Re: The past hypothesis

Rex, you may have made a typo, but in my thinking it does not make a difference: when I translate the 'physicalist' surety into hypothetical (agnostic, assumed) possibilities it leads to the same uncertainty if translated from YES or from NO. My main point is the "*given the universe's initial con

Re: The past hypothesis

On 06 May 2010, at 04:13, Rex Allen wrote: What is belief except another aspect of conscious experience? OK. Well. I am trying to fit everything that I know into a single consistent, coherent framework. Me too. Maybe belief is all that exists? Fundamental and uncaused...

Re: The past hypothesis

On Thu, May 6, 2010 at 12:45 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 06 May 2010, at 04:24, Rex Allen wrote: > >> On Wed, May 5, 2010 at 2:54 PM, Rex Allen wrote: >>> >>> We haven't changed the relative number of Rexs and not-Rexs, we've >>> just labeled them with an extra property and then rearranged th

Re: The past hypothesis

Ha! Indeed, these nesting levels do get fairly obscure. On Thu, May 6, 2010 at 10:49 AM, John Mikes wrote: > Dear Rex, > I tried to paraphrase your next to last par. of this post. > It was: > "As if we could do otherwise. If we assume physicalism, then our > constituent particles are doing all

Re: The past hypothesis

On 06 May 2010, at 04:24, Rex Allen wrote: On Wed, May 5, 2010 at 2:54 PM, Rex Allen wrote: We haven't changed the relative number of Rexs and not-Rexs, we've just labeled them with an extra property and then rearranged them according to that additional property. They retain their original

Re: The past hypothesis

Dear Rex, I went through that long back-and-forth with Brent (not sure which >> meaning whom) and recalled Brono's "we don't 'know': we assume (as in scinece). I also recalled my poor opinion about statistical/probabilistical judgements (because they depend on the limits of counting and sequenc

Re: The past hypothesis

: Re: The past hypothesis On 5/3/2010 12:39 PM, m.a. wrote: If someone hiking along the twisting highway that follows the cliffs in Northern Italy or coastal California, high above the sea, should reach a point that protrudes so far out that looking back, he can see the entire route he had

Re: The past hypothesis

On Wed, May 5, 2010 at 2:54 PM, Rex Allen wrote: > > We haven't changed the relative number of Rexs and not-Rexs, we've > just labeled them with an extra property and then rearranged them > according to that additional property.  They retain their original > properties though. > > So, we still hav

Re: The past hypothesis

On Mon, May 3, 2010 at 11:26 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > On 5/3/2010 7:14 PM, Rex Allen wrote: > > On Sat, May 1, 2010 at 9:48 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote: >>> That's assuming I believe some things are true in some absolute sense >>> unrelated to usefulness. I don't. >>> >> >> I am having the experie

Re: The past hypothesis

On Tue, May 4, 2010 at 12:44 AM, Brent Meeker wrote: > I notice I didn't respond to your first question in this post. So... > I appreciate the response! On 5/3/2010 7:41 PM, Rex Allen wrote: So, given eternal recurrence, there are an infinite number of Rexs. And an infinite numbe

Re: The past hypothesis

On Mon, May 03, 2010 at 02:08:44PM -0400, Jesse Mazer wrote: > If this notion of considering the frequency of different finite sequences in > an infinite sequence is a well-defined one, perhaps something similar could > also be applied to an infinite spacetime and the frequency of Boltzmann > brain

Re: The past hypothesis

I notice I didn't respond to your first question in this post. So... On 5/3/2010 7:41 PM, Rex Allen wrote: Probablistic statements are always about measure. What you write above is true, but it is also true if you substitute "finite" for "infinite". It's just that when you have a finite set or

Re: The past hypothesis

On 5/3/2010 7:14 PM, Rex Allen wrote: On Sat, May 1, 2010 at 9:48 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: That's assuming I believe some things are true in some absolute sense unrelated to usefulness. I don't. I am having the experience of seeing a red book. But do you *believe* you are seeing

Re: The past hypothesis

On 5/3/2010 7:41 PM, Rex Allen wrote: Probablistic statements are always about measure. What you write above is true, but it is also true if you substitute "finite" for "infinite". It's just that when you have a finite set or you are generating a potentially inifinite set, then the cardinality

Re: The past hypothesis

> Probablistic statements are always about measure. What you write above is > true, but it is also true if you substitute "finite" for "infinite". It's > just that when you have a finite set or you are generating a potentially > inifinite set, then the cardinality and the relative rate of generat

Re: The past hypothesis

On Sat, May 1, 2010 at 9:48 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > That's assuming I believe some things are true in some absolute sense > unrelated to usefulness. I don't. I am having the experience of seeing a red book. This is absolutely true, regardless of usefulness - and regardless of whether I am ac

Re: The past hypothesis

On 5/3/2010 12:39 PM, m.a. wrote: *If someone hiking along the twisting highway that follows the cliffs in Northern Italy or coastal California, high above the sea, should reach a point that protrudes so far out that looking back, he can see the entire route he had traversed during the previous

Re: The past hypothesis

Subject: Re: The past hypothesis On 03 May 2010, at 01:20, Brent Meeker wrote: On 5/2/2010 3:33 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 May 2010, at 20:30, Brent Meeker wrote: On 5/2/2010 1:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 May 2010, at 22:02, Brent Meeker wrote

Re: The past hypothesis

On 5/3/2010 11:08 AM, Jesse Mazer wrote: On Sat, May 1, 2010 at 8:26 PM, Rex Allen > wrote: On Sat, May 1, 2010 at 7:37 PM, Brent Meeker mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com>> wrote: > > Sure we can, because part of the meaning of "random", the very

Re: The past hypothesis

On Sat, May 1, 2010 at 8:26 PM, Rex Allen wrote: > On Sat, May 1, 2010 at 7:37 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote: > > > > Sure we can, because part of the meaning of "random", the very thing that > > lost us the information, includes each square having the same measure for > > being one of the numbers.

Re: The past hypothesis

On 03 May 2010, at 01:20, Brent Meeker wrote: On 5/2/2010 3:33 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 May 2010, at 20:30, Brent Meeker wrote: On 5/2/2010 1:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 May 2010, at 22:02, Brent Meeker wrote: On 5/1/2010 12:25 PM, Rex Allen wrote: On Sat, May 1, 2010 at

Re: The past hypothesis

On 5/2/2010 3:33 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 May 2010, at 20:30, Brent Meeker wrote: On 5/2/2010 1:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 May 2010, at 22:02, Brent Meeker wrote: On 5/1/2010 12:25 PM, Rex Allen wrote: On Sat, May 1, 2010 at 3:14 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: This argument is

Re: The past hypothesis

On 02 May 2010, at 20:30, Brent Meeker wrote: On 5/2/2010 1:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 May 2010, at 22:02, Brent Meeker wrote: On 5/1/2010 12:25 PM, Rex Allen wrote: On Sat, May 1, 2010 at 3:14 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote: This argument is not definitive mainly because we don't ha

Re: The past hypothesis

On 5/2/2010 8:40 AM, Rex Allen wrote: Returning to the thread: On Sat, May 1, 2010 at 10:23 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: On 5/1/2010 7:10 PM, Rex Allen wrote: On Sat, May 1, 2010 at 10:01 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: It's invalid simply because your conclusion depends taking the card

Re: The past hypothesis

On 5/2/2010 1:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 May 2010, at 22:02, Brent Meeker wrote: On 5/1/2010 12:25 PM, Rex Allen wrote: On Sat, May 1, 2010 at 3:14 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: This argument is not definitive mainly because we don't have a definitive theory of consciousness, but to th

Re: The past hypothesis

Brent: 2 quotes from your text: 1."You seem like the man who wrote to Bertrand Russell, "There is no way to refute solipism. I don't know why more people don't believe it." - - " AND: - - 2."So if you don't adopt solipism, if you assume there is some world outside the flow of your thoughts to w

Re: The past hypothesis

Returning to the thread: On Sat, May 1, 2010 at 10:23 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > On 5/1/2010 7:10 PM, Rex Allen wrote: >> >>> On Sat, May 1, 2010 at 10:01 PM, Brent Meeker >>> wrote: >>> >>> It's invalid simply because your conclusion depends taking the cardinality >>> to be the measure. The ca

Re: The past hypothesis

On 01 May 2010, at 22:02, Brent Meeker wrote: On 5/1/2010 12:25 PM, Rex Allen wrote: On Sat, May 1, 2010 at 3:14 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: This argument is not definitive mainly because we don't have a definitive theory of consciousness, but to the extent we assume a physical basis for co

Re: The past hypothesis

ese to be reductio ad absurdum arguments, not that they actually > think these are likely to be true. If you disagree, I suggest you haven't > actually read these authors very carefully, or haven't really understood > what you read. Well, I think the

Re: The past hypothesis

verse, like time-symmetry. But if we're talking about the laws of physics in our universe, it's not as if we already know that these laws would naturally lead us to predict Boltzmann brains would be more common than ordinary observers and so we have to tack on the "Past Hypothesis" a

Re: The past hypothesis

s, not that they actually > think these are likely to be true. If you disagree, I suggest you haven't > actually read these authors very carefully, or haven't really understood > what you read. Well, I think the passage I quoted pretty much stands on it's own. Without the extra as

Re: The past hypothesis

On 5/1/2010 6:15 PM, Rex Allen wrote: On Sat, May 1, 2010 at 8:23 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: And do you believe this sequence will persist in producing orderly and consistent experiences? I do believe that. BUT...why do I believe it? Well, ultimately, there is no reason I b

Re: The past hypothesis

On Sat, May 1, 2010 at 8:23 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > >>> And do you believe this sequence will persist in >>> producing orderly and consistent experiences? >> >> I do believe that. BUT...why do I believe it? Well, ultimately, >> there is no reason I believe it. I just do. > > Then why don't y

Re: The past hypothesis

On Sat, May 1, 2010 at 3:31 PM, Rex Allen wrote: > On Thu, Apr 29, 2010 at 11:24 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote: > > But if the universe arose from a quantum fluctuation, it would > necessarily > > start with very low entropy since it would not be big enough to encode > more > > than one or two bits a

Re: The past hypothesis

xpect if we took a > typical microstate within our present macrostate and evolved it toward > a Big Crunch. The truth is, we don't have any more direct empirical > access to the past than we have to the future, unless we allow > ourselves to assume a Past Hypothesis. > > Ind

Re: The past hypothesis

On Sat, May 1, 2010 at 7:37 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > > Sure we can, because part of the meaning of "random", the very thing that > lost us the information, includes each square having the same measure for > being one of the numbers. If, for example, we said let all the "1"s come > first - in whi

Re: The past hypothesis

On 5/1/2010 4:54 PM, Rex Allen wrote: On Sat, May 1, 2010 at 5:47 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: Fine. You solve all problems by postulating that your consciousness is fundamental, it just IS, I don't solve all problems. I only solve all metaphysical problems. But isn't that what physica

Re: The past hypothesis

On Sat, May 1, 2010 at 5:47 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > Fine. You solve all problems by postulating that your consciousness is > fundamental, it just IS, I don't solve all problems. I only solve all metaphysical problems. But isn't that what physicalists attempt to do by postulating a physical u

Re: The past hypothesis

On 5/1/2010 3:17 PM, Rex Allen wrote: On Sat, May 1, 2010 at 4:08 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: Seems like a good answer to me. Suppose there were infinitely many rolls of a die (which frequentist statisticians assume all the time). The fact that the number of "1"s would be countably infinite a

Re: The past hypothesis

On Sat, May 1, 2010 at 4:08 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > > Seems like a good answer to me.  Suppose there were infinitely many rolls of > a die (which frequentist statisticians assume all the time).  The fact that > the number of "1"s would be countably infinite and the number of "not-1"s > would be

Re: The past hypothesis

On 5/1/2010 2:40 PM, Rex Allen wrote: On Sat, May 1, 2010 at 4:02 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: On 5/1/2010 12:25 PM, Rex Allen wrote: On Sat, May 1, 2010 at 3:14 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: This argument is not definitive mainly because we don't have a definitive theory of consciousness, but to th

Re: The past hypothesis

On Sat, May 1, 2010 at 4:02 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > On 5/1/2010 12:25 PM, Rex Allen wrote: > > On Sat, May 1, 2010 at 3:14 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote: > > This argument is not > definitive mainly because we don't have a definitive theory of > consciousness, but to the extent we assume a physical

Re: The past hypothesis

On 5/1/2010 12:31 PM, Rex Allen wrote: On Thu, Apr 29, 2010 at 11:24 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: But if the universe arose from a quantum fluctuation, it would necessarily start with very low entropy since it would not be big enough to encode more than one or two bits at the Planck scale. If o

Re: The past hypothesis

On 5/1/2010 12:25 PM, Rex Allen wrote: On Sat, May 1, 2010 at 3:14 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: This argument is not definitive mainly because we don't have a definitive theory of consciousness, but to the extent we assume a physical basis for consciousness it seems pretty good. Ha! As l

Re: The past hypothesis

On Thu, Apr 29, 2010 at 11:24 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > But if the universe arose from a quantum fluctuation, it would necessarily > start with very low entropy since it would not be big enough to encode more > than one or two bits at the Planck scale.  If one universe can start that > way then ar

Re: The past hypothesis

On Sat, May 1, 2010 at 3:14 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > This argument is not > definitive mainly because we don't have a definitive theory of > consciousness, but to the extent we assume a physical basis for > consciousness it seems pretty good. Ha! As long as you assume there is no problem of con

Re: The past hypothesis

e time-reverse of that is exactly what we would expect if we took a typical microstate within our present macrostate and evolved it toward a Big Crunch. The truth is, we don't have any more direct empirical access to the past than we have to the future, unless we allow ourselves to assume a

Re: The past hypothesis

esent macrostate and evolved it toward a Big Crunch. The truth is, we don't have any more direct empirical access to the past than we have to the future, unless we allow ourselves to assume a Past Hypothesis. Indeed, the Past Hypothesis is more than just "allowed"; it's completel

Re: The past hypothesis

On 4/29/2010 6:53 PM, rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: Probably most of you are familiar with this already, BUT, just in case anyone has any interesting comments... If physicalism is true, your memories are almost certainly false. Consider: Entropy is a measure of the disorder of a system. The hig

Re: The past hypothesis

On Thu, Apr 29, 2010 at 9:53 PM, rexallen...@gmail.com < rexallen...@gmail.com> wrote: > Probably most of you are familiar with this already, BUT, just in case > anyone has any interesting comments... > > If physicalism is true, your memories are almost certainly false. > > Consider: > > Entropy i

The past hypothesis

Probably most of you are familiar with this already, BUT, just in case anyone has any interesting comments... If physicalism is true, your memories are almost certainly false. Consider: Entropy is a measure of the disorder of a system. The higher the entropy, the higher the disorder. If a deck