Re: The semantic view of theories and higher-order languages

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 3 Feb 2019, at 04:35, Russell Standish  wrote:
> 
> On Sun, Jan 20, 2019 at 04:06:49PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>> But when used in physics, this type of inductive inference assume not only a
>> reality, but a “brain-mind” identity, which is not consistent with the
>> mechanist hypothesis.
>> 
> 
> How so? All it assumes is that there is a relationship (correlation if
> you will) between elements of phenomenology. If something is
> phenomenally true (observed) , then some other thing is likely to be
> phenomenally true.
> 
> It is up to the learning algorithm to figure out what the relationships are.
> 
> None of this assumes reality, nor any sort of mind-brain identity.


Imagine that you let a ball falling. To compute the probability that it will 
hit the ground, people will usually assume that there is a ground, that there 
is ball, and that the ball obeys some law, so as to make the 
computation/prediction.
They will also assume that their mind remains attached to the body doing those 
computation/prediction.
Yet, with mechanism, this does not work, as there is no ball, no ground, and no 
identification possible between your first person possible experience and some 
world in which you would be there. The only way is to take into account all 
computations going through your mental state, as this one is attached to the 
infinitely many computations doing this in arithmetic, and the statistics will 
be given roughly by the number of computation which realise the experience of 
seing the ball falling on the grounds, “divided” by all computation leading to 
the initial state and where the ball does or not fall on the ground. 
Mathematically, it is more subtle, because the accessible states of the machine 
is structured by the logic of self-reference (probability one is given by the 
mode with “<>t” in the provability variant). That includes the computations 
involving white rabbits, speed quicker than light, etc. (a bit like the virtual 
particles on quantum filed theory, which can also “violate” the physical laws, 
like physical laws can violate in dreams, and thus in the apparence related to 
some computations. 
A learning algorithm also supposed some stable stream of inputs, which with 
mechanism have to be justified from that statistics on *all* computations.  It 
is not a problem in applied AI, but it is the problem we have to solve (and 
that the Löbian machine do solve in arithmetic) when trying to get a coherent 
theory of the relation between mind and matter appearance.
Just to involve a material universe, or a god, does not work, as it would make 
such God or Matter into a magical thing capable of making some computations 
more “real” than other, without changing anything in the computation, and that 
violates the “yes doctor”, as it call for something not Turing emulable (be it 
a substantial Matter or a God).

Bruno





> 
> Cheers
> -- 
> 
> 
> Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Principal, High Performance Coders
> Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
> Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au
> 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The semantic view of theories and higher-order languages

[Russell Standish]

On Sun, Jan 20, 2019 at 04:06:49PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> But when used in physics, this type of inductive inference assume not only a
> reality, but a “brain-mind” identity, which is not consistent with the
> mechanist hypothesis.
> 

How so? All it assumes is that there is a relationship (correlation if
you will) between elements of phenomenology. If something is
phenomenally true (observed) , then some other thing is likely to be
phenomenally true.

It is up to the learning algorithm to figure out what the relationships are.

None of this assumes reality, nor any sort of mind-brain identity.

Cheers
-- 


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The semantic view of theories and higher-order languages

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 19 Jan 2019, at 00:14, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Fri, Jan 18, 2019 at 8:30 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> >Nwe cannot assume, neither a physical universe, nor analysis or set theory. 
> >Since recently, I have realised that we cannot even assume the induction 
> >axioms,
> 
> Induction says that things are usually pretty much the same from one moment 
> of time to the next and from one point in space to a nearby one,


That is the case for inductive inference, but here I was alluding to the 
induction axioms, which are used only in deduction.

The induction axioms on the numbers is 

P(0) & [For all n (P(n) -> P(s(n)))] ->. For all n P(n).

Or, for the combinators, it is

P(K) & P(S) & [For all x y ((P(x) & P(y)) -> P(xy)) -> For all x P(x)

I do think that inductive inference has deep relation with mathematical 
induction, though. But that is beyond the cope of this post.



> if Everett is right (and my hunch is he is) for some universes that would be 
> true, but such  a chaotic universe would not have structures capable of 
> producing thought or consciousness. Therefore  it is not only safe for us to 
> assume induction we DO assume it and we could not survive in the physical 
> world longer than about 45 seconds without it. At this very second although I 
> have no detailed knowledge of the wiring involved and have not seen the 
> blueprints I am assuming that when I hit the key marked "I" on my keyboard a 
> "I" symbol will appear on my screen; I assume it will happen this time 
> because that's what usually happened in the past, the only time it didn't was 
> when my keyboard was defective a few years ago but that was quickly replaced. 

But when used in physics, this type of inductive inference assume not only a 
reality, but a “brain-mind” identity, which is not consistent with the 
mechanist hypothesis.

Bruno




> 
>  John K Clark  
> 
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com 
> .
> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list 
> .
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout 
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The semantic view of theories and higher-order languages

[John Clark]

On Fri, Jan 18, 2019 at 8:30 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

*>Nwe cannot assume, neither a physical universe, nor analysis or set
> theory. Since recently, I have realised that we cannot even assume the
> induction axioms,*


Induction says that things are usually pretty much the same from one moment
of time to the next and from one point in space to a nearby one, if Everett
is right (and my hunch is he is) for some universes that would be true, but
such  a chaotic universe would not have structures capable of producing
thought or consciousness. Therefore  it is not only safe for us to assume
induction we DO assume it and we could not survive in the physical world
longer than about 45 seconds without it. At this very second although I
have no detailed knowledge of the wiring involved and have not seen the
blueprints I am assuming that when I hit the key marked "I" on my keyboard
a "I" symbol will appear on my screen; I assume it will happen this time
because that's what usually happened in the past, the only time it didn't
was when my keyboard was defective a few years ago but that was quickly
replaced.

 John K Clark



>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The semantic view of theories and higher-order languages

[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, January 18, 2019 at 7:30:14 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 18 Jan 2019, at 09:49, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
> *The semantic view of theories and higher-order languages*
> Laurenz Hudetz
> https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-017-1502-0
>
> "every family of set-theoretic structures has an associated language of 
> higher-order logic and an up to signature isomorphism unique 
> model-theoretic counterpart"
>
>
> *Several philosophers of science construe models of scientific theories as 
> set-theoretic structures. Some of them moreover claim that models should 
> not be construed as structures in the sense of model theory because the 
> latter are language-dependent. I argue that if we are ready to construe 
> models as set-theoretic structures (strict semantic view), we could equally 
> well construe them as model-theoretic structures of higher-order logic 
> (liberal semantic view). I show that every family of set-theoretic 
> structures has an associated language of higher-order logic and an up to 
> signature isomorphism unique model-theoretic counterpart, which is able to 
> serve the same purposes. This allows to carry over every syntactic 
> criterion of equivalence for theories in the sense of the liberal semantic 
> view to theories in the sense of the strict semantic view. Taken together, 
> these results suggest that the recent dispute about the semantic view and 
> its relation to the syntactic view can be resolved.*
>
>
> It cannot do that in the Mechanist Frame, where we cannot assume, neither 
> a physical universe, nor analysis or set theory. Since recently, I have 
> realised that we cannot even assume the induction axioms, but we can use it 
> in the definition of the Löbian entities, whose existence is then a 
> consequence of the theories without induction. Of course, we need induction 
> at the meta level, and even the whole of informal mathematics, like in any 
> science pointing toward some reality independent of us.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
The study of the dances between languages and their semantics is what both 
philosophy and science are all about - from the view at least of 
'language-oriented' philosophers. 

- pt

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: The semantic view of theories and higher-order languages

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 18 Jan 2019, at 09:49, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> The semantic view of theories and higher-order languages
> Laurenz Hudetz
> https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-017-1502-0
> 
> "every family of set-theoretic structures has an associated language of 
> higher-order logic and an up to signature isomorphism unique model-theoretic 
> counterpart"
> 
> Several philosophers of science construe models of scientific theories as 
> set-theoretic structures. Some of them moreover claim that models should not 
> be construed as structures in the sense of model theory because the latter 
> are language-dependent. I argue that if we are ready to construe models as 
> set-theoretic structures (strict semantic view), we could equally well 
> construe them as model-theoretic structures of higher-order logic (liberal 
> semantic view). I show that every family of set-theoretic structures has an 
> associated language of higher-order logic and an up to signature isomorphism 
> unique model-theoretic counterpart, which is able to serve the same purposes. 
> This allows to carry over every syntactic criterion of equivalence for 
> theories in the sense of the liberal semantic view to theories in the sense 
> of the strict semantic view. Taken together, these results suggest that the 
> recent dispute about the semantic view and its relation to the syntactic view 
> can be resolved.

It cannot do that in the Mechanist Frame, where we cannot assume, neither a 
physical universe, nor analysis or set theory. Since recently, I have realised 
that we cannot even assume the induction axioms, but we can use it in the 
definition of the Löbian entities, whose existence is then a consequence of the 
theories without induction. Of course, we need induction at the meta level, and 
even the whole of informal mathematics, like in any science pointing toward 
some reality independent of us.

Bruno





> 
> - pt
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com 
> <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>.
> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list 
> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout 
> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

The semantic view of theories and higher-order languages

[Philip Thrift]

*The semantic view of theories and higher-order languages*
Laurenz Hudetz
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-017-1502-0

"every family of set-theoretic structures has an associated language of 
higher-order logic and an up to signature isomorphism unique 
model-theoretic counterpart"


*Several philosophers of science construe models of scientific theories as 
set-theoretic structures. Some of them moreover claim that models should 
not be construed as structures in the sense of model theory because the 
latter are language-dependent. I argue that if we are ready to construe 
models as set-theoretic structures (strict semantic view), we could equally 
well construe them as model-theoretic structures of higher-order logic 
(liberal semantic view). I show that every family of set-theoretic 
structures has an associated language of higher-order logic and an up to 
signature isomorphism unique model-theoretic counterpart, which is able to 
serve the same purposes. This allows to carry over every syntactic 
criterion of equivalence for theories in the sense of the liberal semantic 
view to theories in the sense of the strict semantic view. Taken together, 
these results suggest that the recent dispute about the semantic view and 
its relation to the syntactic view can be resolved.*

- pt

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.