Jon, list,
You wrote: "Still, there seems to be a sense in which the If is the genuine
Interpretant, the Id is the degenerate Interpretant, and the Ii is the
doubly degenerate Interpretant."
I thought that was just what I was suggesting. At least that was what I
meant. so that if that didn't
Jeff, List:
In your example, *semiosis *does not occur unless and until the Sign *actually
*determines an Interpretant. Suppose that a human sees the ripples on the
water and thinks, "The wind is blowing from the north." How can an Index
(Existent) produce such a thought-Sign (Necessitant) as
Gary R., List:
If there is involution among the three Interpretants, it would be in the
opposite order from what you suggested--the If involves the Id, which
involves the Ii. However, I think of involution as something that
proceeds *across
*each trichotomy, such that a Necessitant involves an
Jeff, Helmut, Edwina, list,
Jeff wrote:
Consider an example. When the wind blows across the lake, the ripples on
the water are an index of the direction of the wind. The ripples on the
water are an indexical sinsign even if these particular ripples have not
yet really been so
Gary, Jeffrey, list,
Uh, that is very complicated. Thank you. So I reduce what I was saying as follows:
In both the relations sign-object and sign-interpretant I have observed, that determination goes in the opposite direction than something else, respectively: Between sign and object it
I have a different view of your example of the wind and the water. I don’t
accept that there has to be a human mind to interpret the interaction.
Therefore, I consider the interaction to be a semiosic triadic interaction.
I consider the wind and the water, as existential entities in dialogue
Helmut, list,
Well, there's been a great deal of discussion among semioticians over the
years as to what exactly Peirce meant by "determines" in his saying that
the object determines the sign which in turn determines the interpretant
sign. When I say "discussion" I mean at times downright
Gary, list,
"Push-pull" is quite a crude metaphor, ok. But I don´t understand how "placing of constraints or conditions" and "using certain features (...) to generate and shape our understanding" is not causal.
Best, Helmut
04. April 2018 um 22:14 Uhr
"Gary Richmond"
Helmut, list,
Peirce's term "determination" as used in his semeiotics does not concern
any causal or generative interaction, certainly no push/pull sort of thing.
As the second quotation below puts it: "this determination is not
determination in any causal sense."
Here *determination* is
List,
Trying to make myself a concept of "determination", I am thinking: Is it a part of a dyadic interaction? And, if the three sign parts S,O,I have dyadic interactions, I guess these are results of a projective reduction, which is possible (Jon Awbrey), in contrast to a compositional (real)
Jon S, list,
A question for the sake of clarity.
Preceding your list of the 10 orders of determination you wrote:
JAS: "In summary, I now believe that the complete order of determination--
*the **logical sequence of the semiotic Correlates and their Relations, not
necessarily their temporal**
Dear list,
*"Examples are the go-cart of judgments."*
To wit,
*Perhaps a concrete example would help clarify all of this.*
With best wishes,
Jerry R
On Wed, Apr 4, 2018 at 12:46 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
wrote:
> Jeff, List:
>
> Regarding your first
Jeff, List:
Regarding your first reconstruction (#1-#3), I do not think that Peirce
ever deviated from the basic principle that the Object determines the Sign,
which determines the Interpretant, such that the Object determines the
Interpretant via the mediation of the Sign. The later taxonomies
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