Re: the theory of everything
On 12 Jan 2010, at 20:55, Mark Buda wrote: On Jan 12, 3:32 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: Here's another: Consciousness is computation. Consciousness is a first person notion. Computation is a third person notion. How could those be identified? How could they be different? Computation is a third person notion. It can be defined formally in mathematics. Consciousness is a first person notion. Even with comp, especially with comp and some definition, consciousness cannot be defined formally. You are doing the same category mistake than those who says "brain = mind". Those are different type of notion. You need the physical supervenience thesis to *associate* mind to brain. And with comp, to associate consciousness to computational state(s)/computation, you need a computational supervenience thesis, which is not something easy to define. But we know today it cannot be a 1-1 relation. I think that there is still a confusion between 1-OM and 3-OM. 1-OM are not just the result of a statistics on the 3-OMs. The failure of the identity thesis prevents any simple relation between 1-OM and 3-OM. Consciousness is an attribute of a person. With comp it needs many 3- OM + some structures. We can try to derive such structure from computer science, + some theory of knowledge (like Theaetetus' one). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: the theory of everything?
Hi Mark, Interleaving - Original Message - From: "Mark Buda" To: "Everything List" Sent: Tuesday, January 12, 2010 10:25 PM Subject: Re: the theory of everything? On Jan 12, 5:51 pm, "Stephen Paul King" wrote: 1) What is the cardinality of this infinite collection/set/class/whatever of machines? I believe that would have to be the cardinality of the continuum, but I'm not entirely sure. Why does the cardinality matter? *** [SPK] It would seem to because there is a difference in the properties of the various infinities. I think that any infinity other than that of the integers, aleph_0, is such that any set that is not a proper subset has a measure of zero.In other words, "A set of points capable of being enclosed in intervals whose total length is arbitrarily small. " http://mathworld.wolfram.com/MeasureZero.html Your chance of picking it out of a pile is zero. This is the case because in considering comptutations we are effectively treating numbers the same way that topologists and geometers treat points, thus the same rules and theorems apply. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Null_set and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lebesgue_measure http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/There_is_no_infinite-dimensional_Lebesgue_measure http://planetmath.org/encyclopedia/AlephNumbers.html But there is, I think, a problem with the infinity of the integers. How do we distinguish one subset of numbers, a string, from another unless there is a set of functions whose role is to map all of the numbers that generate the "same computation" to each other. The problem I see is where is the set of mapping functions encoded? Is it just another string of numbers itself and if so what keeps it from just being another computation itself. Maybe that's a good thing. *** 2) What measure is it that might be used to partition the set or class of machines such that at least one subset of them can be identified as corresponding to consciousness? I don't know. They may all correspond to some kind of conscious experience. (What is it like to be a rock?) The ones that correspond to human consciousness are the ones that do not terminate or repeat. [SPK] We need some kind of measure to constider the abstract properies of these notions that we are playing with. ;) When we say that "the abstract immaterial computations are all that there is" we have to take the notion along with all of the logical implications and attachements. We firt see that there are more than one computation that could implement a rock. The same for any qualia. We use the notion of an equivalence class to gather together all of the computational strings that "implement the same computation". When we are trying to identify the content of consciouness to a computation, does it not make sense that there has to be some difference between the sub-computation (equivalence class) that *is* a tree and the sub-computation (equivalence class) that *is* a car? There would have to exists equivalence classes for any qualia up to and including the "experience of what it is like to be a bat" and "what it is like to be Buda", etc. Ok, so that implies that there is something that is different about each equivalence class of computations, thus there has to exist something that can be considered as a measure of the difference. If I recall correctly, information is a "difference that makes a differense" and computations, loosely, are transformation of sets/collections/etc. of information. So, we must have a measure to have a "difference". *** 3) How can we differentiate between Machines and not-Machines unless there exists some measure to do so? You've lost me here. What not-Machines are you talking about? *** [SPK] Would there not be strings that are purely noise or the computational equivalent: random number generators? These would only be "machines" in that sense but they do not have any notion of information associated with them, thus I consider them non-machines. Make sense? *** 4) How does mere existence of a Machine give any accounting for its implementation? I don't understand the question. *** [SPK] Existence is passive, it does nothing to inform in itself. We can use the presence or non-presence of a particular number in a particular position in a string to identify a state of the Platonic Turing machine tape or head, but the mere existence of a string or individual number that can represent that PTM does not inform the "happening" of the state. Its merely a passive identification. In a lightless room, does the color of the walls make any difference? This is the difficulty that I have with Platonic Computational Idealism, try as hard as I might, I can not see how we can speak meaningfully of any notion t
Re: the theory of everything?
On Jan 12, 5:51 pm, "Stephen Paul King" wrote: > 1) What is the cardinality of this infinite collection/set/class/whatever of > machines? I believe that would have to be the cardinality of the continuum, but I'm not entirely sure. Why does the cardinality matter? > 2) What measure is it that might be used to partition the set or class of > machines such that at least one subset of them can be identified as > corresponding to consciousness? I don't know. They may all correspond to some kind of conscious experience. (What is it like to be a rock?) The ones that correspond to human consciousness are the ones that do not terminate or repeat. > 3) How can we differentiate between Machines and not-Machines unless there > exists some measure to do so? You've lost me here. What not-Machines are you talking about? > 4) How does mere existence of a Machine give any accounting for its > implementation? I don't understand the question. > 5) Are you secretly attempting to construct a reductio ad absurdum proof? Nope. I'm not secretly attempting to do anything. I am just trying to understand the universe. > - Original Message - > From: "Mark Buda" > To: "Everything List" > Sent: Tuesday, January 12, 2010 2:55 PM > Subject: Re: the theory of everything > > snip > > But the abstract immaterial computations are all that there is. There > is no machine, no physical universe, no nothing, without the > computations - the consciousnesses. And all of them "happen", and all > of them are equally real. Each of them is like the execution of a > universal Turing machine given a particular input tape. The initial > portion of the tape encodes some algorithm executed by the machine; > the rest of the tape serves as input to the machine (observations, in > the quantum mechanical sense). > > Some (infinite) subset of these machines correspond to consciousnesses > that believe they are you. I am asserting that they, in fact, *are* > you. The first-person you, including your mind, body, and the entire > observable universe (as seen by you). That's why you can say "yes, > Doctor" and still continue - your consciousness was never really in > your body in the first place. Learning that as an infant was one of > the first mistakes you made, and one of the hardest to unlearn, but it > was necessary for you to be able to learn all the other stuff, the > important stuff, most of which you have yet to learn. > > snip -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: the theory of everything?
Dear Mark, I have questions to pose to you. 1) What is the cardinality of this infinite collection/set/class/whatever of machines? 2) What measure is it that might be used to partition the set or class of machines such that at least one subset of them can be identified as corresponding to consciousness? 3) How can we differentiate between Machines and not-Machines unless there exists some measure to do so? 4) How does mere existence of a Machine give any accounting for its implementation? 5) Are you secretly attempting to construct a reductio ad absurdum proof? Kindest regards, Stephen - Original Message - From: "Mark Buda" To: "Everything List" Sent: Tuesday, January 12, 2010 2:55 PM Subject: Re: the theory of everything snip But the abstract immaterial computations are all that there is. There is no machine, no physical universe, no nothing, without the computations - the consciousnesses. And all of them "happen", and all of them are equally real. Each of them is like the execution of a universal Turing machine given a particular input tape. The initial portion of the tape encodes some algorithm executed by the machine; the rest of the tape serves as input to the machine (observations, in the quantum mechanical sense). Some (infinite) subset of these machines correspond to consciousnesses that believe they are you. I am asserting that they, in fact, *are* you. The first-person you, including your mind, body, and the entire observable universe (as seen by you). That's why you can say "yes, Doctor" and still continue - your consciousness was never really in your body in the first place. Learning that as an infant was one of the first mistakes you made, and one of the hardest to unlearn, but it was necessary for you to be able to learn all the other stuff, the important stuff, most of which you have yet to learn. snip -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: the theory of everything
On Jan 12, 3:32 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Here's another: Consciousness is computation. > > Consciousness is a first person notion. > Computation is a third person notion. > > How could those be identified? How could they be different? > On the contrary, once you associate consciousness to the working of a > digital machine, or digitalizable machine, eventually your "stable" > consciousness links itself to an infinite set of abstract (immaterial) > computations. > But even here, it is not possible to make an identification. > The best you can do is to identify consciousness with a machine belief > state in a reality, or with the incommunicable undoubtable global > quasi instantaneous sum-up-like feeling, etc. But the abstract immaterial computations are all that there is. There is no machine, no physical universe, no nothing, without the computations - the consciousnesses. And all of them "happen", and all of them are equally real. Each of them is like the execution of a universal Turing machine given a particular input tape. The initial portion of the tape encodes some algorithm executed by the machine; the rest of the tape serves as input to the machine (observations, in the quantum mechanical sense). Some (infinite) subset of these machines correspond to consciousnesses that believe they are you. I am asserting that they, in fact, *are* you. The first-person you, including your mind, body, and the entire observable universe (as seen by you). That's why you can say "yes, Doctor" and still continue - your consciousness was never really in your body in the first place. Learning that as an infant was one of the first mistakes you made, and one of the hardest to unlearn, but it was necessary for you to be able to learn all the other stuff, the important stuff, most of which you have yet to learn. > > While composing this email, I apparently achieved enlightenment. (I'm > > serious. It's complicated.) > > Lucky you :) Not really. I am pretty sure it's inevitable, at least for human consciousnesses. > You may elaborate, or not. A full explanation would probably not be appropriate for the list, and would take more time to write than I care to invest at the moment, and still wouldn't necessarily make enough sense to anybody to be worth writing. As I said, it's complicated. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: the theory of everything
Welcome Mark, On 10 Jan 2010, at 18:33, Mark Buda wrote: Greetings. I believe humanity now has all the pieces of the theory of everything. The only remaining problem is putting them together to make a beautiful picture. I believe one of the pieces is: Everything exists. (That's what this list is about, right?) Here's another: Consciousness is computation. Consciousness is a first person notion. Computation is a third person notion. How could those be identified? On the contrary, once you associate consciousness to the working of a digital machine, or digitalizable machine, eventually your "stable" consciousness links itself to an infinite set of abstract (immaterial) computations. But even here, it is not possible to make an identification. The best you can do is to identify consciousness with a machine belief state in a reality, or with the incommunicable undoubtable global quasi instantaneous sum-up-like feeling, etc. The algorithm doesn't matter. We are all running the same universal algorithm. The difference is in our inputs, our starting state, the bits on our Turing machine's infinite tape. Some computations may terminate. Some computations may repeat. The kind of computations that human consciousness is is the kind that does not terminate or repeat. OK. While composing this email, I apparently achieved enlightenment. (I'm serious. It's complicated.) Lucky you :) You may elaborate, or not. Bruno Marchal http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: the theory of everything
On Jan 10, 6:14 pm, John Mikes wrote: > On Sun, Jan 10, 2010 at 12:33 PM, Mark Buda wrote: > > I believe humanity now has all the pieces of the theory of everything. > > The only remaining problem is putting them together to make a > > beautiful picture. > > > I believe one of the pieces is: Everything exists. (That's what this > > list is about, right?) > > JM: I like the naive position myself that the world (indeed: everyhing) DOES > exist. I mean, literally, that every possible universe does in fact exist. If anything exists, that is. > > Here's another: Consciousness is computation. > > JM: if I agree with this one, I consider *computation* in a special sense. What I mean is that consciousness and computation are the same thing. Your subjective experience of the world is the computation that is the universe; the machine you call a computer doesn't actually do any computing. You do. You are each a universe-sized quantum computer that believes (correctly) that it's a human being. Together, we make up the multiverse. I realize I may not be making much sense, but it's taken 42 years for me to get all of this into my head and it's not coming out easily. Please be patient :-) > > While composing this email, I apparently achieved enlightenment. (I'm > > serious. It's complicated.) > > In my wording: it is 'complicated' when we try to touch* complexity*. What I meant was what Buddhists call "bodhi". I think. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: the theory of everything
On Mon, Jan 11, 2010 at 4:33 AM, Mark Buda wrote: > Greetings. > > I believe humanity now has all the pieces of the theory of everything. > The only remaining problem is putting them together to make a > beautiful picture. > > I believe one of the pieces is: Everything exists. (That's what this > list is about, right?) > > Here's another: Consciousness is computation. > > The algorithm doesn't matter. We are all running the same universal > algorithm. The difference is in our inputs, our starting state, the > bits on our Turing machine's infinite tape. > > Some computations may terminate. Some computations may repeat. The > kind of computations that human consciousness is is the kind that does > not terminate or repeat. > > While composing this email, I apparently achieved enlightenment. (I'm > serious. It's complicated.) So I suppose we all achieved enlightenment then. Excellent. -- silky http://www.mirios.com.au/ http://island.mirios.com.au/t/rigby+random+20 beggary, pertinacity CAD kaddish. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: the theory of everything
Dear Mark, I am always attracted to mystery-people. First 'Buda' (also: Bleda) means to me the brother of Attila the Hun, whom he killed and who's name is included in "Budapest", the older city-part on the right (hilly) side of the Danube (Pest was the transportational center at the transitional border starting with (before?) the Roman Empire). Then later I detected that many people use "Buda" as their name sometimes spelled Buddha. Then I read your (unsigned) 'hermit' post. Let me insert some remarks as I read it. I just reflect my own thinking with no judgemental input to what you (or others) wrote. John Mike On Sun, Jan 10, 2010 at 12:33 PM, Mark Buda wrote: > Greetings. > > I believe humanity now has all the pieces of the theory of everything. > The only remaining problem is putting them together to make a > beautiful picture. > > I believe one of the pieces is: Everything exists. (That's what this > list is about, right?) > JM: I like the naive position myself that the world (indeed: everyhing) DOES exist. > > Here's another: Consciousness is computation. > JM: if I agree with this one, I consider *computation* in a special sense. I would like to have the meaning of 'working mind' in some sense, more versatile than just arithmetically, which may be included. Whatever we (and more than just humans) *mentally *do. That may be involved in that 'universal algorithm' you mention next. Combining features with SOME logic (of which we naturally can only use our humanly restricted ways). Same for the "Turing" reference, as a pars pro toto. Our embryonic computerism is at the binary numerical level, I consider it the proto-first step - more and better ones to follow until we reach something representing INDEED the 'universal machine' (from which we are far away IMO.) > > The algorithm doesn't matter. We are all running the same universal > algorithm. The difference is in our inputs, our starting state, the > bits on our Turing machine's infinite tape. > > Some computations may terminate. Some computations may repeat. The > kind of computations that human consciousness is is the kind that does > not terminate or repeat. > > While composing this email, I apparently achieved enlightenment. (I'm > serious. It's complicated.) > In my wording: it is 'complicated' when we try to touch* complexity*. At our present mental stage we cannot reach it. Our 'perceived reality' is fractional and personally slanted, so we cannot (even hope) getting to the all-encompassing complexity (i.e. total relational interrelatedness of indeed everything). IOW: the World, the existence. Thanks for the enlightenment I received while reading your post. John Mikes > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
