[Fis] Mind, matter, meaning and information
6, 1948. Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophical Investigations. Blackwell, Oxford, 1972. Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. First published in 1953. -- Robin Faichney <http://www.robinfaichney.org/> ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es http://webmail.unizar.es/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Mind, matter, meaning and information
designs". Past designs will very often be relevant but I doubt whether
they're necessarily so. And I'm not sure why you mention "situations".
The design stance, in the simplest cases, merely distinguishes
manufactured objects from natural ones, though it can be applied to
natural objects by creationists and those seeking explanations in
terms of evolutionary adaptiveness, and also to much more subtle and
complex scenarios, such as aspects of interpersonal relationships. Is
this what you have in mind?
>>Though the physical stance is very natural and practical in many
contexts, the
>>formal stance is superior in a certain sense: information is all that our
>>senses convey, we do not experience matter directly, it can be considered a
>>theoretical entity (or set of entities).
> S: The word "experience" here is critical. Our experience (and
> meanings) is engendered by our formal organization. Matter is what is
> organized, and so could not itself be the content of experience (or
> meaning) even though it is the carrier (channel).
Here at last we seem to have unambiguous agreement.
>>A mind is a user or processor of intentional information.
> S: That is to say, it initiates finality.
Perhaps, I don't think in these terms.
>>Matter is a theoretical entity extrapolated from physical information.
> S: Presumably "physical information", then, relates to an array of
> possibilities generated by a situation, from which the formal setup
> (context) will select some given a nudge informed by an intentional
> tendency.
Physical information is simply material form. Any physical process
involves contextual selection, but a perfectly static arrangement of
entities embodies physical information too, by virtue of the fact that
it has some form.
Having looked at your home page, I see we have very different concepts
of form. You suggest {energy -> {matter -> {form -> {organization
but I see form as occurring simultaneously with energy, in fact as
more-or-less synonymous with quality. Whatever has qualities, has
form. Perhaps you limit form to instances of stability?
I'm fairly confident that matter can reasonably be considered a
theoretical entity, but I'm now having some doubts about saying that
it's extrapolated from physical information, because it can be argued
that we don't have direct access to that either, all we experience
being intentional information, so physical information is theoretical
too. This needs more thought.
>>Meaning is intentional information (though multiple levels of en/decoding
>>might
>>be involved), and consciousness is the use or processing of
>>intentional information.
> S: Again, then: mind = matter + meaning.
Perhaps, but I think I'm saying rather more than that.
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Re: [Fis] Mind, matter, meaning and information
Probably my last message for a while, as I said. Thanks again for your
help.
Subject: Re: [Fis] Mind, matter, meaning and information
[body begins]
Saturday, March 17, 2007, 2:24:37 PM, Stanley N. Salthe wrote:
>>>>A mind is a user or processor of intentional information.
>>> S: That is to say, it initiates finality.
>>
>>Perhaps, I don't think in these terms.
> SS: Well, using 'intentionality' seems to me to implicitly use
> finality. Consider {propensity {purpose}}. Intent is necessarilly
> directional, and directionality is all that is left is the particular goal
> is removed.
OK, now I understand why we keep failing to connect. In philosophy of
mind "intentionality" refers to the concept revived by Brentano,
meaning "aboutness". It has nothing to do with intent except that,
like all other mental phenomena, intent is intentional, i.e. there's
some content, there must be something that you intend to do. I agree
with Brentano that intentionality is "the mark of the mental", because
everything that's mental is intentional, and everything that's
physical is not.
Intentionality is central to my thinking, so I don't think there's any
point in continuing this particular exchange. If you'd like to start
again on the basis of this revised understanding then I will respond,
but otherwise I'll keep quiet for a while, as I said in my previous
message, replying to John. I'm really sorry to have wasted your time
by failing to allow for the fact that not everyone who's interested in
information has a phil of mind perspective.
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Re: [Fis] about fis discussions (2)
Friday, June 15, 2007, 12:30:07 PM, Pedro wrote: > Perhaps we have not achieved a clear demarcation from “mechanics” yet, theoretically speaking. And that may be another serious problem in itself. In what is different the “informational” from the “mechanical”? Or in my own terms: “Distinction from the Adjacent” versus “Force from the Adjacent” ?… Can I suggest that the form/substance dichotomy is worth considering in this context? The concept of physical information, well established within physics though still controversial for some, basically corresponds to form. Etymologically, "information" derives from "form". I'd argue that "informational" is synonymous with an important if uncommon sense of "formal". The distinction between numerical and qualitative identity seems crucial here. Physical entities are numerically distinct, even when qualitatively identical. Forms, on the other hand, are qualities: if two instances are qualitatively identical, then there's just one form. That, to my mind, is the basic feature of information. This concept is purely syntactic, which for many people is a problem, but I believe that the philosophical problem of meaning can and should be clearly distinguished from the question "what is information"? The concept of form is, I think, more fundamental than that of distinction: both distinctions and similarities are formal features. Information concerns similarities as well as differences. Unfortunately, I don't have the background to present my views formally (to use a different sense of that word), but I'm more than willing to discuss them in such an informal setting as this. -- Robin Faichney <http://www.robinfaichney.org/> ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es http://webmail.unizar.es/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: SV: [Fis] info & meaning
Friday, October 5, 2007, 1:53:51 PM, Loet wrote: > Dear colleagues, I agree with a lot of Christophe Menant's last mail, but I think that I can take it a step further. The _expression_ of Bateson "A difference which makes a difference" presumes that there is a system or a series of events for which the differences can make a difference. This system selects upon the differences (or Shannon-type information) in the environment of the system. The Shannon-type information is meaningless, but the specification of the system of reference provides the information with meaning. The Shannon-type information which is deselected is discarded as noise. That's (at least approximately) what I mean when I say that intentional information is always encoded in physical information. Intentional information is the ordinary concept of information and is meaningful. Physical information is very closely related to Shannon information and has no intrinsic meaning, being mere physical patterns -- on this conceptualisation, which is widely accepted within physics, all physical patterns are treated as Shannon-type information. Intentional or semantic information, on the other hand, requires a context, which plays the part of a decoding key. Thus semantic information, or meaning, is always encoded within physical patterns. > Meaning is provided to the information from the perspective of hindsight. I don't think "hindsight" is strictly correct, because it implies a conscious "looking back", whereas the processing of meaning (decoding) often occurs prior to consciousness. > The meaningful information, however, still follows the arrow of time. Meaning processing within psychological and social systems reinforces the feedback arrow (from the hindsight perspective) to the extent that control tends to move to this next-order level. The system can then become anticipatory because the information which is provided with meaning can be entertained by the system as a model. Perhaps, human language is required for making that last step: no longer is only information exchanged, but information is packaged into messages in which the information has a codified meaning. Modelling is certainly what allows anticipation, but some modelling, at least, does not require language: consider catching a ball that's thrown to you. You model the trajectory, I would suggest, in order to put your hand in the right place at the right time, but language is obviously not involved there. Of course you might say that meaning plays no part in that scenario, but I think it's a very big mistake to deny a continuum from significance of any sort at one extreme to the highly abstract and sophisticated meanings of the messages on this list, at the other. What both extremes have in common is the concept of use, as in Wittgenstein's later view of meaning: it is our use, I would suggest, of physical patterns, that encodes significance and meaning within them, and the modelling of a trajectory has significant similarities with the modelling of correspondents and their intentions (though significant differences too, of course). -- Robin Faichney <http://www.robinfaichney.org/> ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es http://webmail.unizar.es/mailman/listinfo/fis
[Fis] Test
I didn't get Pedro's request, for some reason, though I'm not aware of having missed any previous messages. -- Robin Faichney <http://www.robinfaichney.org/> ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
[Fis] Top-down constraint
I'd like to challenge the concept of top-down constraint that came up here recently. I think the "tipping point" phenomenon is a good example of apparent top-down constraint. This is where a pile of sand has built up gradually, as grains trickle onto it from above. The effect can be seen in an hourglass. It is sometimes said that the slope of such a sand-pile will never exceed 43.5°--though I believe the exact angle will vary with the type of sand. When that point (the "tipping point") has been reached, just one more grain falling onto the slope will cause a "landslide", the base area of the pile will increase, and the slope will stabilise again at or below 43.5°. The tipping point phenomenon is a very good example of how a tiny immediate cause can have a relatively massive effect. Of course, the bigger picture includes not just the last grain to fall before the landslide, but all the grains that fell before that and brought the pile to the delicate condition in which just one more grain was required to set it off. But this is not an example of top-down constraint. The tipping point is certainly a higher level phenomenon than any of those that might be demonstrated by an individual grain, but it, in itself, exerts no effect on the grains. The movements and eventual disposition of each grain are affected only by those of the other grains with which it comes into contact (as well as gravity etc.). When we measure the slope at the tipping point as 43.5°, the consistent precision of that figure might tempt us to think of it as specially significant---and in a sense it is: it's quite fascinating that the features of the individual grains, when aggregated, come to this. But it is not causally effective. What is, are the relationships between all the grains that come into contact. Which is why, as I say, the tipping point will vary with the features of the individual grains, the type of sand. It is just an overview, a simpli cation, of all the relationships between all the individual grains in the pile. The tipping point phenomenon cannot affect the behaviour of individual grains precisely because it is that behaviour, in aggregate. After reading that you might thing that I'm a reductionist, but here is why I'm not: I insist that the tipping point phenomenon is just as real as are the features of the individual grains. Molecules are as real as atoms, and higher level phenomena generally are just as real as lower level ones. But I also insist that "levels of explanation" are well-named: that causal explanations have to adhere to one level to be coherent. -- Robin Faichney <http://www.robinfaichney.org/> ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Top-down constraint
said in the first message): levels of explanation are well named, because (efficient) causal explanations necessarily have a temporal element and must adhere to one level to maintain coherence. One event will have different narratives, depending on the level at which it is viewed, and that in turn is determined by the context, the purpose for which the explanation is required. For instance, there need be no conflict between mental and neurological explanations, because these belong to different realms of discourse, and to import concepts that belong to one into the other is a category error. -- Robin Faichney <http://www.robinfaichney.org/> ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Top-down constraint
One more point, last but not least. Monday, September 1, 2008, 3:17:10 AM, Stanley wrote: >> I'd say >>I'm just as pro-levels as you, perhaps even more so, insisting that, >>to use your terminology, the efficient cause and its effects must be >>viewed on the same level, and the efficient cause must be very >>clearly distinguished from the others for that reason. >Putting it that more precise way leaves me with no objection. > Efficient cause would tend to occur at one of whatever levels a > system has. I'm afraid I can't agree with that. As I see it, causation has to occur along all levels simultaneously. If I bounce a tennis ball off a wall, the narratives regarding (a) macro-level ball-bounce, and (b) molecular-level wall-molecule/ball-molecule interaction, will be quite different, but equally valid, surely? -- Robin Faichney <http://www.dalbrack.org/> ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] The Fascination of Art
The concept of "flow" might be useful here: "Flow is the mental state of operation in which the person is fully immersed in what he or she is doing by a feeling of energized focus, full involvement, and success in the process of the activity. Proposed by positive psychologist Mihály Csíkszentmihályi, the concept has been widely referenced across a variety of fields." (From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flow_(psychology)) I believe it's reasonable to suppose that pursuit of the flow experience characterises both the childhood and adult activities that you describe here. I have recently taken up regular guitar practice again, after a lapse of many years, and I find that my experience of that, when I'm playing well -- which is also, invariably, when it is most enjoyable -- fits the flow concept beautifully. Robin Faichney Tuesday, October 7, 2008, 11:31:46 AM, Pedro wrote: > Dear colleagues, > Maybe the social & market aspects of art are inevitable outcomes, given > the curious role it plays in human life. It is similar to what happens > with science itself ---from an aloof "nec-otium" activity in its > historical origins to the R&D +i trite business of today. I would not > enter in those social aspects right now, rather an anecdote on > "movement" may be interesting: > It is amazing how much of the life of a child is centered in challenging > and exciting the system of balance&equilibrium (the "sixth sense"): > crawling, climbing, cycling, rolling, spinning, jumping, skipping, > skying, surfing,... schoolyards are the usual scenario for most of these > exciting activities. No doubt that some of the balance fun persists in > adulthood: amusement parks, tennis, soccer, ping pong, tai chi, yoga... > Evolutionarily, this ontogenetic process of looking for exaggerated > balance system excitations is rather anomalous in its length and > intensity (to my info). The point is that the crave to explore every > aspect of movement and balance in the physical environment of the child > is gradually displaced toward the mental realm in the adult. Using the > same brain & cerebellum system machineries "the movement of the body" > becomes the "movement of thoughts and percepts" (McCredie, 2007). > And here it is the bold question: does the child fascination for those > exploratory-creative physical "disciplines" (crawling, climbing, > spinning, etc.) become redirected so to be the basis of the adult > fascination for the exploration of mental movements in painting, > sculpting, dancing, singing, etc.? > best > Pedro > ___ > fis mailing list > fis@listas.unizar.es > https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis -- Robin Faichney <http://www.robinfaichney.org/> ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
[Fis] Economic modeling
Not only economists have economic models. In my opinion the most important complicating factor in economics, as in other aspects of human culture, is the fact that every agent, including institutions as well as individuals, models both other agents and, in many cases, the system as a whole. For instance, agents observe the economic behaviour of, and the deals obtained by, many other agents. This informs consumer and business confidence and is what enables the negative and positive feedback loops that lead to booms and busts, respectively. -- Robin Faichney <http://www.robinfaichney.org/> ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Economic modeling
Thursday, November 13, 2008, 7:54:55 PM, I wrote: > Not only economists have economic models. > In my opinion the most important complicating factor in economics, as > in other aspects of human culture, is the fact that every agent, > including institutions as well as individuals, models both other > agents and, in many cases, the system as a whole. > For instance, agents observe the economic behaviour of, and the > deals obtained by, many other agents. This informs consumer and > business confidence and is what enables the negative and positive > feedback loops that lead to booms and busts, respectively. Oops! It is, of course, positive feedback that causes bubbles (in particular sectors) and booms (across an economy), and negative feedback that causes busts. -- Robin Faichney <http://www.robinfaichney.org/> ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Economic modeling
Friday, November 14, 2008, 6:35:13 PM, Guy wrote: > Hi Robin (and other FISers), > I hope this isn't just being picky. > I would argue that both booms and busts are driven by positive feedback. > Buying begets more buying in one instance and selling begets selling in the > other. Negative feedback tends to stabilize the dynamics of a system. You are, of course, absolutely right. That was a foolish mistake, especially as I've corrected others when they've made it in the past. I wouldn't say pointing that out was being picky, but on the other hand it doesn't really impinge on my main point, regarding mental modeling. This is my third post this week, but I think that's reasonable, given how quiet the list has been, and how short my posts have been. -- Robin Faichney <http://www.robinfaichney.org/> ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Asymetry and Information: A modest proposal
ct: Re: [Fis] Asymetry and Information: A modest proposal > > At 11:13 PM 2009/11/27, you wrote: > >Dear Joseph, > > > >Be my guest and have some Irish children for breakfast! > > > >I did not mean my intervention as directed against substantive theorizing. > >In addition to a mathematical theory of communication, we need substantive > >theories of communication. This became clear to me when Maturana formulated > >life as a consequence of the communication of molecules. If atoms are > >communicated, one obtains a theory of chemical evolution (Mason), etc. All > >these special theories of communication can usefully be matched with a > >mathematical theory of communication (or perhaps more generally non-linear > >dynamics). > > > >The special case, of course, is when one multiplies H with k(B) that one > >obtains S (Joule/Kelvin). John seems to imply that there is another unit of > >information in physics which is a conserved entity. John: Can you perhaps > >provide the dimensionality of this unit and provide the derivation? > > Dear Loet, > > It is usually defined as a bit, which is understood as a binary distinction, > wherefore the "it from bit" formulation found in a number of places, but > the term is due, I believe, to John Wheeler. More typically the term is > related to entropy considerations (as in the black hole case). My > derivation is by dimensional analysis. Entropy is the compliment > of information. If we take the maximal entropy of a system by > relaxing all constraints with no other change in macroscopic > parametres (impossible in practice, but possible in the imagination), > and subtract from this the statistical entropy using Boltzman's > formulation based on the number of complexions of the system, > we get negentropy, which can be identified with the information > in the system. This will break up into two parts, configurational > and statistical. The it from bit view is usually talking of configurational > information. The difference between the two is largely a matter of relative > time scale, butt the time scale differences are typically large, so > there is a qualitative difference. So negentropy (physical information) > should be in entropy units. Entropy, as you point out, can be measured > as joules per degree Kelvin. Going back to basics, joules are energy, > and degrees Kelvin as average energy per degree of freedom. > Dividing through by the energy, and correcting for the double denominator, > we get information in units of degrees of freedom. I submit that bits > are an excellent measure of degrees of freed, both being pure numbers. > > So that is it, information (and entropy) are pure numbers with dimensions > of degrees of freedom. Boltzman's constant relates this to energy > measures and other physical values. However, information as > a measure of degrees of freedom can be used in more abstract > formulations as well (it implies Shannon's approach, as well as > all but the required machine dependent part of the computational > approach). I think it is as fundamental as we can get. > > I've argued this all on the list in one place or another before. > > John > > > -- > Professor John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za > Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa > T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031 > http://www.ukzn.ac.za/undphil/collier/index.html > > ___ > fis mailing list > fis@listas.unizar.es > https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis Vous cherchez l'intégrale des clips de Michael Jackson ? Bing ! Trouvez ! ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis PC, téléphones portables, souris hi-tech… à gagner grâce à Hotmail ! C'est ici ! -- Robin Faichney <http://www.robinfaichney.org/> ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
[Fis] On Stan's reply to Gavin
Saturday, January 29, 2011, 9:39:09 PM, Stanley wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 24, 2011 at 6:41 AM, Gavin Ritz wrote:
> SS: Info theory presumably applies to everything and anything.
> GR: It was never intended to apply to anything but communication
> instruments. That is sending English language down a pipe.
> S: Since it was abstracted from human communication systems, it has
> taken on a 'life of its own', as any abstraction has a right to do.
I agree with this. I'm no mathematician, but I believe that the
broader significance of Shannon's work was a method of quantifying
"pure pattern". This was then adopted by physicists who saw that
material form can be treated as pure patterns, and thus we get such
concepts as the conservation of "information" in quantum mechanics and
in black holes. "Conservation of information" can be translated as
meaning that physical laws do not break down, and the state of
affairs at one time can be considered "encoded" in the state of
affairs at another time. For instance, events within the event horizon
of a black hole (or, on the holographic principle, on the surface of
the event horizon) could, in principle, be determined by examination
of the Hawking radiation that escapes as the hole diminishes.
> I think
> the crux of the matter is being examined right now -- is information
> ('bit') primal or is stuff ('it') primal? In my view there needs to
> be stuff in order for there to be a perspective, and there needs to
> be a perspective before there is anything to communicate.
I share your focus on perspective (and also context), but I'm not
clear why perspective requires "stuff" -- but see below.
> Information is an abstraction related closely to form, which it is
> supposed always could be translated to instructions in a computer,
> creating 'bits' from inspection of 'its'. Then the supposition is
> that The World also reckons with information, leading to" 'its from
> 'bits' ". This, to me, is implausible.
I tend to feel the same way about "it from bit", but I think it should
perhaps be taken as implying that the idea of substance derives from
form, which to me is highly plausible. We can take the view that form
is what we encounter -- at all levels, personally and scientifically
-- and substance a theoretical entity or set of such. This view is
related to philosophical idealism, and is, like that, I believe,
strictly irrefutable. By the same token, being unverifiable, it has no
practical consequences. Which is more real, or which came first, form
or substance? These questions are, strictly speaking, meaningless.
Etymologically, "information" is extremely closely related to "form",
and the concept of information used in physics simply IS material
form, where that is generalised from shape to encompass all material
properties. Just as past and future states of affairs are encoded in
the present, so genetic information is encoded in DNA. Biological
information is just a subset of physical information. DNA molecules,
like all physical entities, encode the outcomes of all of their
potential interactions, but in the case of DNA the outcomes are
constrained by the cellular context.
I'm currently working on a paper in which I argue that intentional
information -- using "intentional" in Brentano's sense, and
encompassing meaning and all mental content -- is best considered
encoded in physical/biological information, being decoded in use.
Perspective is obviously highly relevant here, but it seems to me that
it can probably be explained in (literally) formal terms, that
substance as such need not enter the picture, but perhaps I'm missing
something?
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<http://www.robinfaichney.org/>
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[Fis] To Stan and Bob, on physical information
In the interests of focusing on what I see as the main issues, I've made quite a few deletions. Monday, January 31, 2011, 3:26:06 PM, Stanley wrote: > On Mon, Jan 31, 2011 at 7:42 AM, Robin Faichney > wrote: >> I'm no mathematician, but I believe that the >> broader significance of Shannon's work was a method of quantifying >> "pure pattern". This was then adopted by physicists who saw that >> material form can be treated as pure patterns, and thus we get such >> concepts as the conservation of "information" in quantum mechanics and >> in black holes. > Are 'pure patterns' three dimensional? Sorry, but doesn't dimensionality depend upon interpretation? >> I tend to feel the same way about "it from bit", but I think it should >> perhaps be taken as implying that the idea of substance derives from >> form, which to me is highly plausible. > So, "form" here is potentiality. But where could this come from without some > constraints? No, I said "the idea of substance". We actually encounter only form, because that's what our senses convey -- but we find the concept of substance useful. >> Etymologically, "information" is extremely closely related to "form", > Strongly agree. Its function then is to constrain entropy production. I understand form as a reconceptualisation of qualities, so for me it does not have any particular function, but is rather an aspect of material reality (albeit an extremely comprehensive one). The concept of form as constraint I think might not apply to the lowest levels of explanation, and might be limited to a subset of all qualities. (Maybe, if it does not apply to the lowest level, it is necessarily limited to a subset of qualities.) >> and the concept of information used in physics simply IS material >> form, where that is generalised from shape to encompass all material >> properties. Just as past and future states of affairs are encoded in >> the present, > I suppose this takes into account historicity? Via statistics? That snippet concerns physical determinism, not (directly) history, statistics or any other higher level analysis. >> so genetic information is encoded in DNA. Biological >> information is just a subset of physical information. DNA molecules, >> like all physical entities, encode the outcomes of all of their >> potential interactions, but in the case of DNA the outcomes are >> constrained by the cellular context. > But we now know that there is a good deal of material manipulation > and modification in between DNA code and protein complexes. You > could say that the DNA information is generic, while what emerges from > metabolism is particular. You're right, I should have said "in the case of DNA the outcomes are constrained by the cellular context as influenced by the extra- cellular environment." > I'm currently working on a paper in which I argue that intentional > information -- using "intentional" in Brentano's sense, and > encompassing meaning and all mental content -- is best considered > encoded in physical/biological information, being decoded in use. > But the DNA stuff is generic, use is particular. I'm sorry that wasn't more clear. By "biological information" in that case I meant not DNA but, primarily, brain structure and function, which is obviously much more directly related to mental content. Tuesday, February 1, 2011, 12:10:17 AM, Robert wrote: >> On Mon, Jan 31, 2011 at 7:42 AM, Robin Faichney >> wrote: > Dear Robin, > I have always wondered what physicists meant when they talked about > "conservation of information", because Shannon-like measures are > definitely not state variables, and hence not conserved. For example, > information is continually being created and destroyed in ecological > systems. Yes, of course, organisms die and decay. I suppose what physicists mean is that the sort of information in which they are interested, ie at the levels that concern them, is conserved. However, what I'm interested in is the information, not whether, where or to what extent it is conserved: that is merely an illustration of the use of "information" in physics, for me, I'm no physicist, and I'm afraid I can't help with such issues. We all have to specialise! -- Robin Faichney <http://www.robinfaichney.org/> ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Background to Modern Science - Krassimir
Friday, February 11, 2011, 10:59:03 AM, James wrote: >John Dun Scotus was Irish, educated in England and taught in Paris. While not wishing to appear either chauvinistic or pedantic, I'll risk pointing out that John Duns Scotus was a Scot, like myself. See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/duns-scotus/#LifJohDunSco -- Robin Faichney <http://www.robinfaichney.org/> ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] BBC Doco; Cell
Monday, March 28, 2011, 12:05:54 AM, Gavin wrote: > Even at the most basic level of an organism's communication with its > environment. There is no discernable information exchange. Every single one > of our senses is an energy transduction structure-processing unit. All we do > is transduce say light and sound energy to electrical energy. This much is > pretty well established. I think you need to think about what the light and sound, on one hand -- or rather one side of the transduction -- and electrical energy, on the other side, have in common. These are carriers for patterns, and it is the patterns that are carried by light, sound, electricity, whatever, that constitute the information. So the informational analysis is a "higher level" one, relative to matter and energy, a useful (to some, at least) way of looking at patterns embodied in material/energetic processes. -- Robin Faichney <http://www.robinfaichney.org/> ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] meaningful inforamtion
Title: Re: [Fis] meaningful inforamtion Hi Pedro and Anthony, Valentino Braitenberg has a book out this year in German: Information - der Geist in der Natur My knowledge of German is dismal, but it seems to be about information as the "spirit" or "mind" of nature. This would be consistent with a quotation of his from Luciano Floridi, editor, Philosophy of Computing and Information: Five Questions, 2008, p16: The concept of information, properly understood, is fully sufficient to do away with popular dualistic schemes invoking spiritual substances distinct from anything in physics. This is Aristotle redivivus, the concept of matter and form united in every object of this world, body and soul, where the latter is nothing but the formal aspect of the former. The very term “information” clearly demonstrates its Aristotelian origin in its linguistic root. Anthony talks about form too, of course, but I'm afraid I find his concept of "meaningful" information to be somewhat dualistic -- but maybe I just haven't understood his view of the relationship between meaningful information and material form. Robin Wednesday, July 20, 2011, 12:38:03 PM, Pedro wrote: Thanks, Anthony, for the info on your book. As you will see during future discussion sessions (currently we are in the vacation pause) some parties in this list maintain positions not far away from your own views. In our archive you can check accumulated mails about the matter you propose --e.g. discussions during the last spring. But I think you are right that the whole biological scope of information has been rarely discussed. best wishes ---Pedro FIS website and discussions archives: see http://infoscience-fis.unizar.es/ aread...@verizon.net escribió: I emailed an earlier version of the following contribution to the listserve a few days ago and am interested in finding out if it is suitable for dissemination and, if os, when it might be included. My main interest is in promoting discussion about the approach it takes to dealing with the observer-dependent aspects of information. My book " Meaningful Information: The BridgeBetween Biology, Brain and Behavior' has just been published by Springer. Itintroduces a radically new way of thinking about information and the importantrole it plays in living systems. Thiså opens up new avenues for exploring howcells and organisms change and adapt, since the ability to detect and respondto meaningful information is the key that enables them to receive their geneticheritage, regulate their internal milieu, and respond to changes in their environment.The types of meaningful information that different species and different celltypes are able to detect are finely matched to the ecosystems in which theylive, for natural selection has shaped what they need to know to functioneffectively within them. Biological detection and response systems range fromthe chemical configurations that govern genes and cell life to the relativelysimple tropisms that guide single-cell organisms, the rudimentary nervoussystems of invertebrates, and the complex neuronal structures of mammals andprimates. The scope of meaningful information that can be detected andresponded to reaches its peak in our own species, as exemplified by our specialabilities in language, cognition, emotion, and consciousness, all of which areexplored within this new framework. The book's home page can be found at: http://www.springer.com/life+sciences/evolutionary+%26+developmental+biology/book/978-1-4614-0157-5 I am eager tofind out what members think about it. Anthony Reading ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis -- - Pedro C. Marijuán Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud Avda. Gómez Laguna, 25, Pl. 11ª 50009 Zaragoza, Spain Telf: 34 976 71 3526 (& 6818) Fax: 34 976 71 5554 pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/ ----- -- Robin Faichney <http://www.robinfaichney.org/> ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] meaningful information
dealing with the >>> observer-dependent aspects of information. >>> >>> My book " Meaningful Information: The BridgeBetween Biology, Brain and >>> Behavior' has just been published by Springer. Itintroduces a radically new >>> way of thinking about information and the importantrole it plays in living >>> systems. Thiså opens up new avenues for exploring howcells and organisms >>> change and adapt, since the ability to detect and respondto meaningful >>> information is the key that enables them to receive their geneticheritage, >>> regulate their internal milieu, and respond to changes in their >>> environment.The types of meaningful information that different species and >>> different celltypes are able to detect are finely matched to the ecosystems >>> in which theylive, for natural selection has shaped what they need to know >>> to >>> functioneffectively within them. Biological detection and response systems >>> range fromthe chemical configurations that govern genes and cell life to the >>> relativelysimple tropisms that guide single-cell organisms, the rudimentary >>> nervoussystems of invertebrates, and the complex neuronal structures of >>> mammals andprimates. The scope of meaningful information that can be >>> detected >>> andresponded to reaches its peak in our own species, as exemplified by our >>> specialabilities in language, cognition, emotion, and consciousness, all of >>> which areexplored within this new framework. >>> >>> The book's home page can be found at: >>> http://www.springer.com/life+sciences/evolutionary+%26+developmental+biology/ >>> book/978-1-4614-0157-5 >>> >>> I am eager tofind out what members think about it. >>> >>> Anthony Reading >>> >>> >>> >>> ___ >>> fis mailing list >>> fis@listas.unizar.es >>> https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> - >>> Pedro C. Marijuán >>> Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group >>> Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud >>> Avda. Gómez Laguna, 25, Pl. 11ª >>> 50009 Zaragoza, Spain >>> Telf: 34 976 71 3526 (& 6818) Fax: 34 976 71 5554 >>> pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es >>> http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/ >>> - >>> ___ >>> fis mailing list >>> fis@listas.unizar.es >>> https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis >> >> >> ___ >> fis mailing list >> fis@listas.unizar.es >> https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > ___ > fis mailing list > fis@listas.unizar.es > https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis -- Robin Faichney <http://www.robinfaichney.org/> ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Chemical information: a field of fuzzy contours ?
Friday, September 23, 2011, 1:07:07 PM, Michel wrote: > Now, I ask you the following: please can you provide an extremely > simple example (the most simple you could imagine) of situation in > which you can say: << in this situation, information is ... >>. > Chemical information is welcome, but an example from physics would be > great, too. I'm no physicist but I'm interested in physical information. It continues to amaze me how little attention is paid by most non-physicists to the very well established concept of information in physics. Of course, there is no "law" or formula that relates a bit of information to, say, quarks, spin, or whatever. These are different ways of looking at the same thing. Spin is a bit of information (I think it's just one bit, but I might be wrong, as I said, I'm no physicist.) Physical information is a re-conceptualisation of material form that allows it to be quantified. So, for example, physicists can (and do) say that information is generally conserved within black holes. (See the Black Hole Information Paradox, and the bet between physicists concerning it, http://www.theory.caltech.edu/~preskill/jp_24jul04.html) Now, there is obviously more to semantic information than material form, but it is my strongly-held belief that it should be possible to relate all other concepts of information back to physical information, and, in fact, I have proposed a way of doing that for semantic information, which I presented at the DTMD2011 workshop (I've also mentioned it in previous posts on this list), but I'll say no more about it here, because I think that's going too far off the current topic. -- Robin Faichney <http://www.robinfaichney.org/> ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Chemical information: a field of fuzzy contours ?
Two replies in one message, to Michel and Gavin. I hope that this will count as my second in the week ending today, Sunday, so I have another two slots in the week beginning tomorrow, Monday. Saturday, September 24, 2011, 11:07:58 AM, Michel wrote: > Thanks also to Robin Faichney for the example of information in > physics, that I would comment a bit (not joking). > I can understand that a two states system such as a spin can be viewed > as carrying a bit of information. > This is a good example of application of information theory to a > physical system. This class of examples is nice because it takes > benefit from the rigorous definitions available in the field, which > can be found in textbooks (Cover, Renyi, etc.). > However, since we assumed that information theory is a subfield of > information science (in addition to be a subfield of probability > theory), we also need very simple examples of information outside the > field of information theory. Michel, maybe that was a bad example, misleading because of its binary nature. My understanding is that physical information is material form, re-conceptualised, and so the spin state, like every other physical attribute, not just the binary ones, IS information (non-semantic information), as and when it suits us to view it that way, i.e. to focus on form rather than substance. Historically, the concept of non-semantic information, or "pure pattern", arose in the context of information theory, but to focus on form is a basic human capacity, and given the concept of non-semantic information, however that arises, it is a small step to apply it to material form, which thus becomes pure pattern whose transformations are governed by the laws of physics. So material form is like data and the totality of physical laws is the program that operates upon it. The operations are, in principle and in general, reversible, and so physical information is conserved, like matter and energy. (I believe there is a strong consensus within physics that physical information is conserved in quantum mechanics.) In a certain sense the laws of physics "stand in" for substance, which is what constrains material form in our ordinary thinking. When we think in terms of pure patterns constrained by physics, every physical entity embodies its own description, and (which is to say almost the same thing) encodes the outcomes of all of its potential interactions. This is a very powerful way of thinking. Gavin: I agree with you that there is no such free-standing, "thing-in-itself" as information, but that doesn't invalidate the concept, far from it. Information is, in my view, basically form, and form doesn't exist without substance, but we work with form, ignoring substance, all the time, and achieve great things by so doing. -- Robin Faichney <http://www.robinfaichney.org/> ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
[Fis] Physical, chemical, biological, semantic information
I've said nothing so far about the actual topic of this session,
chemical information, so I'm going to remedy that here. It relates
very closely to physical information, for me, and, because I can
reduce it to a slogan, I'm going to say something about semantic
information, though strictly speaking that's off-topic. And I'm going
to throw biological information into the mix too.
As I've said already, for me physical information is simply material
form. Ontologically, in this scheme, chemical (and biological)
information are material form too, at higher levels of description.
The relationships between physical, chemical and biological
information are basically those between physics, chemistry and
biology. Yes, when we move to a higher level, new phenomena emerge,
but these are all, in principle, reducible to physics. So the
differences are pragmatic and epistemological, not ontological.
Any physical process, whether at the level of physics, chemistry or
biology, can be viewed as an information process, simply by focusing
on (some of) the formal aspects of it. Certainly, doing that is more
useful in some cases than in others (most obviously, perhaps, in
biology), but it can be done in all cases.
While physical, chemical and biological information, for me, are just
material form, semantic information is the use of material form
(following Wittgenstein's "meaning as use"). So here again,
ontologically, there is nothing new, the relevant distinctions are
pragmatic and epistemological.
Reducing the foregoing to slogan form(!): non-semantic information is
material form, semantic information is the use of material form.
And relating that to some other contributions, I think the main
implications for what Stan and Loet said are fairly obviously while
Karl, I'm afraid, for me has it backwards: information cannot possibly
fall out of any mathematical procedure because (with respect to Stan)
{form {math}}.
--
Robin Faichney
<http://www.robinfaichney.org/>
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Re: [Fis] Chemical information: a field of fuzzy contours ?
Thursday, September 29, 2011, 11:11:36 AM, Michel wrote: > *** Karl: [Karl's last paragraph:] > As to the assertion of a colleague that the term "information" can not > be subject to a formal definition: if one wants to use a term in a > rational, logical discourse, then the term has to be defined. If we > are to remain in the romantic stage, where "information" is like > "love", "patriotism", "morality" or so, then of course there is no > need to connect the term to the basis of rational discourses. > Otherwise, the need to explicate the roots of a term by showing its > fundaments in a+b=c is of elementary importance. > *** My reply to Karl: > Ok to avoid the mix of the stuff and its reception. > In the addition table: did you meant that having "5" has a result of > an addition of two positive integers, the missing information is: "was > it got from 1+4, 2+3, 3+2, or 4+1" ? If yes, that's indeed a very > simple situation helping to define what is information. If I am wrong, > please just tell me. That is also my impression of Karl's contribution: an example of information, not a definition of it. > The suggestion you did in the last paragraph is of much interest, too. > I hope that FISers will post comments about it. I hope I'm not the colleague mentioned there, because that's most certainly not my position. I believe I offer one of the clearest definitions of information (and, of course, the only correct one!) And I certainly disagree with the implication that all proper definitions are mathematical in form. [Gavin:] > I think the danger is actually there is no such thing as information. > *** My comment about the inexistence of such information: > That is a main point to discuss, and again I hope that FISers will > post their opinions about it. So do I! > *** My reply to Robert: > It does not shock me that chemical reactions are considered as part of > physics, even if chemical reactions are often used to separate the two > fields for pratical purposes. > Since biology is often viewed as part of chemistry, it can be viewed > as physics too (still does not shock me!), but I'm quite sure that > such a conclusion is polemical: this discussion may be postponed to > the next FIS session, focussing on biology, despite that it is of > interest here. I think there's a big difference between saying, as I do, that in principle all chemical and biological phenomena can be reduced to physics, and saying, as I most certainly do not, that the disciplines of chemistry and biology are or should be part of the discipline of physics. That would be just an academic land grab and I'd want no part of it. -- Robin Faichney <http://www.robinfaichney.org/> ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Information as form conveyed by data
Title: Re: [Fis] Information as form conveyed by data Thursday, October 6, 2011, 7:24:09 AM, Loet wrote: Ø There are two ways we can use the idea "in-form". Yes, this is the other notion of information. Shannon-type information does not “inform”, but is counter-intuitively defined as uncertainty (or probabilistic entropy) and measured, for example, in bits of information. It is based on probability distributions. Surely Shannon information is not uncertainty, but its opposite: the reduction of uncertainty. And it has that in common with meaningful or semantic information. Bateson (1973) and many others did define information as “a difference which makes a difference”. Probability distributions contain only differences. If these first-order differences make a difference in a second dimension then a system of reference is assumed for which the first-order difference may make a difference. This system of reference may then discard some incoming information as noise and provide meaning to other information. Perhaps, it is useful to call this meaningful information (or observed information) as different from the expected information (or uncertainty) in the case of Shannon-type information. I find it useful to view Shannon information as "pure pattern". But that might be specific to my particular interest in it, which is its relationship to physical information. (I don't mean that in other contexts it might be wrong to view it that way, but it might not always be the most useful way to look at it.) The system of reference does not have to be “an observer” as is often presumed in the cybernetic tradition; it can also be discourse. Does this contribution make a difference for the discourse? Who or what but an observer can make that judgement? Only to a mind is anything ever meaningful. I read "a difference that makes a difference" as "a significant difference", and only a mind can judge significance. The two notions of information are to be kept apart because otherwise the discussion becomes confused. I certainly agree with that! -- Robin Faichney <http://www.robinfaichney.org/> ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] [Fwd: Re: FW: Meaning Information Theory] ---From Gavin
Title: Re: [Fis] [Fwd: Re: FW: Meaning Information Theory] ---From Gavin
Although I accept neither the title ("Meaning Information Theory") nor
Gavin's description of the content, he tells me that my ideas, among
others, are what he's referring to below, so in case anyone's
interested, my website address is http://www.robinfaichney.org. (The
main relevant aspects have been described here before, as well as at
DTMD2011, but I'd welcome further discussion if anyone is so inclined.)
Robin
Monday, October 24, 2011, 5:22:08 PM, Pedro wrote:
Message from Gavin Ritz
On Fri, Oct 21, 2011 at 12:02 AM, Gavin Ritz <garr...@xtra.co.nz> wrote:
Stan, John list members
I have had a number of off list email dialogue with list members, from this
list and others.
There seems to be a group of listers that have a Theory of Meaningful
Information (It’s not Shannon’s mathematical Information theory), it’s all
about meaning and electrical communication (I guess in this case
neurological).
The common links seem to be Dawkins, Dennett, Searle and a few others.
Does anyone have any clear propositions, with their logical arguments,
evidence. tests, corroboration, modeling, conceptual mathematics, proofs,
for this Meaning Theory of Information. It also seems to include memes.
I am unable to find any clear propositions with their proofs, it all seems
like smoke and mirrors too me. At one point it becomes sort of Shannon’s
mathematical theory then it spoofs into something like Philosophy meaning
arguments (Like Ogden Richards), then it spoofs into living matter and DNA,
then reappears as cultural units, then energy/matter representations.
Is The Meaning Information Theory a shape shifter. Is it the one size fits
all, theory.
What exactly is this Theory, where did it come from, what is it, what is its
proposition, and if there is one how can it be tested, corroborated, where
and how can we gather the evidence.
Regards
Gavin
------
--
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<http://www.robinfaichney.org/>
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Re: [Fis] Discussion of Information Science Education
Saturday, December 3, 2011, 8:43:47 PM, Gavin wrote: > I was reading Richard Dawkins book “the greatest show on earth” and > almost fell over backwards when I read his comments about life and > information. He says the only difference between living matter and > non living matter is information. That would be the most conjectural > statement I have ever read. There is not one scrap of evidence or > test or mathematical model to prove this statement. Don't you find it strange to think that such a successful and prominent scientist, recipient of many honourary doctorates and other awards* and former Professor of the Public Understanding of Science, would take such a position? Is it not much more probable, a much more conservative hypothesis, that Dawkins means something different by "information" than you do? I'd suggest that, if people want to promote information science, Dawkins is someone they should be following. He's probably done more for public recognition of the place of information in science than anyone else has or is likely to do in the near future. Though Stephen Hawking, with his work on the black hole information paradox, should not be neglected. (I wrote to Dawkins in the early nineties suggesting that life could be defined as the survival of information. I'd love to say that he got the idea from me, but in fact he replied saying that it was true, but obvious! I have the handwritten letter (actually my own letter returned with his notes in the margin) carefully stored because I think some day it might be valuable!) * See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Dawkins#Awards_and_recognition -- Robin Faichney <http://www.robinfaichney.org/> ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
[Fis] Semantic and physical information
I'm once again stimulated by these discussions to promote my own theory, involving two complementary concepts, physical and semantic information. I actually prefer the phrase "intentional information" for the latter concept, but "intentionality" is a technical term in philosophy of mind that is often misunderstood outside that context. Physical information is a concept that's well established within physics, and is basically just material form, physical patterns, such as those of these coloured dots on your screen. Physicists can usefully quantify material form with techniques deriving from Shannon, thus this non-semantic but historically justified use of the word "information". My concept of semantic or intentional information is very broad, encompassing all "natural meaning" and significance as well as human communications. Semantic/intentional information is distinguished from physical information but is not metaphysically distinct from it: meaningful information is, as I see it, best considered to be encoded in physical information, being decoded in use. In strictly objective terms there is nothing but material form, but some kinds of entity can effectively use that to inform themselves and each other. This aligns with Wittgenstein's later concept of meaning. We might say that meaning, or semantic/intentional information, is the intersubjective aspect of the use of material form. My "big picture" includes the concepts of mind, consciousness and empathy: it is our tendency to empathize with some processors of information (those like ourselves) that elevates them to the status of information users, ie minds. The best account at present of this theory is my dissertation: http://www.robinfaichney.org/pdf/MScDissertation.pdf The abstract and slides of my presentation at DTMD2011 are also on my website, see below. The resulting paper has been submitted for the forthcoming journal article devoted to that meeting. -- Robin Faichney <http://www.robinfaichney.org/> ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
[Fis] Measuring meaning (was Re: [Fwd: Re: Physics of computing]--Plamen S.)
ce for wavelike > energy transfer through quantum coherence in photosynthetic systems. Nature, > 446(7137): 782-786. > > Collini E., Scholes G. (2009) Coherent intrachain energy in > migration in a conjugated polymer at room temperature. Science, vol. 323 No. > 5912 pp. 369-373. > > Gauger E.M., Rieper E., Morton J.J.L., Benjamin S.C., Vedral V. > (2011) Sustained Quantum Coherence and Entanglement in the Avian > Compass. Phys. Rev. Lett., 106: 040503. > > Cia, J. et al, (2009) Dynamic entanglement in oscillating > molecules. arXiv:0809.4906v1 [quant-ph] > > > Sincerely, > > > Walter > > > > > ___ > fis mailing list > fis@listas.unizar.es > https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > > ___ > fis mailing list > fis@listas.unizar.es > https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > Dr. Plamen L. Simeonov > landline: +49.30.38.10.11.25 > fax/ums: +49.30.48.49.88.26.4 > mobile: +44.12.23.96.85.69 > email: pla...@simeio.org > URL: www.simeio.org > > -- > ___ fis mailing list > fis@listas.unizar.es > https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > ___ > fis mailing list > fis@listas.unizar.es > https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > > ___ > fis mailing list > fis@listas.unizar.es > https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > > __ > > Robert K. Logan > Chief Scientist - sLab at OCAD > Prof. Emeritus - Physics - U. of Toronto > www.physics.utoronto.ca/Members/logan > > > > ___ > fis mailing list > fis@listas.unizar.es > https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > > ___ > fis mailing list > fis@listas.unizar.es > https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > > __ > > Robert K. Logan > Chief Scientist - sLab at OCAD > Prof. Emeritus - Physics - U. of Toronto > www.physics.utoronto.ca/Members/logan > > > > __ > > Robert K. Logan > Chief Scientist - sLab at OCAD > Prof. Emeritus - Physics - U. of Toronto > www.physics.utoronto.ca/Members/logan > > -- Robin Faichney <http://www.robinfaichney.org/> ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Measuring meaning (was Re: [Fwd: Re: Physics of computing]--Plamen S.)
Loet, we seem to be in agreement on Shannon and physical information, or information1. Regarding information2: Monday, April 9, 2012, 12:08:38 PM, Loet wrote: >[Robin wrote] >> But regarding the measurement of information2, this is absolutely >> impossible! The reason is that difference2 is inherently >> subjective: > This seems too apodictic (and perhaps outdated) to me. If the > receiving (or observing) system is a human being then you are right. That was my main point. Such domains for me are the most important, though I acknowledge that "your mileage may vary" (which is of course precisely the point). > If it is a discourse which contains uncertainty, information2 may > add to that uncertainty or reduce it. This is measurable. It seems > to me that precisely here we are at the research front. But that is a very limited concept of information2. You say "we can measure information2", where in my opinion you should say "we can measure what can be viewed as information2 in certain very restricted and well defined domains". By excluding humans you lose my interest, anyway. Sorry! This is my second and therefore last list message of the week. -- Robin Faichney <http://www.robinfaichney.org/> ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Physics of computing
Hi Bruno, This is very interesting for me, my approach to information is via the mind-body and "hard" problems, and I'm sympathetic to computationalism. On the other hand, I have difficulties understanding much of what you say here. Let me focus on one point for now though. Tuesday, April 17, 2012, 8:48:48 AM, Bruno wrote: > Let me sketch the reasoning shortly. If I can survive with a > digitalizable brain, then I am duplicable. For example I could, in > principle, be "read and cut" in Helsinki (say) and pasted in two > different places, like Moscow and Washington (to fix the thing). > The subject to such a duplication experiment, knowing the protocol > in advance, is unable to predict in advance where he will *feel to > be* after the duplication. We can iterate such process and prove > that at such iteration the candidate, seeing if he feels to be in W > or in M, receive a bit of information, and that his best way to > predict his experience, will be, in this case, to predict a random > experience (even algorithmic random experience): like WWMWWWMMMWM > , for example. That is the first person indeterminacy. It seems to me that, if I believe I am duplicable, and understand the protocol, I must predict that I will experience being in both Moscow and Washington. The process bifurcates one person, who becomes two people with absolutely identical physique and memories immediately afterwards, which will then begin to diverge. Both, looking back to pre-bifurcation times, will say "that was me", and both will be correct. There is no "essence" to be randomly (or non-randomly) assigned to one location and not the other. The individual is now two people and therefore can be and is in both cities. -- Robin Faichney <http://www.robinfaichney.org/> ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Physics of computing
Hi again Bruno, Heeding Pedro's kind reminder, this is my second and therefore last message to the list this week. However, I'll be happy to continue the discussion off-list (and to copy in any others who signal their interest). Tuesday, April 17, 2012, 10:57:41 AM, Bruno wrote: > The guy know all this in advance. He knows that if comp is true, he > will survive the duplication, and that, in all possible future > personal situation, he will feel to be in only one city, with an > inferred doppelganger in the other city. No, in my view "he" will experience being in each city (both cities) with an inferred doppelganger in the other city, because "he" is one before the procedure and two after. This is very counter-intuitive regarding personal identity but it is the logical consequence of your assumptions. > So, if he is asked in Helsinki where he will feel to be, he can > only answer that he will feel to be in W or in M, but without being > able to be sure if he will feel to be in W or that he will feel to be in M. Looking forward, pre-bifurcation, the rational expectation is that his identity will split, so that both post-bifurcation versions are genuinely him, and there is no reason for the pre-bifurcation version to choose either city as his destination, he genuinely has two simultaneous destinations, in this scenario one person (pre-bifurcation) can be in two places at once (post-bifurcation). -- Robin Faichney <http://www.robinfaichney.org/> ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Absence and life
Friday, May 18, 2012, 2:55:25 PM, Robert Ulanowicz wrote: > Another difference between Terry's narrative and my own is that he > keeps referring to the "absential" in terms of constraints. But > constraints are specific realities, not the absence thereof. I'm a little doubtful about that, I got the impression that he views constraints as causing absence, rather than being themselves absential. However, he seems to view semantics as absential, which to me is a great mistake: inter/subjective, yes, but absent, no. I must admit I have not read the book, merely viewed an on-line presentation of some of the ideas: http://fora.tv/2012/04/18/Incomplete_Nature_How_Mind_Emerged_From_Matter -- Robin Faichney <http://www.robinfaichney.org/> ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Aspects of the Logical Philosophy of Information
I'm sorry I missed this first time around. On 2012/06/22 at 02:29 PM, in message <4fe46543.6050...@aragon.es>, "Pedro C. Marijuan" wrote: > The concept of "form" can > hardly been maintained along the complexification of information realms... Sorry Pedro, I have to disgree with this. For me, complex forms are just as conceivable as simple ones (though I'll admit that maybe wasn't always the case). Would you accept that, for example, the pattern of neural activity associated with a pleasurable sensation is a form? Or the totality of paths traced by all solar orbiting bodies whose mass is >= 1g? (Thinking of examples is actually quite fun but I've leave it at that.) -- Robin Faichney <http://www.robinfaichney.org/> ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Aspects of the Logical Philosophy of Information
Friday, July 6, 2012, 1:40:29 PM, Pedro wrote: > Dear FIS colleagues, > In relation with Robin (below), the problem of form is not an easy > matter for me (or for anyone) to discuss... it involves so many aspects! It does indeed. Which is why I think we need to try to focus on fundamentals. > Biologically, one is reminded all the mechanisms and forms around > "molecular recognition", D'Arcy Thompson great book "on growth and > form", or the topologically structured maps of nervous systems... and > even Spencer Brown "Laws of form" and those views about "geometry as a > process" and "shapes as memories" (Leyton). But do complex sensations > and conceptual constructions of language purport a "form" too? Given > that for some parties the final view of qualia is also a sort of > hiper-complex form, we are really left in a inflation of forms... Yes > there is a lot of fun around form. In my view "information" is the > vehicle to produce a general scientific discourse once the complexity of > form becomes unbearable. In my view that is a false dichotomy. Information IS form, though the ways in which we deal with it necessarily vary from one context to another. To expand that a little: physical information is material form, and intentional/semantic information, like all other useful concepts of information, is encoded in material form. So, ontologically, there is nothing but material form, but life and mind use it in special ways, one aspect of such use being semantic information, others being genetic information, etc. But anyway it's all form, there is nothing else! (Substance is a theoretical construct that is useful only for some purposes.) > As for John's post on distinction and differences, my only additional > point now deals with the necessity to bring other agents into the arena > ---can a bacteria make "distinctions"; but how, what are its > distinctional mechanisms? I think every stimulus/response paradigm implies a distinction, if only that between the stimulus and its absence. > And what about a company or an institution? > Even in the human case, limitations of the subject, knowledge, > perception... shouldn't we pass through a very thorough neuroscience > filter every conception of the distinction/difference stuff? All actions and decisions can, I think, be parsed in terms of stimulus/response. (In case I'm accused of trying to resurrect behaviourism, I should point out that this is a very abstract theoretical analysis, and I would not dream of trying to deal with any actual person or human organization on such a simplistic basis.) > Finally, > besides the elegance of symmetry, I have doubts on what is the most > parsimonious "logical paradigm" to encapsulate distinctions. The simplest response to a stimulus can be understood in terms of physical causation. Because, as I say, it's all form anyway, the point at which we explicitly bring logic and information into the picture is determined entirely by pragmatic considerations: we do so when it becomes more convenient to think in such terms, for instance when trying to understand a mechanism's "purpose", ie its function within a larger system that is driven by the evolutionary imperative. But to come to the point, surely the most parsimonious "logical paradigm" -- indeed, the only logical paradigm that encompasses decision and action -- is computation! > Indeed these two matters ---forms and distinctions-- are crucial for our > discussions on information! I could not agree more! -- Robin Faichney <http://www.robinfaichney.org/> ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] The Information Flow
Tuesday, November 13, 2012, 3:57:10 PM, Bob wrote: > ... But for me the interesting phenomena where the logic of > cause and effect does not hold is the case of emergence and > self-organization. With an emergent system in which the properties > of the system can not be derived from, reduced to or predicted from > the properties of the components the notion of cause and effect does > not hold. The reductionist program of logical thinking does not do > much to understand emergent phenomena. It is not that logic is wrong > it is that it is irrelevant. So if one is an emergentist one cannot > be a mechanist. That is simple logic. ;-) Don't know if I'm an emergentist or not. On one hand, I do not believe in the "cannot be derived from, reduced to or predicted from" condition because it seems intrinsically subjective, perhaps even circular. But on the other hand I do believe that complex systems are generally just as real and just as significant as their components, higher level explanations being generally just as good as lower level ones, and only the purpose for which the explanation is required determines which level is most appropriate. I also believe that causation can only be considered to occur horizontally, along levels of explanation. That is because causation is inherently temporal, effects following causes, and there is no passage of time in vertical forays into higher or lower levels of description/explanation. There is no vertical causation. However, I do consider myself a mechanist, because as I see it, one high level event can always be decomposed into a number of lower level events, and eventually, if the process is repeated, a level will be reached at which all of the events can be clearly understood as mechanical. The lower level ones do not CAUSE the highest level one, because they are occurring simultaneously, but they COMPOSE it, and there is no mysterious other element to it. Having said which, if the high level event is to be causally explained, other events on the same level will have to be involved in the explanation, a low level story will NOT do the job. So I believe I've reconciled emergence with mechanism, but I suspect that whether you agree with me depends on what you consider to be essential to emergence. Or how strongly you feel about mechanism. Or, of course, maybe I've just made a silly mistake. :) (Some say that levels of description/explanation are not real (Don Ross?), and I don't know whether that's a reasonable thing to say or not, but they're certainly indispensable to us.) -- Robin Faichney <http://www.robinfaichney.org/> ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
[Fis] Paradigmatic diversity
I hope this doesn't seem arrogant, but I feel it appropriate to reiterate and emphasize some recent themes: There is only one ruler in each domain, but there are many domains. A mechanistic (in the broadest, perhaps fashionable sense) understanding at one level or set of levels does not necessarily conflict with a human-centric understanding at a different level or set. Being humans, after all, there is nothing more natural to us than an anthropocentric stance. But it should be recognised for what it is, and not extended to inappropriate realms. The distinction between arts and humanities on one side and sciences on the other is no longer as clear as it once seemed, but it cannot just be dropped and forgotten altogether. The horse must be chosen to suit the course. There is no single almighty king, thank god! -- Robin Faichney <http://www.robinfaichney.org/> ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
[Fis] TripleC special issue from DTMD2011 now published
The special issue of TripleC arising from the The Difference That Makes a Difference 2011 workshop has now been published and is available at http://triple-c.at/index.php/tripleC/issue/view/26. The follow-up conference, The Difference That Makes a Difference 2013, is on 8-10 April next year, and is now open for contributions (abstracts due by 3rd January 2013). Details are at http://www.dtmd.org.uk/ (I'm forwarding this information as a service to FIS and have no formal connection with the organisers other than as a participant in the previous workshop.) -- Robin Faichney <http://www.robinfaichney.org/>--- Begin Message --- Dear all I'm pleased to announce that the special issue of TripleC arising from DTMD 2011 has now been published and is available at http://triple-c.at/index.php/tripleC/issue/view/26. In the end, it has a 2013 publication date. Thanks to everyone for your work on these papers and their revisions. I think the special issue looks good and forms a useful contribution to the literature. In case anyone needs reminding, the follow-up conference, The Difference That Makes a Difference 2013, is on 8-10 April next year, and is now open for contributions (abstracts due by 3rd January 2013). Details are at http://www.dtmd.org.uk/ Best wishes Magnus -- Dr Magnus Ramage Lecturer in Information Systems & Editor-in-Chief, Kybernetes Communication and Systems Department The Open University, Milton Keynes, UK Email: m.ram...@open.ac.uk<mailto:m.ram...@open.ac.uk> Web: http://www.cands.org/Home/people/magnus-ramage-1 Phone: 01908 659779 NOW AVAILABLE: Special issue of TripleC on The Difference That Makes a Difference 2011, http://bit.ly/VC9QCx -- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). - No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com Version: 2013.0.2805 / Virus Database: 2634/5951 - Release Date: 12/11/12 --- End Message --- ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
[Fis] Meaning and mind
As Loet, Krassimir and Karl (at least) have all said (or as I take them to have said), meaning is inherently subjective, or at best intersubjective, but certainly not objective. That is why an understanding of information has to be tightly integrated with an understanding of mind. See my paper “Mind, Matter, Meaning and Information” http://triple-c.at/index.php/tripleC/article/view/323/437 -- Robin Faichney <http://www.robinfaichney.org/> ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
