Re: UDA last question (was UDA step 9 10).
Joel Dobrzelewski wrote: >So the Universal Dovetailer simply enumerates all possible states for "me". Yes. I prefer to say it generates all computations going through that states(°). Bennett has introduced a nice notion of depth from string, which is grosso modo the runtime to produce it. It is still possible (even probable) that "me" is deep and "you" are deep so that the occurence in UD* of you and me can be taken as evidence that we do share a "long" computation. (°) I see Hal Finney says the same thing. >(Whatever "me" is, is unimportant). And somehow, these states are joined by >their similarity to one another, which allows (virtual) motion from one >state to the next. I think the relation of similarity, or proximity bears on the computations/histories/dreams. But you are correct. The only way to keep sharing the same deep computation, and thus sharing our domain of undeterminacy, is that the computation is "linear in our common ignorance". This will multiply both of us, in some conservative way, and in extremely "explosive" way. I guess the first person *plural* has it origin in such self multiplication sharing. >So, if I am currently sitting in the state of "sitting at my desk", I have >several realities branching off from this one where in the next moments I am >"rising from my chair", or "still sitting at my desk", or "petting a white >rabbit". In case comp is true, I'm afraid necessarily so. Note that the existence of QM gives confirming evidence that there is some branching. And perhaps you can guess that comp predicts that any machine looking at her neighborood sufficiently closely, i.e. below her level of substitution will discover some "observable weirdness" and other continua of parallel computations ... Note that histories can be considered as fusing by difference amnesy. I really hope to succeed in "rediscovering" the quantum computer through "machine's introspection". >But I am left with one nagging question. I really hope so Joel. My strongest goal with UDA is to show that computationalism or mechanism does not solve *per se* the mind body problem. Quite the contrary. "Before UDA" you can believe there is only a "consciousness problem", "after UDA" you got a "body" problem too. Understanding comp consists in understanding that matter/space /time is necessarily not obvious and must be recovered from the space of all computations as seen as some internal points of views. I told you that my UD or your MUCA or Schmidhuber's Great Programmer, ... are not the solution, there are only steps toward a mathematical *formulation* of the problem. Of course the formulation gives insight, (the reversal)... and that's nothing compare to the arithmetisation of that formulation, weird quantum logics, but that's technical ... (if you know modal logic search for LASE in the archive). >1) Where is Time? Time is *the* first person concept "par excellence". It is linked with intuition, consciousness, but also construction, and truth. The arithmetical translation of UDA let me hope that time is captured by the modal logic known in the literature as S4Grz. >1a) What governs the trajectory of one's awareness through all his/her >possible states? The geometry generated by the notion of proximity on the (maximal ?) consistent extensions (our alternative "completed" futures). Or if you prefer, what governs the possible trajectory of awaraness is Schroedinger Equation. Our problem: extract it from the geometry above. >1c) How do I get from one state to another? You 3-don't. You 1-do. This must be related to the geometry above. >1d) Isn't this "awareness", and its motion path necessarily "outside" those >states and the Universal Dovetailer? No. But perhaps you are close. A bizare thing is that if someone look at a portion of a representation of UD*, he can say there is, in some sense, no awareness possible in that portion. And this remains true for all finite portions of UD*. The "meaning" appears only when the whole UD* is considered. This is coherent with the fact that the neighborhood of "first person state" are defined on that limit. An image is that each instant, each observer moment perhaps, is defined by a "trip" from the base of the cone (UD*) to the (non existing) top, at infinite speed, just because we cannot be aware of the delays, nor of any initial represention. >Since I am into cellular automata, I always assumed that time is implemented >naturally... by the automaton... from one tick to the next - just like a >movie. That's the integers sequence. No? >Can we really assume UD* exists? Unless you are finitist you can realise that with comp you cannot escape its existence. You get UD* once you accept the existence of *all* natural numbers, and all their describable relations. But no problem without changing your mind. Abandoning comp by abandoning arithmetical platonisme is a way like another :-) >Doesn't it take Time to execute UD? No. Only a co
Re: UDA last question (was UDA step 9 10).
Joel Dobrzelewski, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, writes: > So the Universal Dovetailer simply enumerates all possible states for "me". > (Whatever "me" is, is unimportant). And somehow, these states are joined by > their similarity to one another, which allows (virtual) motion from one > state to the next. Let me explain in English what the Universal Dovetailer (UD) is. I don't necessarily agree with all the conclusions which come from the potential existence of such a program but it will be helpful if we are all in agreement about it. First, the word "dovetail" originally comes from carpentry and refers a kind of wooden joint in which the pieces are joined in an interlocking way that holds them together, which is supposed to resemble a dove's tail. See http://www.kellerdovetail.com/ for a picture of wood joined in this way. You can see that in this case the two pieces of wood alternate along the joint. The word then came to be used in cards. What is commonly called a "riffle" shuffle is technically known as the dovetail shuffle. This is the shuffle in which the deck is split into two parts which are each held in a hand, and then the cards from the two halves are quickly sprung together so that they interleave into a whole, a few cards alternately from each hand. Dovetailing thus came to be known as any system which interleaves two or more independent processes in this way. This is the sense in which we mean to refer to the Universal Dovetailer. The idea of the UD is simply to run all possible computer programs on some particular type of computer in an interleaved way, so that all of them make progress. It's essentially no different from what is done on every computer today, which runs multiple tasks at once via timesharing. Each task gets a little slice of run time, and then the computer switches to another task. The UD has the additional burden that there are an infinite number of possible programs. Unlike in Linux or Windows, it is not given a fixed set of programs and asked to dovetail between them, it has instead a virtual machine specification and needs to generate all possible programs, and then make sure that all of them get run eventually. Generating all the possible programs is easy; they are just all possible bit strings. But if you did that first, you'd never get around to running them. So you also have to interleave the program generation with the running. One approach is to generate all 1-bit programs, then run each of them for one cycle. Then generate all 2-bit programs, and run each of the 1- and 2-bit programs for one cycle. Then generate all 3-bit programs, and run each of the 1-, 2- and 3-bit programs for one cycle, and so on. In this way you can show that every program of any number of bits will eventually be run for as many cycles as you specify. So that's the UD. In terms of your comments above, it does more than enumerate all possible states for "you"; it runs all possible programs, and therefore it runs all possible programs for universes which contain you, including this one you're in right now. What about the fact that the programs are interleaved, so they start and stop? Why are you not aware of this, why does your consciousness stay stuck in this one program, even though other programs are constantly being run? Is it Is it a matter of similarity of state which allows "virtual motion" from one state to the next, even though the UD was doing other things in between? Here we appeal to our intuition from working with timeshare computers, or to the logic of computation, and say that this doesn't matter. I'm typing into a window here, talking to my word processor, and the fact that there are 83 other things going on on my computer doesn't matter; as far as my interactions with the word processor are concerned, it is running as a logical unit. The only affect from the other parts of the computer is that it might slow down. I still think there is a philosophical issue about whether running *all possible programs* has the same effect and implications as running a single selected program. It's perhaps analogous to the question of whether emitting white noise (which includes all sounds) has the same effects as emitting a particular sound. But I won't get into that here, I just wanted to explain the UD plainly, in terms of what it means and where the term came from. Hal
Re: UDA last question (was UDA step 9 10).
Questions 1) and 1a) have been answered in this article: http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/math-ph/0008018 Saibal Joel wrote: > Bruno and fellow Everythingers... > > Sorry I've been disconnected for a while. I think Bruno's last message has > really helped me to understand the Universal Dovetailer. > > > Some of those computations will generate the 3-states corresponding > > to my "preparing coffe 1-state". Because we accept comp. Now if I > > prepare a cup of coffee, my brain will go through a sequence of > > states (third person describable computational state, at the right > > level of description of myself). and I have pick one of those > > state---like in a duplication experiment). > > > > So the UD generates that state eventually (by going through a > > computation which emulates my doing or dreaming of doing that cup of > > coffe). > > So the Universal Dovetailer simply enumerates all possible states for "me". > (Whatever "me" is, is unimportant). And somehow, these states are joined by > their similarity to one another, which allows (virtual) motion from one > state to the next. > > So, if I am currently sitting in the state of "sitting at my desk", I have > several realities branching off from this one where in the next moments I am > "rising from my chair", or "still sitting at my desk", or "petting a white > rabbit". > > But I am left with one nagging question: > > 1) Where is Time? > > 1a) What governs the trajectory of one's awareness through all his/her > possible states? > > 1b) What defines the current state? > > 1c) How do I get from one state to another? > > 1d) Isn't this "awareness", and its motion path necessarily "outside" those > states and the Universal Dovetailer? > > Since I am into cellular automata, I always assumed that time is implemented > naturally... by the automaton... from one tick to the next - just like a > movie. > > Can we really assume UD* exists? Doesn't it take Time to execute UD? > > Joel > > >
Re: UDA last question (was UDA step 9 10).
Bruno and fellow Everythingers... Sorry I've been disconnected for a while. I think Bruno's last message has really helped me to understand the Universal Dovetailer. > Some of those computations will generate the 3-states corresponding > to my "preparing coffe 1-state". Because we accept comp. Now if I > prepare a cup of coffee, my brain will go through a sequence of > states (third person describable computational state, at the right > level of description of myself). and I have pick one of those > state---like in a duplication experiment). > > So the UD generates that state eventually (by going through a > computation which emulates my doing or dreaming of doing that cup of > coffe). So the Universal Dovetailer simply enumerates all possible states for "me". (Whatever "me" is, is unimportant). And somehow, these states are joined by their similarity to one another, which allows (virtual) motion from one state to the next. So, if I am currently sitting in the state of "sitting at my desk", I have several realities branching off from this one where in the next moments I am "rising from my chair", or "still sitting at my desk", or "petting a white rabbit". But I am left with one nagging question: 1) Where is Time? 1a) What governs the trajectory of one's awareness through all his/her possible states? 1b) What defines the current state? 1c) How do I get from one state to another? 1d) Isn't this "awareness", and its motion path necessarily "outside" those states and the Universal Dovetailer? Since I am into cellular automata, I always assumed that time is implemented naturally... by the automaton... from one tick to the next - just like a movie. Can we really assume UD* exists? Doesn't it take Time to execute UD? Joel
Re: UDA last question (was UDA step 9 10).
Thank you Bruno for the clear explanation.
Let me rephrase your explanation in my own words.
For any point X in the Plenitude corresponding to an observer-moment, a state of
consciousness, or state of a CA, the UD* is just that portion of the Plenitude
constrained by
1) that point taken as a boundary condition
2)LOGICAL and LOCAL consistency from any point to any point in the transition
("extensions" , "projections") paths.
Hence the concept of "cone" since the number of points reacheable from a given
initial boundary condition is expected to grow. In fact, we may have a double
cone joined at the vertex to represent the logical past and the logical future.
(I do not want to introduce yet the concept of time)
The cone also illustrates the indeterminacy associated with point X. The further
we are from X the greater the indeterminacy. This indeterminacy is of course a
first person perspective from X.
Please also notice my emphasis on the concept of logical and local consistency
on any point along that cone. It may imply that a consciousness my change along
the way.
Bruno, so far, I agree with you 100%.
One more point. In my opinion, the concept of first person and third person
perspective is really a special case of a continuum. I will discuss this in a
new thread
George
Marchal wrote:
> Levy wrote:
>
> >Marchal wrote:
> >
> >> It is better to read (change in capital):
> >>
> >> < >> from a third person point of view. But, as you aknowledge in
> >> question 7, the delays does not count for the first person, so
> >> the domain of 1-indeterminacy, which BEARS ON first persons EXPERIENCE
> >> is, thanks of that delays elimination, given by the
> >> union (which is just the set theoretical interpretation of the or)
> >> of all portion of UD* (the execution of the UD, an infinite
> >> three dimensional cone in case the UD is implemented in a
> >> two dimensional cellular automaton) in which my "preparing coffee"
> >> state appear. (Reread that sentence slowly, I have written
> >> it slowly, and without doubts it's too long).>>
> >>
> >> So it is a third person measure on first person experiences.
> >
> >iigghhh!!
> >I read the sentence many times and it still does not make sense to me.
> >Should I read it again?
>
> Read it three times at breakfast, and one time in the evening
> jumping the parenthesis.
>
> Ok, ok. My diagnostic is that either you have forget the question
> 7 or 8, (see below) or you are forgetting what the UD does.
>
> >What is:
> >"the union of all portion of UD* in which my "preparing coffee" state
> >appear."
>
> Suppose that the UD is written in Fortran. I guess you know what the
> trace of a program is.
>
> UD* is the infinite trace of the UD. It is describe by the
> sequence of its subsequent states (as a program fortran).
>
> It is an infinite tree describing all possible computations in fortran.
> (which includes fortran simulation of all program in Lisp, all Fortran
> simulation of the COBOL version 5.3 emulation of all linear
> transformations,
> all the unitary transformations, etc.
>
> Some of those computations will generate the 3-states corresponding to my
> "preparing coffe 1-state". Because we accept comp. Now if I prepare a
> cup of coffee, my brain will go through a sequence of states (third person
> describable computational state, at the right level of description
> of myself). and I have pick one of those state---like in a duplication
> experiment).
>
> So the UD generates that state eventually (by going through a computation
> which emulates my doing or dreaming of doing that cup of coffe).
>
> The UD will generates that state eventually. Let us say in 10^googol
> years (or steps). Our poor "universe" has disappeared, but we don't
> care because the UD run in Plato Heaven, or if you prefer,
> the whole UD* (the trace of the UD) lies staticaly but completely
> in Plato heaven). UD* is the block "mindscape" (mindscape borrowed to
> Rudy Rucker's "Infinity and the Mind".).
>
> And we don't care of the number of steps and of the time that UD would
> have
> take to get that states because, as first person we cannot be aware
> of those delays. Ok?
>
> Please reread ten billions times, after lunch, the question 7 and 8.
> Especially 8. (copy and past from
> http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m2992.html below)
>
> Note in passing that a copy and paste is a duplication without
> annhilation of the original.
>
> The apparition in UD* of that third person description of the precise
> state "where is my cup now?" (occuring when I am preparing my
> cup of coffee (existing by comp)) is provided by the fact that
> the UD generates all computations.
>
> Saying yes to 7 and 8, makes that "event", executed by the UD
> equivalent with a delayed reconstitution without demolition of the
> original.
>
> So with comp you *must* bet that at each instant you are copy and paste
> somewhere in your domain of indeterminacy.
>
> But, after a much longer tim
Re: UDA last question (was UDA step 9 10).
Levy wrote: >Marchal wrote: > >> It is better to read (change in capital): >> >> <> from a third person point of view. But, as you aknowledge in >> question 7, the delays does not count for the first person, so >> the domain of 1-indeterminacy, which BEARS ON first persons EXPERIENCE >> is, thanks of that delays elimination, given by the >> union (which is just the set theoretical interpretation of the or) >> of all portion of UD* (the execution of the UD, an infinite >> three dimensional cone in case the UD is implemented in a >> two dimensional cellular automaton) in which my "preparing coffee" >> state appear. (Reread that sentence slowly, I have written >> it slowly, and without doubts it's too long).>> >> >> So it is a third person measure on first person experiences. > >iigghhh!! >I read the sentence many times and it still does not make sense to me. >Should I read it again? Read it three times at breakfast, and one time in the evening jumping the parenthesis. Ok, ok. My diagnostic is that either you have forget the question 7 or 8, (see below) or you are forgetting what the UD does. >What is: >"the union of all portion of UD* in which my "preparing coffee" state >appear." Suppose that the UD is written in Fortran. I guess you know what the trace of a program is. UD* is the infinite trace of the UD. It is describe by the sequence of its subsequent states (as a program fortran). It is an infinite tree describing all possible computations in fortran. (which includes fortran simulation of all program in Lisp, all Fortran simulation of the COBOL version 5.3 emulation of all linear transformations, all the unitary transformations, etc. Some of those computations will generate the 3-states corresponding to my "preparing coffe 1-state". Because we accept comp. Now if I prepare a cup of coffee, my brain will go through a sequence of states (third person describable computational state, at the right level of description of myself). and I have pick one of those state---like in a duplication experiment). So the UD generates that state eventually (by going through a computation which emulates my doing or dreaming of doing that cup of coffe). The UD will generates that state eventually. Let us say in 10^googol years (or steps). Our poor "universe" has disappeared, but we don't care because the UD run in Plato Heaven, or if you prefer, the whole UD* (the trace of the UD) lies staticaly but completely in Plato heaven). UD* is the block "mindscape" (mindscape borrowed to Rudy Rucker's "Infinity and the Mind".). And we don't care of the number of steps and of the time that UD would have take to get that states because, as first person we cannot be aware of those delays. Ok? Please reread ten billions times, after lunch, the question 7 and 8. Especially 8. (copy and past from http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m2992.html below) Note in passing that a copy and paste is a duplication without annhilation of the original. The apparition in UD* of that third person description of the precise state "where is my cup now?" (occuring when I am preparing my cup of coffee (existing by comp)) is provided by the fact that the UD generates all computations. Saying yes to 7 and 8, makes that "event", executed by the UD equivalent with a delayed reconstitution without demolition of the original. So with comp you *must* bet that at each instant you are copy and paste somewhere in your domain of indeterminacy. But, after a much longer time (much longer that 10^googol (the DU *dovetails*, so that it has a lot of work while generating and executing the other programs) it generates a new reconstitution of that states, so he builds little by little your entire domain of 1-indeterminacy. The fact that the DU builds the reconstitutions so slowly does not change the first person experience because of the non awareness of the delay. So when I am preparing my coffee cup, if I want to predict my next possible instant, I must have a measure on the set of computational histories generated by the DU going through the state corresponding to my particular "preparing my coffee cup" state. Or a measure on all the "reconsitution" in UD*. We just cannot care that some of those reconstitution appears at step n1, some other at step n2, other at step n3, The domain of reconstitution will be the union of all the portion (subset or substring or subspace, or whatever depending on the choice of representation) ... portion containing the virtual (or arithmetical) reconstitution. Find a LISP interpreteur, run the UD at http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m2793.html If you don't like LISP, write yourself a UD in COBOL (why not) Run it. Stop it after two days. You have a portion of UD*. Stop it after three days, you get a bigger portion of UD*. By comp there is a day it will generate (and "reconstitute" de facto) my coffee-state of mind (the 3-comp state corresponding for that state whic
Re: UDA last question (was UDA step 9 10).
Marchal wrote: > It is better to read (change in capital): > > < from a third person point of view. But, as you aknowledge in > question 7, the delays does not count for the first person, so > the domain of 1-indeterminacy, which BEARS ON first persons EXPERIENCE > is, thanks of that delays elimination, given by the > union (which is just the set theoretical interpretation of the or) > of all portion of UD* (the execution of the UD, an infinite > three dimensional cone in case the UD is implemented in a > two dimensional cellular automaton) in which my "preparing coffee" > state appear. (Reread that sentence slowly, I have written > it slowly, and without doubts it's too long).>> > > So it is a third person measure on first person experiences. iigghhh!! I read the sentence many times and it still does not make sense to me. Should I read it again? What is: "the union of all portion of UD* in which my "preparing coffee" state appear." You define UD* as "the the execution of the UD, an infinite three dimensional cone in case the UD is implemented in a two dimensional cellular automaton). Is the cone in space, time, or what? Why three dimensions? Why not four or five? Where are these dimensions coming from? The sentence is not too long... it's just that it assumes too much background. Is it the union of UD* or the union of the outputs of UD*? Is UD* a cellular automaton or is it a set of all cellular automatons with particular properties? How does UD* relate to UD? Is it the complement, the conjugate, the inverse, or what? In any case, the whole issue of restricting an implementation to a particular cellular automaton in any dimensional configuration is abhorrent to me. If finite inputs are considered any automaton can be replaced with a huge look up table. And as any electrical engineer knows, any automaton, Turing machine or computer can be implemented by circuits consisting solely of NAND gates (with additional initialization levels of 0 and 1.) That's it. Just NAND gates. Pure logic. No three dimensional cones or any other kinds of cones. > > I apologize for having written in my last post to Jacques Mallah, > > > read > > (The "s" was not exactly at the right place !) Yeah, I sympathize, English sometimes puts s in the singular and no s in the plural! Very confusing. I have the same problems sometime. :-) George
Re: UDA last question (was UDA step 9 10).
Jacques Mallah wrote: >It should be apparent to all that an objective measure is needed on >observer-moments. I agree. (if you agree there is a non trivial conditionalisation, entailing a non trivial geometry on the space of observer-moment). >I do not call this a "3rd person" measure because that >would falsely imply the existance of some other type of measure to be a >logical possibility. I apologise for having written in my last post to joel: <> It is better to read (change in capital): <> So it is a third person measure on first person experiences. This is not so important because the "modal" arithmetical translation i Propose is done at a more abstract level. But ok, I was phrasing things a little to quickly. Bruno
Re: UDA last question (was UDA step 9 10).
>From: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >Personally, I've never been able to understand the attitude of the >anti-measurists--how can anything make sense without one? What possible >reason would I have to believe that the future will resemble the past in >any way whatsoever? After all, there are an infinite number of possible >universes that resemble the one I've experienced up to the present moment, >and then suddenly transform into a swarm of white rabbits--should I be >bracing myself for such a possibility at every moment? Without some kind of >measure on the Plenitude we cannot even talk about the "probability" that >the laws of physics will continue to operate normally a minute from >now...you can't really talk about anything but the present moment, in fact. You're right, almost. But what _about_ the present? Without an _objective_ measure on possible experiences, there would be no reason for even the present moment to be as wabbit-free as it is! (e.g. The present moment suggests evolution, etc.) And you can never see the future (maybe you _will_, depending on the definition of "you", but you never have yet!), so clearly it is only the present that supplies the info you have to make such Bayesian deductions. In fact it's simpler to define "you" as just existing now. (Which is not to say your utility function shouldn't care about future guys.) It should be apparent to all that an objective measure is needed on observer-moments. I do not call this a "3rd person" measure because that would falsely imply the existance of some other type of measure to be a logical possibility. - - - - - - - Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) Physicist / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate "I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum My URL: http://hammer.prohosting.com/~mathmind/ _ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com
Re: UDA last question (was UDA step 9 10)
Joel: >Bruno: >> But don't we have a contradiction, or something like an empirical >> contradiction here. I can certainly hope for certain futures, and >> honestly I think (at least from past experience) that some are more >> probable than others. For exemple I am now preparing some coffee. I >> would have the feeling of lying to myself if I was telling you that I >> do not believe "drinking" coffee is probable. So "something" is >> probable. So, if we maintain comp, we must explain why, after I have >> done coffee, drinking coffee got an higher degree of probability. We >> must aknowledge that physicalist do have an explanation here. There >> is coffee, there is a material machine preparing it, etc. > >Hmm... I think I see the problem now. But I don't understand your proposed >solution. I am glad you begin to see the problem. I have not proposed a solution (yet), I have only try to give an accurate description of the problem. Later I will point onto some strategy to search the solution, which, btw, cannot be "proposed". The solution exists or does not exists. If the solution does not exists (provably), then comp is false (refuted). >Do you want to 1) make predictions about the future based on past >observations, or 2) make predictions about the future based on all possible >histories, or 3) something else entirely. Nicely formulated question: it is neither "1)", neither "2)", neither "3)" ! What I want to do ... Well, no: what I'm *obliged* to do (keeping comp) is to explain why "1)" seems to work giving that comp force me to accept "2)". We must justified something like "2) => 1)". Perhaps more precisely: why a third person "2)" implies a first person "1)". Perhaps that will be clearer below where I will attempt to conclude the UDA less rapidly. >In the first case (1), I think I can see how this might be possible. > >For example, if every 9 out of 10 times you drink the coffee after making >it, then you should be able to reasonably conclude that the next time you >make coffee, you will most likely drink it. I agree, except that this is what we need to explain. >This seems to work in our current simulation because for the most part, our >world appears to be mostly "predictable". But it will start to fail in >worlds where there is little regularity. (e.g. making coffee and drinking >coffee almost never happen) So we must explain why, summing on all computational stories, we stabilise on "predictable" stories. Note also that an expression like "our world" is unavoidably ambiguous, and strictly speaking cannot be used with comp (through the UDA). >But in the second case (2) I can't see how we can make any meaningful >predictions since the number of all possible histories is infinite. Yes, even uncountable. But that is not a problem. Measure theory, including Lebesgue integration theory has been invented for dealing with probability on uncountable domains. This is used in elementary (non relativistic) quantum mechanics too. The problem is not even to find an ad hoc measure which makes the white rabbit stories negligeable, but to show that the unique measure forced by UDA (or arithmetical translation of UDA) is such that rabbit stories are (relatively) negligeable in it. In case it is not, comp is refuted. >> Put in another way, we must derive the laws of physics from computer >> science. And, through the role of the notion of 1-pov, we must derive >> physical belief from coherent discourse by machines, or more simply >> derive physics from (machine) psychology. >> >> Do you agree? > >I'm not sure. I'm still unclear about what you are proposing. I am not proposing anything. I'm just showing that if we are machine then next instants are defined by a (relative) measure put on the set of consistent reconstitutions *as seen by themselves* (the 1-person psychology) generated by the UD. >How can we derive physics from psychology? Interesting question. Note that the UDA just show that: if we are machine then we *must* derive physics from psychology (itself, by comp, embedded in number (meta) theory. Mmh... UDA shows more. It shows that your next instant is "determined" by all computational histories (generated bu the UD) going through your 3-state. >Can you give some simple example, like the coffee experiment? Excellent idea! I will make myself a cup of coffee. >> If you follow me perhaps you can understand why, in case your MUCA >> is *the* bottom, then we should not postulate that!!! We should prove >> it, for exemple by showing that the measure behave well only thanks >> to the infinite MUCAs' work generated in arithmetics (or by any DUs, >> or in Numberland, as I like to say. > >No - sorry. I don't understand that either. I think you've lost me. > >> If you really take the comp 1-indeterminisme seriously, perhaps you >> can guess also why our very finiteness makes us confronting some >> continuum, and some random oracle, ... > >Infinite possibilities? I don't know.
Re: UDA last question (was UDA step 9 10)
> That's part of the problem. What do you mean by "*our* current > simulation?" Within the Plenitude there are an infinite number of > simulations that resemble "this" one up to some moment and then > suddenly change the laws in crazy ways...if you agreed with the > earlier thought-experiment about duplication, in which there's some > chance your "next moment" will be that of any number of different > duplicates, then how can you be sure your own next moment will be one > in a physics-conserving simulation? Hi Jesse. It's hard to keep up with the discussion! But I just wanted to say to your previous message - and with this one - I agree completely. There's no way to tell when the simulation will change drastically. For now, I assume this will happen when I "die"... but I have no way of knowing that for sure - and it could even happen much sooner. (It has happened to me on a couple of occasions already!) Maybe aliens will land tomorrow and they'll take me off to other crazy realities. Heck, speaking of crazy realities, I had a pretty funky dream last night... Predicting the future may be better left to one's imagination. Joel
Re: UDA last question (was UDA step 9 10)
>From: "Joel Dobrzelewski" >Hmm... I think I see the problem now. But I don't understand your proposed >solution. > >Do you want to 1) make predictions about the future based on past >observations, or 2) make predictions about the future based on all possible >histories, or 3) something else entirely. > >In the first case (1), I think I can see how this might be possible. > >For example, if every 9 out of 10 times you drink the coffee after making >it, then you should be able to reasonably conclude that the next time you >make coffee, you will most likely drink it. > >Similarly, if 99 out of 100 times an electron is deflected away from the >nucleus of an atom, then we can be reasonably sure that the next time we >fire one into the nucleus, it will be deflected. > >This seems to work in our current simulation because for the most part, our >world appears to be mostly "predictable". But it will start to fail in >worlds where there is little regularity. (e.g. making coffee and drinking >coffee almost never happen) > >But in the second case (2) I can't see how we can make any meaningful >predictions since the number of all possible histories is infinite. That's part of the problem. What do you mean by "*our* current simulation?" Within the Plenitude there are an infinite number of simulations that resemble "this" one up to some moment and then suddenly change the laws in crazy ways...if you agreed with the earlier thought-experiment about duplication, in which there's some chance your "next moment" will be that of any number of different duplicates, then how can you be sure your own next moment will be one in a physics-conserving simulation? All those other simulated Joels living in simulations that are regular up to a given moment but then suddenly transform into whiterabbitland thought the same thing. What basis do you have for thinking you're not one of "them?" Without some kind of objective measure on the set of all possibilities (or at least all possible 'next moments') we have no sound basis for predicting anything at all. Don't drink that coffee--it might have suddenly turned into hydrochloric acid! Or maybe you'll suddenly find the taste of coffee absolutely revolting, or maybe drinking the coffee will cause you to transform into a stegosaurus...anything's possible, really. Check out this thread I started on the "measure problem" a while ago, which got some interesting responses: http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/index.html?by=OneThread&t=Global%20measure%20and%20%22one%20structure%2C%20one%20vote%22 _ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com
Re: UDA last question (was UDA step 9 10)
Bruno: > We can go back to that "step 11" another time, but for now I will > assume you agree "everything is soft, and even arithmetical (in the > sense that the UD is naturally embedded in plato heaven arithmetics. Yes, that's fine. Joel: >> Yes, this sounds reasonable. I would agree: In general, it's not >> possible to predict one's future. Anything is possible... so nothng >> is probable. >> >> But we can still *hope* for certain futures. ;-) Bruno: > But don't we have a contradiction, or something like an empirical > contradiction here. I can certainly hope for certain futures, and > honestly I think (at least from past experience) that some are more > probable than others. For exemple I am now preparing some coffee. I > would have the feeling of lying to myself if I was telling you that I > do not believe "drinking" coffee is probable. So "something" is > probable. So, if we maintain comp, we must explain why, after I have > done coffee, drinking coffee got an higher degree of probability. We > must aknowledge that physicalist do have an explanation here. There > is coffee, there is a material machine preparing it, etc. Hmm... I think I see the problem now. But I don't understand your proposed solution. Do you want to 1) make predictions about the future based on past observations, or 2) make predictions about the future based on all possible histories, or 3) something else entirely. In the first case (1), I think I can see how this might be possible. For example, if every 9 out of 10 times you drink the coffee after making it, then you should be able to reasonably conclude that the next time you make coffee, you will most likely drink it. Similarly, if 99 out of 100 times an electron is deflected away from the nucleus of an atom, then we can be reasonably sure that the next time we fire one into the nucleus, it will be deflected. This seems to work in our current simulation because for the most part, our world appears to be mostly "predictable". But it will start to fail in worlds where there is little regularity. (e.g. making coffee and drinking coffee almost never happen) But in the second case (2) I can't see how we can make any meaningful predictions since the number of all possible histories is infinite. > Put in another way, we must derive the laws of physics from computer > science. And, through the role of the notion of 1-pov, we must derive > physical belief from coherent discourse by machines, or more simply > derive physics from (machine) psychology. > > Do you agree? I'm not sure. I'm still unclear about what you are proposing. How can we derive physics from psychology? Can you give some simple example, like the coffee experiment? > If you follow me perhaps you can understand why, in case your MUCA > is *the* bottom, then we should not postulate that!!! We should prove > it, for exemple by showing that the measure behave well only thanks > to the infinite MUCAs' work generated in arithmetics (or by any DUs, > or in Numberland, as I like to say. No - sorry. I don't understand that either. I think you've lost me. > If you really take the comp 1-indeterminisme seriously, perhaps you > can guess also why our very finiteness makes us confronting some > continuum, and some random oracle, ... Infinite possibilities? I don't know. Joel
Re: UDA last question (was UDA step 9 10)
>For the computationalist that simple explanation is not available. >For an explanation that "preparing coffee" augment the degree of >plausibility (probability, credibility) of the experience of >drinking coffee, the only way is to isolate, from pure arithmetics, >a measure on the consistent computational extensions of my preparing >coffee-state-history and to show that in most of them (in a sense >which need to be define also purely arithmeticaly) I will be >drinking coffee. Slurp. (I'm definitely drinking coffee now!). > >Put in another way, we must derive the laws of physics from >computer science. And, through the role of the notion of 1-pov, >we must derive physical belief from coherent discourse by machines, >or more simply derive physics from (machine) psychology. > >Do you agree? >From some of Joel's other comments I get the feeling that he's one of those who doesn't believe in putting a measure on the set of all possible events, whether it's a universal measure (the absolute probability that one set of events will be experienced vs. some other) or an observer-relative measure (the first-person probability that *I* will experience some future state, given my current state). Is this correct, Joel? Personally, I've never been able to understand the attitude of the anti-measurists--how can anything make sense without one? What possible reason would I have to believe that the future will resemble the past in any way whatsoever? After all, there are an infinite number of possible universes that resemble the one I've experienced up to the present moment, and then suddenly transform into a swarm of white rabbits--should I be bracing myself for such a possibility at every moment? Without some kind of measure on the Plenitude we cannot even talk about the "probability" that the laws of physics will continue to operate normally a minute from now...you can't really talk about anything but the present moment, in fact. _ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com
UDA last question (was UDA step 9 10)
Joel: >Bruno: >> Do you realise now that not only we have a form of 1-indeterminacy >> but we have also a sort of 1-nonlocality. > >Yes, from the first-person point of view. Though I would try to >argue that the third-person point of view must always remain local. >Note: If you find that remark controversial, feel free to defer that >discussion until later. For now, I would just like to follow your >argument. Actually I agree with you: the third-person point of view must always remain local. I talk sometimes of 3-locality. Note that MWI (Many World Interpretation of QM) is really the necessary move to conserve QM and 3-locality (and 3-determinacy btw). Experimental confirmation of the violations of Bell's inequality is either a confirmation of our 3-non-locality or of the existence of parallel histories. Bell supposes implicitely that quantum experience have a unique outcome, but both with COMP or with SE (Schrodinger Eq.) we must accept the idea of the realisation of multiple outcomes. >> And so do you agree that the way of quantifying 1-indeterminacy >> is invariant if we substitute real environment by virtual one, or >> if we mix them ... > >Yes, this is fine by me. As I've said, I also believe our immediate >world IS virtual. In fact I'm not sure there is any difference >between real and virtual. In my mind, everything is real. Or >everything is virtual. It doesn't matter. But maybe this isn't >the place to discuss that. So please continue... No need to discuss that, I still agree with you. I have introduced the "real physical world" (a quite mythical construct) only for the sake of the argument. In fact you have answered question 11 (and probably more other) which are needed to explain why we don't need to really concretely run the UD. Like most people in this list it seems you have no problem with that so I skip those questions. We can go back to that "step 11" another time, but for now I will assume you agree "everything is soft, and even arithmetical (in the sense that the UD is naturally embedded in plato heaven arithmetics. >> Do you agree that, in that case, for any experience/experiment >> you intend to do, here and now, to predict your immediate >> personal futur (this includes the result you see when observing >> the needle), you must take into account (i.e. the domain of >> 1-indeterminacy is given by) all the virtual reconstitutions (and >> the computational stories going through it) of yourself generated >> by the UD? > >Yes, this sounds reasonable. I would agree: In general, it's not >possible to predict one's future. Anything is possible... so >nothng is probable. > >But we can still *hope* for certain futures. ;-) But don't we have a contradiction, or something like an empirical contradiction here. I can certainly hope for certain futures, and honestly I think (at least from past experience) that some are more probable than others. For exemple I am now preparing some coffee. I would have the feeling of lying to myself if I was telling you that I do not believe "drinking" coffee is probable. So "something" is probable. So, if we maintain comp, we must explain why, after I have done coffee, drinking coffee got an higher degree of probability. We must aknowledge that physicalist do have an explanation here. There is coffee, there is a material machine preparing it, etc. For the computationalist that simple explanation is not available. For an explanation that "preparing coffee" augment the degree of plausibility (probability, credibility) of the experience of drinking coffee, the only way is to isolate, from pure arithmetics, a measure on the consistent computational extensions of my preparing coffee-state-history and to show that in most of them (in a sense which need to be define also purely arithmeticaly) I will be drinking coffee. Slurp. (I'm definitely drinking coffee now!). Put in another way, we must derive the laws of physics from computer science. And, through the role of the notion of 1-pov, we must derive physical belief from coherent discourse by machines, or more simply derive physics from (machine) psychology. Do you agree? (Actually I have pave the way for doing that derivation of physics and I've got some (technical) result which I have explain to George in this list, except that I still must answer some question. The basic idea is to substitute the grandmother psychology by the Godel-Lob logic of provability. You can look in the archive, but it is rather technical). If you follow me perhaps you can understand why, in case your MUCA is *the* bottom, then we should not postulate that!!! We should prove it, for exemple by showing that the measure behave well only thanks to the infinite MUCAs' work generated in arithmetics (or by any DUs, or in Numberland, as I like to say. If you really take the comp 1-indeterminisme seriously, perhaps you can guess also why our very finiteness makes us confronting some continuum, and
