Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

sociate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > > > From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > Sent: Thursday, March 9, 2017 1:06 PM > To: Jerry LR Chandler > Cc: Peirce List > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

On 3/10/2017 8:57 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: By contrast, Peirce's realism recognizes that "correspondence, coherence, consensus, and instrumental reliability are all essential and constitutive elements of truth--none is any more fundamental than the others. Moreover, each of these elements of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

> On Mar 10, 2017, at 6:57 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > In chapter 8 of Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism, Paul Forster > argues--convincingly, I think--that the different "theories of truth" are > competitors only within a nominalist epistemology and

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

Clark, Jeff, List: In chapter 8 of *Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism*, Paul Forster argues--convincingly, I think--that the different "theories of truth" are competitors only within a nominalist epistemology and metaphysics. By contrast, Peirce's realism recognizes that "correspondence,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

List: In her book, Charles Peirces’s Pragmatic Pluralism, Rosenthal states: … the literature on Peirce contains “no fewer than thirteen distinct interpretations of Peirce’s views on the nature of truth”, attributing the account to Robert Almeder. She apparently intends contrast CSP’s

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

Jerry, Clark, list, In my response to Jeff B.D., I was defending the claim that board games are versions of mathematics. But I definitely do *not* restrict math to board games or to set-theoretic models. Jerry Many mathematicians reject set theory as a foundation for mathematics Yes. Peirce

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

;goldst...@adelphi.edu<mailto:goldst...@adelphi.edu>>; Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>>; Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen <ahti-veikko.pietari...@helsinki.fi<mailto:ahti-veikko.pietari...@helsinki.fi>>; John F Sowa <s...@bestw

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

PM > To: Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > Cc: Benjamin Udell <baud...@gmail.com>; Frederik Stjernfelt > <stj...@hum.ku.dk>; Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>; Jeffrey > Goldstein <goldst...@adelphi.edu>; Jon Alan Schmidt > <jonalansch

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

ohn F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points. List, John: I’m rather pressed for time so only brief responses to your highly provocative post. Clearly, your philosophy of mathematics is pretty main stream relative to mi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

> On Mar 7, 2017, at 9:10 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > On 3/7/2017 3:19 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: >> pure mathematics starts from a set of hypotheses of a particular sort, >> and it does not seem obvious to me that these games are grounded >> on such hypotheses. > > More

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

List, John: I’m rather pressed for time so only brief responses to your highly provocative post. Clearly, your philosophy of mathematics is pretty main stream relative to mine. But this is neither the time nor the place to develop these critical differences. My post was aimed directly at

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

On 3/8/2017 12:10 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: I'm trying to interpret Peirce's remarks about the importance of stating the mathematical hypotheses of a system precisely for the purpose of drawing conclusions with exactitude. I certainly agree. And the point I was trying to make is that

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

irce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points. On 3/7/2017 3:19 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: > pure mathematics starts from a set of hypotheses of a particular sort, > and it does not seem obvious to me that these games

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

On 3/7/2017 3:19 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: pure mathematics starts from a set of hypotheses of a particular sort, and it does not seem obvious to me that these games are grounded on such hypotheses. More precisely, pure mathematics starts with axioms and definitions. A hypothesis is a

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

y LR Chandler; Peirce List; John F Sowa > *Cc:* Benjamin Udell; Frederik Stjernfelt; Jeffrey Brian Downard; Jeffrey > Goldstein; Jon Alan Schmidt; Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen > *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and > Boscovich points. > > &

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

bor...@primus.ca> Sent: Tuesday, March 7, 2017 8:54 AM To: Jerry LR Chandler; Peirce List; John F Sowa Cc: Benjamin Udell; Frederik Stjernfelt; Jeffrey Brian Downard; Jeffrey Goldstein; Jon Alan Schmidt; Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Cont

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; } John Sowa - very nice outline of 'thinking', which is, as you say, diagrammatic. And as you say, independent of any language or notation. The ability of the human species to 'symbolize', i.e., to transform that

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

Jerry, We already have a universal foundation for logic. It's called "Peirce's semiotic". JLRC the mathematics of the continuous can not be the same as the mathematics of the discrete. Nor can the mathematics of the discrete become the mathematics of the continuous. They are all subsets of

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

    Supplement: Is there a crisis of systems theory, like I am feeling? If so, I have the hunch, that the reason for that is the blunt "Network" metaphor, whose wide use blocks the inquiry about structures, scales, continuity, processes, and so on. I feel, that the "Network" concept is normative

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

List, I guess it might help to talk about time (and space) scales now, and about systems hierarchies with the sytems having different time (and space) scales. I think that synechism is connected to (Peircean) monism. Eg. the dualism of mind and matter: Matter is effete mind. "Effete" is an

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

List, John: > On Mar 3, 2017, at 1:37 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > I am having a hard time following your thought process here, Yes, you certainly do. And, I can identify several conjectures why this is the case. At the top of the list of conjectures are the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

Jerry, Jon S, list, Jerry, you wrote, In MS 647, he compares a fact with "a chemical principle extracted therefrom by the power of Thought;” That is, the notion of a fact is in the past tense. It is completed and has an identity. It is no longer is question about the nature of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

Jerry C., LIst: Peirce makes it very clear elsewhere (and repeatedly) that a *true *continuum does not contain *any *points or other definite, indivisible parts. He defines it as that which has *indefinite *parts, all of which have parts of the same kind, such that it is *undivided* yet

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

List, Ben: Your recent posts contribute to a rather curious insight into CSP’s beliefs about the relationships between mathematics, chemistry and logic of scientific hypotheses. > On Mar 2, 2017, at 10:58 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > from MS 647 (1910) which appeared in

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real

Jon, Charles, List, Jon wrote: Where exactly did Peirce say "that truth cannot be known by means of signs"? I don't believe that Peirce ever did say anything of the sort. It seems to me that what Charles may be claiming is that since the sheet of assertion represents TRUTH, than that and that

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real

Charles, Gary R., List: Where exactly did Peirce say "that truth cannot be known by means of signs"? If all thought is in signs, as Peirce clearly held, then this would seem to entail that truth cannot be known at all. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real

Charles, List, You wrote: In his diagrammatic logic Peirce posited the sheet of assertions as the fundamental ground of semiosis. He called the sheet of assertion TRUTH (in caps). It is represented by the unmarked space that is there prior to and in which cuts are inscribed, a cut being the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real

Jon S., list, By jove, I think you've got it. I've just added it as a reference at the Synechism wiki https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synechism#Hypotheses . - Best, Ben On 3/2/2017 3:09 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: Clark, List: CG: Yes, if there were a late quote along those lines that

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real

Clark, List: CG: Yes, if there were a late quote along those lines that would have answered my question directly. I suspect though that is just someone assuming it’s merely regulative. How about this one, from Peirce's definition of "synechism" in Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real

"To go further than this, and try to establish abstract laws of greatness and superiority, *is to argue without an object*; in practical life, particular facts count more than generalizations. Enough has now been said about these questions of possibility and the reverse, of past or future fact,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real

> On Mar 2, 2017, at 9:58 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > In the Wikipedia article "Synechism," somebody wrote, without providing a > reference, "The fact that some things are ultimate may be recognized by the > synechist without abandoning his standpoint, since synechism is