Jerry, List,
Thanks for your response, Jerry. We are in agreement on a number of points that
I will mark below. Others, not so much. My PhD thesis was an argument for
realism that was basically Peircean, starting out with separating Peirce’s
criterion for cognitive significance from even weak v
John:
Thanks for your interesting and provocative insights.
By way of background, I have compared the various theories of nominalism and
realism for more than 20 years. I find your values deeply embedded in the
assertion that one is a weaker hypothesis than the other. Often, nominalists
app
> On Jan 30, 2017, at 12:28 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
> wrote:
>
> Regarding #2, once again you insist on assigning a pejorative label to my
> view. It is not Platonic, it is Aristotelian (and Peircean), since I clearly
> and consistently affirm that 3ns does not exist apart from 2ns (and 1ns).
> On Jan 30, 2017, at 1:05 PM, Eric Charles
> wrote:
>
> Well... that seems like a different sort of issue. That is a straight forward
> issue of whether we exist in a deterministic world, and that can't be
> nominalist-realist distinction, can it?
Even if this isn’t a deterministic world
> On Jan 30, 2017, at 9:57 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>
> But I don't think that Peirce argued that the laws/symmetries are real,
> 'independent of the objects' for wouldn't that be similar to 'logically
> prior'??. My view is that the laws are real, as general operational forces
> but they
> On Jan 30, 2017, at 10:16 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt
> wrote:
>
> What you quoted from Clark was his description of "a very nominalist
> conception of thermodynamics." By contrast, I think that Peirce quite
> clearly held (1) that the mental (psychical law) is primordial relative to
> the mater
Eric, List:
With respect to probability, I am reminded (for obvious reasons) of this
passage.
CSP: According to what has been said, the idea of probability essentially
belongs to a kind of inference which is repeated indefinitely. An
individual inference must be either true or false, and can sho
Jon, many thanks! Adding to the discussion:
Does that mean that if I told a nominalist that if I repeatedly shuffled a
> deck of cards, and then looked at the top card, there was a 1/4 *chance*
> of drawing a heart, they would say I was talking gibberish?
>
>
JAS: Probably not; but once you have
Edwina, List:
I am not pointing out our differences to *you*, I am pointing them out
to *others
*reading along, especially any newcomers like Eric who are presumably not
familiar with our past discussions.
Regarding #1, I do not know what you mean by "primoridal determinism." I
was simply alludin
JAS: Yes, I disagree, strongly, with point #1, which seems to me to be
primordial determinism and I've no idea why you need to, again, point out our
differences to me.
As for point #2, of course the reality of laws can't be reduced to their
existences; that would be akin to reducing Thirdness
Eric, List:
Responses inserted below.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Mon, Jan 30, 2017 at 10:14 AM, Eric Charles wrote:
> Jon,
> As I understand you,
John,
That first bit - on *ontological misogyny*, etc. - is fascinating and
clever! As a skewering of Quine et al, it seems to work well.
However, for the purposes of this discussion, it might be a bit of a bait
and switch.
Let us assume our antagonist is a misogynist, and that he will set it upo
Jon,
As I understand you, a nominalist would say that "possibilities" are not
part of "real" and that "habit/law" is not part of "real".
Does that mean that if I told a nominalist that if I repeatedly shuffled a
deck of cards, and then looked at the top card, there was a 1/4 *chance* of
drawing a
Edwina, List:
What you quoted from Clark was his description of "a very nominalist
conception of thermodynamics." By contrast, I think that Peirce quite
clearly held (1) that the mental (psychical law) is primordial relative to
the material (physical laws), and (2) that the *reality *of laws (as
Peircers,
Speaking of continua, I lost a week of continuity to travel and another
to some bug that I picked up in transit — Michigan is a harsh mistress,
especially in some of her seasonal affections, and she exacted full
retribution on me for my dalliance in southerly latitudes.
I started this
Clark, you wrote:
"So you don’t need the idea of laws logically prior to the objects to make
sense of them. Just properties inherent to the objects. (There’d still be an
ontological question about some of these properties like overlap and
interactions of course — but in theory you could argue t
List:
> On Jan 17, 2017, at 5:32 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
>
> But extending the dualism, even dichotomy of "ontology" and "epistemology" to
> Aristotle is not just a (big) bone, but a grave misrepresentation.
>
> This distinction is a modern one. - Still going strong, in spite of all
> On Jan 29, 2017, at 12:57 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
> wrote:
>
> I would not call it a "force," but I agree that the traditional debate is
> about whether there is something real (hence "realism") that all rabbits have
> in common to make them rabbits vs. "rabbits" merely being a name (hence
>
> On Jan 27, 2017, at 4:19 PM, Eric Charles
> wrote:
>
> I must admit that I find much of the recent discussion baffling. In part,
> this is because I have never had anyone explain the Nominalism-Realism
> distinction in a way that made sense to me. Don't get me wrong, I think I
> understand
Hello Mara, List,
I have a background in and regularly teach courses on Constitutional Law with a
focus on the interpretation of the 14th in the context of American history. In
class, I help the students trace the development of the conception of justice
as it applies to the legal rights and ob
Sorry, ignore that last message,
I hit send by accident in the
middle of drafting a post.
Jon
--
academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_
Edwinia:
Your horrendous mis-representation of the meaning of my sentence kills all
desire to explore this issue.
Cheers
Jerry
> On Jan 29, 2017, at 5:13 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>
> Jerry Chandler - calm down. You are evading the issue, which is, that you
> claimed that 'many, if no
Splicing 3 Threads:
JAS: https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-01/msg00013.html
JA: https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-01/msg00055.html
JA: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Doctrine_Of_Individuals
JA: https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-01/msg00058.html
John C, John S, List,
Kant's lectures on logic and his remarks in the three Critiques make it clear
that he recognizes and appreciates inference to hypothesis and inference by
induction as forms of argument that are different in kind from deductive
inferences such as demonstrative reasoning.
I
Quite, John. I could have been more clear about that, but composing posts on my
phone is tedious, and I kept it short.
John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier
> -Original Message-
> From: John F Sowa
John C and Edwina,
JC
Nominalism is a weaker hypothesis than Realism, so if something is
consistent with realism, then it is consistent with nominalism. Locke,
for example, distinguished between the nominal essence and the real
essence. The former tells us what we think something is like, while
John, I see your point, but I consider the shift to nominalism far more
important than is suggested by its being a 'weaker hypothesis than Realism'.
My view is that the shift to nominalism was a huge 'tectonic' transformation in
western society, actually admitting, allowing that the 'common man
Jerry, List,
Nominalism is a weaker hypothesis than Realism, so if something is consistent
with realism, then it is consistent with nominalism. Locked, for example,
distinguished between the nominal essence and the real essence. The former
tells us what we think something is like, while the lat
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