
> either in a prime numbered room or he is not, So that probability figure must 
> just be a measure of that John Clark's ignorance.

Which is the same as the one before the multiplication, as we have accepted 
that all copies are continuation of the candidate (we use the non transitive 
notion of personal identity on which we have always agreed on).

In your sense of “subjective probability” here, Mechanism makes all probability 
subjective, even the frequentist notion, despite it is also an observable 
(after Graham-Hartle-Omnes-Griffith type of treatment).  I have no problem with 
that. By objective, we can mean here 3p, or 1p-plural. That does not change the 
probability calculus.

Bruno

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM


> On 6 Sep 2020, at 19:58, Lawrence Crowell  
> wrote:
> 
> This is a reasonable account of teleporation.

I agree too, … except for minor technical details (already discussed with 
Bruce, and I guess Bruce will not be convinced by Vaidman, nor by my slight 
corrections, which is mainly that a quantum state always refer to infinity of 
worlds/histories/relative-states).

Bruno


> 
> LC
> 
> On Sunday, September 6, 2020 at 12:03:30 PM UTC-5 sce...@libero.it wrote:
> BTW I've found that quote by Vaidman.
> 
> 'In the framework of the MWI, the teleportation procedure does not move the 
> quantum state: the state was, in some sense, in the remote location from the 
> beginning. The correlated pair, which is the necessary item for 
> teleportation, incorporates all possible quantum states of the remote 
> particle, and, in particular, the state which has to be teleported. The local 
> measurement of the teleportation procedure splits the world in such a manner 
> that in each of the worlds the state of the remote particle differs form the 
> state by some known transformation. The number of such worlds is relatively 
> small. This explains why the information which has to be transmitted for 
> teleportation of a quantum state—the information which world we need to split 
> into, i.e., what transformation has to be applied—is much smaller than the 
> information which is needed for the creation of such a state. For example, 
> for the case of a spin-1/2 particle there are only 4 different worlds, so in 
> order to teleport the state we have to transmit just 2 bits.' – Lev Vaidman 
> in https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9810089 
> 
> 
> 
>> Il 06/09/2020 12:47 Bruce Kellett > > ha scritto:
>> 
>> 
>> On Sun, Sep 6, 2020 at 6:55 PM 'scerir' via Everything List < 
>> everyth...@googlegroups.com 
>> > wrote: 
>> Bruce: "The idea of a large ensemble of pre-existing worlds that just get 
>> distinguished by results has never been taken seriously by anyone outside of 
>> this list. It has never been worked through in detail, and it is doubtful if 
>> it even makes sense. It certainly has nothing to do with the Schrodinger 
>> equation."
>> 
>> Vaidman, speaking of quantum teleportation, 
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_teleportation 
>>  , pointed out that 
>> when Bob receives the message from Alice, he will know which of the four 
>> states his particle is in, and using this information he performs a unitary 
>> operation on his particle to transform it to the desired state. But (as 
>> Vaidman pointed out) before Bob receives the message from Alice there are 
>> four pre-existing equiprobable states, one of them (Bob doesn't know which 
>> one) is already the right one. 
>> 
>> 
>> Serafino,
>>  I am sorry to have to say this, but Lev Vaidman is something of an idiot 
>> about these things. Don't take anything he says seriously, even though he 
>> has been around for many years. This quote is irrelevant to my point. MWI is 
>> incompatible with the Born rule. The Born rule makes sense only in single 
>> world settings.
>> 
>> Bruce
>> 
>> 
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>> .
>>  
> 
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Re: Probability in Everettian QM